The same difference: a comparative analysis of Dutch aid channels to India by Schulpen, L.W.M.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/146420
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-05 and may be subject to
change.
NICCOS 
Lau Schulpen 
Nijmegen Studies 
i n 
III 
Development 
and 
Cultural Change 
The Same 
Difference 
A comparative analysis of Dutch 
aid channels to India 

Nijmegen Studies in Development 
and Cultural Change 
ISSN 0935-7173 
Published by 
Nijmeegs Instituut voor Comparatieve 
Cultuur- en Ontwikkelingsstudies 
(NICCOS) 
Nijmegen Studies in Development 
and Cultural Change 
Board of editors: 
J. M. G. Kleinpenning (Editor in Chief) (Catholic University, Nijmegen) 
J. Breman (University of Amsterdam) 
H. Hoetink (University of Utrecht) 
G. Huizer (Catholic University, Nijmegen) 
Mrs. W. Jansen (Catholic University, Nijmegen) 
R. Peters (University of Amsterdam) 
A. de Ruijter (University of Utrecht) 
W. G. Wolters (Catholic University, Nijmegen) 
E. J. Zürcher (University of Leiden) 
Verlag für Entwicklungspolitik Saarbrücken GmbH 
Auf der Adt 14 · D-66130 Saarbrücken/Germany 
Tel. (0 68 93) 98 60 94 · Fax 98 60 95 · eMail: vfesbr@aol.com 
THE SAME DIFFERENCE 
A comparative analysis of Dutch 
aid channels to India 
Een wetenschappelijke proeve op het gebied van 
de Sociale Wetenschappen 
PROEFSCHRIFT 
ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de 
Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen, volgens besluit van 
het College van Decanen in het openbaar te 
verdedigen op dinsdag 16 september 1997 
des namiddags om 1.30 uur precies 
door 
Laurens Wilhelmus Marie Schulpen 
geboren op 14 november 1961 
te Susteren 
Promotor: 
Prof. dr. G. Huizer 
Co-promotor: 
Dr. P. Hoebink 
Manuscriptcommissie: 
Prof. dr. J.M.G. Kleinpenning, voorzitter 
Prof. dr. E. Hommes (TUT) 
Prof. dr. W. Tims (VU) 
Acknowledgements 
My colleague Francien van Driel already noted in her PhD thesis that 
writing a dissertation is usually a lonesome job. She also notes that she 
was for the most part not alone at all. Although we certainly do not 
agree on everything, I have to agree with her on this point. There have 
only been a few periods in the last years in which I thought of myself as 
'Remy.' Most of the time there were simply too many people around 
with whom to discuss my work (and my life) to feel even remotely 
lonely. As most who have reached the phase of writing the acknow-
ledgements to their thesis, I have to admit that it is simply impossible to 
mention everybody who has — knowingly or unknowingly - contributed 
to this book. My apologies, thus, for not explicitly mentioning many, 
many people. 
In the Netherlands, I would like to thank Paul Hoebink, Fons van der 
Velden and Berry Roelofs who as members of my 'reader group' com-
mented upon practically every word I wrote. Without their dedication 
and inspiration, the finalisation of this thesis would have lasted even 
longer. Paul Hoebink also provided numerous articles, books and com-
ments which enlarged the number of footnotes although the quantity 
which he himself reached in his own thesis is not even approximated 
here. Thanks are also due to my colleagues at the Third World 
Centre/Development Studies at the University of Nijmegen for their 
open ears on matters relating directly, indirectly, or not at all to this 
study: Prof. Gerrit Huizer, Francien van Driel, Frans Schuurman, Detlev 
Haude, Luuk Knippenberg, Jaco Appelman, Wilbert Kruysen, Hans 
Siebers and Rietje van Dalen-Meijer. At DGIS, I would like to particu-
larly mention Ton van Zeeland, the staff of the former DAL/ZZ and the 
staff of the library where I was made to feel at home between stacks of 
dossiers. At ICCO, special thanks are due to the staff of the (former) 
India desk: Bram van Leeuwen, Aad van der Meer, Peter Goedhart, 
Maria Verhoeven, Nelleke van Vleuten, Berry Roelofs, Fons van der 
Velden and Julia van Doom. Thanks must also certainly be said to some 
special friends who have guided me through an exciting period in my 
personal and professional life: Sandra, Winnie, Paula, Pieter, Kees and 
Anetta. Finally, thanks to Lee Ann Weeks for reading and correcting the 
English. 
In India many thanks must be said to all the people in the many 
villages across the districts in Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Orissa and 
West Bengal. These people invited me into their homes and endured my 
endless questions. Without their selfless contribution, this thesis simply 
could not have been written. Thanks are also due to all the staff mem-
vi The same difference 
bers at the NGDOs and DGIS projects for their positive and constructive 
cooperation. I do hope they enjoyed working together as much as I did. 
At the Dutch embassy, I would like to thank all the staff who set time 
aside for me and in particular Peter Rik and Jan van der Laan for then-
friendship and dedication. Finally, I would like to say thanks to all the 
staff of the numerous government departments which were also involved 
in my study. 
I dedicate this thesis to my father, Gerard Schulpen, who did not live 
to see his children reach some major milestones in their lives. 
Contents 
Acknowledgements ν 
Contents vii 
List of figures, tables, boxes and annexes χ 
Abbreviations xii 
Introduction 1 
1 Aid, poverty and participation 9 
1.1 Aid: alternatives within modernisation 10 
1.1.1 The grounding of modernisation 11 
1.1.2 A time for reformism 14 
1.1.3 The lost years of stabilization 20 
1.1.4 The second reformist period 23 
1.2 Three central concepts 25 
1.2.1 Poverty and poverty alleviation 28 
1.2.2 Participation and empowerment 32 
1.2.3 Non-governmental development organisations (NGDOs) 37 
1.3 Conclusions 41 
2 Dutch bilateral aid to India 43 
2.1 Dutch bilateral development aid 43 
2.2 The India policy of DGIS 50 
2.2.1 Up to 1973: Dutch economic interests and India 50 
2.2.2 1974-1984: Poverty alleviation, concentration 
and broadening 52 
2.2.3 1985-1992: Consolidation of the aid programme 56 
2.3 DGIS: Outcome of the policy 60 
2.3.1 The regular programme 61 
2.3.2 Sector-wise distribution of disbursements 66 
2.3.3 Poverty alleviation and economic self-reliance 68 
2.3.4 State-wise distribution of disbursements 71 
2.3.5 ... and NGDOs 72 
2.4 DGIS in India: policy evaluation 73 
viii The same difference 
3 ICCO's aid to India 79 
3.1 The Co-financing programme 79 
3.1.1 1965-1974: The starting years 79 
3.1.2 1974-1980: Years of struggle 81 
3.1.3 1980-1994: Consolidation and change 83 
3.2 The policy of the ICCO India desk 87 
3.2.1 1971-1976 and 1977-1983: The India experiment 87 
3.2.2 1984-1990 and 1991-1992: Reflection and tuning 92 
3.3 ICCO in India: Outcome of the policy 95 
3.3.1 Projects/programmes in India 96 
3.3.2 The ICCO counterparts 104 
3.3.3 Growth of ICCO counterparts 108 
3.4 ICCO in India: Policy evaluation 110 
4 Drinking water & sanitation 115 
4.1 India: problems, policy and achievements 116 
4.1.1 Problems and policy 117 
4.1.2 Programmes and achievements 119 
4.2 Sector policies: DGIS and ICCO 121 
4.2.1 DGIS sector policy on water and sanitation 121 
4.2.2 DGIS policy and programmes in India 123 
4.2.3 ICCO policy on water and sanitation 125 
4.2.4 ICCO policy and programmes in India 126 
4.3 Projects of DGIS and ICCO in India 128 
4.3.1 Andhra Pradesh / Darsi scheme 129 
4.3.2 Uttar Pradesh / SP-III and SP-V 140 
4.3.2.1 SP-III 141 
4.3.2.2 SP-V 146 
4.3.3 Uttar Pradesh / SP-VI 153 
4.3.4 Kassar Trust 163 
4.3.5 Youth Charitable Organisation 172 
4.4 Drinking water and sanitation: A comparative evaluation 180 
5 Irrigation 189 
5.1 India: problems, policy and achievements 190 
5.1.1 Problems and policy 192 
5.1.2 Programmes and achievements 194 
5.2 Sector policies: DGIS and ICCO 197 
Contents ix 
5.2.1 DGIS policy on irrigation 197 
5.2.2 DGIS policy and programmes in India 198 
5.2.3 ICCO policy on irrigation 200 
5.2.4 ICCO policy and programmes in India 201 
5.3 Projects of DGIS and ICCO in India 203 
5.3.1 Uttar Pradesh Tubewell Project 204 
5.3.2 North Bengal Terai Project 216 
5.3.3 Centre for Rural Development 228 
5.3.4 Two other ICCO counterparts 239 
5.3.4.1 Rural Development Trust 239 
5.3.4.2 Action for Integrated Rural Development Society 244 
5.4 Irrigation: a comparative evaluation 247 
6 Conclusions 255 
Notes 
Introduction 272 
Chapter 1 273 
Chapter 2 291 
Chapter 3 311 
Chapter 4 324 
Chapter 5 351 
Chapter 6 378 
Annexes 379 
Bibliography 401 
Dutch summary 422 
Curriculum Vitae 429 
List of figures, tables, boxes and annexes 
Figures 
1.1 Net-ODA per capita per HDI-category (in US$) 18 
1.2 Net-ODA per capita per income group (in US$) 19 
1.3 Bilateral aid commitments per sector (in %) 26 
1.4 Bilateral aid commitments per dimension 27 
2.1 Percentage distribution for disbursements devoted to poverty 
alleviation versus economic self-reliance (1974-1992) 69 
2.2 Percentage of total disbursements under project aid per state 
since 1980 71 
3.1 Number of projects sanctioned (per year) 97 
3.2 ICCO contribution per state (1971-1992) 99 
3.2.1 SP-contribution per state (1971-1992) 99 
3.2.2 Own contribution per state (1971-1992) 99 
3.2.3 Other donors per state (1971-1992) 99 
3.2.4 Total costs per state (1971-1992) 99 
3.3 General financial data regarding the projects approved 
by ICCO in India, per programme year (x Dfl. million) 101 
5.1 Characteristics of major, medium and minor irrigation 191 
Tables 
1 Initial selection of projects (DGIS) and organisations (ICCO) 5 
2.1 Gross disbursements under the regular programme 
(in Dfl. million) 64 
3.1 Priorities as formulated in 1976, 1984, 1990 and 1993 
for India (compilation) 88 
3.2 ICCO projects per sector (as % of total) 103 
3.3 Number of projects sanctioned per year with number of 
(new) NGDOs (1971-1992) 105 
3.4 ICCO- and SP-contribution per group of NGDOs (N=276) 
for the period 1971-1992 106 
3.5 ICCO contribution per identity organisation 1971-1992 
(as % of total) 107 
Boxes 
1.1 Aid disbursements per GNP and HDI category 18 
1.2 Aid commitments per sector 26 
2.1 Official development aid to India 62 
List of figures, tables, boxes and annexes xi 
2.2 Disbursement problems: Some examples 65 
3.1 The four co-financing organisations 82 
4.1 Problems and issues in drinking water supply and sanitation 116 
4.2 Characteristics of water use and sanitation in India 118 
4.3 Piped water scheme in Govindapalem village 175 
5.1 Irrigation in India 190 
5.2 Minor irrigation facilities in the North Bengal Terai project 218 
Annexes 
1 Questionnaires ICCO counterparts India 379 
2 Socio-economic background of states and districts 391 
Table 1: States, districts and projects 
Table 2: Some basic population data on states 
and districts (rural areas) 
3 Irrigation in India 395 
Table 1: Irrigated area under different crops 
(as % of total area under crop) 
Table 2: Distribution of net area irrigated by 
sources of irrigation (in %) 
Table 3: Net irrigated area by source in selected 
states and All India (in % of total net area 
irrigated - 1986-87) 
Table 4: Targets and achievements in major/medium and 
minor irrigation potential under successive 
Five Year Plans (in million hectares) 
Table 5: Public investment (in million Rupees) and 
potential created (in million hectares) and 
utilisation thereof (in %) through Plan periods 
4 Indicators of project performance 398 
Table 1: Indicators of project performance - DGIS and ICCO 
Abbreviations 
AA 
AeA 
AFPRO 
AIC 
AIRDS 
AP 
APDDC 
APPC 
APVHA 
ARDC 
ARWSP 
ARP 
AWARE 
ВС 
вес 
BEB 
BfdW 
BHU 
BINGO 
BoP 
CA 
CAD 
CAPART 
CBS 
CEBEMO 
CEP 
CHAAP 
CIDA 
CMC 
CP 
CRD 
CRSP 
DAC 
DAL/ZZ 
DANIDA 
Action Aid 
Aide et Action 
Action for Food PROduction 
Aid India Consortium 
Action for Integrated Rural Development Society 
Andhra Pradesh 
Andhra Pradesh Dairy Development Cooperation 
Andhra Pradesh Productivity Council 
Andhra Pradesh Voluntary Health Association 
Agricultural Refinance and Development Corporation 
Accelerated Rural Water Supply Programme (also: ARP) 
see: ARWSP 
Action for Welfare and Awakening in Rural Environment 
Backward Castes 
Block Coordination Committee 
Bureau Economische Betrekkingen (Directorate General 
for Foreign Economic Relations - Dutch Ministry of 
Economic Affairs) 
Brot für die Welt (Bread for the World) 
Benares Hindu University 
Big Non-Governmental Organisation 
Balance of Payment 
Christian Aid 
Command Area Development 
Council for Advancement of People's Action and Rural 
Technology 
Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (Central Büro of Statis-
tics) 
Katholieke Organisatie voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking 
(Catholic Organisation for Development Cooperation) 
Community Education Programme 
Catholic Health Association of Andhra Pradesh 
Canadian Institute for Development Assistance 
Central Mission Commissioner's Office 
Community Participation 
Centre for Rural Development 
Central Rural Sanitation Programme 
Development Assistance Committee 
(former) South-Asia desk of DGIS 
Danish International Development Agency 
Abbreviations xiii 
DCC 
Dfl. 
DGIS 
DHV 
DM 
DMU 
DPAP 
DTH 
DTW 
DWCRA 
ECP 
ETC 
EZE 
EU 
Euroconsult 
EWE 
FAO 
FPU 
GNP 
GoAP 
Gol 
GOM 
GoN 
GoUP 
GoWB 
GLSR 
HDI 
HIVOS 
HSL 
HTW 
IBRD 
ICCO 
IDA 
IDTP 
IDC-
District Coordination Committee 
Dutch Guilders 
Directoraat-Generaal Internationale Samenwerking (Direc-
torate-General International Cooperation) 
Dutch consultant 
District Magistrate 
Direction and Monitoring Unit 
Drought Prone Areas Programmes 
Directoraat Technische Hulp (Directorate International 
Technical aid) 
Deep Tube Well 
Development of Women and Children in Rural Areas 
Expanded Base of Community Participation 
Dutch consultant 
Evangelische Zentralstelle für Entwicklungshilfe 
European Union 
Dutch consultant 
Education for Women's Equality 
Food and Agriculture Organisation 
Farmers Participation Unit 
Gross National Product 
Government of Andhra Pradesh 
Government of India 
Gemeenschappelijk Overleg Medefinanciering (Common 
Consultation Co-financing) 
Government of the Netherlands 
Government of Uttar Pradesh 
Government of West Bengal 
Ground Level Service Reservoir 
Human Development Index 
Humanistisch Instituut voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking 
(Humanistic Institute for Development Cooperation) 
Householf Sanitary Latrine 
Hand Tube Well 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
Interkerkelijke Organisatie voor Ontwikkelingssamenwer-
king (Inter Church Organisation for Development Cooper-
ation) 
International Development Association 
Indo-Dutch Tubewell Project (also see: UPSTP) 
Indo-Dutch Cooperation-
xiv The same difference 
IDWSSD International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation De­
cade 
IF AD International Fund for Agricultural Development 
IOV Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking te Velde (evalu­
ation unit of DGIS) 
ILO International Labour Organisation 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
IMV Intensive Mobilisation Village 
IPM Institute for Preventive Medicine 
IRC International Water and Sanitation Centre 
IRDP Integrated Rural Development Programme 
IREDA Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency Limited 
ISI Import-Substituting Industrialisation 
KT Kassar Trust 
LCF Local Cost Financing 
LIW Landelijke India Werkgroep (India Committee of the 
Netherlands) 
MAC Monitoring and Appraisal Unit 
MFO Medefinancieringsorganisatie (Co-financing Organisation) 
MFP Medefinancieringsprogramma (Co-financing Programme) 
MLA Member of Legislative Assembly 
MNP Minimum Needs Programme 
NAB ARD National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development 
NAP Netherlands Assisted Project 
NAPO Netherlands Assisted Project Office 
NAPSO Netherlands Assisted Project Support Office (also: NAPO 
or NAPSU) 
NAPSU Netherlands Assisted Project Support Unit (also: NAPO or 
NAPSO) 
NAR Nationale Adviesraad voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking 
(National Advisory Council for Development Cooperation) 
NBTDP North Bengal Terai Development Project (DGIS-project) 
NDWM National Drinking Water Mission (also: Technology 
Mission) 
NGDO Non-Govemmental Development Organisation 
NGO Non-Govemmental Organisation 
ΝΙΟ Nationale Investeringsbank voor Ontwikkelingslanden 
(National Investment Bank for Development Countries) 
NOVIB Nederlandse Organisatie voor Internationale Ontwikke­
lingssamenwerking (Netherlands Organisation for Interna­
tional Development Cooperation) 
Abbreviations xv 
NREP 
OC 
ODA 
ODF 
ODI 
OECD 
OHSR 
OKMKP 
OOF 
ORET 
O&M 
PAP 
PAR 
PDW 
PFM 
PPP 
PR 
PRED 
PSU 
PV 
R&D 
RDT 
RLI 
RNE 
Rs. 
RWS/S 
SAL 
SEW 
SC 
SI 
SP 
SP-III/VI 
SSL 
ST 
STW 
TMC 
TRYSEM 
T&V 
UN 
National Rural Employment Programme 
Other Castes 
Official Development Assistence 
Official Development Finance 
Overseas Development Institute 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
Overhead Service Reservoir 
Orissa Khet Mazdoor Kisan Parishad 
Other Official Flows 
Ontwikkelings Relevante Export Transacties (Develop-
ment-Related Export Transactions Programme) 
Operation and Maintenance 
Poverty Alleviation Programme 
Participatory Action Research 
Pump Dug Well 
Programma Financierings Model (Programme Financing 
Model) 
People's Participation Programme 
Panchayat Raj 
Panchyat Raj Engineering Department 
Programme Support Unit 
Problem Village 
Research & Development 
Rural Development Trust 
River Lift Irrigation 
Royal Netherlands Embassy 
(Indian) Rupees 
Rural Water Supply/Sanitation 
Structural Adjustment Loan 
Social Extension Wing 
Scheduled Castes 
Sulabh International 
Special Programme (ICCO source of funds) 
Sub-Project III/VI 
School Sanitary Latrine 
Scheduled Tribes 
Shallow Tube Well 
Tubewell Management Committee 
Training of Rural Youth for Self-Employment 
Training and Visit 
United Nations 
xvi The same difference 
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade And Development 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
UNICEF United Nations International Children and Education Fund 
UP Uttar Pradesh 
UPDESCO Uttar Pradesh Development Systems Corporation 
UPJN Uttar Pradesh Jal Nigam 
UPSTP Uttar Pradesh State Tubewell Project 
VAC Village Action Committee 
VLOM Village Level Operation and Maintenance 
VWSP Village Water Supply Programme 
WACO Water Coordinator (Royal Netherlands Embassy New 
Delhi) 
WB West Bengal 
WHO World Health Organisation 
YCO Youth Charitable Organisation 
Introduction 
At the end of the 1980s, Dutch bilateral aid was heavily criticised for 
inefficiency (due to, among other things, spending pressures and lack of 
staff), insufficient attention to the proper preparation and monitoring of 
projects and programmes, strong links to Dutch business and generally 
low impact in the field of poverty alleviation.1 The discussion of Dutch 
bilateral aid which became known as the 'quality discussion' cannot be 
separated from renewed attention to such themes as poverty alleviation. 
The quality discussion was not restricted to bilateral aid, and the co-
financing organisations were also increasingly criticised. In effect, the 
'closed-door policy' followed by the four Dutch co-financing organisati-
ons (MFOs) CEBEMO, HIVOS, ICCO and NOVIB up to then showed 
signs of indefensibility. The MFOs were reviewed as performing no 
better than bilateral aid with regard to poverty alleviation, as not being 
able to reach the poorest of the poor and as being focused on their own 
survival.2 The MFOs were pressed to provide insight into their work, to 
substantiate their claims of being the perfect channel for development 
cooperation and to show they deserve the millions in tax money recei-
ved each year. The public quality debate dwindled to a debate among a 
few professionally interested individuals and organisations by the mid 
1990s with only a few empirical studies published with regard to the 
work of the MFOs in the meantime. 
Objectives and methodology 
The present study was set up in the early 1990s in order to (1) provide 
additional scientific data on private development aid as implemented by 
the MFOs and (2) contribute to the quality debate in the Netherlands by 
comparing the effectiveness of MFO projects and bilateral projects. The 
policy and effectiveness of two aid channels (bilateral aid and private 
aid) are compared in light of the central objective of (sustainable) 
poverty alleviation. The starting assumption was that the co-financing 
programme (i.e., the MFOs) would be more effective and reach its 
2 The same difference 
objectives better than the bilateral-aid programme because the former 
follows a more participatory method: the MFOs work not only for but 
also with the poor. It is exactly the shared objective of sustainable 
poverty alleviation which makes the two channels comparable despite 
obvious differences in scale, counterparts and strategy. Over the years, 
the MFOs in the Netherlands have fallen under bilateral development 
policy. As such and despite the greater degree of authority of MFOs 
over their own programmes, they still form part of the structure of 
Dutch bilateral aid. 
It was impossible to compare Dutch bilateral aid with the assistance 
from all four MFOs. One of the MFOs was therefore selected: the Inter 
Church Organisation for Development Cooperation (ICCO). This was 
not only because of the familiarity of the author with this MFO but also 
because an Impact Study conducted in 1991 did not find significant 
differences between the four MFOs as far as their project activities.3 
The MFOs all have the financing of the development activities and pro-
grammes of NGDOs in developing countries as their main task. 
The research was further restricted to one country: India. This 
country was chosen primarily because it is one of the concentration/pro-
gramme countries of DGIS and at the same time the most important 
country (quantity-wise) for ICCO. Both DGIS and ICCO also have 
extended experience with the financing of development activities in 
India which provides substantial possibilities for comparison. 
As a final restriction on the present research, only activities in the 
field of drinking water supply/sanitation and irrigation were considered. 
The choice of these two sectors was determined by the fact that ICCO 
has no programme- or budget-support activities comparable to DGIS and 
only projects could therefore be compared. The projects should be aimed 
at direct poverty alleviation and the activities of DGIS in direct poverty 
alleviation are largely restricted to these two sectors. 
According to the OECD,4 evaluation is 'an assessment, as systematic 
and objective as possible, of an ongoing or completed project or pro-
gramme or policy, its design, implementation and results. The aim is to 
determine the relevance and fulfilment of objectives, developmental 
efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability.' This definition 
implies four types of evaluation: (1) policy, (2) effectiveness, (3) effi-
ciency and (4) impact (or external effectiveness).5 Policy evaluation 
principally concerns the coordination and fine-tuning of objectives and 
is, as such, concerned with consistency. The question is whether the 
targets and aims of the development activities can be related to the 
objectives formulated in the policy.6 In Chapters 2 and 3 on DGIS and 
Introduction 3 
ICCO in India, respectively, such policy evaluation will be undertaken. 
In addition to policy consistency, attention will also be paid to (1) prio-
ritisation within the India policies of DGIS and ICCO, with special 
attention to the concentration efforts (e.g., state-wise, target-group-wise, 
sector-wise) and (2) the extent to which allocations for specific activities 
can be related to formulated priorities. 
In addition to policy evaluation, evaluation at the level of implemen-
tation will also be undertaken. Effectiveness (the extent to which the 
programme/project attains its objectives), efficiency (fine-tuning of 
means and targets) and impact (the wider effects of the project or activi-
ty) are all important at this level. The most important indicator and thus 
tool for comparison of the two aid channels is formed by (1) participati-
on (or the extent to which activities in the area of popular participation 
are found to contribute to the attainment of project objectives). Participa-
tion is taken to be an overall indicator in the sense that it is a means as 
well as an objective and thus relevant to efficiency, effectiveness and 
impact. Efficiency further covers (2) cost-effectiveness (i.e., financial 
costs per working facility) and (3) maintenance of facilities constructed 
under the project. Effectiveness also includes (4) poverty reach (i.e., 
characteristics of the target group covered) and (5) utilisation of the 
facilities. The final criteria are (6) sustainability (i.e., the possibility to 
continue the project activity after foreign support is withdrawn) and (7) 
impact.7 In this study, impact is measured in two different manners. In 
the case of drinking water and sanitation, the perception of the target 
group with regard to particular health indicators is considered. In the 
case of irrigation projects/activities, the perception of the target group 
with regard to changes in income is considered. The evaluations at the 
levels of policy and implementation clearly identify the contributions of 
the two channels in the field of poverty alleviation and thereby make it 
possible to determine which channel is more effective in reaching its 
objective. 
Research methods 
The projects to be taken up in this research were selected on the basis of 
file reviews and interviews at DGIS and ICCO. The criteria used for this 
selection were: (1) the project had to be situated in one of the concentra-
tion states for DGIS in India and that state had to be important (policy-
wise or quantity-wise) for the ICCO programme; (2) the projects had to 
relate to drinking water (and sanitation) or irrigation as these were the 
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two sectors in which both DGIS and ICCO financed activities; and (3) 
the projects had to be financed for a longer period. The latter criterion 
meant that in the case of ICCO only projects (and thus organisations) 
were selected with which ICCO had a financial relationship over a 
longer period of time. In the case of ICCO, the second criterion proved 
to be a difficult one because the majority of the projects co-financed in 
India by this organisation are so-called integrated projects.8 In practice, 
therefore, the ICCO projects were selected mainly because a significant 
part (in terms of funds and/or attention) of the activities were dedicated 
or related to drinking water supply/sanitation and/or irrigation. 
A total of 13 DGIS and ICCO projects were selected on the basis of 
the foregoing criteria (see Table 1). Although all of the projects were 
visited during the course of my stay in India (from April to September 
1992 and from September 1993 to March 1994), not all of them were 
taken up in actual field research. This holds for the AWARE and 
UPSTP projects. In these cases, the research was restricted to interviews 
with staff members and key people not directly involved in the pro-
jects/organisations, file review and literature search. The AWARE and 
OKMKP projects were not included in the end because either the 
circumstances for thorough data collection were unfavourable (AWARE) 
or the organisation turned out to be less active than anticipated in the 
field of drinking water supply/sanitation (OKMKP). For the remaining 
projects, the field research was conducted across a period of two to five 
weeks. Here again different methods of data collection were used depen-
ding on the possibilities for assessment within the specific projects. 
These possibilities depended on the openness and willingness of the staff 
from the relevant organisations and external circumstances (e.g., electi-
ons). 
The selection of villages or communities to be considered for each of 
the projects was based on (1) the activities of the relevant organisation 
per village/ community and (2) the duration of the interaction between 
the implementing organisation and the village/community. Initial selec-
tion was made on the basis of the data collected via dossiers and inter-
views with staff members; this selection was then finalised in consulta-
tion with the implementing organisation. The villages were visited and 
members of the target group interviewed either with or without staff 
members from the implementing organisation being present. In the case 
of ICCO projects, introduction to the villages was provided by staff 
members from the implementing organisation. In the case of DGIS pro-
jects, this was also done independently on occasion. The selection of the 
Table 1 
Initial selection of projects (DGIS) and organisations (ICCO) 
7 UTTAR PRADESH 
sWEST/ 
BENQ> 
10 
ORISSA 
11 
fANDHRA PRADESH 
State RWS/S Irrigation 
DGIS 
Andhra Pradesh 
Uttar Pradesh 
West Bengal 
1 Andhra Pradesh-I 
2 Sub Project-Ill 
3 Sub-Project-V 
4 Sub-Project-VI 
5 Uttar Pradesh State Tube-
well Project 
6 North Bengal Terai Deve-
lopment Project 
ICCO 
Andhra Pradesh 7 Youth Charitable Organisa-
tion (7) 
8 Action for Welfare and 
Awakening in Rural Envi-
ronment 
11 Centre for Rural Develop-
ment 
12 Action for Integrated 
Rural Development 
Society 
13 Rural Development Trust-
/Accion Fraterna 
Uttar Pradesh 9 Kassar Trust 
Onssa 10 Onssa Khet Mazdoor 
Kisan Panshad 
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households to be interviewed was done in all cases independently and 
was mainly based on caste composition and geographical spread. 
Within the household (defined as those living under one roof and 
using one kitchen), the female and/or the male head were interviewed. 
Being a man myself and using male interpreters, the interaction with 
women was in some cases restricted, although women were certainly not 
in all cases 'unapproachable.' This latter accounted, for instance, for 
many of the NGDO projects and for the irrigation project in West 
Bengal. A comparison of the interviews held with women and men did 
not show a significant difference in the answers despite the men being 
more outspoken in many cases. The fact that I consistently had my own 
interpreter who was not connected in any way to the concerned 
organisation ensured no dependence on staff members for interaction 
with the target group. Given that the research was conducted in four 
different states, several interpreters had to be used and were selected on 
the basis of recommen-dations from universities and training institutes 
(e.g., Jawaharlal Nehru University New Delhi, National Institute for 
Rural Development in Hyderabad). 
In the main part of the present research (i.e., the project evaluations), 
both qualitative and quantitative research methods were used. In the 
Netherlands, the most important research was of a qualitative nature: file 
reviews at DGIS and ICCO and interviews with representatives from the 
India desks for both of the agencies and representatives of organisations 
involved in Dutch development aid to India (e.g., consultants, advisory 
organisations for DGIS). Particularly at DGIS, the project dossiers were 
supplemented by dossiers of a more general nature." For both donors, 
policy papers were also used to get a picture of the changes in policy 
related to aid to India. More quantitative methods were used to deter-
mine the impact of changes in development thinking on the distribution 
of aid (commitments). 
In India, file reviews constituted an important part of the research, 
most notably at the Dutch Embassy in New Delhi but also at the differ-
ent projects themselves. The actual field work consisted of interviews 
' According to Dutch law {Wet Openbaarheid Bestuur) the information derived from 
dossiers should be Objectified.' This means that the viewpoints expressed in the 
dossiers should not be reducible to specific persons. Because of this, all the informa-
tion derived from the dossiers at DGIS and the Royal Netherlands Embassy (RNE) 
are presented as 'Internal Documentation.' The same accounts for specific docu-
ments from the ICCO archives. All quotations have been translated into English by 
the author and are thus his responsibility. 
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with members of the target group for each project and took different 
forms. Structured individual (household) interviews were held in all 
cases and complemented by group interviews, group discussions and 
open individual (household) interviews. Within two ICCO projects (i.e., 
YCO and CRD), staff members from the organisation were also actively 
involved in the interviewing of members of the target group following a 
fixed questionnaire. Closed monitoring of this process and cross-check-
ing of the data by sampling contributed to the reliability of the collected 
data. The participation of the staff members in the actual research not 
only enhanced the number of people interviewed but was also con-
sidered very positive by the staff members as it provided them with the 
opportunity to question members of the target group on some specific 
points of interest. Such participation also created more room for interac-
tion with the target group (mainly via group interviews and discussions). 
Interviews and discussions were not only held with staff members but 
also board members, representatives of concerned government depart-
ments and outside informants (experts). In order to gain a more coherent 
picture of development aid to India, moreover, interviews were also held 
with bilateral donors, multilateral donors and the relevant Ministries and 
government departments in New Delhi. 
In order to shed greater light on the implementation of private devel-
opment aid by MFOs in India (the first research objective), two ques-
tionnaires were devoted to the Indian counterparts of ICCO and the 
work of ICCO in this subcontinent. The first questionnaire dealt with the 
background to the local NGDOs and the relations with ICCO, the Indian 
government and other NGDOs. The questionnaire was sent to 295 
NGDOs which had been supported by ICCO between 1971 and 1992. A 
total of 125 (42.4%) of these (former) ICCO partners returned the 
questionnaire, and 119 (40.3%) were finally used for analysis. On the 
basis of the information provided in response to the first questionnaire, a 
second questionnaire was sent to those NGDOs which reported being 
active in the fields of drinking-water supply, sanitation and/or irrigation. 
The response to this second questionnaire provided more background 
information on ICCO's involvement in these sectors (also see Annex 1). 
General outline of the study 
The study consists of two parts. In part one, development policy of 
DGIS and ICCO with regard to India is evaluated. In part two, specific 
projects financed by DGIS and ICCO in the field of drinking water 
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supply/sanitation and irrigation in India are evaluated. In Chapter 1, the 
three central concepts used in this evaluation exercise are introduced: 
poverty alleviation, participation/empowerment and Non-Govemmental 
Development Organisation (NGDOs). The emergence and evolution of 
these concepts is presented in a historical overview of the development 
strategies used since the 1950s, and thereafter the concepts are further 
specified. 
In Chapters 2 and 3, the policy evaluations of DGIS and ICCO 
respectively are presented. Within each of these chapters, a short histori-
cal sketch of the policy evolution is provided and accompanied, in the 
case of ICCO, by an overview of the emergence and maturation of the 
co-financing programme since its inception in the mid 1960s. Following 
this, the concrete policy of the relevant donor with regard to India and 
changes in this policy over time are considered. The results of the 
relevant India policy are then presented with quantitative data on, among 
other things, disbursements, commitments, sectoral distribution and state-
wise division. The two chapters are then concluded with an evaluation 
of the India policy of DGIS (Chapter 2) and ICCO (Chapter 3). 
The next two chapters are devoted to a number of drinking-water 
supply and sanitation projects (Chapter 4) and irrigation projects (Chap-
ter 5) financed by DGIS and ICCO in India. After briefly discussing the 
state of affairs with regard to these sectors in India, the relevant policies 
of the Indian government and the policies of DGIS and ICCO with 
regard to the two sectors, the specific projects are reported on. Each 
project description is divided into three parts. First a historical overview 
of the project or organisation is presented with attention to the main 
objectives, means, organisational structures and any changes. This is 
followed by the presentation of the main findings of the evaluations 
carried out in the course of this research. Specific attention is paid to the 
ways in which participation is fostered and the impact of the projects in 
terms of their objectives. In the third part of each chapter, the main con-
clusions with regard to the specific projects are presented and an initial 
comparison of the ICCO and DGIS projects is presented. 
Finally, in Chapter 6, the main conclusions to be drawn from the 
policy and project evaluations carried out in Chapters 2 through 5 are 
presented. Specific attention is paid to the central concepts introduced in 
Chapter 1 and thereby an overall picture of the impact of ICCO and 
DGIS policy and projects in India. 
1 
Aid, poverty and participation 
The core of this introductory chapter is formed by three concepts which 
have played and still play a major role in the shaping of development 
aid1 policy and practice: poverty alleviation, participation and Non-
Govemmental Development Organisations (NGDOs).2 These concepts 
will also prove to be particularly useful in our comparison of the Dutch 
bilateral and private aid channels. The first of these concepts, poverty 
alleviation, is a central objective of all aid donors. As such, poverty 
alleviation is the point of departure for this chapter and basically for the 
research underlying this aid-channel comparison study. A basic distinc-
tion should be made here between direct and indirect poverty alleviation, 
where the latter refers to the trickle down effects of aid to overall 
growth and the former to aid explicitly targeted at poverty alleviation.3 
The second central concept in this study is that of participation/em-
powerment. Attention to direct poverty alleviation has gone hand in 
hand with attention to participation. Thus, in the 1970s the trickle down 
effect was seriously questioned and attention was not only shifted to 
more direct poverty alleviation interventions but also to the involvement 
of people in the shaping, implementation and evaluation of these inter-
ventions. Important here is a differentiation between participation as a 
means and participation as an end. Whereas in the 1970s and the larger 
part of the 1980s, participation was mainly seen as a means of creating 
more sustainable development projects which would at the same time 
benefit the poor, the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s 
saw a move towards participation as an end in itself. The notion of 
empowerment — a phrase already introduced in the 1970s and revived in 
the 1990s ~ coincides with that of participation. As such, participa-
tion/empowerment form one of the central concepts in what is presently 
called human development (for further discussion, see 1.1.4). 
The concepts of participation/empowerment and poverty alleviation 
are linked to the third central concept in this study: Non-Governmental 
10 The same difference 
Development Organisations (NGDOs). These organisations emerged in 
the first reformist period of the 1970s and were catapulted into main-
stream development thinking/aid in the 1980s as organisations capable 
of reaching the poor (in contrast to bilateral and multilateral donors and, 
thus, government organisations). The NGDOs were also seen as follow-
ing a participatory approach which was most welcome in the 1990s 
when development aid was more clearly linked to the promotion of 
democracy and civil society. NGDOs are not only important because 
they form the counterparts for one of the two aid channels under scru-
tiny in this study (namely the private channel), but also because they 
form one of the most visible manifestations of the neo-liberal resurgence 
within development thinking in the 1980s — a resurgence which called 
for the retreat of government and an enhanced role for private initiatives. 
In section 1 below, an overview of the historical context in which the 
three aforementioned concepts emerged and were given shape is pres-
ented. Particular attention will be paid to those issues which can help 
place the central concepts of participation, poverty and NGDOs in a 
historical context.4 In section 2, we move to a clearer conceptualisation 
of these concepts. The emphasis in the present chapter is on the phase 
from 1980 onwards because the central concepts are worked out more 
clearly in this period and because the development projects evaluated in 
the present study (and presented in Chapters 4 and 5) were established 
and implemented in this period. It is, however, necessary to start at the 
beginning in the 1950s, when development aid and development related 
thinking emerged. In this way, not only the roots of modernisation 
(which forms, as will be seen, the backbone of development aid up to 
the present) can be exposed but also the emergence of the three central 
concepts in this study. 
1.1 Aid: Alternatives within modernisation 
In the following subsections, a periodisation of development strategies 
specifically related to aid will be outlined according to the amount of 
attention devoted to direct and indirect poverty alleviation. The first 
period covers the 1950s and 1960s, when modernisation strategies were 
developed and the basis for development thinking up to the present was 
laid. The second period starts in the early 1970s and is characterised by 
the emergence of the basic needs approach, redistribution with growth, 
participation, and what Griffin has called 'redistributive development.'5 
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This period in particular was influenced by neo-Marxist and Dependen-
cia writers.6 The economic crisis and debt crisis which manifested 
themselves at the end of the 1970s seriously challenged this reformism. 
The market and economic stabilisation again become the central focus of 
development, and it will take until the end of the 1980s for people and 
more direct poverty alleviation to receive attention again. In this fourth 
period cumulating in the 1990s many of the concepts from the 1970s are 
returned to and some new concepts are added. 
Such a periodisation is in line with a remark of the Dutch Minister for 
Development Cooperation, who stated in his 1996 development-cooper-
ation budget that the 'history of development cooperation/aid is 
characterised by a patchwork of concepts, strategies and the continuous 
swing of a few pendulums.'7 For instance, 'the swing between a strong 
technocratic and/or economic focus in the 1950s, 1960s and 1980s to 
greater emphasis on the social, cultural and political dimensions of 
development' in the 1970s and the late 1980s. With the latter, Pronk is 
referring to what Oman and Wignaraja8 have labelled the reformist 
period of the 1970s and what can be labelled the second reformist 
period of the late 1980s/early 1990s. The very word 'reformist' indicates 
no thorough break with the dominant thinking on development but 
merely some alteration of it. Modernisation and thus the primacy of 
(economic) growth as the motor for development along the lines set out 
in the West remains the basis for reformist thinkers as well. In the 
discussion of development cooperation and development aid, 
modernisation strategies are essential.9 
1.1.1 The grounding of modernisation 
The free trade doctrine of comparative advantage, dating back to Ricar-
do in the early 19th century, constitutes what Oman and Wignaraja call 
the 'early stand of orthodox development literature.'10 In this stand, it 
was stipulated that states should specialise in those goods in which they 
have a comparative cost advantage over other states, and trade these 
goods against those in which other states have such an advantage." For 
developing countries, this meant that they had to specialise in the 
production of raw materials and primary products, thereby earning the 
funds to finance imports as well as growth. The fact that the terms of 
trade for these goods put developing countries at a constant disadvantage 
to industrialised countries led to heavy criticism of the 'growth by trade' 
doctrine of the 1950s as an imperfect route to development. As a conse-
12 The same difference 
quence of this criticism and with the development path of the West as 
guiding principle, industrialisation was brought forward as the best route 
to development for developing countries as well. Rostow with his 
economic take-off theory in his non-communist manifesto, is probably 
the most well-known proponent of this industrialisation path.12 
According to Rostow, each country has to pass through five success-
ive stages in order to reach the development of the West (in this case, 
the USA). The third or take-off stage marks the start of the fast econ-
omic growth necessary to transform a traditional society into a modem 
one.13 Fast economic growth is thus seen as the motor for development, 
which also includes what can be referred to as 'societal development' 
(e.g., democracy, capitalist production, freedom). For economic growth, 
the production capacity of the country has to increase and 
industrialisation is considered necessary for this increase. 
The notion of industrialisation as the motor for development was 
subsequently worked out by a number of authors who paid greater 
attention to the problem of initiating industrialisation in backward areas. 
Some of these authors highlighted the role of government as investor, 
provider of infrastructure and general facilitator of (industrial) develop-
ment. Rosenstein-Rodan pointed in his 'big push development strategy' 
at the need for government to plan, coordinate and provide incentives 
for investments that would increase the national production and the size 
of the domestic market. Nurkse decisively criticised Rostow's assump-
tion that developing countries should follow the path of the West. 
According to Nurkse, Rostow ignored the possibility of the very exist-
ence of this Western world exerting a detrimental effect on the develop-
ment efforts of the less developed. In the eyes of Nurkse, the 'vicious 
circle of (economic) poverty' could only be broken by a strategy of 
'balanced growth' which includes a 'generalised expansion of the 
market' through the 'application of capital throughout industry.'14 
At the same time that many focused on industry and inter-industry 
relations with industrialisation viewed as the road to development, others 
focused more on the relation between agriculture and industry (inter-
sectoral relations). This led to 'dual-economy models' in which an 
essential characteristic of underdevelopment is assumed to be the exist-
ence of both a modem capitalist sector (industry) and a backward 
traditional sector (agriculture) within the same country. In these models, 
development is achieved when dualism vanishes (i.e., the modem sector 
expands and the traditional sector shrinks). Agriculture is taken to be 
instrumental for industrialisation because it provides some of the raw 
materials to be processed in industry and the manpower needed for 
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industrialisation. Given the fact that this manpower comes from tradi-
tional rural areas, it has to be trained and educated in order to perform 
its duties within the modem sector.15 
It took until the second half of the 1960s before a more direct role for 
agriculture in the facilitation of economic growth and development was 
brought forward. Agriculture became important as a labour-ab sorb ing 
sector but also the need for an increase in agricultural production was 
expressed more clearly. This was also the period in which land reforms 
were increasingly seen as one of the means for increasing agricultural 
production and as a means for the creation of employment.16 In addi-
tion to land reforms, agricultural research was also emphasised in the 
1960s as a means for increased production in this traditional sector.17 
The Green Revolution, which is the most clear outcome of this research, 
indeed contributed to a sharp increase in agricultural production in such 
countries as India. For some, the Green Revolution was seen as an 
alternative to land reforms which were politically difficult to implement 
in most cases. Others, however, were highly critical of this high-yielding 
seed variety revolution which required not only sufficient water (i.e., 
irrigation), fertiliser and pesticides but also farmers who knew how to 
use these inputs correctly. The occasionally detrimental effects of the 
Green Revolution on the environmental, social and also economic fronts 
eventually formed the basis for many of the rural development strategies 
developed in the 1970s. These included the integrated area or rural 
development programmes in which Green Revolution technologies were 
combined with infrastructure and support services for regions.18 
In the 1950s and a large part of the 1960s, when modernisation was 
firmly rooted as the route to economic development, the provision of 
development aid was given an important role. The focus in the 1950s on 
technical assistance (following the idea that the lack of development was 
due to technical deficiencies),19 changed to aid as a means of providing 
capital for industrialisation in developing countries. Industrialisation 
needed capital and, as the savings in developing countries were insuffi-
cient to provide for the necessary investments, aid was to supplement 
this deficiency.20 When agriculture was brought more clearly forward 
as, first, a sector providing labour for industry and, later, a sector which 
could itself contribute to growth and employment, aid did not lose its 
momentum. Aid was then needed for education and skills training, for 
research, and for the provision of inputs (fertilisers, pesticides, irrigation) 
to make the Green Revolution work. 
The importance of aid for development is also made clear in discussi-
ons of the volume of aid. In 1965, the UN General Assembly and 
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UNCTAD proposed that one per cent of the national income of western 
countries should be devoted to development aid. This figure was merely 
symbolic, however, as it was 'an entirely arbitrary figure based on no 
calculations of need or capacity to pay.'21 The modernisation focus 
within development aid held for not only multilateral and bilateral 
donors but also for private development organisations and is exemplified 
by the situation in the Netherlands. With the start of the so-called Dutch 
co-financing programme in 1965, the transfer of knowledge was seen as 
one of the major pre-conditions for projects to be financed (see further 
Chapter 3). 
The aforementioned development paths paid little attention to the 
question of who might benefit from such economic growth. The land 
reforms constitute a possible exception. Put differently: The 1950s and a 
large part of the 1960s were characterised by an economistic, techno-
cratic paradigm in which 'an understanding of development as a social -
a societal - process encompassing cultural and sociological dimensions is 
missing.'22 The main reason for this neglect can be found in the wide-
spread belief in the operation of a trickle-down mechanism which is 
assumed to allow the benefits of economic growth to filter down to all 
layers of society. The idea of trickle down and societal change occurring 
automatically as a result of economic growth were the main reasons for 
no explicit attention to more direct poverty alleviation in this period.23 
1.1.2 A time for reformism 
In the second half of the 1960s, direct poverty alleviation slowly moved 
to the forefront to mark the start of what can be referred to as the 
reformist period. Critique at the Green Revolution, for instance, was 
strongly linked to demands for greater income distribution, which 
became a theme within development thinking in the 1960s. Unemploy-
ment, dualism and inequality became additional themes in the early 
1970s. Empirical studies undertaken in this period showed the trickle-
down mechanism, which was at the heart of modernisation, to not work 
as well as it should.24 Inequality and absolute poverty increased despite 
unequalled economic growth and impressive gains in health and liter-
acy.25 The rethinking of approaches to development led to a body of 
literature criticising modernist development thinking as concentrated too 
much on economic growth and too little on poverty and the quality of 
life. Direct poverty alleviation, in which the needs of people are placed 
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more central, was brought forward as the solution to growing unemploy-
ment and widening inequality.26 
The most clear proponent of this reformist thinking became the World 
Bank.27 In his famous speech in September 1973 in Nairobi, the then 
World Bank president Robert McNamara set out the broad policy 
guidelines for the future of the Bank. Poverty and poverty alleviation -
and thus the poor — were to be central to World Bank policy. In the 
years before the Nairobi-speech, the World Bank had already taken up 
activities in the field of population control and nutrition, which were 
viewed as essential issues for poverty alleviation. This activity also 
illustrated the Bank's ideas with regard to poverty: 'a condition of life 
so degraded by disease, illiteracy, malnutrition, and squalor as to deny 
its victims basic human necessities.'28 Following this assessment, the 
Bank started to urge the governments of developing countries to conduct 
direct attacks on poverty and re-orient their development policies. 
Central to such re-orientation was rural development as most of the poor 
lived in rural areas although urban development should not be neglected. 
In both cases, the World Bank opted for an integrated approach in which 
the creation of employment29 was coupled to the provision of infra-
structural and basic needs. 
McNamara's focus on fighting wide-scale poverty was an important 
deviation from the dominant development thinking of the 1950s and a 
large part of the 1960s when it was considered advisable to concentrate 
on the modern sector and hope for the trickle-down mechanism to do its 
job.30 The measures proposed to tackle the productivity problem of 
small farmers (e.g., better access to credit, assured availability of water 
and — most importantly — new forms of rural institutions and 
organisations)31 also took as their point of departure the assumption 
that governments cannot deal directly with millions of small farmers and 
that the organisation of small fanners was therefore essential.32 The 
need for a more market oriented mode of production was expressed and 
poverty remained de-individualised. Countries were classified as poor 
(i.e., having a GNP per capita below a particular level), and the poor 
were seen as groups with similar characteristics (e.g., malnutrition, 
illiteracy, low productivity). 
The strategies stemming from a definition of poverty in terms of 
'economic' and 'basic needs' were already laid out in the early 1970s; 
they included 'accelerating economic growth, reducing population 
growth, and redistributing income towards the poorest sectors of the 
population.'33 McNamara noted in this regard that despite the growth in 
mining, industry, and government the productivity and income of the 
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small farmer remained unchanged.34 The solution was sought in a 
development policy redirected toward better distribution. This redistribu-
tion of growth became the redistribution-with-growth strategy of the 
World Bank. In the basic study on this redistribution with growth 
strategy, Chenery et al.35 stood up for economic growth and a better 
distribution of this growth for the 40% poorest in developing countries. 
The focus on poverty and direct poverty alleviation proclaimed by the 
World Bank in the early 1970s remained, according to many critics, 
largely theoretical. B. Rich, for instance, claims that the idealistic and 
even moralistic development vision expressed by McNamara has to be 
set against 'a disquieting lack of accountability, a structure of top-down 
control, and a thrust toward domination.'36 At the same time, the rather 
sudden shift within the Bank towards poverty alleviation was also 
questioned. Was this shift indeed dictated by moral and ethical consider-
ations as McNamara proclaimed, or was it, in the words of S. George 
and F. S abelli, because the poor constituted a threat to political stabil-
ity?37 Writing from a pro-Bank perspective, R.L. Ayres had already 
expressed the opinion that the focus of the World Bank on poverty 
alleviation in the McNamara years was not so much a reaction to what 
could be called compassion for those living in poverty but mainly (or 
merely) an act to retain political stability (e.g., by preventing uprisings 
in Third World countries that would threaten the status quo).38 
As far as the two central pillars of the new Bank strategy (i.e., 
poverty alleviation and equality), several studies reached the conclusion 
that 'the Bank by its very nature (top-down, technocratic, closed) and 
programs (lending to governments controlled by corrupt elites) not only 
did not improve the lot of the poor in the 1970s, but actually contributed 
to increasing inequality.'39 For C. Payer, the World Bank was an impe-
rialist agency which provided aid to, what she called, 'comprador elites' 
in the Third World. The outcome was a development based on class 
with no hope for reducing poverty.40 A. v.d. Laar had already argued 
that this focus on the poor should be judged by the type of projects (in 
this case: rural development projects) financed which strengthen the ten-
dency towards 'greater economic differentiation and social fragmenta-
tion.'41 The poverty focus of the World Bank remains open to criti-
cism. In discussing the commitment of the Bank to sustainable poverty 
reduction in the 1990s, S. George and F. Sabelli state that 'the Bank has 
never been able to reach the absolute poor and it is not clear why this 
deficiency should suddenly disappear.'42 
A few years after McNamara's Nairobi-speech, the predominantly 
economic poverty analysis in redistribution with growth is altered by 
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another multilateral organisation, the ILO.43 Taking the phenomenon of 
economic growth with growing inequality as its point of departure, the 
basic-needs approach of the ILO incorporated not only employment-
oriented strategies and/or transfers of income and assets for the allevi-
ation of poverty but also the provision of non-material needs.44 The 
division of basic needs into a material part (covering such items as food, 
shelter, health, education, sanitation and water supply) and a non-
material part (including such human needs and rights as equality and 
participation)45 called for a broader conceptualisation of development 
and poverty. The basic-needs approach saw poverty as having an econ-
omic (growth, employment, income), social (education, water supply, 
health), and political (participation, human rights) dimension. From this 
it logically followed that people were considered poor if one or more of 
these dimensions were jeopardised. 
Three important shifts in aid policy are said to be the outcome of the 
reformist thinking at this time: (1) a large increase in aid for poverty 
alleviation in the latter half of the 1970s; (2) an emphasis on the support 
of such basic-needs sectors as health, education, the provision of safe 
drinking water, irrigation, agriculture and rural development; and (3) a 
tendency among some agencies to finance and promote small-scale loca-
lised projects (specially geared at attacking poverty at a grass-roots 
level) as opposed to sectors and large-scale projects.46 The data pres-
ented in Box 1.1 with regard to the distribution of aid disbursements 
between 1969 and 1993 show poorer countries to indeed receive a larger 
share of the increased volume of aid in the second half of the 1970s 
(also see Box 1.2 which provides an overview of the sectoral distribu-
tion of aid commitments for the period between 1974 and 1993). 
Throughout these years, the basic-needs approach met with severe 
criticism. Whereas for some the whole concept of basic needs was 
assumed to obstruct more radical changes, for others, and especially 
those from the neo-conservative comer, the approach was assumed to 
add nothing new to the fight against poverty. For Little,47 the basic-
needs approach merely functioned as a slogan for supporters of greater 
equality in society. The approach was argued to hardly differ from 
redistribution with growth or other general approaches for tackling 
poverty, the basic needs were nowhere defined, and governments were 
simply asked to provide subsidised services and food by increasing 
government spending and increased taxation of the rich. Lai48 reduced 
the entire basic-needs approach to a conflict between the state and the 
free market by accusing the proponents of such an approach of aiming 
at changing 'the ownership of the means of production and distribution 
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Box 1 Ì Aid disbursements per GNP and HDI category" 
In connection with the changes in development thinking described m this chapter, 
one may ask the question whether these changes and particularly increased 
attention to poverty alleviation are actually reflected in the aid disbursements to 
groups of developing countries Data concerning the net ODA disbursements for 
the period 1969-1993 show the countries in the lowest range (whether one takes 
the income or HDI categorisation as the point of departure) to consistently receive 
the majority of the aid w The shares of the low-income and low-HDI countries 
can be seen to increase during the first reformist period in the 1970s From the 
end of the 1970s into the 1980s, moreover, the shares of these countries can be 
seen to decrease, which is congruent with the fact that direct poverty alleviation 
received less attention in those years The figures are less clear for the second 
reformist period, while the share of high HDI countries substantially increased in 
the early 1990s and the share of low HDI countries decreased as a consequence, 
such a shift cannot be witnessed among the highest and lowest level income 
countries Looking at ODA per capita, data on aid disbursements per group of 
countries show that the high income category of countries has done much belter 
than the lower levels, whereas in the HDI categonsation it is exactly the other 
way around (see Figures 1 1 and 1 2) The main reason for this discrepancy can 
Figure 1.1 
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be found in the distorting influence of Israel, India, and Chinasl When these 
three countries are omitted, it becomes clear that the lowest levels (1 e, low HDI 
countries) have received more aid dollars per capita than any other level with a 
clear increase up to 1990 followed by a decrease thereafter 
Figure 1.2 
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of goods and services from the private to the state sector by nationalisa-
tion and other measures.' 
In the implementation of the basic-needs approach, emphasis was 
placed on the economic and social dimensions and the political dimen-
sion was thereby avoided. Given that the realisation of active participa-
tion for the poor in decision-making processes was considered essential 
to making the basic-needs approach a viable development strategy, the 
loss of the political dimension reduces the approach to little more than 
just another attempt to cope with the phenomenon of poverty by provid-
ing for some of the material needs of the poor. At the end of the 1970s, 
however, the reformist period was characterised by a neglect of both 
international and internal reforms, a lack of redistribution by the North 
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and South and a tendency to focus on other issues.52 The situation was 
largely due to the adverse international economic climate facing devel-
oping countries following the oil shocks and other commodity price 
shocks of the 1970s and 1980s but also to the withdrawal of the major 
actor in the basic-needs approach (i.e., the World Bank). The effect was 
to cause a partial shift in attention from poverty and basic human needs 
(which were perceived to require expensive medium- to long-term 
solutions) to macro-economic problems and stabilisation programmes 
(which were perceived to be short-term and require immediate sol-
utions).53 
1.1.3 The lost years of stabilisation 
The basic idea behind the upcoming macro-economic approach was 
simple: free trade as the cornerstone of economic growth. According to 
proponents of this approach, many developing countries — influenced as 
they were by the export pessimism of the 1950s and 1960s and by the 
supposed merits of import-substituting industrialisation (ISI) — adopted 
inward-looking strategies aimed at the development of a modern indus-
trial sector through protectionism, government planning and other direct 
incentives which produced a strong anti-export bias. By the end of the 
1960s, however, many of the countries following this ISI approach faced 
serious problems, including inefficient industries, foreign-exchange 
shortages and a bias against agriculture. A few countries switched to 
more outward-looking strategies while others continued to adhere to the 
inward-looking ISI. 
The countries following such an outward-looking strategy of develop-
ment were brought forward in the 1980s as prime examples of an open 
economy and export-led growth.54 Studies of the four little tigers (i.e., 
Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea) showed their success 
in terms of growth, employment, income distribution, balance of pay-
ments and structural change. In 1993, the World Bank also published a 
policy report on these export-led growth economies under the title 'The 
East Asian miracle.' One of the essential features of this miracle was a 
market-friendly view 'with effective but carefully limited government 
activism.' The World Bank had already argued in 1991 that the role of 
government was to be limited to 'ensure adequate investments in people, 
provide a competitive climate for private enterprise, keep the economy 
open to international trade, and maintain a stable macroeconomy.'55 
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The reduced role of government in the development process associ-
ated with such macro-economic approaches is in sharp contrast to the 
1970s when government was seen as an important motor on the route to 
development. The Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs - see below) had 
already forced government intervention to be something of the past. This 
was particularly the case for the state as economic agent, which was 
proclaimed as 'a major disillusionment' in the 1980s.56 This 'disillusion-
ment' can be ascribed to the insight that 'the accumulation of unservice-
able debt was (one-sidedly) attributed to irrational investment decisions' 
and that this insight was 'increasingly [being] associated with a lack of 
enlightened governance in developing countries.' The call for the retreat 
of government was only one step further and the 1980s can therefore be 
seen as the decade for 'dismantling of the welfare state notion, seeking 
to replace even the most basic government functions by the market 
mechanism.'57 
One of the consequences of this market-oriented development path 
was not only that interference of the government was seen as unnecess-
ary or even detrimental to development; the same feelings also emerged 
concerning official aid. For the more fierce proponents of the counter-
revolution, radical policy changes (i.e., opting for complete laissez-faire 
trade and termination of official aid) were seen as desirable. One of the 
main reasons for this negative attitude towards aid is that it leads to an 
'increase in the size of an unproductive public sector,' which in turn has 
an Opportunity cost to the private sector, because potential private 
sector investors are "crowded out" by aid-fuelled expansion of the public 
sector.'58 The resurgence of neo-liberal economics accompanied by a 
'neo-liberal democratic theory,'59 in which emphasis is placed on a 
reduced role for government also paved the way for the private sector in 
development aid or Non-Governmental Development Organisations 
(NGDOs).60 The 1980s saw the emergence of these NGDOs in the 
North as well as in the South (also see 1.2.3). 
Probably the clearest example of the neo-classical outward-oriented 
approach which emerged in the early 1980s are the Structural Adjust-
ment Loans (SALs) introduced by the World Bank in 1980.61 In turn 
for such loans many developing countries had to adhere to 'changes 
towards policies favoured by the development counter-revolution: the 
avoidance of overvalued exchange rates; rates of interest which reflect 
the market forces of supply and demand; shrinkage of the public sector; 
deregulation of markets; the setting of agricultural prices which are 
"properly remunerative" to cultivators; the dismantling of direct controls 
over trade and investment; the equalization of domestic and imported 
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energy prices and the reform of energy taxation.'62 For most aid 
donors, moreover, agreement to such a SAL from the World Bank 
became a prerequisite for aid. As such, the donor community followed 
clearly in the footsteps of the Bank and thus in the footsteps of neo-
classical development strategy. In the meantime, the SALs failed to 
produce the desired economic effects63 and were even found to have 
some detrimental social effects. The shrinkage of the public sector and, 
as a consequence, cuts in government spending mainly affected services 
for the poor. 
The rapidly emerging macro-economic crisis and the criticism at the 
ISI strategy detracted attention from direct poverty alleviation. Although 
poverty seemed to vanish as a central element in the development dis-
course at the end of the 1970s, it did not disappear completely. Atten-
tion did shift from a more direct attack on poverty (e.g., employment 
creation, redistribution, basic needs) to an essentially indirect approach. 
Other authors continued along the lines set out in the 1970s.64 What is 
common to many of these authors is that poverty is not considered only 
or mainly an economic issue, which can be ascribed largely to the 
discussions on poverty in the late 1960s and 1970s.65 So-called 'micro-
directed' or 'welfare-targeted aid' also did not disappear from the 
donor's agenda.66 
A similar story can be told with regard to participation. Whereas the 
reformist period of the 1970s was characterised by debates about partici-
pation as a means and participation as an end, 'during the 1980s partici-
pation lost ground in international discourse, sharing in the eclipse of 
development conceptions oriented to social justice and human wel-
fare.'67 Participation was basically brought back to the project level in 
the 1980s. As a consequence, participation was highlighted as a means 
for improving project performance, operation, and maintenance. This 
included specific attention to ways of involving people (i.e., target 
groups) in the implementation of development projects/programmes and 
thereby avoidance of the more or less political discussion of the partici-
pation of the poor in society at large. 
Coupled with growing criticism at the cornerstone of the neo-classical 
approach and under the banner of export pessimism because of increased 
protectionism on the part of the West and/or the impossibility of the 
same strategy working for all countries calls for Adjustment with a 
Human Face were issued.68 A new reformist period was fuelled with 
direct poverty alleviation back on the development agenda together with 
the market as the driving force behind development and the necessity of 
government retreat. Only in the second half of the 1980s and as a result 
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of heavy critique of the social effects of structural adjustment policies, 
thus, did poverty and direct poverty alleviation return to the agenda. 
1.1.4 The second reformist period 
The 1950s and 1960s, in which economic growth was considered to be -
- if not the only ~ at least the most important prerequisite for develop-
ment, were followed by a period in the 1970s in which economic growth 
was coupled to redistribution and poverty alleviation. The 1980s, in 
which economic growth and macro-economic stabilisation stood central, 
were followed by a period in which poverty alleviation and basic needs 
were again brought to the forefront as important and necessary steps 
towards development. As such, the second reformist period of the 
1980s/1990s has much in common with the first reformist period of the 
1970s. Both periods can be regarded as a reaction to a preoccupation 
with macro-economic measures and growth. The concepts and measures 
introduced to counter this preoccupation in the second reformist period 
show a high degree of similarity to those introduced in the first 
reformist period. As in the 1970s, the second reformist period involves 
attention to poverty in general, the measurement of poverty, basic needs, 
employment creation and participation.69 In contrast to the first 
reformist period, however, the second reformist period saw the emerg-
ence of NGDOs as a growing force within the development field. 
Moreover, the combination of economic growth and direct poverty 
alleviation was brought more forcefully forward as the major tasks 
within development in the second reformist period.70 
The major difference between the first and the second reformist 
period, however, relates to the end of real socialism as a development 
alternative — symbolised by the falling of the Berlin Wall. In addition to 
a big push towards conditionality in aid,71 this fall led to the conviction 
that the western development route — symbolised by modernisation 
thinking — was the only route to development. Fukuyama has called this 
the End of History72 with capitalism, economic liberalisation, and lib-
eral democracy constituting the end-state for human development. As a 
consequence, 'the aspirations of political leaders in developing countries 
to work towards alternative ends by alternative means are regarded as 
illusory and misguided.'73 The universality of the western road to 
development has been strongly questioned and criticised,74 not in the 
least by developing countries themselves. One of the main issues at 
stake is democracy which is regarded by the West and the organisations 
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dominated by the West, as part and parcel of the process of develop-
ment. Democracy, for them, refers to the western way of democracy 
(i.e., liberal democracy) with political parties, pressure groups, human 
rights and parliaments as the major components. For many countries (or 
the leaders of such countries), this is simply not acceptable. An increas-
ing number of developing countries regard the western model of devel-
opment as 'inadequate, outdated, and detrimental to their own cultu-
re.'75 
Development construed as the outcome of public and private initiat-
ives already shows the monetarist and neo-classical strategies dominat-
ing the development debate at the beginning of the 1980s to have lost 
ground. These strategies have been criticised for their unconditional 
belief in the workings of the market and their unrealistic claims with 
regard to the ability and willingness of individuals to absorb and process 
information. Pointing at clear market failures including the existence of 
certain desirable goods and services that cannot be produced or provided 
at a profit by private markets and persistent poverty and inequality these 
critics have made room for a renewed attention to government interven-
tions.76 The role of government captured under the term 'good govern-
ance' became to create 'a conducive social, economic and political envi-
ronment in which development may take place through a mixture of 
public and private initiatives.'77 
The 'private initiatives' mentioned not only refer to industry and/or 
private enterprises but also and increasingly to what has been labelled 
civil society with citizens and organisations of citizens called upon to 
play a role in development. For aid agencies, civil society's role in 
development seems to have been reduced to the operation of NGDOs, 
which have shown a marked expansion over the last decade. Aid 
agencies since the late 1980s have turned their policy towards develop-
ment by, for and through the people and have paid more attention to 
basic needs, institutional assistance and strengthening of civil society. 
Box 1.2 shows that these changes in policy are, however, only marginal-
ly reflected in the division of aid disbursements by sector.78 
With economic growth as fixed prerequisite for development in the 
background and in reaction to the lack of a 'human face' in the domi-
nant development discourse, the late 1980s saw a revival of attention to 
the underside of society (e.g., to poverty and the means for its allevi-
ation) and a call for a state to provide the means for poverty alleviation. 
The neo-classical development strategy nevertheless proclaimed the 
benefits of the free market and a reduced (economic) role for the state 
with ever more vigour.79 The latter was of course strengthened by the 
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end of real socialism as an alternative. This led to even greater emphasis 
on démocratisation,80 self-help and participation as conditions for 
sustainable economic and societal development and also to a focus on 
civil society and the individual as alternatives to the state for develop-
ment. The post-modernism critique of great theories and a pinch of 
environmental concern have insured victory for the concept of 
sustainable development and the notion of development is thereby being 
changed as a combination of political, economic, social and environ-
mental dimensions. 
For Lele, the 'phrase Sustainable Development [...] has become the 
watchword for international aid agencies, the jargon of development 
planners, the theme of conferences and learned papers, and the slogan of 
developmental and environmental activists.'81 Although the concept 
emerged as an answer to the environmental degradation debate of the 
1980s, sustainable development soon grew to include basically all 
aspects of the term development. For some, sustainable development 
also implies a new concept of economic growth that (1) 'provides 
fairness and opportunity for all the world's people, not just for the 
privileged few' and (2) does this 'without destroying the world's finite 
natural resources and carrying capacity.' This new concept is not only 
aimed at the interrelationships between 'all aspects of human life,'82 
but also states that development is only development when it is political-
ly, socially, environmentally, culturally and economically sustainable 
(i.e., meets the needs of the present generation without compromising 
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs).83 This 
broadened concept of sustainable development fits the new reformist 
period; it places people and human development at the forefront of 
development issues. The question, however, is whether the use of such a 
broad concept can facilitate our understanding of the development 
problem and the establishment of effective programmes and projects for 
the alleviation of development problems. 
1.2 Three central concepts 
In the present section the three central concepts in this study will be dis-
cussed in greater detail: poverty alleviation, participation and Non-
Governmental Development Organisations. As shown in the previous 
section on development strategies these concepts are historically closely 
related. In the 1970s, when direct poverty alleviation became a central 
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Box I 2 Aid commitments per sector*4 
Like for the aid disbursements per group of development countries (see Box 1 1), 
also the aid commitments per sector can shed some light on the impact of changes 
in thinking on development aid or cooperation Data concerning the sectoral 
division of bilateral aid commitments from DAC-countnes reveal that (1) the 
"supremacy of the economic dimension in development thinking is reflected by 
the fact that aid commitments over the period 1973-1993 have for the largest part 
been dedicated towards economic development activities (ι e, especially "econ­
omic infrastructure and services ' and 'production ) (see Figure 1 3), and (2) that 
the changes m development thinking from the early 1970s onwards are only 
marginally reflected in the aid commitments made since then 
Figure 1.3 
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As was to be expected, commitments made for basic needs (grouped under the 
social dimension) increased from the mid-1970s onwards (see Figure 1 4) 8 5 This 
increase was, however, not as steep as the dominant focus on basic needs in that 
period would make one believe Moreover, the economic dimension increased 
even faster in the same period The levelling off of the social dimension in the 
beginning of the 1980s is already more in line with the dominant development 
thinking of that moment, although it does not explain why the same happened to 
the commitments geared at economic development When at the end of the 
1980s/beginmng of the 1990s, the social dimension is once again brought forward 
as an important part of development, this is not reflected in aid commitments In 
fact, percentage-wise these commitments even decreased to the level of the early 
1970s That also commitments in the economic sphere decrease in the early 1990s 
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could have been caused by some reluctance regarding economic development in 
relation to the environmental degradation focus Overall figures, however, indicate 
that the decline in economic and social development commitments has more to do 
with the sharp increase in commitments for debt relief and emergency aid The 
rise of commitments falling within the political dimension from the late 1980s 
onwards, finally, is in accordance with the growing attention for good governance 
within development thinking The slow but steady increase during the 1980s, on 
the other hand, seems to be in sharp contrast to the neo-classical resurgence that 
dominated development thinking then 
Figure 1.4 
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issue for development in the Third World, participation was also brought 
forward in a departure from the growth-centred approaches previously 
advocated. At the same time, the NGDOs were making a name for 
themselves (although they would not be brought forward as an important 
alternative for a retreating government until the 1980s). As will be seen, 
the focus of these NGDOs on direct poverty alleviation and their presen­
tation as organisations working from a participatory perspective unifies 
the central concepts in this study. With the start of the second reformist 
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period, moreover, direct poverty alleviation and the need for participa-
tion would take centre stage in the official policies of both bilateral and 
multilateral donors. 
1.2.1 Poverty and poverty alleviation 
The renewed attention for the alleviation of poverty in the world (and 
especially the Third World) is apparent in the different indexes devel-
oped over the years for the measurement of the problem. These indexes 
show poverty to no longer be regarded as strictly an economic issue. 
Instead, poverty is increasingly being seen as a synonym for deprivation, 
involving many different aspects of hardship. In a publication entitled 
'The State of World Rural Poverty,' the authors provide several charac-
teristics of poverty at the household level:86 material deprivation, isola-
tion, alienation, dominance and dependence, lack of participation and 
freedom of choice, absence of assets, vulnerability and insecurity. All of 
these characteristics may not apply to all poor households in the Third 
World, but they certainly provide a general picture of the many manifes-
tations of poverty and once again show economic deprivation to be only 
part of the problem. With these characteristics the authors fall back on 
the writings of Robert Chambers on this subject. 
For Chambers, who has provided one of the more comprehensive 
sketches of the phenomenon of poverty, the word poverty itself refers to 
a 'lack of wealth or assets, and lack of flows of food and cash' and is as 
such only one of the clusters of disadvantage that distinguishes poor 
people from others. Taking communities (and not individuals) as his 
point of departure, Chambers presents four other clusters of disadvantage 
which characterise poor communities: physical weakness, vulnerability, 
isolation and powerlessness. Poverty thus refers to the lack of assets, 
whether in the economic (e.g., money, land, livestock) or non-economic 
(e.g., shelter, cooking tools, toilets) sense. Physical weakness refers to 
hunger, sickness, malnutrition and the generally high ratio of dependents 
(young, old, sick, or handicapped people) to able-bodied adults. Isolation 
refers to such items as illiteracy, no active participation in public meet-
ings and peripheral location. Vulnerability is expressed by the fact that a 
poor household has few buffers against contingencies, and powerlessness 
is exemplified by ignorance of the law, lack of legal advice, low negoti-
ating position and exploitation by the more powerful forces in the 
society. It should be clear that these five clusters are very much inter-
linked, and that they can (and often do) negatively strengthen each 
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other.87 Together they form what Chambers calls the 'vicious circle of 
poverty' or the deprivation trap. 
As Chambers himself notes, these clusters of disadvantage are from 
the perspective of outsiders and not the poor themselves. If looked at 
from the latter perspective, three objectives or priorities stand out with 
regard to the phenomenon of poverty: survival, security, and self-respect. 
Survival is based on the need for a stable subsistence and is the first and 
lowest-level objective referring to basic income and basic consumption 
for survival. Survival is also linked to physical weakness and poverty or 
two of the clusters of deprivation distinguished by Chambers. Security 
'concerns the ability to meet contingencies without further impoverish-
ment, and depends on rights, assets and access to money whether 
through savings, sale of assets or loans.' The security objective is linked 
to the cluster vulnerability. Although Chambers, Saxena, and Shah 
acknowledge that 'there is a danger here of imputing to and imagining 
for people values which they may not hold,' they nevertheless argue that 
'self-respect and independence, including freedom from humiliating 
subservience, seem to matter to them more and more.'88 Self-respect is 
the third and highest-level objective and linked to the cluster 
powerlessness. 
It is important to note that as the lower objectives are met the higher 
objectives gain greater significance. In other words, as incomes rise, 
security and self-respect become more important. People must satisfy 
their basic needs (income, housing, clothing, health) before they can be 
open to those issues related to powerlessness and self-respect or higher 
priorities.89 The hierarchial structure of these objectives can also be 
detected in the UNDP definition of human development: 'a process of 
enlarging people's choices.' These choices may be infinite and change 
over time but 'at all levels of development, the three essential ones are 
for people to lead a long and healthy life, to acquire knowledge and to 
have access to resources needed for a decent standard of living.*90 In 
other words, elements of what we have labelled the social and economic 
dimensions are viewed by the UNDP as most important with regard to 
poverty. Elements of the political dimension are secondary: participation, 
personal self-respect, and human rights." 
In the 1970s, the reformists restricted their ideas and strategies to 
largely the lower-level priorities. While the basic-needs strategy per-
tained somewhat to powerlessness with such terms as human rights and 
participation, the main aim was to provide and secure access for the 
poor to such basic needs and services as adequate food, shelter, clothing, 
safe drinking water, sanitation, public transport, education, and health. In 
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the second reformist period or the late 1980s and early 1990s, these 
basic material needs plus the economic situation of the poor (employ-
ment, income) were again brought to the foreground, but with the 
political dimension of poverty or powerlessness at the centre of the 
stage. These higher-level priorities continue to be of importance today as 
indicated by the growing emphasis on sustainable development. 
The five clusters of deprivation put forth by Chambers can be reduced 
to a three-dimensional division of poverty into economic, social, and 
political dimensions.92 The economic dimension is related to the 
unequal distribution of resources and/or inadequate utilisation of these 
resources, and it thereby involves the clusters poverty, vulnerability, and 
isolation. The social dimension is related to inadequate access to the 
basic amenities necessary for a dignified existence or such items as 
health, education, and housing. This dimension therefore involves the 
clusters physical weakness and isolation. The last and often most forgot-
ten dimension is the political dimension, which is related to little or no 
access to the decision-making process and lack of human rights.93 This 
dimension thus involves the cluster powerlessness. These three aspects 
of poverty ~ lack of income, basic needs, and political participation ~ 
must be clearly addressed in any alleviation strategy. Just as the five 
clusters of deprivation identified by Chambers, the three dimensions of 
poverty also cannot be separated from each other. 
As already mentioned, the economic, social, and political dimensions 
constituted part of the development in the 1970s. However, the political 
dimension was largely snowed under by the economic and social dimen-
sions at that time and basically reduced to a hollow concept of participa-
tion (see 1.2.2 below).94 When poverty alleviation was again defined as 
the central objective of development at the end of the 1980s, the politi-
cal dimension was again ignored by an important part of the develop-
ment establishment. In 1990, for instance, the World Bank presented a 
two-part strategy for the reduction of poverty. First, the productive use 
of the poor's most abundant asset ~ labour — had to be promoted. In 
other words, the economic opportunities of the poor had to be enlarged 
in order to raise incomes and, thus, patterns of consumption. Second, 
basic social services had to be provided for the poor. These included 
primary health care, family planning, nutrition, and primary educa-
tion.95 This basic strategy would have to be supplemented by a 'pro-
gram of well-targeted transfers and safety nets' in order to reach those 
untouched by the two parts of the strategy. In such a manner, the World 
Bank attends to what have been labelled the economic and social 
dimensions of poverty. The political dimension does not constitute part 
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of this poverty-reduction strategy although it is cited as a prerequisite 
when it is stated that 'the two-part strategy is [...] more likely to be 
adopted in countries where the poor have a say in political and econ-
omic decision-making.' In characterising the target populations, how-
ever, the World Bank sticks to the issues of malnutrition, low income, 
lack of education, low life expectancy, sub-standard housing and isola-
tion. Elements of the political dimension are nowhere mentioned. 
With the resurgence of attention to poverty and poverty alleviation at 
the end of the 1980s, the UNDP initially characterised poverty in terms 
of income, nutrition, health, and education. Somewhat later, the 
organisation more clearly and explicitly identified human freedom, good 
governance, empowerment, démocratisation, and participation as essen-
tial elements for human development. Presented as an all including 
development strategy96 which places people (in contrast to the econ-
omic system) at the forefront, human development is clearly seen by the 
UNDP as a reaction to the economic crisis of the 1980s when 'attention 
was paid first and foremost to economic reform and growth through 
macroeconomic policy instruments' and 'little attention [was given] to 
the probable adverse impacts of these reforms and policies on 
people.'97 In addition, the UNDP sees the 1980s as 'years of mobiliz-
ation of people in search of freedom - to participate in the events and 
processes that shape their lives.' By this, the 'spread of multiparty 
democratic systems' is intended.98 
For the UNDP, this emphasis on people should not distract from the 
fact that economic growth is an absolute pre-condition for human 
development. Without economic growth and the generation of productive 
employment sustained improvement in human well-being simply is not 
possible. The UNDP makes clear that economic growth is not an end in 
itself but merely a means for achieving human development. Similarly, 
the provision of education and health (or, more broadly, basic material 
needs) and political participation are not ends in themselves, but means 
for increasing and satisfying the choices available to people. Human 
development can be clearly characterised along the three dimensions of 
development and poverty alleviation highlighted above. The economic 
(e.g., growth, employment), the social (e.g., health, education), and the 
political (e.g., participation, empowerment, good governance) dimensions 
are what sustainable development is all about and largely correspond to 
the three basic objectives identified by Chambers: survival, security, and 
self-respect. The concept of human development, thus, meets with the 
same critique: Given the interconnected nature of the different elements, 
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trae development may only be achieved if all of the different elements 
are tackled. 
Although the word integrated is not used in relation to the concept of 
human development, it should be clear from the above that the concept 
of Human Development is intended to capture the different elements 
needed for a development strategy with people as its point of departure. 
In a reaction to criticism stating that the concept is antigrowth and/or 
only concerned with social-sector development, the UNDP clearly 
presents the concept as a 'holistic development paradigm embracing 
both ends and means, both productivity and equity, both economic and 
social development, both material goods and human welfare.'9* In 
short, enlarging people's choices in both the economic and social senses 
requires they also have the capacity to participate in and benefit from 
these developments. 
1.2.2 Participation and empowerment 
Participation as a prerequisite for human development indicates the 
return of the phenomenon to such an extent that 'some talk of a para-
digm shift to participatory development.'100 Participation has been 
brought forward as a means as well as an end. As a means, participation 
is equated with cooperation and incorporation into pre-determined 
activities.101 In the case of a development project or programme, the 
word participation is often accompanied by 'in preparation, design, 
implementation, and evaluation'102 but also strongly linked to the 
improvement of project effectiveness. People are stimulated to get 
involved in implementation and maintenance because a voluntary 
contribution (in terms of labour and/or cash) from the target group is 
one of the most clear ways of creating a feeling of ownership and, thus, 
fostering responsibility among the target group for the project. It is 
important to recognise that participation becomes mainly a management 
item when viewed as a means: 'The basic decisions which underlie the 
development action have already been taken and government bureau-
cracy, in the process of implementation, invites the [...] population to 
endorse and to collaborate with the decisions taken.'103 Participation as 
an end refers to involvement of people in economic, social and political 
processes which affect their lives. As an end in itself, participation has 
the intrinsic merit of increasing self-esteem, confidence, and a sense of 
power and may thereby be viewed as a basic human need.104 
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Although participation was brought forward in the reformist period of 
the 1970s, and particularly within the basic-needs approach as both a 
means and an end, the emphasis within development aid at the time was 
clearly on the former. In the current debate on human development, in 
contrast participation is clearly viewed as an end in itself. As such, it is 
closely linked to empowerment, which is a concept strongly linked to 
the late 1980s/early 1990s.105 At that time, participation became 
equated with the achievement of power in terms of access to and control 
of the resources necessary to protect one's livelihood.106 For the 
UNDP, empowerment simply means increasing people's capacity to 
control their lives107 and as such, empowerment encapsulates participa-
tion. Empowerment is defined here as 'a process of awareness and 
capacity building leading to greater participation, to greater decision-
making power and control, and to transformative action.' Central to the 
process of empowerment are the notions of awareness, capacity building, 
and participation. In addition, the notion of organisation should be 
included as central because people develop awareness and the capacity 
to take action largely through organisation and involvement in 
groups.109 
In his (dis)empowerment of poverty model, which J. Friedmann calls 
a political variant of the basic-needs approach, it is argued that social 
power has to become political power and that the poor pursue political 
empowerment.109 For S.C. White, transformative participation is both a 
means to empowerment and an end in itself. Behind the concept of 
transformative participation is the notion of empowerment and the idea 
'that the practical experience of being involved in considering options, 
making decisions, and taking collective action to fight injustice is itself 
transformative.'110 
For Chambers, achieving participation is dependent on the reversal of 
power relations. In other words: empowerment presupposes participation 
and participation presupposes empowerment. Chambers also clearly 
distinguishes three uses of participation in the development discourse: as 
'a cosmetic label, to make whatever is proposed look good,' as 'a co-
opting practice, to mobilize local labour and reduce costs,' and as an 
empowering process to enable people 'to do their own analysis, to take 
command, to gain in confidence, and to make their own decisions.'111 
The latter boils down to people having a say in those decisions that 
affect them, but it is precisely a lack of decision-making participation 
which is most difficult to counteract. Many projects employ a participa-
tory strategy with regard to the implementation of development projects 
and programmes but lack participation in the earlier decision-making 
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and design stages. Although such an implementation strategy can be 
very effective for the achievement of agency objectives, it does not 
enable 'the incorporation of local knowledge and the development of 
local commitment necessary for sustainability and self-reliance.'112 
In light of the need for participation in the decision-making and 
design stages of development projects, it can also be stated that people 
must gain a say in local, regional, national and international affairs in 
order to speak of sustainable development. Participation in the political 
dimension is ultimately responsible for the sustainability of development. 
And this points to the necessity of empowerment as part of any develop-
ment strategy and thus as an end in itself. 
When talking about obstacles to participation or factors influencing 
participation, it is again important to note the difference between partici-
pation as a means and participation as an end. In the former case, 
obstacles can be found in project design and include such items as 
overly centralised planning. In the latter case, obstacles can be found in 
the existing power structure which often includes the legal system (in 
favour of those with the most political influence and economic clout), 
bureaucratic constraints (innumerable regulations and controls) and 
social norms (persistent prejudices). Participation as a means may 
involve obstacles associated with the operational procedures for the 
undertaken task. Participation as an end may involve obstacles associ-
ated with structural and institutional relationships at both the local and 
national levels."3 It is these reasons and the unequal distribution of 
assets and most notably land that lead the UNDP to conclude that 'there 
can never be true participation in the rural areas without far-reaching 
land reforms.'"4 
Despite rhetoric to the opposite, participation within development aid 
is still largely regarded as a means for improving project perform-
ance."5 In the words of M. Stiefel and M. Wolfe: 'When it comes to 
the practical implementation of development policy, international organ-
izations invariably tend to put aside the "empowerment" rhetoric and 
revert to traditional "beneficiary" or "target group participation".'"6 
The World Bank argues that 'extending the level of participation to 
relevant stakeholders can contribute to more sustainable programs and 
broaden ownership and commitment' and that 'participation can make a 
large contribution to getting good projects implemented, maintained, and 
evaluated.'117 The UNDP leans more towards participation as an actual 
end when it states that participation does not refer 'only to people's 
involvement in particular projects or programmes' but to 'an overall 
development strategy' and that 'any proposal to increase people's 
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participation must therefore pass the empowerment test.'118 The UNDP 
sees some new openings for greater participation. These openings, which 
can also be seen as the conditions for participation (and thus human 
development), include democracy (e.g., decentralisation of decision-
making processes),"9 the transition to market economies, privatisation, 
the information revolution and the emergence of NGDOs.120 
Although one can argue about the conditions for participation, it 
remains clear that the active involvement of people in a development 
process (whether under the name of participation, empowerment or 
ownership) is regarded nowadays as an absolute prerequisite for devel-
opment by the major players in the field of development aid. The 
question is whether this renewed attention to participation will pay off. 
M. Stiefel and M. Wolfe are quite sceptical about the influence of such 
changes on actual development practice. One of the main reasons for 
their scepticism is the vagueness and ambiguity with which the term 
participation is used. This vagueness and ambiguity can lead to not only 
confusion among the staff of the aid-agencies but also widespread 
cynicism with regard to the emergence of yet another new fad. The 
vagueness and ambiguity in the use of the term participation also allow 
the donors 'to limit themselves when convenient to general proclama-
tions and advocacy of participation without having to spell out the 
practical implications, the political aspects, and thus the power conse-
quences of participation.'121 Other impediments to participation in 
development projects may relate (1) 'the real or imagined political 
power implications' of such participation and the opposition to participa-
tion arising from both local and national elites and powerholders; (2) the 
fact that international agencies are obliged to 'work only with or through 
governments' which makes participation dependent on 'the quality and 
the dominant value systems of public administration and of government 
staff; and (3) the concentration on 'technical and economic aspects of 
development' because 'international organizations and their field staff 
are aware of [...] political problems and constraints.'122 
The question is in what way such an empowerment/participation 
process can be enabled. Central here are the elements already mentioned 
in our definition of empowerment: awareness and capacity building 
accompanied by organisation. 'A truly participatory development process 
cannot be generated spontaneously given the deep-rooted dependency 
relationship that exists,' according to P. Wignaraja.123 A catalyst is 
necessary to initiate the process, and the interaction between the people 
and the catalyst will set 'in motion a process of action-reflection, with 
mobilization, and organization, and further reflection among the poor.' 
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This process, in short, is a process of sensitisation and awareness 
raising, without which people 'are merely manipulated with a pretence 
of consultation.' It is at the same time a process of organisation for 'it is 
difficult for the poor to individually break away from the vicious circle 
of dependence and poverty.' In short: 'participation implies mobilization, 
conscientization, and organization - in that order.'124 
It is these elements which are also central to one example of a partici-
patory development strategy: the People's Participation Programme 
(PPP) from the FAO. In this PPP, in which participation is seen as a 
means as well as an end, group promotors are agents of change and 
assist the target groups in organising 'themselves into small (10-15 
persons), informal, socially and economically homogeneous groups.'125 
Central to this strategy are also the use of participatory action research 
and planning from below.126 Such an approach requires not only that 
'government agencies and institutions [...] reserve a portion of their 
supplies and services for the exclusive use of the disadvantaged rural 
poor' but also that a 'communication and coordination network for all 
levels from central government to the farmer' be established. Only with 
the latter can a match of 'local plans [...] with those plans coming from 
the top national level' be insured.127 The use of participatory action 
research in which the people determine what should happen and how it 
should happen is also intended to avoid the 'paternal trap.' According to 
Chambers,128 complete escape from this trap is not possible for despite 
'rhetoric changes to "participation", "participatory research", "community 
development" and the like, at the end of the day there is still an outsider 
seeking to change things.' In other words: there will always be 'a 
stronger person [who] wants to change things for a [weaker] person.' 
The only remedy - and then only a partial one - is to start any inter-
vention with the priorities of the poor themselves. 
The above shows participation as an end to be about power and 
closely related to the political dimension of development and poverty 
alleviation for 'the exercise of power is politics.'129 As early as 1974, 
Berger noted that 'participation as an objective of aid [...] should be 
recognized for what it is - an externally motivated political act.'130 It 
should be stressed that the need for empowerment, participation in 
decision making, priority for the poor, education, and organisation can 
best be addressed at the local level first. As J. Friedmann states, how-
ever, 'local empowering action requires a strong state' and the preceding 
issues must therefore be addressed at higher levels as well. Political 
empowerment is action empowerment.131 Regional, national, and even 
international broadening of the local empowerment process is an abso-
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lute requirement for development and can be witnessed among the 
"rising stars" of development in the 1980s: the NGDOs. Awareness 
raising and organisation are central elements in the policies of many 
NGDOs and particularly those with strategies incorporating the concepts 
of participation and empowerment. For J. Lane, the 'paradigm shift in 
development thinking' towards a central role for people is strongly 
linked to increased attention to NGDOs.132 
1.2.3 Non-Governmental Development Organisations (NGDOs) 
As already mentioned, NGDOs fit neatly into the neo-liberal revival and 
can also be seen as "instrumental" in the creation of democracy particu-
larly because they are seen as strengthening civil society.133 They have 
also been brought forward as an alternative to government because they 
are supposedly better at reaching the very poorest, 'ideal vehicles and 
agents for participatory development and key actors in strategies to 
empower the poor and excluded,' and also highly valued 'as instruments 
to reduce state intervention and promote the privatization of develop-
ment action.'134 Their alleged flexibility and closeness to the poor 
make them the ideal delivery mechanisms for projects expected to 
benefit the poor. 
The increased funds made available to NGDOs from aid agencies as 
well as governments allowed the number of NGDOs to mushroom but 
also increased demands with regard to professionalism, evaluation, and 
reporting. Simultaneously, these organisations were pushed to "spread 
their wings" and move beyond the local level but without forgetting 
their 'grassroots origins.'133 Although the "NGDO-euphoria" of the 
1980s has made room for a more "realistic" view of the phenomenon in 
the 1990s,136 NGDOs remain an important actor within development in 
general and development cooperation in particular. 
Four important relationships can be distinguished and shown to 
influence the impact of NGDOs in the area of poverty alleviation, 
participation/empowerment and democracy: the relation with (1) foreign 
donors, (2) government, (3) other NGDOs, and (4) the target group.137 
The first two relations, which are the principal funding agencies for 
NGDO activities in Third World countries, have been discussed most 
frequently.138 In the 1980s, Third World governments started acknowl-
edging the importance of NGDOs in reaching the poor. Driven by 
budget cuts and the prevailing ideology which prescribed government 
retreat, the NGDOs came to be viewed by both governments and aid 
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donors as instruments for the provision of social services. The alleged 
participatory approach of the NGDOs was also assumed to contribute to 
the strengthening of civil society and, by doing so, démocratisation, 
which were the new catch-words in development. 
The relations among the NGDOs are regarded as important because of 
their putative role in the strengthening of démocratisation and popular 
participation. Jointly, they can also place greater pressure on the govern-
ment machinery. As D. Korten has noted, however, 'one of the most 
serious barriers to expanding the development roles of NGDOs may be 
the difficulties they face in working with one another. Jealousies among 
them are often intense, and efforts at collaboration all too often break 
down into internecine warfare that paralyses efforts to work together 
towards the achievement of shared purposes.'139 In a survey among 
Indian NGDOs supported by the Dutch co-financing organisation ICCO, 
a large majority of the NGDOs indicated a regular (working) relation 
with other NGDOs. However, this relation was characterised by most of 
the NGDOs as informal (i.e., without fixed goals or strategies). Half of 
these NGDOs also reported problems in this relationship, including 
differences in vision/ideology and differences in strategy/programmes, 
with personality problems also mentioned.140 
Group formation, then, is one of the characteristics which distin-
guishes NGDO activities from government activities.141 Organisation 
into groups is also seen as one of the best ways of achieving a more 
participatory approach (see 1.1.4 above) and thus démocratisation. It is 
important for these groups to operate in a democratic manner and avoid 
becoming another means for already politically, economically, or other-
wise powerful people to either dominate or frustrate the participation of 
the poor. The NGDO should provide opportunities for people to be 
involved in the activities, strategies and decisions of the NGDO itself. It 
will also be important for the "agent of change" to withdraw at some 
point to allow the organised groups to proceed on their own. Over 
dependence on the agent may frustrate efforts at self-reliance on the part 
of the target group.142 Such withdrawal is certainly not an easy task, 
and establishing the appropriate time for withdrawal may be particularly 
problematic, as will become clear in our discussion of some projects in 
Chapters 3 and 4. In general, a withdrawal strategy is difficult to imple-
ment even in cases where the NGDO or some other "agent of change" is 
'committed to people's self-reliant development and pledge[s] to transfer 
control and initiatives to group members.' An ODI evaluation of NGDO 
action with regard to rural poverty alleviation in Bangladesh, however, 
very clearly states that 'the members do not want the NGDO to with-
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draw' and that the 'push towards "member control" comes from national 
and international development theorizing, not from the clients them-
selves.'143 The issue of withdrawal thus remains open to question. 
The distinction between northern and southern NGDOs is important as 
the former are in most cases donor NGDOs and the latter are in most 
cases implementing NGDOs. With money from the government and/or 
public in the donor country the northern (or donor) NGDOs finance 
development projects and programmes in Third World countries.144 
Many of the donor NGDOs are also involved nationally and, increasing-
ly, internationally in both advocacy145 and awareness campaigns.146 
These donor NGDOs constituted an important part of the NGDO mania 
of the 1980s. 'The number of development NGOs registered in the 
OECD countries of the industrialised "North" has grown from 1,600 in 
1980 to 2,970 in 1993.' Over the same period 'the total spending of 
these NGOs has risen from US$2.8 billion to US$5.7 billion in current 
prices' (with similar figures reported for southern NGDOs as well).147 
Donor NGDOs show a remarkable variety as to strategy, ideology and 
fund-raising. In the Netherlands, the most important of these NGDOs are 
the four so-called co-financing organisations: the catholic CEBEMO, the 
protestant ICCO, the neutral NOVIB and the humanistic HIVOS (see 
Chapter 3). 
The implementing agencies for the projects and programmes financed 
by northern NGDOs are either the northern organisations themselves or, 
more often, southern NGDOs. The diversity within the latter group is 
perhaps even larger than that of their northern counterparts and evident 
in the funds available to the organisations and the extent of their activ-
ities. In India, for example, the NGDO Action for Welfare and Awaken-
ing in Rural Environment (AWARE) was, until recently, supported by a 
consortium of donors including NOVIB and ICCO. AWARE is active in 
five states, has a staff of several hundred people and an annual budget 
of millions of guilders. There are also, in contrast, local NGDOs work-
ing solely in one part of a village and implementing a low-budget 
programme without any outside assistance. A division according to size 
or a division on the basis of the use of local versus foreign funds is 
nevertheless much less meaningful than a division on the basis of the 
particular strategy followed by the organisation.148 
D. Korten distinguishes three generations of NGDOs using the follow-
ing indicators: 'relief and welfare,' 'small scale self-reliant local devel-
opment,' and 'sustainable systems development.'149 The first gener-
ation of NGDOs aims, as in the Indian example above, at the alleviation 
of direct needs. The NGDO itself is the most important actor and the 
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people for which the programmes are intended are either marginally 
involved or not at all. The small scale self-reliant local development 
generation emerged at the end of the 1970s and initiated programmes on 
preventive health care, local infrastructure and other community-oriented 
projects. The emphasis was placed on local self-reliance and sustainabili-
ty, and participation by the people thus became necessary. According to 
Korten, the programmes from many of these second generation NGDOs 
run parallel to those of the government. The programmes remained small 
scale and, by definition, there was little room for an analysis of the 
wider causes of inequality,150 which led to the emergence of a third 
generation of NGDOs. 
Realising that the impact of small-scale activities can only be 
guaranteed when supported by an (inter)national system, a growing 
number of NGDOs have increased their efforts to influence policy-
making at the regional, national and international levels. This 
(inter)national advocacy continues to be an area of growth for NGDOs. 
Cooperation between northern and southern NGDOs also appears to be 
an important condition for lobbying activities, as revealed by the Confer-
ence on the Environment in Rio de Janeiro (1992) and the Human 
Rights Conference in Vienna (1995). NGDOs have also been seen to 
form networks at the national level in order to increase pressure on their 
government. This networking is still in an early phase and does not have 
the creation of a strong "civil movement" as its only objective. A survey 
among (former) ICCO counterparts in India showed 90% to have a 
regular working relationship with other NGDOs which could neverthe-
less be categorised as informal in most cases. Furthermore, the central 
focus of the cooperation between the NGDOs remained at the local level 
and for a large part concerned a mutual teaching/learning process with 
respect to the implementation of specific activities and projects.1" 
Although Korten's categorisation clearly shows the development 
within the NGDO sector from small-scale initiatives to national and 
even international advocacy, it neglects the fact that the majority of 
southern NGDOs still belong to the first two generations of NGDOs and 
the fact that an additional subdivision can (and should) be made within 
the second generation of NGDOs. This subdivision pertains to the 
strategy of the organisation with regard to local activities and the 
empowerment strategy of the NGDOs with participation of the target 
group as the central theme. Awareness campaigns, education and 
organisation of the target group are permanent parts of the programmes 
of more NGDOs than ever. The objective of this is twofold: first, to 
attain sustainable poverty alleviation and, second, to influence the policy 
Aid, poverty and participation 41 
of regional and national governments through a process of mental, 
economic, social and political strengthening of the poor. In other words, 
four generations of NGDOs can be distinguished on the basis of their 
'charitable, developmental, participatory, or globalist approaches,'152 
and the concept of empowerment emerged with the participatory gener-
ation. 
1.3 Conclusions 
According to D. Lai 'an emerging theme [in the 1990s] amongst both 
practitioners and analysts of developing countries is the role of popular 
participation, and in particular of nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) 
in both the promotion of democracy (seen as essential for better govern-
ance) and the maintenance of a market economy.'153 The historical 
overview presented above showed how this merging of the political and 
economic dimensions of development occurred and that these dimen-
sions are also strongly connected to what has been labelled the social 
dimension of development and to poverty alleviation. Poverty alleviation 
was an integral part of modernist development thinking as it emerged in 
the 1950s and 1960s and later linked to employment, to basic needs and 
to participation/empowerment in the 1970s and late 1980s. The 1990s 
presented yet another perspective on the concept of poverty alleviation. 
Poverty is seen as a threat to human security and as going hand in hand 
with other threats to such security including drugs, environmental 
degradation, migration, and unemployment.154 The multidimensional 
definition of poverty (and thus of its alleviation) is increasingly being 
acknowledged and bringing greater emphasis on what can be considered 
the political dimension of development. 
The latter was already evident in the (re-)emergence of such concepts 
as democracy, ownership and civil society which clearly point to the 
necessity of active (political) participation. The DAC has most recently 
alluded to this need in the following manner: 'we have learned that 
successful development projects are more likely in a sound policy 
environment [...] that the quality of policies [...] is influenced by the 
political processes by which decisions are made [and that these pro-
cesses are] influenced by the capacity of people and institutions, not 
only to formulate decisions, but also to carry them out on a sustained 
basis.'155 The major difference with regard to the conceptualisations of 
poverty in the 1970s and the 1980s/1990s is, therefore, not so much the 
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inclusion of new elements or dimensions.156 The major difference can 
be found, rather, in the individualisation of the concept. Under the 
banner of putting people at the centre of development and under the 
influence of neo-conservative (development) thinking greater emphasis is 
now placed on what can be called the own responsibility of the poor in 
the fighting of poverty. In DAC terms, 'helping people to improve their 
capacity to overcome poverty.'157 
The question that remains is: What are the means for improving this 
capacity, either on an individual or a collective basis?158 The answer is 
clear from the strategy emerging in the 1990s which is centred around 
the three dimensions distinguished in the preceding: An integrated 
development strategy in which attention to employment and income is 
coupled to basic needs and empowerment of the poor. This all occurs 
under the banner of individual and collective ownership with a strong 
focus on démocratisation and the NGDOs are seen as important facilitat-
ing agencies. This integrated approach is thus an accumulation of the 
strategies developed since the 1950s onwards. These strategies focused 
alternately on growth/economics and people/direct poverty alleviation 
with the latter including greater attention to participation as well. 
It should be stressed that despite the distinction of four periods in the 
preceding, a single major thought runs through all of these periods and 
thereby makes them variations on a theme. The theme is that of 
modernisation, which can be characterised by thinking in relatively 
simple dichotomies. The basic idea is that modem society is the goal of 
development because it has some typical social, economic and political 
patterns which are missing in traditional societies. By transforming these 
traditional societies following the patterns of modern society develop-
ment is attained.159 This thinking has basically not changed over the 
years, and it is fair to state that modernisation strategies have dominated 
development thinking since the years after World War II. 
Such modernisation thinking is illustrated by the fact that developing 
countries are always set against developed countries to determine the 
appropriate route to development. The focus of this comparison has been 
differentiated over the years (into educational, growth, industrial and 
democratic levels, for example), but it has remained a comparison to 
reveal the areas in which the Third World is lagging. Development and 
modernisation thinking are thus aimed at the bridging of this gap and 
the major factor binding such diverse subjects as education and democ-
racy is their role in modem society, in casu western society. Western 
thinking has always dominated development thinking, and the fact that 
this is now being acknowledged more explicitly can only be welcomed. 
2 
Dutch bilateral aid to India 
Since the start of Dutch development aid in the 1950s, billions of 
guilders have found their way to projects, programmes and activities in 
developing countries. Most of this aid has been provided in the form of 
bilateral aid (i.e., aid from one country to another) and most of this 
bilateral aid has been allocated to a limited number of countries. One of 
these countries is India. In this chapter, Dutch bilateral aid to India will 
be examined. Starting with a brief overview of the major landmarks in 
the provision of bilateral aid from the early 1960s, Dutch aid policy to 
India and the outcomes of this policy will be discussed and then evalu-
ated along the lines set out in the Introduction. 
2.1 Dutch bilateral development aid 
Dutch bilateral aid to non-colonies started in the early 1960s and has 
been the major component of total Dutch aid since the late 1960s. The 
bilateral channel has also, in contrast to the multilateral and private 
channels, stirred up major controversies between the political parties in 
the Dutch Parliament. Further examination of the parliamentary debates 
on bilateral aid, however, show these controversies to be limited to only 
a few issues. Probably the most controversial issue has been the selec-
tion of countries to receive the major bulk of the aid (i.e., concentration 
countries or, since the mid-1980s, programme countries). Another 
important and recurring issue relates to the volume of aid. The pollution 
of the budget should also be mentioned (i.e., the placement of an 
increasing number of items under the budget of the Ministry for Devel-
opment Cooperation which do not bear a direct relation to development 
aid or development cooperation). In the late 1980s, this pollution came 
to a peak with the massive number of refugees arriving in the Nether-
lands. Finally, the involvement of the Dutch private sector in the provi-
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sion of development aid has also stood central in many of the discussi-
ons of bilateral aid over the last three decades. 
The involvement of the private sector was made into a public issue at 
the end of the 1980s when not only the evaluation desk of DGIS itself 
but also P. Hoebink heavily criticised the role of the private sector in the 
provision of aid. In addition to the presentation of some 150 pages of 
white elephants in Tanzania and Sri Lanka, Hoebink also presented a 
comprehensive historical overview of Dutch bilateral aid based on the 
policy documents of the successive Ministers for Development Cooper-
ation.' In this review, Hoebink distinguished six periods and four 
important turning points in the bilateral development-policy of the 
Netherlands. 
The first period is from 1949 to 1964 and called the 'running period' 
because it is mainly characterised by a focus on multilateral aid and aid 
to the Dutch colonies: Surinam, Dutch Antilles and New Guinea. 
Multilateral aid occupied 23% of the total aid-allocations between 1950 
and 1962,2 and it was preferred because the Netherlands 'as a small 
country had insufficient financial means at its disposal to provide 
bilateral aid on a large scale.' The limited contribution of 'political and 
economic interests' to the provision of multilateral aid and the general 
'economy' of the Dutch government also played a role in this choice.3 
The emergence of bilateral aid in the 1963 budget and, in particular, the 
fast growth of this type of aid in the years to follow, mark the first 
'turning point' within Dutch development policy.4 
The second period is from 1965 to 1973 and is largely a result of 
pressure from the corporate sector in the Netherlands. In two papers in 
1960 and 1964, Dutch employers organisations called for increased 
bilateral aid because development aid is not only 'a moral duty, but also 
a case of well-understood self-interest.' The Minister of Foreign Affairs 
changed his thinking and accepted bilateral aid because of 'the promo-
tion of [Dutch] export.'5 Starting in 1966, the amount of bilateral aid 
showed a sharp increase and, in 1968, it had already surpassed the 
amount of multilateral aid. The amount of bilateral aid has also 
remained larger than the amount of aid passed through multilateral 
organisations. With the initiation of bilateral aid the politically sensitive 
issue of concentration countries emerged and would continue to domi-
nate discussions in the Dutch Parliament well into the 1980s.6 In con-
nection with this concentration issue, the division between technical and 
financial aid also became more important. Financial aid is largely 
restricted to concentration countries while technical aid is not. 
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In 1965, the first Minister for Development Cooperation, Bot, was 
installed. He would be succeeded by Udink in 1967 and by Boertien in 
1971. Writing on the 'formation of cabinets and development cooperati-
on' between 1965 and 1982, P.F. Maas concluded that 'the creation of a 
Minister without portfolio responsible for matters concerning aid to 
developing countries mainly happened for political and personal rea-
sons.'7 Moreover, the creation of a ministerial position without an 
independent department and budget within the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs created confusion with regard to his exact tasks. Ten months 
after Bot became Minister, his task was defined as follows: 'the Minister 
without portfolio [is] responsible for the promotion of a strong and 
coherent aid policy. For this he, among others, has a coordinating and 
stimulating task, to which the division of tasks within the cabinet will be 
constantly tuned. The Minister without portfolio carries responsibility for 
the total policy of the Dutch Parliament on this issue.' This formulation 
did not end the confusion, however, because nothing was organised with 
regard to the official authority of the Minister with respect to aid 
allocations, international trade and international financial institutions. For 
Udink this issue created hardly any problems. Although the Minister for 
Development Cooperation did not have prime responsibility for such 
issues as UNCTAD or aid allocation, he clearly had a finger in the pie 
for both issues.8 
The third period covers the years 1973 to 1977 and is characterised 
by the solution of the question with regard to responsibility for aid 
allocations and international trade and finance. One of the first achieve-
ments of Pronk, who became Minister for Development Cooperation in 
1973, was to gain responsibility for the World Bank and the develop-
ment banks together with the Minister of Finance, and the UNCTAD, 
together with the Minister of Economic Affairs. Pronk became solely 
responsible for the consortia, aid groups policy and financial aid.9 With 
this, development aid became development cooperation; the Minister 
was not only responsible for the aid itself but also shared responsibility 
for the foreign-trade and financial policy of the Netherlands.10 Pronk 
also presented new criteria for the selection of concentration countries, 
although this did not lead to the removal of countries from the list. 
Some new countries were added, however, and the inclusion of Cuba 
created some tensions between mainly the liberal party and Pronk. The 
rapid growth of the total budget for development cooperation within this 
period produced organisational problems within the Ministry and led to 
a growing 'reservoir' of allocated but not as yet disbursed funds. The 
Netherlands also became one of the first donors to reach the target 
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percentage of 0.7% of the Gross National Product (GNP) for develop-
ment aid." 
Although multilateral and bilateral aid showed considerable increases 
in this third period, it was mainly the bilateral aid that boomed due to 
substantial increases in the amount of programme aid.12 Despite this 
growth, Pronk only presented a white paper on bilateral aid at the end of 
his ministerial period in 1977.'3 Central to this report was the term 
self-reliance, which referred to 'economic, political, and social emanci-
pation' at the macro- or national level as well as at the micro- or target 
group level. A need for greater attention to the identification and prep-
aration of development projects in order to increase the quality of the 
Dutch aid was also expressed. Aid should be focused as much as 
possible on the poor in the Third World. Development projects should 
focus on 'fighting welfare inequality, on direct alleviation of the present 
needs of the poor, and on activities aimed at strengthening the economic 
position of the poor.' With the preceding words, reference was made to 
the redistribution strategies announced by the World Bank in the early 
1970s and to the ideas of the ILO with regard to basic needs (see Chap-
ter 1). The new goal of development cooperation became the redistribu-
tion of power and wealth in the world. Towards this end, the poor 
nations should strengthen their negotiating positions and try to achieve 
national and collective self-reliance. Dutch aid policy would be directed 
at the strengthening of the position of the poor with respect to the 
wealthy.14 
Pronk's white paper constitutes the second turning point in the deve-
lopment of Dutch aid policy for it was the first explicit formulation of 
such policy. The validity of this turning point can be questioned when 
the execution of such policy is examined, but such an excursion into 
actual practice is not necessary here.15 One can also ask whether this 
turning point should not in fact be situated a few years earlier. A 
number of the developments at the outset of Prank's ministerial period 
(e.g., the solution of a number of authority questions, new criteria for 
concentration countries, attainment of the international standard for 
development aid) appear to qualify this entire period as a turning point 
in the development of Dutch cooperation policy. 
The fourth period starts in 1977 and lasts until 1982 to include the 
Ministries of De Koning (1977-1981) and Van Dijk (1981-82). This 
period is largely characterised by a continuation of the policy set out 
under Pronk. One difference concerned the objective of Dutch aid. De 
Koning retained the most important objective of poverty alleviation 
using a target-group approach but added the 'promotion of political and 
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economic émancipation' of nations. This led to the so-called two-track 
policy in which an improvement in the position of the poor was coupled 
to the economic self-reliance of Third World countries. This was not 
very new as such a policy could also be distilled out of the macro- and 
micro- levels of the self-reliance policy formulated by Pronk. De Koning 
also changed the criteria for inclusion as a concentration country and 
removed Cuba from the list at the beginning of his ministerial period 
and Turkey, Tunisia, Nigeria, Peru, and Jamaica at a later stage. In order 
to improve the quality of bilateral aid, De Koning opted for a program-
matic approach,15 for broadening relations with developing countries 
(see 2.2.2 below) and for a sectoral and regional concentration within 
the aid to specific countries. In 1979, the latter led to a reorganisation of 
DGIS and thereby the merging of the separate desks for technical and 
financial aid into regional and country desks and the creation of sector 
desks.17 
The Ministry of Van Dijk lasted only 14 months and thus gave him 
little room to leave a mark on Dutch development policy. Van Dijk 
nevertheless more fervently focused on the relation to Dutch business 
than his predecessor. In keeping with De Koning, Van Dijk criticised the 
business community for not taking a more active role in relations with 
the Third World.18 Three other developments then characterised the 
Ministry of Van Dijk: his troubles with the civil service because of his 
'inaccessibility and lack of communication,'19 the introduction of a 
cash-ceiling on expenditures at the beginning of the 1980s and a new 
struggle with regard to responsibility for the World Bank settled in 
favour of the Minister of Finance. The introduction of a cash-ceiling on 
expenditures was part of a general economy measure and meant in effect 
that the reservoir of allocated but not as yet disbursed funds could not 
be tapped and the 'arrangement in the coalition agreement (maintenance 
of aid at 1.5% of Net National Income) remained paper.' 
The authority question, the reservoir and certainly the involvement of 
Dutch business in development cooperation/aid found their height in the 
fifth period under the first liberal Minister for Development Cooperation, 
Schoo. At the end of 1982, some nine years after Pronk first gained a 
voice with regard to Dutch foreign-trade and financial policy, Schoo 
gave this voice away to the Ministries of Finance and Economic Affairs. 
In conclusion, 'the Minister for Development Cooperation [became] a 
Minister for only development aid.'20 Schoo also cancelled the reser-
voir altogether and the millions of Dutch guilders waiting to be dis-
bursed in developing countries went straight back to the Dutch treasury 
as a result. Schoo was only allowed to spend slightly more than was 
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budgeted and then for only a few years. Starting in 1985 the total budget 
for development aid was to be spent in the same fiscal year leading to 
even greater disbursement pressure on DGIS. Schoo is most famous for 
her two white papers in which the involvement of Dutch business in 
development cooperation is made official policy.21 
In the first of these papers (the Reverification Paper), the two objec-
tives of De Koning (poverty alleviation and economic self-reliance) were 
combined into a new central objective for Dutch aid: structural poverty 
alleviation. At least in the eyes of Schoo, the artificial distinction 
between the tracks of economic self-reliance and poverty alleviation was 
thereby abolished. The Minister adjusted the criteria for concentration 
countries (which she called programme countries) and three countries 
were removed from the list. In addition to programme countries, Schoo 
also distinguished programme regions to receive aid through the two 
concentration sectors for Dutch aid: rural development and industrial 
development. It was further stipulated that projects be executed as much 
as possible by Dutch business: contracting out therefore became the 
norm.22 In a follow-up paper published under the well-chosen title 
'Development Cooperation and Employment,' the involvement of Dutch 
industry and trade was further elaborated. With contracting out as the 
rule, it was also argued that aid sectors and activities matching the 
Dutch supply possibilities should be chosen. Finally, cooperation 
between Dutch industry and developing countries was to be stimulated, 
and a 'well functioning informal consultative structure' should be 
created. 
The period Schoo constitutes the third turning point in the Dutch 
development of Dutch aid policy mainly because of the focus on Dutch 
business. Whether this period really constitutes a turning point in 
practice can again be asked as the focus 'was mainly expressed in 
official documents and in only a part (broadening of the aid, namely 
fitting in the trade and investment relations, with India and Indonesia; 
fertiliser export) of the actual policy.'23 The initiative for this turning 
point was already made at the end of the 1970s, moreover, under De 
Koning. After the elections in 1986, Schoo left to become Dutch Am-
bassador to India and was succeeded by Bukman. Bukman's Ministry 
has been described as 'the most colourless period in the history of Dutch 
development cooperation.' In addition to the introduction of four themes 
(three of which disappeared one year later) and support to 'young 
democracies' in Central America and the Philippines, Bukman's central 
theme was centred around donor coordination. Few results have been 
observed, however. In response to the quality debate which started in 
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1988, Bukman also presented a white paper with little or nothing to add 
to the issues raised in the debate.24 
The sixth period and with it the fourth turning point in the develop-
ment of Dutch policy, started in November 1989 when Pronk became 
Minister for the second time. Ten months later, Pronk presented a white 
paper of almost 400 pages under the title 'A World of Difference.'25 In 
addition to a comprehensive analysis of the role of development cooper-
ation in the world order after the fall of the Berlin Wall, this white 
paper changed - following the Brundtland report ~ the central objective 
of Dutch aid to sustainable poverty alleviation. Poverty alleviation thus 
returned as the central element in development cooperation, although the 
structural objective of economic self-reliance at a country level was 
certainly not abandoned. The objective of sustainable poverty alleviation 
also implies the same elements found in the two track policy of De 
Koning. With respect to poverty alleviation, three issues were placed 
central: investments in the productive capacity of poor, investments in 
basic needs and investments in enlarging the participation of the poor in 
political decision making. With respect to sustainable development, three 
issues were placed central: 'growth in production, an equitable distribu-
tion, and preservation of environmental utilisation space.'26 For Hoe-
bink, the second period Pronk is characterised by the presentation of this 
white paper, an impact study of the four Dutch co-financing organisati-
ons (see Chapter 3), and by the termination of development cooperation 
with Indonesia. Under Pronk, moreover, also the first real cuts in the 
budget for development cooperation occurred. It was Pronk who increa-
sed the budget to 1.5% of the GNP in the 1970s, and it was also Pronk 
who reduced this budget to around 0.8% in 1995.27 
In sum: This short historical overview of the development of Dutch 
bilateral aid shows clear parallels to the evolution of development 
thinking outlined in Chapter 1. An emphasis on technical aid and capital 
investments first occurred. Growing attention to more direct poverty 
alleviation in the 1970s under the banner of self-reliance and also 
greater attention to international policy and aid policy later occurred. In 
the 1980s, the discussion again returned to aid per se; only at the end of 
the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s with the return of Pronk as 
Minister, poverty alleviation again became the main objective of devel-
opment cooperation. At the same time, poverty alleviation was embed-
ded in such themes as democracy and participation which were also 
gaining importance in international policies. In the development of 
bilateral aid in particular, the selection of developing countries and 
competition between the Ministries played a definite role along with 
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questions regarding the roles of the Dutch private sector and the Dutch 
economic interest in the provision of such aid. Discussions with regard 
to the quality of the Dutch aid projects and programmes only come to 
the forefront at the end of the 1980s. This is not to say that the qualitat-
ive aspects of Dutch bilateral aid were not addressed in several white 
papers from the successive Ministers: self-reliance and participation 
were considered by Pronk; organisational changes and a more program-
matic approach were considered by De Koning; thematic changes and 
greater contracting out were considered by Schoo, and organisational 
changes and more attention to the pre-financing phase of development 
programmes were considered by Pronk. 
2.2 The India policy of DGIS 
In the following, a historical picture of the aid policy towards India in 
particular will be presented. In doing this, three periods will be distin-
guished: up to 1973, 1974-1984 and 1985-1992. 
2.2.1 Up to 1973: Dutch economic interests and India 
Apart from colonies and former colonies, India was the first developing 
country to receive bilateral aid from the Netherlands. After the decision 
in the early 1960s to initiate bilateral aid on a larger scale, the Nether-
lands gave a preference to those countries for which a consortium of 
donors already existed. Such a consortium had been launched in 1958 
for India under the chairmanship of the World Bank. The early members 
of this Aid India Consortium (AIC) were the United States, the United 
Kingdom, West Germany, Canada and the World Bank. The AIC was 
set up with a view to keeping India 'out of the influence of the Soviet 
Union.'28 A consortium is also usually set up to help coordinate the aid 
to a particular country, but for India this was hardly the case.29 
On May 25, 1962, the Netherlands decided to join the AIC.30 There 
were some compelling reasons for doing so, and these included the 
interests of the Dutch private sector in India. Dutch exports were 
increasingly threatened (and in some cases actually cancelled) as India 
was forced by 'a desperate shortage of foreign exchange' to 'confine 
consideration [for imports] to countries with which [it had] a line of 
credit.'31 The discussion in the Netherlands centred around the Ministry 
of Finance (which was hesitant to join because of the continual and 
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variable claims to government funds), the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
(which was very much in favour of joining), and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (which was in favour, because of pressure from other western 
donors and the 'conviction that the [...] stable Indian administrative 
machinery, the availability of sufficient technical experts and a reason-
able infrastructure would make effective aid possible').32 
In 1969 Minister Udink declared that 'all development aid was spent 
for 100% in the Netherlands,'33 and Dutch aid to India in this period 
indeed used to finance Dutch industrial exports to India. From the total 
disbursements of around 193 million under aid through 1968, a total of 
150 Dutch companies appear to have profited. Some 70% of this 
amount, however, was used for exports from only five companies.34 
Philips, for instance, exported for some Dfl. 112 million in aid to India 
between 1962 and 1973; the larger part of this export went to its own 
branches, moreover. Fertiliser, supplied for the first time under aid to 
India in 1965, took up some Dfl. 35.5 million in aid through 1972 while 
IHC (shipbuilding) was good for nearly Dfl. 45 million.35 In essence 
only large companies and/or companies with subsidiaries in India 
regularly exported under aid.36 
One can thus be very brief about the policy of the Dutch Ministry for 
Development Cooperation towards India in this period. Based on the 
broad policy lines set out by the Ministers Bot and Udink, Dutch 
development policy was 'emphatically given shape by the wishes of 
Dutch trade and industry and in which bilateral aid became the most 
important channel and the Ministry of Economic Affairs played first 
fiddle.'37 From the joining of the AIC in 1962 up to the first minister-
ial period of Pronk starting in 1973, development aid to India (as well as 
to other developing countries) was determined in policy and practice by 
Dutch economic interests. The Directorate General for Foreign Econ-
omic Relations (BEB), which had pressed for the joining of the AIC 
together with the relevant industries, headed the annual consultations 
between the Netherlands and India in the 1960s and early 1970s.38 
BEB heavily advocated the interests of the Dutch corporate sector in the 
decisions regarding disbursements, and based on 'shopping lists drawn 
up by both sides [...] almost all development aid [...] was used to 
finance Indian imports from the Netherlands.'39 
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2.2.2 1974-1984: Poverty alleviation, concentration and broadening 
The changing views on aid expressed by Minister for Development 
Cooperation Pronk together with the replacement of BEB by DGIS as 
head of the Dutch delegation to the annual consultations paved the way 
for the introduction of projects aimed at (direct) poverty alleviation. 
Significant improvement in the balance-of-payments position of India 
also contributed to this shift, which was further 'inspired by the recogni-
tion that industrialisation and economic growth in India had relatively 
minor effects on the welfare and prosperity of the majority of the 
population.'40 The fact that development aid to India consisted mainly 
of 'fertilizer export by Dutch fertilizer manufacturers' also strengthened 
policy aimed at diversification of the aid relationship and the establish-
ment of a more equal balance between project and programme aid.41 
Whereas the outcome of the annual consultations in 1974 was a near 
copy of previous outcomes (i.e., only commitments for import support 
and projects with a large capital-goods component), the outcome of the 
1975 consultation saw a new phenomenon: a commitment for social 
projects (i.e., projects aimed at poverty alleviation). 
The commitment of Dfl. 15 million for social projects in 1975 and 
again in 1976 was not so difficult to achieve, but disbursement of these 
millions proved to be much more troublesome.42 It was 1977 before the 
funds were finally spent for the Small Farmers Development 
Agency/Marginal Farmers and Agricultural Labourers programmes from 
the Indian government.43 Problems in identifying suitable social pro-
jects for funding under Dutch aid manifested themselves right from the 
beginning. With the introduction of social projects, DGIS wanted to 
provide additional funds for priority projects or programmes aimed at 
the less privileged and economically poor sections of the population for 
which there were either no or insufficient funds available in India itself. 
In setting up the budget, however, India had already earmarked the 
donor funds. One cannot, thus, speak of additionality or 'priority pro-
grammes and projects.'44 At the same time, the Indian preference for 
import support obstructed easy identification of projects in the field of 
poverty alleviation. Proposals for social projects were hard to come 
by.45 
The latter touches upon one other reason for the difficulties in build-
ing up a project pipeline or the so-called additionality principle. This 
principle originates from the fact that the Indian government received all 
of the foreign aid and then distributed the funds among states and state 
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enterprises. In this way, the Government of India (Gol) maximised its 
say in the foreign aid. As discussed above, foreign aid out of the regular 
programme was already contained in the Indian budget and as such was 
by definition not additional. In 1978, DGIS concluded that states were 
not very eager to start social projects with foreign funds, for 'in many 
cases they have to pay the full amount of the aid in rupees to the central 
government or they only receive an additionality of 25%.,46 
In practice only part (i.e., the additionality) of the funds received for 
projects was transferred from the central government to the states. Up 
until 1977 this additionality was set at 25% which meant that the states 
had to pay 75% themselves. The additionality was raised to 35% in 
1978 and to 70% one year later. The 'remaining 30% go the general 
budget and should in fact be regarded as budget support, which could be 
used just as well for military expenditures or social projects in any of 
the states.'47 The conditions under which a foreign donor provided aid 
were also not passed on to the states. Foreign funds (whether grants or 
loans) were lumped together by the Indian government and 'on the basis 
of this [the Gol] decides on the 'average financial conditions' under 
which this aid will be transferred to the states for the social projects of 
the foreign donors.'48 In practice, funds were partly transferred to states 
as a grant and partly as a loan. It did to the states, thus, not really matter 
whether the funding of a project came as a loan or a grant. According to 
DGIS, it was thus no disadvantage to the states if part of the grant was 
used for import support. 
Matters were further complicated in 1984 when DGIS decided to sub-
tract 15% from local cost-financing (LCF) projects because 'the policy 
of the Netherlands does not allow for reimbursements of local taxes.'49 
Between the local tax component and the additionality provided by the 
central government, 40.5% of the project costs had to be financed out of 
the state budget.50 It took up to 1988 before additionality was set at 
100% and the total costs (excluding the tax component) were covered by 
foreign aid. Not surprisingly, it was only in 1989 that DGIS observed 
the project pipeline to have developed very well.51 
The difficulties experienced in setting up a project pipeline led to 
slow disbursement rates for the Dutch aid. One of the ways in which 
DGIS tried to increase disbursements was by concentrating on specific 
sectors. For one of these concentration sectors (i.e., rural water supply), 
the first projects were sanctioned in 1977. The annual consultations in 
the late 1970s only led to further commitments or reservations for a 
minor irrigation project and the Kamataka Industrial Sheds-programme 
(within the social project aid) and for harbours and fishery (within the 
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economic self-reliance track). Over the years, however, different sectors 
were opted to become concentration sectors. In 1978, with the agree-
ment to concentrate the development programme as far as possible on a 
limited number of sectors,52 four (possible) concentration sectors were 
mentioned: rural water supply, minor irrigation, rural electrification and 
urban improvement. 
One year later, the rural drinking water sector was brought forward by 
DGIS as the main concentration sector for social projects, mainly 
because it was thought that the similarity among the various projects 
would facilitate early appraisal and implementation. India disagreed; 
drinking water projects in various states were not deemed to be exten-
sions of projects elsewhere. Slum improvement and agriculture were 
brought forward as possible concentration sectors at the beginning of the 
1980s.53 Watertransport later followed as part of the broadening exer-
cise (see below) and was succeeded by energy and environmental 
projects. Agriculture, rural electrification and urban development did not 
grow into concentration sectors. With regard to rural electrification, for 
instance, DGIS turned down project proposals in 1980 and again in 1981 
as such funding would bring the Netherlands into a new sector on a very 
large scale.54 Agriculture was dropped in 1986. The agricultural agree-
ment signed as part of a broadening exercise (see below) was regarded 
as interesting from the viewpoint of technology, science and commerce 
but much less interesting in light of the objectives of development 
cooperation. There were also no projects as yet emerging from the 
agreement. During the 1987 consultations, DGIS discontinued assistance 
to agricultural projects falling under the cash ceiling due to 'manpower 
constraints.'55 Only in the second half of the 1980s would closure on 
the issue of sector concentration be achieved. 
The concentration of Dutch aid on social projects was also pursued 
with regard to the states, but Indian rules and regulations proved to be a 
major obstacle.56 The first social projects (i.e., rural drinking water) 
were implemented in the states of Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh 
in 1977. These states were followed by Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, 
Madhya Pradesh and Kamataka one year later. At the beginning of the 
1980s, Kerala, Rajasthan, West Bengal and Tamil Nadu followed while 
DGIS had already wondered whether its aid was not too scattered for 
some time. In 1979, DGIS had proposed concentrating its aid on a few 
states (at that time state concentration was only opportune for drinking 
water projects). India, however, wanted to avoid regional disparities 'in 
view of the arrangements for the additionality provided by the Central 
Government to the States.'57 After committing funds for new drinking 
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water projects in Himachal Pradesh and Rajasthan during the consulta-
tions in 1980, it was agreed that 'the Indian authorities would endeavour 
to limit to the extent possible the number of States to which Dutch 
assistance will be given' (emphasis added, LS).58 
Other important policy developments between 1978 and 1983 pertain 
to integrated rural development and to broadening. The former concept 
predominantly arose in connection with drinking-water and irrigation 
projects with the intention of moving from mere construction activities 
to a more integrated approach and thereby undertaking additional 
activities in the fields of health, income generation, organisation and 
education (see Chapters 3 and 4). The concept of broadening occupied 
several minds within a number of Dutch Ministries throughout the 1980s 
and pertains to expansion of the relationships between India and the 
Netherlands. In 1977/78, a study had already been contemplated with 
regard to the relationship between India and the Netherlands because 
this relationship was dominated by development cooperation and India 
was striving for less dependence on foreign aid.59 The motivation for 
broadening is also the fear of a post-aid period with little or no relation-
ships to India.60 The fact that economic ties with India were hard to 
develop outside of the aid relationship was important in this regard.61 
In October 1979, the special advisor for Development Cooperation 
(His Royal Highness Prince Claus) was asked to set up a working 
committee in order 'to make an inventory and analysis of the develop-
ment relationship with India in light of other bilateral relationships and 
to make recommendations for an integral Dutch development policy.' 
Special attention was to be given to the areas of science, commerce and 
culture. In a report issued by the 'Working Committee Country Policy 
India' in November 1980, the 'bilateral relations outside of development 
cooperation' were indeed observed to be 'only minor and incidental.'62 
The committee recommended better coordination, intensification and 
broadening of the bilateral relations between the Netherlands and India 
particularly within the economic, scientific, cultural and agricultural 
areas. Needless to say, these recommendations fit in neatly with the 
policy recommendations of the then Minister De Koning with (eco-
nomic) interdependency and the need for a broader view of development 
cooperation as the cornerstones.63 
As a consequence of this Working Committee paper, it was decided 
in December 1980 to broaden the relationship with India. In this broade-
ning exercise, development aid was regarded as the catalyst for the 
establishment of new and other relations between the two countries. Not 
surprisingly and as observed in the Country Policy Plan for India in 
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1984, these relations were largely economic: 'particularly in the com-
mercial field not unsatisfactory initiatives were taken' and different 
agreements were signed aimed at a 'structural cooperation between 
Indian and Dutch trade and industries.'64 Despite these positive state-
ments, the Dutch corporate sector was at first not very enthusiastic.65 
India, however, seemed quite charmed by the idea of broadening the 
relationship with the Netherlands, as long as it did not require funds 
from its own budget. For India any supply or service aimed at strengthe-
ning its self-reliance was an activity in keeping with broadening, which 
suggests that they also viewed broadening as a predominantly economic 
exercise. 
There were initially no guidelines to streamline the broadening 
exercise and DGIS, which was to act as intermediary, had difficulties 
finding broadening activities that also fit its development objectives. 
Two conditions were particularly difficult to reconcile: namely that the 
broadening activities be relevant from a development perspective and 
otherwise not feasible (i.e., without additional subsidies).66 The Dfl. 25 
million which were reserved for broadening during the annual consulta-
tions in 1982 were eventually spent for the supply of a specific type of 
dredger by IHC, although the relevance of this supply from a develop-
ment perspective could be questioned.67 Further broadening projects 
under the regular programme were not undertaken, and the exercise 
more or less came to a halt. Although several cooperation agreements 
between India and the Netherlands were signed within the broadening 
exercise, like the agreement on economic and technical cooperation of 
March 1983,68 the exercise basically failed to materialise.69 It was not 
until the second half of the 1980s, however, that DGIS acknowledged 
that its contribution to broadening had come to an end — mainly because 
staff restrictions had made the active and qualitative monitoring of the 
wide range of activities 'not possible.'70 
2.2.3 1985-1992: Consolidation of the aid programme 
In November 1984, the India desk from DGIS produced the first more 
comprehensive country policy-plan based on the assumption that 'the 
objectives of Dutch development cooperation policy corresponded (and 
still correspond) in broad outline to the development policy of the Indian 
government.'71 An array of priorities for Dutch aid to India is men-
tioned including a target of 55% of disbursements for rural development 
and 45% for urban development, largely via import support.72 As this 
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division does not correspond to the massive Indian need for rural 
development, allocation of extra funds from the sector programme for 
rural development was simultaneously proposed (i.e., from non-regular 
funds, see also 2.3 below). 
Rural development activities should focus on rural drinking water, 
small-scale irrigation and land improvement for small farmers, (possibly) 
rural credit, and projects geared at increasing productivity in agriculture 
and livestock. With regard to drinking water projects, DGIS intended to 
start activities aimed at the sustainable improvement of the positions of 
small farmers, the landless, and women.73 The main objective of these 
projects was 'sustainable employment' to be reached by activities in the 
field of off-farm employment, environmental improvements, energy, and 
improvements in the health situation of the people.74 In the case of 
industrial development, five concentration sectors were selected: water 
transport, energy, environmental technique, agro-industry and fertiliser 
infrastructure. The so-called 'broadening projects' were to fall within 
one of these sectors in the future although DGIS 'will be flexible with 
regard to proposals outside these sectors.' Small-scale industry and the 
informal sector would also be part of the industrial development activ-
ities mainly 'under the LCF programme' and sectoral programme 
funds.75 
The 1984 paper stipulated that back-financing of imports would not 
be allowed anymore, and DGIS would try to introduce 'levies and/or 
taxes' to finance recurrent costs (i.e., 'salaries and other operational 
costs') instead of covering these out of the aid budget.76 In this paper, 
it was further promised that the possibilities for co-financing with the 
World Bank and the involvement of Indian NGDOs in the bilateral 
programme would be investigated. Four criteria (i.e., degree of poverty, 
quality of the 'receiving structure' in the state, experiences of multilat-
eral organisations, and 'accessibility') were mentioned for the selection 
of concentration states. These criteria, however, were only applicable for 
a sixth state to be selected in addition to the already existing concentra-
tion states of Gujarat, Uttar Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Kerala and 
Karnataka. Finally, the India-desk at DGIS formulated some other areas 
for special attention: education and research (mainly by stimulating 
cooperation between Indian and Dutch institutions as part of the broade-
ning exercise) and women (with emphasis on employment as part of 
rural drinking water projects, among others). 
Whereas the 1984 policy paper was meant for internal use by DGIS 
only, the country policy-paper for the period 1985-1988 (presented at the 
beginning of 1986) was sent to parliament.77 Broadly speaking, the 
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country policy-paper was a copy of the 1984 policy paper with some 
subtle changes. In the 1984 paper, for instance, it was stated that 'India 
was informed that fertiliser supply will decrease' because of increased 
production in India itself; in the official 1986 document, it is remarked 
for the same reason that a 'gradual reduction of fertiliser aid is thought 
possible.' It is remarked with regard to the broadening exercise in the 
official 1986 document that 'the original idea behind [the exercise] has 
manifested itself insufficiently,'78 while such an assessment was simply 
not present in 1984. With regard to policy intentions for the period 
1985-1988, the official 1986 document changes the 55% for rural 
development in 1984 to 50-60% with 25% for fertiliser supply in both 
cases. More important are the changes made with regard to local cost 
financing. In 1984, this was restricted to poverty alleviation projects, but 
in 1986 it was added that 'in the near future more LCF will be needed 
for industrial projects in India, particularly projects in which Dutch and 
Indian firms work together.' A paragraph on contracting out is also 
added in which this general policy is described. 
Nothing was changed with regard to the concentration states, although 
it is noted that the five states were selected on the basis of positive 
experiences. Considering the fact that the states were said a few pages 
earlier in the document, to have been selected on the basis of project 
supply, one may wonder whether the word 'positive' should be replaced 
by the word 'most.' In the area of industrial development, one sector is 
added: 'although telecommunication is not one of the concentration 
sectors [...] it will be possible, considering the Dutch expertise in this 
area, to finance improvements in telecommunication within the frame-
work of other Dutch activities in rural areas.' At the end, ecology is 
added as one of the 'other areas of special attention', and a few words 
are devoted to donor coordination (mention of the India Consortium, the 
ad hoc cooperation with donors in some programmes and the lack of 
initiatives on the part of multilateral organisations and the Indian 
government in this regard). Finally, the document — under the heading 
'quality improvement' — stipulates that 'the quality of some projects in 
India can improve considerably by intensive monitoring and cultural 
embedding.' Seven criteria are mentioned for more successful projects: 
active participation of the target group in planning and implementation, 
positive impact on employment, increasing productivity and income with 
an eye towards taking responsibility for operational costs, use of locally 
constructed and acceptable means, positive effect on the position of 
women, training for local staff, and a significant own contribution. 
Dutch bilateral aid to India 59 
In 1988, under Minister Bukman, the policy paper for the period 
1989-1992 was not only presented to parliament but also made available 
to the general public.79 The larger part of this policy paper is dedicated 
to the political and socio-economic policy of India and to what is called 
'an evaluation of the Dutch aid programme over the period 1985-1988.' 
From this evaluation it became clear that not every policy intention 
formulated in 1984 and 1986 had come true. This, for instance, accounts 
for a sixth concentration state (which did not materialise), for local cost 
financing (which varied between 30% and 50% of the cash ceiling), and 
for some of the concentration sectors within industrial development (e.g., 
agro-industry and fertiliser infrastructure). The paragraph on policy 
intentions starts with the remark that 'for the period up to 1992 no large 
changes are envisaged.' Continuity is defended by pointing out that it 
will lead to a higher quality of aid. The major change in the 1988 paper 
is that bilateral aid is no longer grouped under the headings of rural and 
industrial development.80 Instead four project sectors and four program-
me sectors are distinguished which already exist with the exception of 
'informal education of rural women.' Funds will be nearly equally 
divided between project and programme aid, and the total LCF will 
come out at 50% of the cash ceiling. 
In 1992, Minister Pronk finally presented the third country paper for 
the period 1992-1995.81 One of the most striking changes is that India 
will only receive grants from 1992 on and thus there was a substantial 
reduction in the annual aid allocation.82 In this 1992 policy paper, both 
the regional concentration mentioned in earlier papers and the exceptions 
to this are affirmed. These exceptions include not only programme aid, 
but also land and water, the environment, and watertransport in the 
project sectors. This actually leaves only one project sector (i.e., drink-
ing water supply) where the concentration in five states is taken strictly. 
Under Schoo, rural water supply was seen as an entry point for more 
integrated area development programmes; under Pronk this sector was 
and is seen as the starting point for more general support of poverty 
alleviation in rural areas using an integrated approach. As a conse-
quence, concentration on a particular region or district within the state is 
proposed rather than spreading the aid activities across the entire state. 
With regard to programme aid, it is suggested that greater budget 
support (aimed at direct poverty alleviation) be provided at the expense 
of import support. 
These policy aims would prompt some shifts in the cash-ceiling dis-
tribution across the different sectors: 60% for project aid and 40% for 
programme aid. Within rural development, specific attention would be 
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paid to women (i.e., obligatory Women Effect Reporting for each new 
activity) and environment (e.g., in the land and water sector with its 
problem of brackiness). Within the drinking water projects, greater 
attention would be paid to institutional development and training in 
order to 'increase the efficiency of the implementing organisations' 
while participation of the target group would be geared at developing 
the 'capacities for management of the local facilities.' Greater attention 
was also envisaged for sanitation and greater involvement of NGDOs on 
behalf of target-group participation. 
The 1992 country paper states that the focus within poverty allevi-
ation programmes should shift to the 'organisation of the poor themsel-
ves' with village-level organisations formed and managed by the people 
themselves playing an important part.83 With regard to rural credit, the 
1992 paper writes off NAB ARD which had received large sums of 
Dutch aid in the past.84 Non-formal education for women (as part of 
budget support) should be continued, and budget support in the field of 
employment (e.g., through Employment Guarantee Schemes) should be 
investigated. In addition to the integration of attention to the environ-
ment in projects and programmes (e.g., by way of obligatory Environ-
mental Effect Reporting), the focus will be on the transfer of knowledge 
and technology in the fields of the environment and institutional devel-
opment. In line with the white paper 'A World of Difference,' attention 
should also be paid to urban development in India. 
2.3 DGIS: Outcome of the policy 
It has been said that the total amount of Dutch bilateral aid to India is 
'peanuts.' The evaluation department of the Ministry (IOV) concluded 
that 'although the total Netherlands aid to India between 1980 and 1992 
may seem impressive, the net annual contribution amounted to just about 
US$ 0.10 or Dfl. 0.25 per capita.'85 In 1978 and 1981, the total net 
bilateral aid from the Netherlands was 0.5% and 0.6% respectively of 
the total Indian government budget.86 This is yet another indication of 
the relative unimportance of Dutch aid for India. Looked at from a 
different perspective, Dutch bilateral aid to India constitutes a relatively 
large part of the total amount of aid to the country. The Netherlands 
forms the fifth largest donor when the total aid disbursements between 
1969 and 1992 are examined. With 10.8% of the total amount of 
bilateral net aid coming from OECD countries for this period, Dutch aid 
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comes directly after Japan (18.9% of the total amount of OECD aid), the 
United Kingdom (18.6%), Germany (15.5%), and the United States 
(15.2%). (see Box 2.1 for more specific information on the bilateral and 
multilateral aid totals for India). 
India is also the major recipient country for Dutch development aid. 
Within this aid, a differentiation should be made between the regular 
and the non-regular programme. The latter 'does not provide India with 
a given annual budget, but consists of various aid components [...] 
which are not specifically addressed to India but to developing countries 
in general.' Aid under a non-regular programme is also 'not managed by 
the country desk, but by several other DGIS sections.'87 In essence, the 
non-regular programme covers bilateral aid provided under budget 
Category I (e.g., balance-of-payment support,88 industrial develop-
ment,89 debt relief, emergency aid, mixed credits or low concessional 
loans) and Category IV (e.g., food aid and the co-financing programme 
(see Chapter 3)). Between 1974 and 1992, the total disbursements under 
the non-regular programmes amounted to some Dfl. 825 million.90 The 
regular programme, in contrast, is administered by the country desk 
from DGIS and covers aid provided to India as concentration/pro-
gramme country under Category Il-a of the budget for Development 
Cooperation.91 This regular programme constitutes the point of depar-
ture for a quantitative analysis of Dutch bilateral aid to India with 
special attention to, among other things, the total amount of Dutch aid 
(commitments, disbursements, loans, grants), the sectoral division and 
the division per state. 
2.3.1 The regular programme 
The total allocations to India under the regular programme amounted to 
Dfl. 4.2 billion between 1962 and 1992, with 62.5% offered as a loan 
and the remaining 37.5% as a grant. The latter includes technical aid 
grants, which were allocated for the first time under the regular pro-
gramme in 1980.92 Up to 1975, the total aid package consisted of 
loans. From 1975 onwards, grants became increasingly important. 
Through 1982, the allocation also increased annually. The 15% reduc-
tion in financial aid in 1983 was due to the introduction of a cash 
ceiling on expenditures as a means of economising Dutch government 
expenditures. Whereas India highly regretted this decrease in light of the 
broadening exercise,93 voices from within DGIS expressed a fear that 
'the credibility of the Dutch policy will be damaged' if the cash ceiling 
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should fall below the allocation. As a consequence of this increase in the 
this decrease in the allocation, the space for new commitments was 
limited.94 In 1985, when the reservoir of allocated but not as yet dis­
bursed funds (the so-called stuwmeer) was confiscated by the Dutch 
Ministry of Finance, the cash ceiling for India was set at around Dfl. 
200 million annually. In 1990, 20 million of the original loan allocation 
of 105 was converted into grants on a 1:0.6 rate 'with a view to provide 
sufficient grant funds for projects during 1990 and to ensure full utiliz­
ation of the cash ceiling.'95 Since 1992 only grants have been provided 
and the cash ceiling has been reduced to Dfl. 160 million. 
Box 2 1 Official development aid to India 
In absolute terms India is among the most important countries receiving develop­
ment assistance from multilateral and bilateral sources Total net external assist­
ance to India totalled nearly US$ 38 billion for the period 1969-1992 % Aid 
nevertheless covered only 0.9% of India's GNP in 1987-1988." Between 1969 
and 1992, the OECD countries together provided 95 2% of the bilateral aid and 
50.3% of the total amount of aid.9" Within total bilateral OECD aid, Japan is the 
most important donor, followed successively by the United Kingdom, Germany, 
the United States, the Netherlands, Sweden, Canada and France Together, these 
eight countries provided 89 4% of bilateral OECD aid. Within the multilateral aid, 
IDA is by far the most important donor with nearly 74% of multilateral aid and 
35 3% of the total amount of aid IDA is followed by the (combined) UN 
organisations and the European Union " 
The total net bilateral aid from OECD countries shows a decline in the early 
1970s, which picks up from 1974 through 1981 (with the exception of 1977 when 
net disbursements dipped). In the 1980s, disbursements fluctuated heavily, with a 
low of 471 million in 1982 and a high of 1,770 million in 1991. Multilateral aid, 
in contrast, shows an almost constant increase in disbursements up to 1980. From 
1980 to 1988, net disbursements from multilateral sources remain between 1 and 
1.2 billion annually, followed by a rather sharp decrease (at 47%) in 1989. From 
1991 onwards, net disbursements climb again This general picture does not apply 
to each and every individual donor. In absolute terms (i е., in US$), Canadian aid 
to India, for instance, sharply decreased after 1975 and picked up again only at 
the beginning of the 1980s. British aid, in contrast, increased significantly up to 
1981, saw a sharp decrease in 1982, followed by a levelling of annual aid 
disbursements throughout the 1980s to the level of the mid-1970s. Net aid 
disbursements from the United States show yet a different picture with aid in the 
1980s and early 1990s being only a fraction of the aid disbursements in the years 
1970 and 1971. Germany showed an almost constant increase in net aid disburse­
ments throughout the period 1970-1992, with the years 1977 and 1980 as obvious 
exception Finally, Japan's aid remained at a constant level up to 1985, after 
which a sharp but fluctuating increase took place. 
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As already noted, the total allocation to India under the regular pro-
gramme between 1962 and 1992 amounted to Dfl. 4.2 billion. The actual 
disbursements under the regular programme in this same period reached 
a level of nearly Dfl. 4 billion. Table 2.1 shows 94.7% of the total allo-
cated amount to indeed have been disbursed. Prior to 1981, the annual 
disbursements remained (well) below the annual allocation. In 1981, 
however, disbursements suddenly jumped to over 150% of the allocation 
due to extra supplies of fertiliser. The disbursement rate as a percentage 
of the annual allocation/cash ceiling improved significantly in the 1980s. 
Between 1980 and 1992, the annual allocation/cash ceiling was almost 
reached or, in most cases, exceeded. The only exception is the year 
1982, when fertiliser exports under aid decreased sharply 'due to the fact 
that India's domestic fertiliser production was sufficient to meet 
demand."00 
There are two important matters not shown by these general figures. 
The first refers to the pipeline funds, for which an amount of nearly 350 
million is mentioned at the end of 1984;101 with the introduction of the 
cash ceiling at the beginning of the 1980s and the subsequent 
abolishment of the reservoir of allocated but not as yet disbursed funds 
in 1985, India missed at least Dfl. 231 million of Dutch aid.102 The 
second important matter consists of the problems encountered in disburs-
ing the annual allocation/cash ceiling, which may be obscured in Table 
2.1. In the discussion of the Dutch policy with regard to India (see 2.2 
above), it was observed that disbursement problems characterised the aid 
relationship from the second half of the 1970s onwards103 and several 
reasons for these disbursement problems were raised: problems in 
finding a balance between project and programme aid, the additionality 
principle, India's persistent request for more import support, and the 
growth of the Dutch aid budget for India together with insufficient staff 
to handle this. Other reasons can be found in the delays in the signing of 
the aid agreements104 and frequent fund reallocations. 
These reallocations can lead one to wonder about the significance of 
the agreed minutes to the annual consultations, particularly in the 1970s 
and early 1980s. As a result of India's international tendering, severe 
delays occurred in disbursements and funds had to be reallocated as 
projects were shifted to other donors. In 1976 and 1977 alone, DGIS 
had to reallocate a total of 200 million 'due to too expensive Dutch ten-
ders.'105 Expensive Dutch tenders even led to questions in Parliament. 
Although the government declared that it was not certain about the 
delivery of goods under aid to India being reallocated because of overly 
expensive tenders, it provided a short list of supplies for which this was 
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the case.106 Overprogramming was quite common during the annual 
consultations because of these frequent reallocations, which - together 
with delays in the implementation of projects/programmes — made 
planning of disbursements extremely difficult and unreliable (see Box 
2.2 as well). Difficulties in the planning of disbursements continued 
throughout the 1980s and became most acute with the introduction of 
the cash ceiling. In September 1984, fear of under-utihsation was 
followed a few months later by a likely over-utilisation and it was 
therefore proposed that the reimbursement claims for drinking water 
projects and fertiliser not be paid until January 1985.107 In 1989, a 
renewed fear of under-utilisation led to "preponing" part of the import 
component from 1990.108 
Box 2 2 Disbursement problems Some examples 
The shortfall in disbursements in 1975-76 (also in 1977) was due in part to the 
fact that no payments 'were effected from the amount of 15 million for social 
development projects, since the selection of suitable projects was still under 
consideration ' Moreover, 'large value contracts' in which a disbursement of 13 
million was planned materialised only to the tune of 4 4 million 109 In 1979, the 
supply of tug boats under aid came under pressure when India decided that 'in 
future no orders are to be placed at shipyards abroad unless the required craft 
cannot be built in India '"° 
The controversy over the delivery of fishing trawlers at the beginning of the 
1980s is another example of things that went wrong '" In 1976, the first con-
tacts between the Netherlands and India for the development of modem fishing 
and processing were made At the end of the 1970s, a research boat was supplied 
under Category IH-a of the budget for an amount of Dfl 15 million In 1980, Dfl 
13 million under the regular programme was finally committed for seven trawlers, 
followed, in 1981, by an extra allocation of Dfl 20 million for ten more trawlers 
Of these 17 trawlers, a total of nine was supplied before May 1981 (for a total 
sum of Dfl 17 5 million) The contracts for the remaining eight trawlers were 
postponed because of senous objections to the supply by, among others, an Indian 
federation of traditional fishermen and the India Committee of the Netherlands 
(LIW) It was then agreed that India would first examine the need for deep-sea 
fishing During the annual consultation m 1982, however, the remaining funds 
(Dfl 16 5 million) were reallocated and no further mention of the examination 
was made."1 
Disbursement problems existed for not only financial aid but also tech-
nical aid. Of the Dfl. 15 million allocated for technical aid between 
1980 and 1984, only 4.8 million was actually disbursed by October 
1984. This was due in part to the hesitance and sometimes outright 
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rejection by India of Dutch interference in projects and programmes, 
including a Dutch expert for the trawler project. India objected to a 
Dutch mission because of an internal social conflict between traditional 
and modem fishers involving labour unions and action groups. The 
follow-up order for a dredger in 1984 also created problems on this 
front. Whereas DGIS opted for a mission because of rumours of bad 
materials, maintenance and management, India declined such a mission. 
According to India, there was simply no need for an assessment by the 
Netherlands, as the project had been approved by the National Invest-
ment Board."3 The involvement of Dutch experts in rural drinking-
water projects also caused problems between India and DGIS.114 It 
was not until the late 1980s that India adopted a more positive attitude 
towards the Dutch monitoring of projects."5 
Some of the solutions found to expedite the disbursement of aid have 
already been touched upon and included the use of import support as 'an 
inflatable life-jacket [...] to attain the cash ceiling.'"6 Another mechan-
ism to expedite disbursements was sought in the field of management 
and included the Mid Term Reviews which were introduced in 1984. 
The idea was that more frequent consultations with India (i.e., twice a 
year) would produce better control over the disbursements. The delega-
tion of tasks and responsibilities to the Embassy in New Delhi as 
'another step [...] to improve the quality of the development program-
me'"7 can also be viewed as an attempt to establish a management 
information system.118 Finally, a system of pre-financing and post-
financing should also be mentioned. The latter has mainly been used for 
import support with India financing imports out of its own budget and 
later filing for reimbursement. Pre-financing has predominantly been 
used for social projects and was first used in 1987 when Dfl. 57 million 
was disbursed to pre-finance drinking-water projects in Gujarat, Uttar 
Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh and Kerala.119 
2.3.2 Sector-wise distribution of disbursements 
As already mentioned, the sectoral concentration of Dutch bilateral aid 
was only established in the mid-1980s. After proposing different concen-
tration sectors for the Dutch bilateral aid to India in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, four sectors for the concentration of project aid and four 
sectors for the concentration of programme aid were identified in 1986. 
Within project aid, assistance would be concentrated on the sectors: land 
and water, rural drinking water, water transport and environment. Within 
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non-project or programme aid, assistance would be concentrated on the 
sectors: import support, rural credit, women's education and energy. 
The latter three sectors lumped together under budget-support. With 
this distribution, the already existing situation was basically confirmed. 
Import support was already the most important sector between 1974 and 
1984 with slightly over 70% of the disbursements under the regular 
programme. Its importance dwindled after 1985, although it remained 
the major sector up to 1992 with 38% of disbursements across the 
period 1985-1992 used to finance imports. The single most important 
product for import support was fertiliser, which constituted 79% of the 
import in the period 1974-1984 and 56.6% in the period 1985-1992. In 
the latter period, caprolactum and edible oils were also provided under 
import support. 
The budget support sector had disbursements of Dfl. 200 million (or 
10.5% of total disbursements) up to 1984. If the Dutch assistance to the 
Small Farmers' Development Agency and the Marginal Farmers and 
Agricultural Development Agency in 1977 is included, the amount is 
215 million up to 1984. Between 1985 and 1992, nearly Dfl. 284 million 
(or 16.7%) was disbursed as budget support, thereby making it the third 
most important concentration sector after the sectors import support and 
water transport. Up to 1987 budget support consisted only of assistance 
for agricultural and rural credit through ARDC and, later, NABARD. In 
1988 and at the same time that NABARD received its last contribution 
under Dutch aid, IREDA (renewable energy) was added. In 1989, EWE 
(informal education for rural women) was added. Finally, the Nether-
lands also contributed Dfl. 10 million to an immunisation programme 
from UNICEF in 1990 and 50 million to the Social Safety Net Adjust-
ment Programme from the World Bank in 1992.120 
Although officially established in 1982, the sector water transport was 
already one of the major sectors in the 1970s. Dredging ships, which 
partly constitute one of the four sub-sectors, were already supplied in the 
mid-1970s to the tune of Dfl. 96 million. The same accounts for activ-
ities in the field of harbour development for which a total of Dfl. 12.6 
million was disbursed between 1974 and 1978. Between 1974 and 1984, 
nearly 8% of the disbursements went to the water transport sector and 
mainly to dredging. Two new sub-sectors (i.e., inland water transport; 
shipbuilding and repair) were added in 1986, and the sector water 
transport absorbed nearly Dfl. 339 million or 19.9% of the disburse-
ments under the regular programme between 1985 and 1992. 
The sector rural drinking-water supply constitutes another concentra-
tion sector already existing in the 1970s. With Dfl. 119.5 million (or 
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6.2% of disbursements) between 1974 and 1984 and Dfl. 224.9 million 
(or 13.3%) between 1985 and 1992, it is the second most important 
project sector. The remaining two project sectors of land and water, on 
the one hand, and environment, on the other, were relatively new sectors 
when officially declared as concentration sectors for Dutch project aid. 
Whereas the activities under land and water (i.e., irrigation) started in 
1981, the activities in the field of environment actually only started in 
1984. No substantial disbursements in these sectors were actually made 
until 1987, moreover. With Dfl. 107.3 and Dfl. 54.3 million in disburse-
ments, the sector land and water and the sector environment are the 
smallest concentration sectors within the regular aid programme. 
2.3.3 Poverty alleviation and economic self-reliance 
Although the start of project aid in the mid-1970s marks the start of 
direct poverty alleviation as part of the Dutch aid to India, this is not to 
say that the total amount of project aid is necessarily aimed at direct 
poverty alleviation. The goal of poverty alleviation is only found among 
what are called 'social projects.' Among these social projects are those 
falling under the sector rural drinking-water supply, the sector land and 
water (i.e., irrigation), the sector budget support with the exception of 
the activities of IREDA, part of the activities under the sector environ-
ment and part of the miscellaneous activities. Other activities falling 
under import support, water transport, IREDA, the environment and 
miscellaneous are, thus, directed at the second objective of Dutch 
bilateral development aid: economic self-reliance. 
On the basis of the above division, the shifts in aid directed at 
poverty alleviation and aid directed at economic self-reliance can be 
traced for the period 1974-1992. As can be seen in Figure 2.1, aid 
directed at economic self-reliance constituted well over 50% of the 
disbursements except in the years 1982 and 1986. It took up to 1980 for 
the disbursements for poverty alleviation to gain momentum. For the 
entire period 1974-1992, nearly 72% of the bilateral-aid disbursements 
went to activities in the field of economic self-reliance and 28% to 
activities in the field of direct poverty alleviation. For the two periods 
distinguished here, these figures are 81% versus 19% for 1974-1984 and 
61% versus 39% for 1985-1992. There has, thus, been an increase in aid 
devoted to direct poverty alleviation which is also illustrated by the 
substantial increases in the amount of project aid (largely dedicated to 
poverty alleviation) since 1985. 
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Figure 2.1 
Percentage distributions for disbursements devoted to poverty alleviation 
versus economic self-reliance (1974-1992) 
74 7β 7β 77 78 70 80 81 82 83 84 86 88 87 88 88 90 91 92 
• В poverty alleviation EZ3 eoon. ••If-rellano· 
Source: Own calculations based on IOV 1994a. 
Note: Poverty alleviation covers disbursements under the sector rural drinking-
water supply, the sector land and water, 50% of disbursements under the 
sector environment, 75% under miscellaneous project aid, and disbursements 
under budget aid with the exception of funds for IREDA. 
Local Cost Financing (LCF) is directly related to the above as it consti­
tutes an important indicator of the possibilities for financing poverty 
alleviation projects. LCF has, however, been restricted as a result of an 
agreement between DGIS and BEB. At the beginning of the 1980s, LCF 
was set at 30% of the allocation.121 Even then, BEB (particularly with 
regard to the broadening exercise) pushed for fewer LCF funds because 
these funds did not generate economic benefit for the Netherlands. In 
1981, BEB suggested lowering the amount for LCF in favour of so-
called counter-value funds which are the returns in local currency 
emerging from the selling of goods supplied under aid. DGIS was, 
however, strongly opposed to such a manoeuvre. Local Cost Financing 
was necessary for a target group approach to development assistance. 
LCF was also at that time only about 20% of the allocation; a system of 
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counter-value funds did not fit with current policy; and such a system 
was simply not feasible if only because of staff shortage. More import-
ant yet, the Government of India (Gol) had already allocated the 
counter-value funds for its own development programmes, which made 
them very unlikely to agree to such a shift.122 
'Over the entire period 1980-1992, it is estimated that about one-third 
of the overall budget in the programme was spent on financing local 
costs.'123 A rough calculation shows LCF to indeed occupy some 34% 
of the total disbursements for this period. It can also be seen that in 
1977, with funds being disbursed for the first social projects, Local Cost 
Financing also started. At the beginning of the 1980s, disbursements for 
LCF fluctuated heavily with actual percentages ranging from 17% in 
1984 to 69% in 1986. These fluctuations were largely due to changes in 
disbursements for budget support, which was non-existent in 1984 and 
reached a peak two years later. Between 1974 and 1984, some 18% of 
the disbursements was used for LCF; this increased to over 40% in the 
successive period of 1985-1992.124 Fluctuations in this percentage have 
continued since 1985 onwards.125 
Taking the division between LCF and non-LCF disbursements under 
the regular programme as our point of departure, the present figures can 
also be related to the aid-export relation, and, thus, indirectly to one of 
the main objectives of the broadening exercise in the early 1980s. 
Broadening was largely motivated by the fact that the Dutch economic 
relationship with India was basically restricted to aid and not improving 
or increasing. By aiming at a broader relationship with India, it was 
hoped to increase and diversify Dutch export. Development aid was 
intended as the catalyst. Although the general opinion is that the broade-
ning exercise did not pay off, there have been significant changes in the 
aid-export relation since 1980. 
The percentage of export carried by aid has declined considerably 
since 1981, the year in which the broadening exercise started. Disburse-
ments under Dutch aid for non-local cost financing declined sharply in 
1982, again increased in 1983 and stayed at approximately the same 
level for the remainder of the 1980s. The value of export, in contrast, 
increased rather sharply up to 1985, decreased slightly in 1986 and 
remained at approximately the same level until 1990. Stronger export 
outside of aid was therefore established for India in the 1980s. The 
export products showing the most growth in the 1980s were organic 
chemical products, electrical equipment and scrap metal, while two of 
the traditional exports under aid (i.e., ships and fertiliser) declined. This 
suggests that the increased export to India was an 'autonomous process' 
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and cannot be attributed to the broadening exercise.126 The conclusion 
that broadening failed to materialise in that area with which it was most 
concerned, namely economic relationships, appears to be justified. 
Figure 2.2 
Percentage of total disbursements under project aid per state since 1980 
Uttar Pradesh 21% 
Kerala 11% 
Andhra Pradesh 8% 
All India 23% 
Other 3% 
West Bengal 2% 
Orlssa 3% 
Miscellaneous 6% 
Gujarat θ% 
Karnataka 6% 
Tamil Nadu 5% 
Maharashtra 6% 
Source: IOV 1994: 202-204. 
Note: Other states include: Lakshadweep (2.1% of total disbursements under 
project aid), Himachal Pradesh (0.8%), Delhi (0.2%), Haryana (0.2%) and 
Goa (0.1%). Miscellaneous includes training, monitoring and project prep­
aration. 
2.3.4 State-wise distribution of disbursements 
Prior to the official completion of the regional concentration efforts of 
DGIS in the mid-1980s, most of the project funds were already concen­
trated on those states which would become the concentration states: 
Uttar Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Gujarat and, to a lesser extent, 
Karnataka (see Figure 2.2). The regional concentration on specific states 
has been justified by the size of India, the (relatively) small amounts of 
Dutch aid, the quality of the programme, and the limited staff capacity 
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at DGIS and the Embassy. The five concentration states were not chosen 
because they were the poorest states, but because DGIS had implemen-
ted projects and programmes predominantly in these states in the past. 
Assistance in the field of rural drinking water was clearly at the base 
of the selection of these concentration states. Drinking-water projects 
have been implemented in six different states, and only Himachal 
Pradesh did not become a concentration state. Assistance in the sector 
environment, starting in 1986, was mainly disbursed in Uttar Pradesh 
with one (small) project in Tamil Nadu. The remaining projects in this 
sector were nation-wide. Aid in the sector land and water (irrigation) 
was already disbursed in eight different states (in addition to nation-wide 
projects). Aid in the sector miscellaneous was disbursed in six different 
states or nation-wide projects (10.3% of total disbursements within this 
sector between 1980 and 1992). Finally, the aid in the sector water 
transport was disbursed in fourteen states. According to the India policy 
adopted by DGIS in the second half of the 1980s, the above mentioned 
concentration on five states accounts for three of the four projectsectors. 
For the sector water transport, more than 43% of the disbursements in 
the 1980s were made for nation-wide projects and the major states were 
Tamil Nadu, Orissa, Kerala, Uttar Pradesh and Maharashtra. 
2.3.5 ... andNGDOs? 
Although NGDOs have only marginally been touched upon in the 
preceding and only had a marginal role in the annual consultations 
between the Netherlands and India, they nevertheless provide an 
example of the problems experienced by DGIS in implementing its 
country policy. The NGDO discussion started in 1984 as part of Minis-
ter Schoo's attempt at the 'socialisation' of development cooperation and 
coincided with explicit recognition of the role of these non-govemmental 
organisations in the seventh Five Year Plan from the Indian govern-
ment.127 At the same time, it was thought that the involvement of 
NGDOs would speed up the identification of projects and the building 
of a project pipeline.128 In a discussion with the India Committee of 
the Netherlands (LIW), Minister Schoo declared that she wanted to 
increase the NGDO involvement in rural development. Simultaneously, 
she acknowledged that certain problems largely prevented such a move. 
The involvement of NGDOs demanded more of the civil services of 
DGIS and the Embassy but the money would be routed through the 
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Indian government. The reaction of the Indian government was 
basically 'evasive.'130 
In 1986, the special advisor for development cooperation His Royal 
Highness Prince Claus remarked during a visit to India that he 'got the 
impression that [DGIS] should cooperate much more with NGOs.'131 
A few months later, the search for NGDO involvement in the implemen-
tation of the bilateral programme was called a 'dead end.'132 In 1987, 
during the annual consultations, the possibilities of co-financing for 
CAP ART were discussed. DGIS wanted more information on the matter, 
which they received from the Embassy in November of that year. In the 
opinion of the Embassy, CAP ART was no option for funding under the 
Dutch (regular) programme as the staff was unprofessional, a 
reorganisation had not led to any improvements, there was a major 
backlog and the Government of India simply kept 30% of the donor 
contribution to CAPART.133 In keeping with the white paper 'A World 
of Difference,' the Dutch delegation to the annual consultations in 1990 
explained the Dutch policy with regard to NGDOs: implementation will 
be increasingly geared towards the provision of support for local NGOs 
in which the local population participates in the planning, preparation 
and implementation of activities. Up to now, NGDOs have been mainly 
involved in the drinking water programme in different states. A more 
general involvement of these organisations in Dutch aid has not matured 
over the years, and the question with regard to the impact of these 
organisations thus remains open (also see Chapter 4). 
2.4 DGIS in India: Policy evaluation 
A more comprehensive policy with regard to Dutch bilateral aid to India 
only developed in the mid-1980s when the different ideas, priorities and 
fads from the preceding period were brought together in a number of 
policy papers. The successive India policy papers from DGIS clearly 
reflected the idiom of the successive Ministers for Development Cooper-
ation, ranging from socialisation under Schoo to a more central role for 
women and the environment under Pronk. Prior to the 1980s, the general 
development-aid policy of the Netherlands can also be detected in the 
India policy. India was, after all, one of the first countries to enter into a 
bilateral aid relationship with the Netherlands in the 1960s. The Dutch 
corporate sector was one of the major driving forces behind bilateral aid 
and also played a major role in the case of India. Aid to India in the 
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1960s and 1970s consisted of import support above all and large capital 
investment projects to a lesser extent. This was in line with the general 
outlook on Dutch bilateral aid at the time. The shift to more direct 
poverty alleviation and basic needs under Pronk in the mid-1970s is also 
clearly reflected in the aid to India at that time;134 the emphasis on 
interdependence under De Koning and thus one of the driving forces 
behind the broadening exercise in the early 1980s is similarly reflected 
in the aid to India at the time.135 India therefore constitutes a prime 
example of some of the more significant changes that have taken place 
in Dutch bilateral development aid. 
The question here is whether the different priorities formulated by the 
Netherlands over the years were decisive for the development of the aid 
programme in India (or perhaps the other way around?). The answer is 
most likely that both India and the Netherlands played significant roles 
in the development of Dutch bilateral-aid policy with regard to India. In 
many cases, the Netherlands took the initiative and this initiative was 
either taken up or downplayed by India. Indian rules and regulations to a 
large extent determined the actual implementation of the priorities 
formulated by the Dutch. This accounts for not only the (1) state and (2) 
sectoral concentration efforts, but also for the (3) the almost constant 
struggle between project and programme aid. With a focus on these 
three issues, the purpose of the present section is to provide a more 
comprehensive answer to the question formulated above. Consideration 
of these issues will also illustrate how each policy plan led to a further 
refinement of the aid policy with regard to India. The plans show 
increasing specification and attention to details as well as growing 
attention to the quality of the programme. 
The concentration on specific states has played a central role in 
Dutch bilateral aid to India. The Dutch desire to concentrate on specific 
states was mainly motivated by quality considerations. Given the size of 
India, it was thought better not to disburse Dutch aid across the entire 
country. This wish met with scepticism in India, largely because it was 
regarded as foreign interference in domestic affairs. Indian rules and 
regulations with respect to the distribution of funds among the states and 
the related conditionality principle determined the implementation of the 
state concentration efforts.136 The concentration sought by the Nether-
lands for so-called social projects was also regarded with scepticism by 
India mainly because of the almost constant struggle over project and 
programme aid (see below).137 
Activities aimed at direct poverty alleviation are the only ones to 
which the state concentration applied.138 In the India policy paper for 
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1989-1992, for instance, it is stated that the already existing regional 
concentration will be maintained. It is also added, however, that this 
concentration is of 'lesser importance for the support of such national 
programmes as import support, water transport, environment, NABARD, 
IREDA, and informal training for women.'139 Excluding the sector 
environment, as these funds were mainly used for a project in Uttar 
Pradesh, this basically means that the state concentration did not apply 
to 75% of the disbursements between 1985 and 1992 (and 80% between 
1980 and 1992). For the sector land and water, the state concentration 
was also less obvious as 27% of the disbursements between 1980 and 
1992 were spent in states other than Andhra Pradesh, Urtar Pradesh, 
Kerala, Gujarat and Kamataka. This basically leaves the sector rural 
drinking-water supply and sanitation, for which disbursements almost 
entirely went to the five concentration states. Although a regional/state 
concentration of Dutch aid is generally regarded as essential in the case 
of India, the importance of such a concentration for the total bilateral aid 
package is questionable at best. When taken together, the five states 
cover an area of nearly one million square kilometres (nearly three times 
the size of Germany and 25 times the size of the Netherlands itself) and 
have a population of 319 million. In this light, the recommendation of 
the IOV to concentrate on two or three states seems to be justified,140 
particularly from a management point of view and independent of the 
fact that DGIS claims to concentrate it efforts on the poorer districts in 
these states. 
The final regional/state concentration specified by the policy papers 
in the second half of the 1980s are more a result of chance than of 
policy, and this also applies to the sector concentration. Although the 
variety of sectors proposed in the early 1980s can be attributed to a lack 
of clear policy, they mainly reflect a frantic search for a more diver-
sified aid programme in order to establish a project pipeline and thereby 
focus on poverty alleviation and also expedite disbursements. Import 
support, water transport, budget support, and rural water supply were 
already established as concentration sectors.141 The major project 
under miscellaneous project aid (i.e., the Kamataka Industrial Sheds 
programme) already existed and the sector land and water (i.e., irriga-
tion) became a concentration sector first of all because the search for 
agricultural cooperation (through the Indian Ministry of Agriculture) did 
not materialise. Only the sector environment appears to be the outcome 
of the general policy changes made in the 1980s. 
The more specific division within each of the concentration sectors 
called for in the 1989-1992 policy paper did not occur. The actual 
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disbursements for project aid closely paralleled the targets set with the 
exception of the sector environment (i.e., 22% for water transport with a 
target of 15-20%; 14% for rural water supply with a target of 15%; 9% 
for land and water with a target of 10%; and 5% for the environment 
with a target of 10%). The disbursements for programme aid, in con-
trast, turned out quite differently. Not only was the target set for rural 
credit in December 1988 not attained for the simple reason that the 
Netherlands discontinued its assistance in this field; the disbursements 
for energy (IREDA) and non-formal education for women (EWE) also 
remained far below the targets (in both cases 1% of total disbursements 
were reached as opposed to a target of 5-10% and 10% respectively). 
Moreover, import support still accounted for a large part of the total 
amount of disbursements under the regular programme. 
At the end of the 1970s, Dutch aid consisted mainly of import 
support. Import support was also nearly synonymous with fertilisers at 
that time.142 With the financial start of project aid, DGIS also opted 
for a diversification of the aid, which meant that the fertilisers would 
have to be reduced. In 1982, fertiliser import under Dutch aid suddenly 
dropped from more than 60% in 1980 and 1981 to 14% of total dis-
bursements. However, this substantial decrease was not so much the 
outcome of deliberate DGIS policy as 'increased domestic production 
and depressed demand following a drought.'1" In 1984, fertiliser 
imports were again up to 68%, although for the last time. In the policy 
paper for the period 1986-1989, the possibility of a reduced budget for 
fertilisers was again mentioned. At about the same time, India and the 
Netherlands agreed to reduce the allocation for import support to 25% or 
approximately Dfl. 50 million. This target was not attained in the 
following years, however. Between 1986 and 1989, fertiliser import 
ranged from 12% to 16% of disbursements with the exception of 1987 
when no fertilisers were provided. By 1992, the share of disbursements 
for fertilisers had climbed to 46%. 
Attempts to reach a more equal division of project and programme 
aid were frustrated up to the end of the 1980s by the persistent Indian 
preference for import support and the mechanisms used to delay project 
aid. The agreement with BEB on the share of local costs financing and 
the (equally persistent) threat of under-utilisation of the cash ceiling also 
played a role. With the start of project aid in the late 1970s, DGIS had 
already tried to find a balance between aid aimed at (economic) self-
reliance and aid aimed at poverty alleviation, though not always with the 
same passion.144 The difficulties in building up a project pipeline par-
ticularly hindered attainment of such a balance. These difficulties were 
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partially due to the reluctance of the Indian government to propose 
(suitable) projects, making the identification of projects both difficult 
and time-consuming. Project proposals were 'insufficiently prepared and 
the presentation [...] was mediocre',145 while the Dutch pressure for a 
proper pre-assessment of projects sometimes led India to choose 'a less 
critical donor.'146 The fact that many of the project proposals never 
made it to the implementation phase is seen as a consequence of the 
bureaucratic structure in India, 'the Indian custom not to discuss projects 
seriously with donors before there is certainty that a company in the 
donor's country had won a tender,' and 'the Indian wish to receive 
mainly programme aid coupled to the experience that in the case of a 
lack of projects and disbursement pressure from the cash ceiling, the 
Netherlands will indeed reallocate funds to this.'147 
The struggle to achieve a more equal balance between project and 
programme aid became more earnest in the early 1980s. The project aid 
started in the mid-1970s only gained momentum in the mid-1980s with 
the formalisation of the project concentration sectors. Between 1981 and 
1984, 80% of the disbursements still went to programme aid which 
mainly consisted of import support. In the following four year period 
(i.e., 1985-1988) which included the appearance of the first official India 
policy paper, disbursements under programme aid were down to 60% 
leaving 40% for project aid. The India policy paper for the following 
period (i.e., 1989-1992) stipulated that the available budget would be 
equally divided across programme and project aid and from 1989 to 
1992, 50% of the disbursements indeed went to the four project sectors 
and 50% to import and budget support. The strive initiated in the mid-
1970s for greater attention to direct poverty alleviation had therefore 
paid off although it took about a decade to do this. 
The above shows that the larger part of Dutch aid must be evaluated 
with reference to the second track of Dutch aid policy: economic self-
reliance. That budget support and import support together constitute 
nearly two-thirds of the disbursements between 1980 and 1992 implies 
that the Netherlands was quite charmed by Indian economic (and social) 
policy. In 1989, for instance, DGIS states that India implements 'an 
exceptionally sensible and balanced policy with regard to the manage-
ment of the balance of payments.'148 The Aid India Consortium and 
the IMF also highly appreciate this Indian policy and according to the 
IOV, this appreciation is one of the major problems with the provision 
of programme aid to India.149 In its 1994 evaluation report on Dutch 
aid to India, the IOV concludes that 'generous Netherlands import 
support has helped the Indian government to postpone policy adjust-
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ments.'150 This point is stated somewhat harder in a draft of the evalu-
ation report on import support and budget support: 'As a long time 
member of the Consortium the Netherlands has been a significant 
element in the socio-economic development of India. Consequently, it 
has also done its share in making it possible to delay again and again 
measures, which could have prevented the economy from weakening as 
much as it has; measures, which could have avoided poverty from 
growing as big as it has.'151 
To summarise: As a major recipient of Dutch bilateral aid, India pro-
vides a good example of a developing country which uses aid largely to 
its own ends. The history of Dutch aid to India provides a picture of a 
constant struggle over disbursements and priorities, with India wanting 
mainly import support and DGIS pressing for a more balanced aid 
programme divided across the two tracks of Dutch development policy. 
In this struggle, Indian rules and regulations (such as the additionality 
principle and the fact that foreign funds are already allocated) restrict 
the possibilities for DGIS to give shape to its India policy in actual 
practice. Such limitations clearly explain the concentration (or lack 
thereof) on particular states and sectors. Perhaps more importantly, the 
Netherlands was often pressed with disbursement problems and India 
never really abandoned its preference for quickly disbursable aid. The 
latter relates to Indian resistance to foreign interference, which tends to 
be larger in project than in programme aid and manifest itself as resis-
tance to the involvement of Dutch experts in projects. A review of 
developments in the Indo-Dutch relationship in the field of development 
aid creates a strong impression of a country which is (1) critical of 
donor intervention and (2) prepared to push its own will through and 
delay changes not directly in favour of this will. It is important to note 
in this regard that India has succeeded to a large extent in doing this. 
This is not only due to its own expertise in shuffling between donors 
and conditions, but also to the fact that Dutch aid to India (at least in 
financial terms) is more important for the Netherlands than for India. 
3 
ICCO in India: Policy and performance 
In January 1994, the co-financing programme (MFP) existed for exactly 
30 years. In those years, the four co-financing organisations (MFOs) 
have not only gained a specific role within Dutch bilateral development 
cooperation but also played a major role outside the sight of the general 
public. In this chapter, a historical overview of the co-financing 
programme will first be presented. This will be followed by a discussion 
of the India policy of one the four MFOs: the Interchurch Organisation 
for Development Cooperation (ICCO). In the third section, the outcome 
of this India policy will be presented. And in the fourth section, this 
policy will be evaluated along the lines set out in the Introduction. 
3.1 The co-financing programme 
Taking the relation between the Dutch government and the MFOs with 
their relative freedom of movement (see below) as the starting point, the 
history of the co-financing programme can be divided into three periods: 
1965-1974, 1974-1980 and 1980-1992 (also see Box 3.1 for comparison 
of the four MFOs). 
3.1.1 1965-1974: The starting years 
It all started in December 1964 when the Undersecretary of Foreign 
Affairs declared that 'with regard to assistance to less developed 
countries an amount of Dfl. 5 million will be made available for co-
financing by the government for development projects from non-
commercial private organisations.' In September 1963, a number of 
private organisations had requested the government to make funds 
available for development activities. In a letter from the Central Mission 
Commissioner's Office (CMC) and the Dutch Mission Council, several 
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conditions were proposed for the provision of such funds. These condi-
tions were then taken over by the government in the criteria for the new 
programme: (1) requests for assistance could be forwarded by the 
concerned Dutch organisations or by 'indigenous private organisations in 
less developed countries'; (2) projects had to fit into the development 
plans of the receiving country and had to be agreed upon by the relevant 
government; (3) the contribution from the Dutch government would only 
be available for capital expenses; and (4) the implementing organisation 
had to cover at least 25% of the costs and ensure sufficient funds for 
running or exploitation costs.' For the execution of the programme, a 
separate desk was created within the Directorate International Technical 
Aid (DTH) at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This desk would be 
responsible for approving each separate project proposal. The projects 
had to fit in with Dutch development policy which was aimed at the 
time at the transfer of technical knowledge.2 And the co-financing pro-
gramme was definitely not meant to finance the activities of the 
missions from Catholic and Protestant Churches and organisations in the 
restricted sense of the word.3 
By 1966, Dutch development assistance 'was impossible to imagine 
without the co-financing programme.'4 The Minister for Development 
was not inclined to substantially increase the funds made available to the 
programme,5 but the funds for the MFP nevertheless increased more 
than the general budget for development cooperation in these first years. 
In 1968, the co-financing programme was streamlined into three 
organisations: ICCO, CMC/CEBEMO and NOVIB. These organisations 
were given the status of mediative umbrella organisations for the MFP, 
and a code for the distribution of funds was accepted for these MFOs 
(40%, 40% and 20% respectively).6 
The programme was judged as positive by practically all political 
parties as well as by the Dutch government itself. In 1967, Minister for 
Development Cooperation Udink declared 'the work being done [...] 
under the programme for private projects [...] of utmost importance for 
the development of developing countries.'7 This point of view was also 
not contradicted by the evaluation mission from Dutch Development 
Cooperation in 19698 and was, in essence, shared by Pronk who became 
Minister for Development Cooperation in 1973. The political discussion 
with regard to the co-financing organisations during the period up to 
1973 centred around a few, and in some cases recurring, themes: an 
increase in the funds for the MFOs, combination of the MFP with the 
volunteer programme, the possibilities for the MFOs to make use of 
additional funds from the European Community, the formalisation of 
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consultations between the government and the MFOs (the so-called Bos 
commission) and, last but not least, the DTH procedure for approving 
project proposals, which was described by a member of parliament in 
1969 as 'cumbersome.'9 On the average, approval of a project 
forwarded by one of the co-financing organisations took one year. 
Expenditure of project funds naturally lagged even further behind. At the 
end of 1967, for instance, only Dfl. 16 of the 35 million reserved for the 
programme up to then had indeed been disbursed.10 
In light of the problems with the expenditure of funds, the Vierhouten 
consultation between the MFOs and the Minister for Development 
Cooperation (held in 1972) agreed to a split between projects under Dfl. 
50,000 and projects above this amount. For the former, a simplified 
procedure was made possible. The Vierhouten consultation further led to 
a relaxation of the capital expenses criterion thereby allowing the MFOs 
to experiment with new kinds of projects: credits, revolving loan funds, 
community housing projects, provision of complimentary services, 
leadership training and courses, and projects for the handicapped." 
Another important outcome of the consultation was government subsidy 
for part of the operating costs of the three MFOs with a more important 
role for the MFOs in the assessment process for new applications as the 
reason.12 Final project approval, however, remained in the hands of the 
Ministry. 
3.1.2 1974-1980: Years of struggle 
The Vierhouten consultation later proved to be the beginning of not only 
more freedom for the MFOs but also substantial increases in the funds 
made available by the government. Five months after the installation of 
a new Cabinet, in which Pronk became the Minister for Development 
Cooperation, the three MFOs presented their joint view on development 
cooperation and their own role in this. Influenced by changing thoughts 
with regard to development, dissatisfaction with the MFP (still regarded 
as too much of a straitjacket) and the opinions of the new Minister, the 
MFOs called for a fundamental change in the co-financing programme 
in their Chairmen's Statement of October 1973. Pronk considered the 
co-financing programme a 'suitable means [...] for the development of 
underdeveloped regions and groups in Third World countries' 
particularly in those cases where 'governmental aid is difficult' and 
supported the MFOs call for change.13 
82 The same difference 
Box 3 1 The four co-financing organisations™ 
Since HIVOS joined the co-financing programme at the end of the 1970s, four 
MFOs have split the funds made available by the Dutch government CEBEMO 
and ICCO, which equally divided the Dfl 5 million in 1965, still receive the most 
funds from the government In 1991, these two each received 34% of the co-
financing funds, NOVIB received 213% and HIVOS received 10 7 % " The 
latter two supplement these government funds with funds derived from the general 
public This particularly holds for NOVIB In 1991, for instance, the total 
available funds for NOVIB amounted to Dfl 182 million with only 89 million 
coming from DGIS block-grant funds 
Since its inception in 1965, the Dutch co-financing programme has grown sub-
stantially In absolute terms, the programme grew from Dfl 5 million in 1965 to 
Dfl. 382 4 million in 1992 or from 2% of the development aid budget to 6 5% 
Following the decision of DGIS, based on the results of the impact study 
presented in September 1991, the funds for the four MFOs were increased to 7% 
of the budget in 1994 In addition to these regular funds, the MFOs also use so-
called additional funds from other categories of the budget (presently up to a 
maximum of 1% of the budget) and from the European Union 
Between 1986 and 1994, the four MFOs approved a total of 20,035 new pro-
jects ICCO was responsible for 29 0% of these new projects, CEBEMO for 
44 6%, NOVIB for 18 3%, and HIVOS for the remaining 8 1%. In 1980, 
CEBEMO was active in 74 Third World countries, as opposed to 64 countries for 
ICCO, 31 for NOVIB, and 24 for HIVOS In 1989, the number of countries had 
increased in particular for ICCO to 93 and for NOVIB to 52 In the early 1990s, 
the MFOs showed a substantial decline in number of countries as a consequence 
of stricter concentration policies In 1994, ICCO had reduced the total number of 
countries to 53, CEBEMO to 63, and NOVIB to 47 Only HIVOS showed an 
increase from 24 countries at the end of the 1980s to 29 in 1994 
In the Chairmen's Statement in October 1973, the three MFOs declared 
'social justice and self-reliance' to be their major objectives. The 
development process should be aimed at 'construction of an authentic 
society in the political, economic and socio-cultural sense.'16 Special 
attention was needed for the poor, the process of conscientisation and 
human investment. The transfer-of-knowledge criterion was seen as too 
limited in this regard,17 and the target-group approach was made the 
central focus of the MFP at a meeting between the Dutch government 
and the MFOs in 1974 (Zandvoort I consultation). At this consultation, 
it was also agreed to give priority to 'initiatives from the local commu-
nities,' 'activities with the aim of stimulating local leadership,' 
'activities from the target groups which demanded minor financial 
investments and were characterised by a high local cost component,' and 
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'activities aimed at social justice and self reliance of the target group. 
In addition to adopting a target-group approach, Zandvoort I led to 
several 'important policy, procedural and financial changes' (i.e, 'current 
expenditure acceptable as part of a project, assent of the government of 
a developing country no longer required for approval of a project, a 
fixed percentage (4.8%) of the budget of development cooperation 
reserved for the co-financing programme').19 Exploitation costs and 
programmes were now allowed under the MFP20 which clearly indica-
tes a broadening of criteria. In 1977, a second Zandvoort consultation 
occurred. The outcome was not as revolutionary as in 1974 but 
nevertheless resulted in HIVOS joining the co-financing programme. 
The MFOs 'were given greater responsibility for the financial and 
technical project procedure'21 but their desire for a block grant from 
the government with accountability only afterwards was simply unac-
ceptable in the then 'political constellation.'22 
3.1.3 1980-1992: Consolidation and change 
Two years later, in 1979, the political constellation changed and the new 
Minister for Development Cooperation (De Koning) decided to give the 
MFOs their block grant under the Programme Financing Model (PFM). 
Based on a positive assessment of the work of the MFOs, their 
willingness to cooperate 'in a constant evaluation of their policy and 
activities' and the incapacity of DGIS to process the growing number of 
applications,23 the MFOs 'were given an annual block grant (inde-
pendent spending with accountability afterwards for the entire amount of 
the funding).'24 The PFM has operated since 1980 and, with the 
exception of specific developments in the criteria as agreed upon by the 
government and the MFOs, not undergone any fundamental changes. 
The Programme Financing Model has been evaluated three times: in 
1983 (for the period 1980-1983), in 1988 (for the period 1984-1988), 
and in 1992 (for the period 1989-1992). These evaluations were directed 
at the functioning of the PFM itself and mainly involved evaluation of 
the relationship between the Dutch government and the MFOs. The 
evaluations were clearly not impact or effectiveness evaluations.25 The 
1983 evaluation produced positive conclusions with regard to the 
functioning of the financing model and marked the end of the initial 
experimental phase for the PFM. At the same time, the criteria were 
slightly revised. One of the most important changes involved explicit 
mention for the first time of the importance of women in development 
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processes.26 The possibility for the Dutch government to make use of 
the so-called 'doubt paragraph' was also incorporated into the agree-
ment.27 The rules of the revised PFM confirmed the policy assumptions 
centred around the target-group approach (i.e., socio-political and 
cultural rights, active participation, poverty alleviation) and also the 
priorities and criteria for financing established back in 1980. 
The evaluation in 1988 also presented a positive picture of the func-
tioning of the PFM. This evaluation did not lead to major changes in the 
agreement with the MFOs; the agreement was renewed in 1989 for 
another four years.28 The evaluation in 1992 led to a reformulation of 
the PFM agreement. In the policy assumptions for the years 1992-1996, 
'target-group approach' was replaced by 'structural poverty alleviation' 
as the central objective of Dutch development cooperation. The 
environment was introduced as a point of attention for the MFOs and 
the procedures with regard to the execution of the PFM by the MFOs 
were more clearly defined. For the rest, the agreement simply confirmed 
the agreements from 1983 and 1988, indicating a positive evaluation of 
the general operation of the PFM.29 
The preceding evaluations constitute one of the control mechanisms 
for the PFM. As the Programme Financing Model meant an end to the 
direct involvement of the Ministry in project proposals, a few control 
mechanisms were introduced. In addition to the annual reports from the 
MFOs, monthly consultations between the MFOs and the Ministry were 
agreed upon along with independent investigations by the IOV or so-
called programme evaluations. These types of evaluations, carried out 
under the joint responsibility of DGIS and the relevant MFO, are 
directed at 'a programme or part thereof within a particular theme for 
one or more countries.'30 Between 1980 and 1991, a total of 43 
programme evaluations were carried out and thereby contributed to the 
'continuous policy dialogue between the MFOs and their counterparts as 
well as between the MFOs and the Dutch government.'31 
An analysis of the policy implications for 20 of these programme 
evaluations carried out between 1984 and 1990 showed growing 
attention within the MFOs for more explicit formulation of policy 
(particularly in the field of women and development), intensification of 
the policy dialogue between the MFOs and their counterparts, growth in 
donor coordination by way of consortium building, stimulation of 
networking between counterparts, and increasing attention to institutional 
strengthening of counterparts and income-generating activities. A greater 
willingness to cooperate with the governments of developing countries 
and a shift from project financing to multi-year programme financing 
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can also be seen.32 These programme evaluations can thus be regarded 
as not only a control mechanism but also a means for policy develop-
ment. 
On the basis of the evaluations by the MFP itself and the programme 
evaluations discussed above, the MFOs were (and are) regarded as a 
functional part of Dutch development cooperation. Like official 
development cooperation at the end of the 1980s, however, the MFOs 
also became the target of growing discontent and criticism.33 The 
MFOs were criticised for their paternalism and their bureaucratisation as 
well as for not reaching the poor any better than the bilateral aid of the 
Dutch government.34 The latter kept strikingly quiet with regard to the 
growing critique of the functioning and impact of the MFOs. Minister 
Bukman in 1989 also felt no need for a comparative study of the MFP 
in relation to bilateral and multilateral aid and simply repeated his 
confidence in the MFP and MFOs instead.35 The MFO discussion 
mainly involved the media and certain researchers. Despite the active 
involvement of the MFOs themselves in the discussion and their claims 
to be a 'relatively effective channel,'36 they initiated an impact evalu-
ation of their activities in 1989. An independent steering committee was 
given the task to 'determine the effectivity, efficiency and impact of the 
MFP as carried out by the four MFOs, as much as possible from the 
perspective of deprived groups and individuals in developing coun-
tries.'37 
In September 1991, the outcome of this Impact Study (as it was 
called) was published. On the basis of an evaluation of 19 pro-
jects/organisations spread across six countries, the steering committee 
came to the following conclusions: the economic programmes had a 
limited reach; social services were provided and used; and organisation 
of the target groups was successful. The study found 'no complete 
failures or cases of corruption but also no complete successes. The 
whole is not white, nor black; grey tones dominate.'38 The MFOs were 
told to be more modest with regard to their ambitions in the areas of 
poverty alleviation and contributions to the establishment of a demo-
cratic society. Further recommendations were made with regard to 
cooperation between the MFOs, greater attention to the cost-benefit 
analysis of activities, operationalisation of objectives, and systematic 
reflection and building of (institutional) knowledge. 
The MFOs were hard hit by the publication of this impact study 
because it was more critical than originally envisaged by the MFOs 
themselves. The criticism was short-lived, however. Brief but critical 
items on the subject were published in newspapers and periodicals and 
86 The same difference 
mostly left it at that.39 Only a few of these articles were critical of the 
impact study itself.40 After a first defensive reaction to the outcome of 
the impact study, the MFOs came forth with an official response in 
February 1992. Changes in a number of different areas were promised: 
more attention would be paid to the sustainability of the activities 
supported, the process of making their policy more explicit would be 
continued, Africa would receive greater attention, the cooperation among 
the MFOs would be strengthened, and more attention was promised for 
institutional support to NGDOs.41 Even before the results of the impact 
study were made public, Minister Pronk for Development Cooperation 
announced an increase of the structural block grant for the MFOs to 7% 
of the Development Cooperation budget in 1994.42 The mildly critical 
impact study and the reaction of the MFOs to the outcome of the study 
were regarded as constructive. The agreement between the Dutch 
government and the MFOs was renewed with only minor changes in the 
content, which is proof of the continuously positive attitude of Dutch 
politics towards the activities and functioning of CEBEMO, HI VOS, 
NOVIB and ICCO. 
To summarise: The history of the MFP as described above shows a 
gradual move towards greater autonomy for the MFOs over the years 
cumulating in the PFM in 1980. Only minor changes were made in the 
agreement with the Dutch government in the 1980s, which suggests that 
the MFOs have sufficiently adjusted to the changes brought forward by 
the PFM and become relatively independent organisations within the 
field of Dutch development cooperation.43 Despite growing criticism 
from certain (mainly scientific) corners of society at the end of the 
1980s and a critical impact study, the generally positive attitude of 
Dutch politics (and the general public) towards MFOs has not changed 
much over time. This positive attitude has been substantially fed by the 
co-financing organisations themselves. The private development-aid 
channel presents itself as a stepping stone to democratic civil 
organisations which form a countervailing power to the state and the 
market. The MFOs also present themselves as directed at the poor and 
having a positive impact in the areas of poverty alleviation and 
démocratisation. Although the tone of these statements is perhaps a bit 
more modest than it used to be, there is very little difference from those 
made before the MFOs became a part of the quality-debate.44 The 
evidence for these statements is still quite restricted, making them more 
the subject of wishful thinking than accurate descriptions of reality. 
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3.2 The policy of the ICCO India desk 
Ever since its inception in 1976, the India desk has been one of the 
more important desks in the organisation. This is not only because India 
is inhabited by more people than in all of Africa belonging to the 
primary target group for aid (i.e., the poor); the India desk is also the 
biggest department with regard to applications, financial turnover and 
staff membership. In addition and particularly in the first ten years of its 
existence, the India desk also served as a kind of guinea pig for certain 
areas of policy development.45 In the present section, this policy­
making will be discussed in greater detail. From the start of the India 
experiment in 1976 to the latest policy profile in 1993, the history of the 
India desk will be reviewed with respect to developments and changes 
in its policy (or priorities, as they are mostly referred to). Four periods 
of policy development can be distinguished: 1971-1976, 19771984, 
1984-1990 and 1991-1992. These periods will be considered here in two 
blocks and a compilation of the more important priorities formulated in 
successive policy papers from the ICCO India desk is presented in Table 
З.1.46 
3.2.1 1971-1976 and 1977-1983: The India experiment 
Nearly five years after the start of ICCO's work in the Third World, the 
first official visit was made to India. Contacts were laid with some 
Protestant-Christian institutions, and the first projects were approved in 
1971. Several more staff members travelled to India thereafter.47 It was 
not, however, until 1976 that these visits became more frequent (and of 
a different nature). In the same year, ICCO decided to start an 
experiment in which India formed the central focus. India was chosen as 
a test case not only because of the enormous extent of poverty and the 
presence of ten million Christians but also because of the expected 
growth in funds and staff within ICCO. Discussions regarding the build 
up of the Asia region and further régionalisation, as well as the changing 
vision on development and demand for greater attention to reaching the 
poor also contributed to the decision to start a separate desk for India.48 
The target-group approach became one of the most important objecti-
ves of the India experiment. In addition to the objective of assessing the 
possibilities for implementing the new policy guidelines for the MFOs 
with a few staff members in a single country, the experiment was also 
aimed at finding new initiatives with regard to visitations and relations 
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with NGDOs.4' The latter pertains to the possibilities for decentralisati-
on of decision-making from ICCO to the counterparts, which was also at 
the base of the so-called Reverse Consortia between ICCO and its 
counterparts in the Third World in the late 1970s. ICCO clearly stated 
that relations would not be restricted to Christian organisations and that 
an active policy towards these so-called 'natural partners' in India would 
be combined with funding for non-Christian NGDOs as well.50 
Between 1977 and 1980, the India experiment took shape with 
frequent and long-lasting visitations from the then coordinator of the 
India desk and the financing of a growing number of projects. Priorities 
were formulated to guide these visits and the approval of projects.51 
The priorities were also distinguished as project or NGDO specific. With 
regard to projects, priority should be given to: (1) target groups 
consisting of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, women, marginal 
farmers and/or landless labourers; (2) rural areas; and (3), in case of 
projects in cities, slum projects. Furthermore, the projects should 
emphasise participation as a prerequisite for development. The NGDO-
specific priorities included the expansion and deepening of contacts with 
churches and support to initiatives enlarging the commitment of 
churches to development. At the same time, modest relations with secu-
lar NGDOs should be built up and contacts in the poorer states sought. 
In order to extend the possibilities for reaching the poorer sections of 
Indian society, it was also thought necessary to lay contacts with so-
called non-institutional organisations. Finally, the establishment of a 
network of Indian advisors and advisory organisations was also 
considered crucial. 
The report of the India desk presented in January 1980 as a self-
evaluation of the India experiment for the period 1976-1980 reached 
only some general conclusions.52 The report showed relations with 
Christian as well as secular organisations to have expanded considerably, 
but an effective network of advisors was not yet established. Problems 
were encountered in assessing the two central objectives (i.e., the extent 
to which a participation approach was adhered to and whether projects 
contributed to structural changes defined as changes in the political-
economic power concentration in favour of the powerless). The only 
thing which could be said was that nearly all of the organisations 
acknowledged the importance of people's participation but the degree of 
implementation differed from NGDO to NGDO.53 The India desk saw 
only a few NGDOs satisfying the structural-change criterion, whereas 
the majority of the organisations was active in the 'conditional sphere' 
or the creation of more space for the target group within the existing 
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order. The difficulties in stating anything substantial with regard to the 
two central objectives were not only due to a lack of information but 
also to the lack of a clear and operational elaboration of the concepts of 
participation and structural change.54 
The report presented in 1980 also laid out the main lines for develop-
ment in the period 1980-1983. These centred around further expansion 
of the relationships in India (to include regions where a strong partner-
network had already been established) while maintaining the priorities 
with regard to projects and organisations. It was proposed that the 
travels and cooperation between the secretary and the staff of the desk 
be continued.55 The idea of forming an informal consultative group out 
of Indian counterparts to discuss the policy of the desk and assist (and 
evaluate) the staff of ICCO was inspired by the Reverse Consortium and 
was new. 
Just as the Reverse Consortium, this consultative group would disap-
pear by the beginning of the 1980s. In the follow-up report from the 
India desk in 1984,56 the idea of such a group is not even mentioned as 
one of the priorities set for the period 1980-1983. It is, however, stated 
that the India desk sees little benefit in further 'transfer' (i.e., decentrali-
sation).57 This 1984 report also reflects the problems in the relations 
with the churches in India and the political interpretation of the 
developmental problems in India by the India desk.58 ICCO's general 
objective for India was the creation of possibilities for the poor to 
express themselves and to be part of the decision-making structure in 
their society through the funding of a range of projects at the local level. 
This political objective of 'societal justice' is often undermined by 
stating that most of the counterparts do not adhere to such a political 
orientation, that ICCO is not free in her choice of partner, that 
development is a long process in which societal changes (particularly 
those of a political nature) gradually occur, and that fighting for direct 
survival of people often takes precedence over the political goal of 
increased decision-making.59 The latter reasoning can be followed for 
an organisation with the funding of developmental projects and pro-
grammes as its main task, the statement with regard to the criteria seems 
a bit strange: the India desk prefers 'a flexible use of criteria above 
strict adherence to policy priorities, subject to the NGO being sincere, 
the project improving the situation of the poor, aimed at enhancing the 
participation of people as communities and both technically and 
organisationally feasible.'60 
Despite this practical stand of the India desk, priorities seem to be 
necessary. In contrast to the priorities formulated in 1976 and 1980, the 
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priorities for 1984 are in some cases formulated more extensively. For 
target groups, the focus remains on people below the poverty line while 
a maximum of 10% of the annual allocation is reserved for the handi-
capped. The priority for rural areas (and slums, in the case of urban 
projects) is also repeated, but the regional priority is more clearly 
defined. Priority will be given (in random order) to Tamil Nadu, Andhra 
Pradesh, Rajasthan, Bihar, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and 
North-East India.61 For the remaining states, a more selective policy 
will be followed with priority for those projects clearly aimed at the 
poorer sections. Priority will also be given to projects in which special 
attention is paid to awareness raising, organisation and education.62 
With respect to economic activities, priority will be given to activities 
strengthening a cooperative approach with, as a rule, only 50% of the 
costs being financed. Economic and social-justice projects should 
constitute two-third of the total projects. The project duration will be 
between one and three years, depending on the nature of the project and 
the implementing organisation.63 
Despite reflection on her activities in India in the period 1976-1984 
and despite the formulation of priorities, the policy of the India desk had 
yet to be institutionalised.64 Policy discussions were held during the 
assessment of a project proposal and guided more by 'feelings of 
solidarity with the poor' than by criteria for efficiency and effectiveness. 
The optimistic attitude of the India desk at the time and the idea of 
NGDOs being 'always reliable, more effective than others and therefore 
worthy of support' meant that attention was mainly given to the dedica-
tion of the implementing organisation and questions relating to the target 
group and the relevance of the proposed activities for them in the 
assessment of projects.65 
3.2.2 1984-1990 and 1991-1992: Reflection and tuning 
The period 1984-1992 can be described in short as a period of 
reflection, growing attention to policy development and a further fine-
tuning of priorities. The period saw the development of more Objective 
criteria which were better usable as a basis for the assessment of project 
proposals.' The formulation of these more objective criteria took place at 
the end of the 1980s although the process had already been initiated 
some years earlier. 'Around 1985 the idea took root that more things 
went wrong than known' with projects and organisations supported.66 
The optimistic view prevailing before 1985 slowly gave way to a 
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'feeling of insecurity' with regard to ICCO's activities in India fuelled 
mainly by negative experiences with individual organisations. The staff 
increase at the India desk in the second half of the 1980s further 
contributed to a more critical viewpoint. This critical viewpoint was 
strengthened by the outcome of an internal evaluation conducted by the 
India desk in 1988 with regard to all projects and organisations 
supported since 1971. 'The quality of the work of 99 organisations (38.5 
percent) was judged as positive to very positive. The impact of the work 
of 54 organisations (21 percent) was judged to be inadequate. For the 
remaining 104 organisations (40.4 percent) it was not possible to reach a 
definite conclusion.'67 This last category of 'grey organisations' in 
particular suggested that something was definitely wrong with the 
assessment procedures for projects and programmes.68 
In 1986 a visit of the director of ICCO to India cumulated in a propo-
sal with far-reaching policy implications. This proposal, aimed at further 
expansion of ICCO's involvement in India, promoted more extensive 
support for the large rural-development organisations in India (the so-
called BINGOs or Big NGOs). This recommendation was based upon a 
visit to six of the Indian BINGOs already supported by ICCO. The 
management explained its recommendation by stating: (1) 'there seems 
to be a reasonable to good participation of the target group in the 
projects at the village level'; (2) 'the Indian government seems at the 
moment to provide sufficient room for this type of activity'; (3) 'the 
leaders of the national NGOs seem to possess sufficient pragmatism and 
realism to not go further than (politically) acceptable'; (4) 'in a large 
number of villages, clear economic development is visible'; (5) 'these 
programmes reach a target group which belongs to one of the poorest in 
the world'; (6) 'although the project sums are large, the investments per 
capita are limited'; and (7) 'the mentioned organisations seem to have 
sufficient and qualified staff.' In conclusion, the large-scale rural 
development activities for five of the six NGDOs can 'be seen as a 
positive contribution to the creation of facilities for development of the 
poor rural population based on self-help.'69 
This proposal would have far-reaching consequences for the India 
desk: growth of the budget for India from Dfl. 13 to 20 million, 
institutionalisation of programme and organisation financing, and staff 
increases. More concentrated attention for BINGOs did not occur,70 
however, and the 20 million budget for India was never reached (see 
also 3.3 below). The proposal did have consequences for the decision-
making process and the organisation of the desk. Programme and 
organisation funding became an accepted form of financing,71 and the 
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discussions with regard to the expansion of the India desk can be seen 
as a first step in the direction of the integration of the preparation and 
monitoring staff (which would take shape in 1987 under the term 'India 
experiment ΙΓ).72 In other papers, specific topics were touched upon 
relating to policy development. In a short 'introductory note' concerning 
ICCO's involvement in India in August 1987, the concept of 
empowerment was introduced.73 This note further touched upon the 
BINGO discussion and confirmed the need for further strengthening of 
'support and consultancy organisations.'74 
In some general discussions of policy development and improvement 
of the quality of the work within ICCO at the end of the 1980s and be­
ginning of the 1990s staff consultations were held. For the consultation 
in 1990, the India desk prepared a policy note.75 This note was a kind 
of mid-term report based on the internal evaluation of the activities 
supported in India between 1971 and 1988. The internal evaluation was 
discussed at length and certain policy proposals which promised a break 
with the past were formulated. There was an intention, for instance, to 
drastically reduce the number of projects in order to reach a controllable 
project package.76 Regional priorities were also adjusted with the most 
interesting adjustment involving the transfer of the states in which the 
majority of the projects had been financed to a group in which a very 
selective policy would be adhered to with regard to applications. 
The prospect of more intensive and long lasting relations with ecume­
nical counterparts was also held out while income-generating projects 
were given the highest priority. For the first time, women received 
specific attention, although the desk adhered to its 'two track policy' in 
this regard (i.e., attention to projects specifically directed at women and 
attention to integrated projects with a women's component). The inte­
grated approach would also account for projects in the field of health 
(i.e., health as; part of a socio-economic and political approach). In 
contrast to the previous policy, more attention to projects aimed at the 
urban poor was proposed along with an important change with regard to 
the availability of funds. 'Recent analyses have taught that in the past a 
number of NGOs supported by ICCO have grown too fast and have 
been overfinanced. The desk therefore proposes to continue the policy of 
tight financing; to insist on a substantial own contribution [...] and to 
indicate in a growing number of cases the finiteness of the ICCO 
support, so that from 1992 onwards a minimum of 20% of the allocation 
is available for new, innovating projects.'77 
Continuation was proposed with regard to the total allocation for India 
(some 40% of the Asia budget) and the multiformity of the package of 
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counterparts supported. This continuation would lead to financing of 
bigger projects and/or bigger NGDOs for there would be extra funds 
available as a result of a reduction in the number of projects/counter-
parts. Part of the funds should also be made available to support 
organisations working at a national level. Relations with existing support 
organisations were to be intensified, while an expansion was envisaged 
in the areas of ecology, women and development and income-generating 
activities. This policy note also stressed the need for a change in project 
assessment and monitoring, particularly in the case of bigger projects 
and counterparts, which suggests that nothing much had happened in this 
area since the BINGO discussion in 1986. 
Although some of the points mentioned in the policy note of 1990 
were to be further elaborated in the years to follow,78 the lines set out 
in the note itself were fairly fixed. The policy profile of 1993 can 
therefore be seen as largely a public confirmation and to some extent 
further refinement of the 1990 note.79 This confirmation pertained in 
particular to the regional priorities, the thematic priorities of health care 
and income generation, the identity of the counterparts and the 
urban/rural division. The remainder of the 1993 policy paper involved 
refinement of the lines set out in previous years: more attention for 
women and development (also within economic activities), reduction in 
the number of counterparts and projects, greater cooperation with other 
donors, and more strictly defined priorities with regard to the thematic 
issues. 
3.3 ICCO in India: Outcome of the policy 
As project financing (and more recently organisation and programme 
financing) has always been considered the prime task of ICCO (and thus 
the India desk), it is logical to take a closer look at the projects, pro-
grammes and organisations co-financed in India following the division 
into four periods made above.80 In the first part of this section, some of 
the features of the projects sanctioned in India between 1971 and 1992 
will be discussed. Attention will be given to, among other things, the 
division of projects across the subcontinent, the growth in the number of 
projects sanctioned annually, the funds made available and the sectoral 
division of the projects. The NGDOs behind these projects will be 
discussed next. A classification of the counterparts according to identity, 
region and growth (number of people and communities reached, 
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comprehensive picture of ICCO's activities and actions in India can be 
drawn. 
3.3.1 Projects/programmes in India 
The ICCO policy towards India was realised in the period 1971-1992 
through the financing of a total of 927 projects.81 After a careful start 
with three projects in 1971 and one each in 1972 and 1973, the number 
of projects sanctioned per year steadily increased following the decision 
to start the so-called India experiment in 1976. In 1977, 16 projects 
were sanctioned; at the end of this period, in 1983, 55 projects were 
sanctioned. In the period 1984-1990, the number of sanctioned projects 
initially increased per year to reach a all time high of 89 projects in 
1988. Thereafter, the number of approved projects declined to 63 in 
1992. One year later, in 1993, the total number of projects stagnated at 
32, which had not been reached any more since the late 1970s (see also 
Figure 3.1). 
The first three projects sanctioned in 1971 were situated in the states 
of Gujarat, Kerala and Uttar Pradesh. Diversification took place in later 
years, although a strong concentration in a few states can generally be 
observed for the entire period 1971-1992. In particular, the southern 
states of Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu, and the state of 
West Bengal in the North emerged as the most important states as far as 
the number of projects. A total of 546 projects (59%) was implemented 
in these four states. Many of the projects also fall under the so-called 
All India projects carried out by organisations which are, in principle, 
active throughout India. Other major states are Kerala and Kamataka 
(both in the South), and the Northern states of Haryana, Punjab and 
Himachal Pradesh are appreciably underrepresented in the range of 
projects. 
This picture of concentration in a few states is even more marked 
when the actual ICCO contribution per state is considered. Between 
1971 and 1992, 54.6% of the ICCO contribution went to the four most 
important states mentioned above with the All India projects claiming 
another 11.2%. The decline in the number of projects sanctioned in the 
five most important states over the years is more clearly shown by the 
decline in the ICCO contribution to these concentration states. Andhra 
Pradesh, for instance, received 23% of all projects and nearly 32% of 
the total ICCO contribution over the years 1984-1990. In the years 1991 
and 1992, these percentages were down to 18% and 14% respectively. 
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The same can be seen with regard to Tamil Nadu, West Bengal and 
Maharashtra. The All India projects show exactly the opposite: a decline 
in the number of projects and funds from the period 1977-1983 to 1984-
1990 followed by a sharp increase not only in the number of projects 
but also in the share of ICCO funds. In 1991-1992, 20 4% of the ICCO 
funds sanctioned for projects in India went to these so-called All India 
projects.83 
Figure 3.1 
Number of projects sanctioned (per year) 
'72 '74 '78 '7Θ '80 '82 '84 '88 '88 '80 '92 
Source Internal administration ICCO 
Andhra Pradesh is by far the most important state with regard to S(peci-
al)P(roject) funds (see below). Between 1977 and 1983, slightly more 
than 39% of the SP funds went to this southern state. This percentage 
increased to more than 65% between 1984 and 1990, and 51% of the SP 
funds still went to Andhra Pradesh in 1991-1992. West Bengal, 
Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu only received some 8% of all SP funds 
between 1971 and 1992.*4 Andhra Pradesh also accounted for 37.6% of 
the contributions from other donors, while the three other states together 
accounted for only 10.2% of these contributions over the total period of 
1971-1992. The own funds of the implementing organisations in Andhra 
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Pradesh are equally striking. Of the total own contribution of nearly Dfl. 
84 million, Andhra Pradesh accounts for more than 54% (see also 
Figures 3.2 to 3.2.4).85 
In Figure 3.3, data on the contribution to the projects sanctioned 
between 1971 and 1992 are presented. The total costs of the 927 
projects amounted to Dfl. 420.4 million, with 43.2% of this coming 
from ICCO (Category IV) funding, 6.3% coming from SP funds, 19.9% 
coming from the own contribution of the implementing organisation, and 
30.6% coming from other donors.86 Over the years, major changes in 
the contributions of the four sources distinguished here have occurred. In 
almost every year in the first two periods of 1971-1976 and 1977-1983, 
the ICCO contribution was more than half of the total costs of the 
projects. After 1984, the percentage of the total costs carried by ICCO 
decreased considerably and was little more than 25% in 1989 and 1990. 
This reduction in the ICCO contribution went hand in hand with 
increased funding from other donors and the implementing NGDOs. 
After a slow start in 1978-1983, the SP funds expanded but then for 
only a couple of years. From 1988 to 1992, the SP funds not only 
decreased in absolute terms but also as a part of the total costs of the 
projects sanctioned. In 1992, less than 2% of the total costs was 
financed out of SP funds. 
The other donors which contributed more than Dfl. 128 million to 
projects approved by ICCO are difficult to name. ICCO has a working 
relationship with a few Protestant Christian donor-organisations in 
Europe: Brot für die Welt (BfdW) and Evangelische Zentralstelle für 
Entwicklungshilfe (EZE) in Germany and Christian Aid (CA) in Great 
Britain. A few projects have also been co-financed with NOVIB (one of 
the four co-financing organisations in the Netherlands). For the majority 
of the sanctioned projects, no contribution from other donors is 
mentioned, which makes ICCO presumably the only donor for that 
project. This does not imply that ICCO is the only donor for the NGDO 
implementing the project. In a survey of Indian ICCO counterparts 
(N=116), 147 foreign donors were cited as having supported the various 
NGDOs over the last ten years. On average, each NGDO mentioned 
more than four different foreign donors (including ICCO). The most 
important NGDO donors were the British Oxfam and Christian Aid and 
the German organisations EZE, BfdW and Miserior. The most important 
bilateral donors were Sweden and the Netherlands, and the most 
important multilateral donor was UNICEF.87 
Figure 3.2 
ICCO contribution per state (1971-1992) 
Other' 
Andhra Pradesh 
Tamil Nadu 
West Bengal 
Maharashtra 
All India 
Figure 3.2.1 
SP contribution per state (1971-1992) 
Figure 3.2.2 
Own contribution per state (1971-1992) 
Figure 3.2.3 
Other donors per state (1971-1992) 
Figure 3.2.4 
Total costs per state (1971-1992) 
Source: ICCO internal administration (own calculations) 
* Other states: Bihar, Delhi, Goa, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Kamataka, 
Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, North East India, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh. 
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The SP funds either come from the Dutch Ministry for Development 
Cooperation (DGIS) or the European Union (EU). DGIS has specific 
categories of its budget open for applications from co-financing 
organisations. A project proposal must be submitted and each proposal is 
judged by DGIS on its own merits. These additional DGIS funds were 
tapped for the first time in 1978. Up to 1985, the number of projects 
financed with additional DGIS funds was only one or two per year. 
Starting in 1985, however, a sharp increase can be observed. Between 
1985 and 1990, a total of 35 projects was (partly) financed through SP 
funds. Over 1991 and 1992, the number of projects sharply declined to a 
level just above that for the period 1977-1983. Of the 927 projects 
approved by ICCO for India (1971-1992), a total of 47 received such 
additional SP funds from DGIS. The most important types of projects 
for the SP funds were emergency projects and projects falling under the 
'rural development' category. With regard to SP funds from the EU, 
which contributed to 56 different projects in India,86 the so-called 
block-grants are the most important.89 Of the Dfl. 26.5 million in SP 
funds between 1971 and 1992, 83.5% came from additional funds from 
DGIS and 16.5% from the EU. 
The contribution of the implementing NGDO is of specific interest 
here because it is typically regarded as a sign of 'self-reliance.' This 
own contribution does not necessarily imply that the NGDO takes the 
funds from its own budget. Own resources refer to 'domestic resources', 
which can be divided into funds from the government, banks, the target 
group and/or the NGDO itself (e.g., interest on bank deposits, income 
from specific (economic) activities). The ICCO administration does not 
differentiate between these different types of 'domestic resources' (see 
also the 'growth of ICCO counterparts' below). In recent years, the 
India desk has insisted on a contribution from the implementing agency 
itself. In the year 1991, the own contribution was down to 6% of the 
total project costs from 31% in the previous year. In 1992, the percen-
tage climbed again to 25%. For the entire period 1971-1992, a 
considerable fluctuation in the own contribution as a percentage of the 
total costs of projects and programmes can be observed. For the period 
1971-1976, this percentage ranges between 5% and 29% (with an 
average of 16.1%); for 1977-1983, between 7% and 28% (average of 
18.6%), and for 1984-1990, between 11% and 31% (average of 23.7%). 
With a total ICCO contribution to the 927 India projects of Dfl. 181.6 
million, the average ICCO contribution per project is Dfl. 196,000. 
During the period 1971-1992, the average ICCO contribution per project 
in India decreased appreciably. The very first three projects in India still 
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had an average ICCO contribution of around Dfl. 500,000. During the 
1980s, the average contribution per project only exceeded Dfl. 200,000 
once. 'This can be explained to a large extent by the nature of the 
projects financed by ICCO. The three projects from 1971 and 1972 
concerned large hospital projects (the so-called 'brick and mortar 
projects'), while mainly community projects were approved during the 
1980s.'90 The average ICCO contribution per project showed a signifi­
cant increase to well over Dfl. 200,000 in 1991 but was again less than 
Dfl. 190,000 in 1992." 
Figure 3.3 
General financial data regarding the projects approved by ICCO in India, 
per programme year (x Dfl. million). 
70 
ES3 Other means 
ttttH Own contribution 
E22 ЭР contribution 
ШЁ ICCO commitment 
Source: ICCO administration 
Note The figures show the total amount reserved in the relevant year for projects 
in India and do not refer to the actual annual expenditure 
Construction projects in the field of health and training represented 
almost 73% of the total number of approved projects during the period 
1971-1976, but this percentage dropped to 0% in the period 1991-1992 
as can be seen in Table 3.2.'2 Just as in many other donor agencies, a 
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noticeable shift from infrastructural to so-called community-development 
projects can be observed to occur in the second half of the 1970s. 
During the 1980s and early 1990s, community-development projects 
represent the major part of the project range. Health-care projects also 
tended to increase between 1976 and 1992. During the period 1971-
1992, 13.5% of the projects were in the health-care sector. Projects in 
the sectors human rights, legal aid and refugees were only approved 
incidentally in the 1970s and early 1980s. Finally, the great increase in 
the number of emergency aid projects in the second half of the 1980s 
clearly stands out.93 
In more than half of the projects between 1971 and 1990, the target 
group is referred to with the general designation 'poor people' in the 
internal ICCO registration.94 In the remaining projects, some twenty 
different references are used ranging from 'rag pickers' to 'tenants' and 
from 'hospital staff to 'leather workers.' It is obvious that the majority 
of the projects in India has a target community coming from the lower 
rungs of society. This is also evident when the cultural allocation of 
projects is examined. The tribal populations, harijans and/or lower castes 
are the target group for 42% (N=790) of the projects. This picture is 
confirmed by the survey showing Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, 
Economically Backward Classes and women to be the major groups 
targeted by the ICCO counterparts. The NGDOs concentrate on only one 
of these categories in only a very few cases which means that the target 
group generally consists of a combination of categories also including 
children, youth, handicapped/disabled/leprosy patients and workers at 
times. The NGDOs, themselves, can also be a target group. This is the 
case with ICCO counterparts which do not implement development pro-
grammes but act as consultants and advisory organisations.95 In the 
first six years of the India desk (1971-1976), NGDOs were not 
registered as a target group. With the start of the India experiment and 
particularly during the second half of the 1980s, the NGDOs grew in 
importance as a target group. In nearly 17% of the projects between 
1984 and 1990, NGDOs were cited as a target group. 
The target group for almost 68% of all projects is situated in a rural 
area. For some 10% of all projects, the target group clearly lives and 
works in a town. The remaining projects are those for which the target 
group is both rural and urban. In the last 20 years, little change has 
taken place in this situation. The same cannot be said when observing 
the division of the target group in terms of sex. For nearly two thirds of 
the projects, a specification of the target group in terms of male and/or 
female is simply not provided in the internal ICCO administration. For 
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the remaining (more recent) projects a differentiation is made between 
men, women, and projects with a women's component. Projects exclusi-
vely aimed at males are limited: only 12 of the 927 projects (i.e., 1.3%) 
are specified as such. Specific women's projects are also limited to 5.6% 
of all projects between 1971 and 1992. Despite this relatively low 
figure, these projects constituted more than 10% of the total projects in 
the years 1971, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1979 and 1981. Projects with a 
women component are also the fastest growing category. In 1977, when 
projects with a women component were distinguished for the first time, 
they constituted slightly more than 6% of all projects. In the period 
1984-1990, this percentage increased to an average of 34.7%. In the 
years 1991-1992, this figure increased even further to 43%. 
Table 3.2 
ICCO projects per sector (as % of total) 
Community development 
Health care 
Schooling and training 
General activities 
Construction health care 
Habitat, housing and infrastructure 
Construction training 
Emergency aid 
Economic & industrial activity 
Communication/media 
Agriculture and land development 
Human rights 
Legal assistance 
Refugees 
Total (in absolute figures) 
1971-
76 
-
10.0 
-
-
50.0 
3.3 
23.3 
-
3.3 
-
10.0 
-
-
-
30 
1977-
83 
31.0 
14.9 
9.1 
8.3 
8.7 
6.6 
7.0 
1.7 
5.8 
2.9 
3.7 
-
0.4 
-
242 
1984-
90 
45.0 
11.8 
9.8 
9.8 
1.7 
3.5 
1.9 
5.0 
2.5 
4.1 
2.7 
0.4 
1.5 
0.2 
258 
1991-
92 
47.4 
18.2 
11.7 
11.7 
-
0.7 
-
0.7 
2.2 
1.5 
5.8 
-
-
-
137 
Total 
40.2 
13.5 
9.6 
9.4 
4.9 
3.9 
3.7 
3.3 
3.3 
3.2 
3.7 
0.2 
1.0 
0.1 
927 
Source: ICCO administration (own calculations). 
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3.3.2 The ICCO counterparts 
The 927 projects discussed above have been implemented by 276 
different NGDOs.96 Most of these NGDOs (108 or 39.1%) are 
responsible for only one ICCO project. In addition to this group, there is 
a large group (119 NGDOs or 42.3%) which has signed between two 
and five project contracts with ICCO, and 42 organisations (or 14.9%) 
succeeded in getting six to ten projects sanctioned. This leaves only a 
few (eight NGDOs) with more than ten project agreements with ICCO. 
In practice, contracts are signed with new counterparts (i.e., NGDOs 
with no previous financial relations with ICCO) each year. Over the 
years and mainly since 1981, the number of new counterparts has 
nevertheless declined considerably.97 Whereas 75% of the NGDOs with 
which ICCO signed a contract in 1977 was new, this accounted for only 
8% of the NGDOs in 1990. Over 1991 and 1992, the percentage of new 
NGDOs per year increased gradually. Examination of the ICCO 
contribution for these new counterparts also confirms the preceding 
picture. Of the total ICCO funds sanctioned in 1980, 60% was for new 
counterparts: this was 3% in 1990; and a gradual increase can be seen 
since 1991 indicating the strive of the India desk to make room for new 
counterparts. In Table 3.3, an overview of the number of projects, the 
number of implementing NGDOs, the percentage new NGDOs and the 
ICCO contribution to these new counterparts for the period 1971-1992 is 
presented. The figures show the room for new counterpart organisations 
to be very limited. The number of ICCO counterparts in India remains 
fairly stable. In effect, therefore, 'ICCO in India has for years been 
active in programme financing in terms of projects.'98 
A large number of organisations has been supported for a long time, 
and several of these have received financial aid for a wide variety of 
projects. One of the best examples of this is the organisation Action for 
Welfare and Awakening in Rural Environment (AWARE) in Andhra 
Pradesh, which has been supported since 1976. By the end of the 
financial relationship in 1994 with AWARE, a total of 39 projects had 
been approved in sectors varying from emergency aid to community 
development projects. Of the total allocation to India between 1971 and 
1992 of Dfl. 181.6 million, 55.5% went to only 27 NGDOs with each of 
these thus receiving more than 1% of the total contribution. These 
NGDOs work in different parts of India (i.e., a concentration in a few 
states does not exist).99 Moreover, this group of major counterparts also 
received the majority of the SP funds allocated in this period. Of the 
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total of Dfl. 26.5 million made available, nearly 73% went to seven 
NGDOs all belonging to the category of major counterparts. In Table 
3.4, the figures regarding the ICCO and SP contributions per group of 
NGDOs are presented for the period 1971-1992. 
Table 3.3 
Number of projects sanctioned per year with number of (new) NGDOs 
(1971-1992) 
Years 
1971-1976 
1977-1983 
1984-1990 
1991-1992 
TOTAL 
Number of 
projects 
sanctioned 
15 
242 
518 
137 
927 
Number 
of 
NGDOs 
10 
137 
186 
88 
276* 
New NGDOs (as 
% of number of 
NGDOs) 
100.0% 
92.0% 
62.4% 
17.0% 
-
ICCO contribution to 
new NGDOs (as % of 
total ICCO contribution) 
100.0% 
81.2% 
31.3% 
16.7% 
-
Source: Internal administration of the ICCO India desk (own calculations). 
* This figure represents the total number of NGDOs with which ICCO has 
(had) a (financial) relationship between 1971 and 1992 and is therefore not 
the sum of the figures for the individual periods. 
The clear concentration of projects in certain states in India shown 
above naturally holds for the implementing NGDOs as well. The majori-
ty of the Indian counterparts works in the states of Andhra Pradesh, 
West Bengal and Tamil Nadu. Most NGDOs not only concentrate their 
work on one state but also on only part of this state. Data from the 
survey of the Indian counterparts of ICCO showed 53% of the respon-
dents (N=108) to be active in only one district. Although exact infor-
mation is not available for all NGDOs, they can be assumed to be wor-
king with a limited number of villages or communities within these 
districts. The total number of so-called programme villages for the 362 
projects for which such data were available was found to be 23,506 (i.e., 
an average of 64 villages per project although this figure is heavily 
biased by a few projects involving as many as 2,000 target villages). 
According to the ICCO administration, a large number of these pro-
jects (44%) is in fact restricted to a maximum of 10 villages. All this 
clearly shows the counterparts in India to be relatively small organisât!-
Table 3.4 
ICCO and SP contribution per group of NGDOs for 1971-1992 (N=276) 
ICCO CONTRIBUTION 
0 
1-10,000 
10,000-25,000 
25,000-50,000 
50,000-100,000 
100,000-250,000 
250,000-500,000 
500,000-1,000,000 
1,000,000-2.000,000 
>2,000,000 
TOTAL 
Number 
of NGDOs 
2 
14 
27 
26 
38 
44 
37 
36 
32 
20 
276 
As % of 
NGDOs 
0.7 
5.8 
15.6 
25.0 
38.8 
54.7 
68.1 
81.2 
92.8 
100.0 
ICCO 
contribution 
-
100 
487 
967 
2,865 
7,553 
12,741 
25,140 
44,129 
87,635 
181,617 
SP CONTRIBUTION 
0 
1-10,000 
10,000-25,000 
25,000-50,000 
50,000-100,000 
100,000-250,000 
250,000-500,000 
500,000-1,000,000 
1,000,000-2,000,000 
>2,000.000 
TOTAL 
Number of 
NGDOs 
204 
11 
24 
11 
9 
2 
4 
5 
2 
4 
276 
As % of 
NGDOs 
73.9 
77.9 
86.6 
90.6 
93.8 
94.6 
96.0 
97.8 
99.3 
100.0 
SP 
contribution 
-
76 
409 
378 
747 
299 
1,197 
3,248 
3,012 
17,108 
26,473 
As % of SP-
contribution 
0.0 
0.3 
1.8 
3.3 
6.1 
7.2 
11.7 
24.0 
35.4 
100.0 
Source: ICCO administration (own calculations). 
As % of ICCO 
contribution 
0.0 
0.1 
0.3 
0.9 
2.4 
6.6 
13.6 
27.4 
51.7 
100.0 
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ons implementing activities in a limited number of locations.100 This 
picture is reinforced by the fact that nearly 61% of the 927 projects 
sanctioned by the India desk through 1992 can be characterised as local 
projects with 29% characterised as regional projects, 10% as national 
projects and 0.4% as international projects.101 
Table 3.5 
ICCO contribution per identity organisation 1971-1992 (as % of total) 
Christian 
Christian secular 
Secular 
Gandhian 
Hindu/Muslim/Buddhist 
TOTAL 
1971-
76 
99.4 
-
0.6 
-
-
100.0 
1977-
83 
51.6 
22.5 
20.1 
3.8 
2.0 
100.0 
1984-
90 
22.6 
33.1 
33.3 
10.2 
0.8 
100.0 
1991-
92 
26.4 
29.2 
31.2 
13.2 
-
100.0 
TOTAL 
36.7 
27.2 
26.9 
8.2 
1.0 
100.0 
Source: ICCO administration (own calculations). 
In section 3.2, it has already been noted that the India desk became a 
test case for 'new types of relationships.' One of the effects of this 
status was the funding of non-Christian NGDOs. Over the years, there 
have been some major changes in the background of the NGDOs 
supported in India. As can be seen in Table 3.5, most of these 
organisations (i.e., 166, or 59% of the total) have a Protestant-Christian 
origin or close ties to the Protestant-Christian community in India (i.e., 
are Christian secular organisations). An additional 78 counterparts (or 
28%) are deemed to be secular organisations. The remaining 
counterparts have either a Gandhian background or connections to the 
Hindu, Muslim, or Buddhist communities. During the first six years 
(1971-1976), nearly all of the ICCO funds went to Christian organis-
ations. The first secular NGDO was supported in 1976. In the period 
1977-1983 nearly 52% of ICCO's contribution still went to this type of 
NGDO, with secular organisations receiving 22.5%. In the 1984-1990 
period, these latter agencies received slightly more than Dfl. 28 million 
or 33% of the ICCO contribution. The Christian and secular 
organisations combined accounted for 56% of the ICCO contribution in 
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this same period. Across the entire period, the Christian organisations — 
both in number and in terms of ICCO contributions — were clearly most 
important, followed by the Christian secular and secular 
organisations.102 Gandhian organisations and those with a Hindu, 
Muslim or Buddhist background constituted 8% of the total number of 
organisations and accounted for 9% of the ICCO contribution between 
1971 and 1992. 
3.3.3 Growth of the ICCO counterparts 
The picture presented above with respect to the projects and ICCO 
counterparts in India already shows differences with regard to 
geographic domains and expenditures. The NGDOs range from 
organisations working in just a few communities and a financial ICCO 
contribution of a few thousand guilders to organisations working in 
thousands of villages and annual expenditures in the millions of guilders. 
From this it should be clear that large differences in staffs of NGDOs 
also exist. From the survey conducted among the Indian counterparts, 
data with regard to the area of operation, expenditures and staff can be 
deduced for the period 1988-1992. Generally speaking, the counterparts 
saw growth with regard to the population/communities reached and 
Financial expenditure in this period. An increase in the number of staff 
can also be observed from 1988 to 1990 followed by a reduction from 
1990 to 1992.103 
As with the number of target people and communities, the annual 
expenditures of the ICCO counterparts saw a substantial increase of 68% 
over the period 1988-1992. The single most important source of 
financing for the NGDOs — although slightly reduced — remained 
financial assistance from foreign donors. The ICCO counterparts derive 
more than 50% of their annual expenditures from this source, and the 
number of foreign donors is also quite high (a total of 147 different 
donors is mentioned). The second most important source of financing is, 
according to the respondents, the contribution from their own 
organisation (e.g., contributions from the target group). In light of the 
'participatory approach' propagated by ICCO since the 1970s and seen 
by most of the NGDOs as their type of approach, the contributions of 
the counterparts themselves are relatively low. Although there are a few 
organisations for which this source constitutes more than 50% of their 
annual expenditures, on average the counterparts generally contribute 
less than 8% to their own budget. 
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The remaining two sources of financing distinguished in the survey of 
the ICCO counterparts (i.e., government funds and bank loans) are also 
of only minor but slightly increasing importance. A slightly increased 
use of government funds, resources from the target group itself and bank 
loans to finance activities was observed. In other words: domestic 
sources are becoming more important as a source of financing for the 
NGDOs. This development fits within ICCO policy, as stated in the 
most recent policy paper from the India desk which highlights the 
importance of tapping domestic sources. 'Insufficient domestic sources' 
has also been used as a criterion for termination of the relationship with 
some counterparts in the last couple of years. 
With regard to developments in the staff of the various counterparts, 
the number of staff members increased between 1988 and 1990 and then 
decreased between 1990 and 1992. A major 'reshuffling' of office and 
field staff of the NGDOs meant an increase in the office staff 
accompanied by a decrease in the number of the field staff. The overall 
decline in the number of staff members between 1990 and 1992 is 
therefore due to a decrease in the field staff. The actual reduction in the 
number of staff members in this same period also means that the growth 
in the number of people and communities covered was actually realised 
with less staff and certainly less staff in the field. The rather sharp 
increase in office staff can perhaps be attributed to increased pressure 
from the donor agencies for evaluation, policy development and 
administration. An explanation for the decrease in the field staff despite 
growing budgets and coverage of people and communities may be 
increased experience with previously established programmes. This can 
be seen with the organisation Centre for Rural Development in Guntur 
(Andhra Pradesh), which saw a sharp increase in the number of 
communities over the last couple of years, while the staff (field and/or 
office staff) remained practically the same (see also Chapter 5). The 
actual decrease in field staff in combination with an increase in people 
and communities covered could also mean less attention is being paid to 
these new communities and/or that the growth of the organisation in this 
field is done for the sake of growth alone. 
About 40% of the staff of the ICCO counterparts is female. This 
percentage is much higher in the field than in the office. In 1992, for 
example, 43% of the field staff as opposed to 28% of the office staff 
was female. The decline in the overall staff between 1990-1992 was not 
only restricted to the field staff but also more to women than to men. In 
absolute figures, the 100 NGDOs 'let go of 812 field staff between 
1990 and 1992; 475 (or 58.5%) of these were female. Of the total 
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growth in the office staff between 1990-1992 by 323 staff members, 
only 17.3% was female. Despite the relatively high percentage of 
females on the staff, females were more likely to work in the field and 
thus more likely to be let go of in this period. 
3.4 ICCO in India: Policy evaluation 
Two facts stand out in the policy development of the India desk between 
1976 and 1993. First, the general objective of the programme has been 
clearly maintained although sometimes formulated in different terms. 
Poverty alleviation with basic needs, economic development and 
political struggle as its components has always been the major objective 
of ICCO (and the various co-financing organisations taken together for 
that matter). The India desk has largely focused on political struggle 
over the years. At the same time, it has been recognised that this 
political focus is largely out of the reach of most of its counterparts. In 
practice, therefore, an integrated approach to development has been 
followed with the idiom of the 1970s and 1980s (i.e., people's 
participation, structural changes, economic development, education, 
awareness and organisation) brought together under the term 
empowerment in the 1990s. The policy of the India desk has been 
largely in line with the policy of ICCO (and other MFOs). It should 
nevertheless be repeated that the India desk was a forerunner on some 
fronts (e.g., funding of non-Protestant organisations, visitations, 
programme financing). 
The second fact standing out in the policy development of the India 
desk between 1976 and 1993 is the refinement leading to clearer 
specifications of ICCO's policy towards India. It was only in the second 
half of the 1980s that the India desk actually took policy formulation 
more seriously. Prior to this, the policy was formulated in rather vague 
terms. From the end of the 1980s and particularly since the early 1990s, 
however, an increasing number of items have been formulated as 
priorities, policies or points of special interest and more strictly 
formulated as well. This stricter formulation has led not only to a clearer 
concentration policy104 but also to the question of the operationalisati-
on of these priorities. 
The same more generally holds for ICCO as a whole. The quality 
debate in the Netherlands — with, as far as the MFOs are concerned, the 
Impact study as its climax — definitely contributed to greater clarity. For 
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the India desk, the start of a more intrinsic policy debate in the second 
half of the 1980s in response to some tempered optimism about the 
programme and the NGDOs in India is probably more important. A few 
key issues have played a central role in the prioritisation and fine-tuning 
of subsequent India policy: (1) concentration efforts (i.e., states, sectors 
and partners — including the expansion of relations and later restriction 
of the number of counterparts in the early 1990s); (2) the priority for the 
poor; (3) the relationship with churches in India; and (4) the continuous 
search for support organisations. In discussing these key issues, an 
evaluation of the India policy of ICCO will be presented in this section. 
With regard to the division of the ICCO projects across the states, it 
is interesting to note that the priorities stated in the 1970s and 1980s 
were never clearly specified. The priority for poorer states voiced in 
1976, for instance, is quite meaningless unless it is accompanied by a 
list of states regarded as poorer. All in all, the concentration of projects 
in specific states during the 1970s and 1980s was not so much the 
outcome of deliberate policy but of contacts made with NGDOs right 
from the start of the India experiment. In contrast, the regional priorities 
voiced in 1990 and explicitly acknowledged in the 1993 policy 
document were the outcome of an assessment of the states in India 
according to, among other things, 'the poverty situation, the position of 
women and ethnic groups, the ecological situation in an area, the 
presence of (Church) development organizations, the policy of other 
funding agencies, and the experiences of personnel in the India team.-
'
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 The outcome of this assessment was a clear division of the states 
into three categories ranging from no new projects in a number of states 
to the highest priority for other states. Priority was interestingly also 
given to those states with which ICCO had rather limited experience. 
The concentration efforts are the most obvious with regard to regions 
or states. As shown above, a clear concentration in the states of Andhra 
Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra and West Bengal existed right from 
the start of ICCO's involvement in India and was further strengthened 
during the late 1970s and 1980s. The hegemony of these states was only 
broken in the early 1990s. This suggests that the state-concentration 
policy formulated in 1990 (with the four above-mentioned states placed 
in the category of limited project acceptance) had paid off. Similarly, the 
policy formulated in the early 1980s envisaged no change in the states 
and hardly any change occurred. In 1984, the policy gave priority to 
eight states. Two of these states (i.e., Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh) 
were already important and the number of projects increased signifi-
cantly from 1985 to 1990. The other six states also experienced a 
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growth in the number of projects, but the number of projects increased 
in almost all states between 1985 and 1990. One can thus speak of 
adherence to the concentration policy but in a very trivial sense. 
The sectoral concentration so visible within DGIS (see Chapter 2) has 
never received high priority within ICCO. This is mainly because of the 
integrated or multi-component nature of the programmes generally 
implemented by most of the Indian NGDOs and exemplified by the 
predominance of community development projects. The India desk has 
also shown a strong preference over the years for activities geared at 
'societal justice.' Thematic priorities were formulated in the 1980s but 
again took to the early 1990s for more clear specification. The two 
themes of income generation and education received some attention in 
the 1984 policy paper. Other themes such as women and the 
environment would have to wait until the early 1990s.106 
The NGDOs supported in India (or 'partners' in ICCO terms) vary 
enormously and range from organisations working with a few 
communities to those working in thousands of villages spread across 
several states. This diversity has characterised the India programme of 
ICCO since its inception and it looks like it will continue to characterise 
the programme.107 Although there have been calls from within ICCO 
to pay greater attention to the larger NGDOs (the so-called BINGOs), no 
significant changes have occurred in the size of the organisations being 
supported. Most of the ICCO counterparts in India are (and have always 
been) relatively small organisations. 
Although it was clearly stated in the 1993 India policy paper that 'a 
distinction will be made between financing of projects, programmes, and 
organizations,' ICCO had already adhered to these distinctions for many 
years. Programme financing is apparent in the funding of the long-term 
activities of counterparts over a substantial period of time and clear from 
the 27 NGDOs accounting for more than half of the ICCO contribution 
as well as from the decline in the number of new NGDOs. Such long-
term financing restricts the possibilities for new relations, and only since 
the early 1990s can the increased inclusion of new counterparts again be 
seen. 
This trend towards the inclusion of a greater number of new counter-
parts is directly related to the official policy of the India desk in the 
early 1990s. This policy stipulated that the number of projects (and thus 
the number of NGDOs) should be restricted in order to create room for 
new initiatives. In the years preceding this official policy, the number of 
projects sanctioned annually had already declined. This was partly in 
anticipation of the restrictions which were already being discussed. In 
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1989, moreover, the funds committed for new projects also dropped for 
the entire ICCO organisation as a consequence of the general policy of 
the MFO to create 'sufficient financial room for policy renewal.'108 
The decline in the number of projects and the ICCO contributions within 
the Indian context in 1989 can be largely seen as the outcome of a 
general ICCO policy decision. When the India desk adopted a restriction 
in its 1993 policy paper the number of projects sanctioned declined even 
further. 
Priority for the poor is essentially a non-issue within the policy of 
ICCO. The poverty orientation of this MFO has been at the base of the 
majority of the projects sanctioned. Moreover, there have been no 
significant changes in this regard over the years. The majority of 
projects and programmes were and are aimed at either the poor or those 
sections of the population in India generally regarded as constituting part 
of the poor in economic, social and/or political terms: women, 
Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, marginal and small farmers and 
landless labourers. In addition to the continuous attention to the poor 
within the India programme of ICCO over the years, further fine-tuning 
and prioritisation can also be witnessed. The target group is more clearly 
specified and funds may be allocated to a specific group, such as 10% 
for (the empowerment of) women in the 1993 policy paper. 
On several occasions the India desk has expressed a desire to work 
more closely with the Churches and related development organisations. 
Taking all of the organisations referred to as Christian in the ICCO 
administration to be Churches and Church-related organisations,109 the 
data provided on the ICCO contribution per identity of organisation 
largely correspond to the policy of the India desk. In 1980, for instance, 
it was stated that the 'active [position] towards organisations from the 
Churches or connected with the Church' would be continued.110 After 
a short interlude in the mid-1980s when the official Churches in India 
were criticised by the India desk for not using their wealth for the poor 
and a minimum programme was adhered to, the Churches returned to 
the picture. The 1990 policy paper once again opted for more intensive 
relations, if only because ICCO could not close its eyes to the problems 
being confronted by its natural partners. 
One last item to be discussed here concerns the support organisati-
ons.111 These organisations were regarded as important not only with a 
view to the provision of support for ICCO (e.g., feasibility studies, 
evaluations) but also for the Indian NGDOs working at the grass-roots 
level (e.g., technical assistance). In the 1970s, these organisations were 
already included as a policy priority and the intention was to build a 
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network of advisory organisations and people. Intensification of relations 
with the existing support organisations and broadening of the network 
were mentioned in 1990 and subsequently confirmed in the 1993 policy 
paper. There has indeed been a gradual increase in the number of 
support NGDOs and their projects since 1983."2 The search for 
support agencies in India initiated in the 1970s has only paid off since 
1983 with an increasing number of projects, more diverse spectrum of 
organisations, and increasing ICCO commitment. 
To summarise: Up to the second half of the 1980s, the policy of the 
India desk was mainly directed at expansion of the project portfolio. The 
policy itself was only stated in very general terms. Some of the more 
specifically formulated priorities were reached (such as openness to sup-
porting organisations other than the natural partners of ICCO), while 
others were set aside (such as efforts to establish an informal consult-
ative body of Indian ICCO partners). It was only in the second half of 
the 1980s, that the India desk started a more systematic process of 
deliberation and prioritisation in response to the often negative 
judgements with regard to projects and counterparts. The spring-cleaning 
in the early 1990s was also prompted by the crowding of the project 
portfolio and obstruction of possibilities for the implementation of new 
priorities. Many of these priorities are too recent to assess here: For a 
few, however, results can be seen and among these are the regional 
concentrations established in 1991 and 1992 for India. 
4 
Drinking water and sanitation 
Following the Mar del Plata Action Plan on water, the 1980s were 
declared the International Drinking-Water Supply and Sanitation Decade 
(IDWSSD or Decade).1 In formulating formal plans for the Decade, not 
all countries set a target of 100%. Depending on the coverage already 
reached and an assessment of the available means, for instance, India set 
a target of 85% coverage for rural water supply and 5% coverage for 
rural sanitation.2 As became clear at the end of the Decade, the goal of 
water for all (let alone the goals formulated for sanitation) had not been 
reached.3 In 1984, the WHO concluded that the biggest constraint was a 
global shortage of funds." Although lack of funding was not the major 
problem in all regions, it certainly was in the South-East Asian region 
and India (see Box 4.1). 
The present chapter is mainly based on field research into six projects 
(co-) funded by either ICCO or DGIS in the field of drinking water and 
sanitation. The extent to which the different projects reflect an 
awareness of the above-mentioned weak spots, the manner in which the 
projects have tried to cope with these constraints, and how they have 
managed to incorporate policy guidelines with regard to implementation 
and execution will be of primary concern. Also central will be the use 
made and maintenance of the constructed facilities and the role of 
participation within this use and maintenance. For each of the projects, a 
short description of the specific area, objectives and history will be 
followed by the research findings and some major conclusions. A short 
overview of the policies and activities of the Indian government, DGIS 
and ICCO in the field of (rural) drinking water and sanitation will first 
be presented, and the chapter will be closed with a comparison of the 
activities of DGIS and ICCO. 
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Box 4 1 Problems and issues m drinking-water supply and sanitation 
The problems in achieving the Decade goals can be divided into three categories 
institutional, financial and operational5 Institutional problems range from weak 
coordination and little attention to environmental degradation to inadequate 
infrastructure for quality control and inadequate information development 
Financial problems include such issues as lack of resources, no priority funding 
for water supply in national development plans and little involvement of private 
enterprise Operational problems include such issues as no priority to unserved, 
underserved or weaker sections of the population, top-down planning, poor 
operation and poor maintenance In India, the water supply programmes have 
received priority funding in national development plans, private enterprises have 
been involved in the sector, and there has been no dependence on imported 
equipment which could hamper local product development and the sustainabihty 
of the facilities. 
From the list of problems above and from the literature produced in the course 
of the Decade, it is clear that attention should be paid to not only the technical 
but also the non-technical aspects of the provision of drinking water and 
sanitation6 Problems in the field of operation, maintenance, use and organisation 
came to be seen as major obstacles in reaching the Decade goals Many facilities 
quickly fell into disuse because of improper maintenance and operation Many of 
the intended beneficiaries also failed to make optimal use or made no use at all of 
the improved facilities It is now understood (and accepted) that provision of 
these facilities must be accompanied by better overall hygiene The call for 
greater attention to the non-technical aspects of the activities in this sector has 
also become louder, particularly in the field of (community) participation, health 
or hygiene education and organisation, with the aims of improving the use made 
of the facilities provided, improving the maintenance and operation of the 
facilities and improving the impact of the facilities on the health position of the 
people concerned 
4.1 India: Problems, policy and achievements 
The main problem for the supply of drinking water in India is not so 
much the availability of water for drinking purposes as the availability 
of safe drinking water. Contamination of the water is the main cause of 
concern in many Indian states. The coastal areas suffer from salinity, 
while the guinea worm, excess fluoride or excess iron make the water 
unfit for human consumption in other areas In this section, an overview 
of the Indian policies, programmes and achievements with regard to the 
problems of safe drinking water and sanitation will be presented. 
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4.1.1 Problems and policy 
In the various Five Year Plans developed by India, the problems and 
issues mentioned by the WHO are also addressed. The respective Five 
Year Plans reflect changes in Indian policy with respect to water supply 
and sanitation. They also reflect a growing awareness of the importance 
of water supply and sanitation from a number of different perspectives 
(e.g., health, productivity),7 the major hurdles in achieving particular 
targets and the different ways of overcoming these hurdles. 
In the Second Plan, attention is mainly paid to such technical hurdles 
as the availability of pipes, pumps and other equipment. In the Third 
Plan, organisational (coordination) and educational problems and soluti-
ons are forwarded. The need for maintenance arises in the Fourth Plan 
and is followed five years later by recognition of the need for greater 
coordination of the different programmes for rural development. In this 
Fifth Plan, the contours are emerging of a more comprehensive policy 
towards water supply and sanitation. The contours of such policy will be 
worked out more clearly in the 1980s under the Sixth and Seventh Plans 
when the importance of an integrated approach becomes visible and 
include such items as community involvement, sanitation, low cost 
structures, recovery of costs and health education.8 
Three developments stand out in the evolution of the major problems, 
issues and solutions with regard to rural water supply and sanitation. 
The first involves sanitation which was neglected over the years and 
largely regarded as the provision of latrines until the 1990s. Only in the 
Eighth Five Year Plan was a clearer link established between environ-
mental sanitation and health, on the one hand, and the need for a more 
comprehensive and integrated approach, on the other hand. The second 
development involves the move away from the concept of problem villa-
ges and greater attention to problem communities (i.e., the poor in the 
villages).9 It took until the second half of the 1980s for the problem of 
equal access of the poor to drinking-water and sanitation facilities to be 
mentioned. This is despite an evaluation performed by the Planning 
Commission in 1978-79 which had shown that 'although the "poor" have 
been benefited by the drinking water provided mainly through the piped 
water and bored/tube/drilled wells under the MNP/ARP [see below], 
their share in relation to the "non poor" has been less - both in terms of 
the total number of points (public and private) provided in their 
localities and in availability of the facility of piped water points.'10 
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Box 4 2 Characteristics of water use and sanitation in India" 
1 The dug well is the most important source of drinking water in India, followed 
by the hand pump 
2 Women are the principal collectors (nearly 86%) of water for household use 
Each woman collects about 192 litres of water per day for an average household 
of 7 members Between 1 2 and 3 5 hours are spent collecting water per day 
3 In 75% of the households the water is stored in the same vessel which it was 
collected in In 68% of the households, drinking water is removed from these 
storage pots using containers without handles, causing hands to be dipped in the 
water 
4 Drinking water is considered 'good' if it is visually clear, tastes sweet (free of 
unpleasant flavours and odours) and cooks food well/quickly 
5 A large majority (88-95%) of the Indian people believes that bad drinking water 
causes health problems The most frequently mentioned health problems (such 
as fever, cough and colds, sore throat) are, however, not directly related to 
drinking unsafe water Only 10-18% of the people across India are aware that 
bad drinking water can cause diarrhoea, stomach disorders and cholera 
6 Two out of three users of public hand pumps believe them to be the property of 
the government Actual costs for operation and maintenance should therefore be 
bome primarily by the government and secondarily by the Panchayat although 
nearly 25% agrees that maintenance should also be their responsibility 
7 Two-thirds of hand-pump users are willing to pay a monthly fee for 
maintenance while 41% of the Indians are willing to pay for new hand-pump 
installations when directly related to their contribution 
8 Most people are aware of a link between hygiene and health, but it is a belief 
lacking conviction, diluted by years of resigned tolerance of unhygienic 
surroundings While personal hygiene and to some extent household hygiene are 
believed to influence health, people fail to see the possibility of environmental 
hygiene influencing their health Most people attempt to practice a rudimentary 
amount of personal hygiene and a lesser amount of household hygiene, but 
almost no effort is directed towards maintaining environmental hygiene 
9 Some 92% defecate out of doors at sites common for all categories of villagers 
About 10% express a distinct preference for sites close to a water source 
Privacy is the ovemding concern in selecting a site The 8% who have a 
household latrine use them regularly, while community latrines are used by less 
than 10% of those with access to them Although 63% of the people think that 
exposed excreta is harmful to one's health, less than 20% are correctly aware of 
how this harm exactly anses 
10 Although only 37% and 52% of the people have ever seen a dry or pour-flush 
type of latrine, respectively, even fewer have ever used one As many as 86% 
feel there are distinct advantages to having a private latrine (mainly because of 
convenience and privacy) Whereas some 87% is interested in getting a latrine, 
more than 71% is unaware of government subsidies for this purpose 
11 For dissemination of messages on water and sanitation, the radio is the most 
important mass media and the school teacher is the most visible and familiar 
figure among the interpersonal media 
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The third development standing out in India's policy evolution pertains 
to people's participation. Initially, the shortages of funds and lack of 
proper maintenance of the facilities were the main reasons to call for 
people's participation and cost recovery. In the Seventh Plan, participa-
tion was elevated to more than just operation and maintenance (O&M). 
Although O&M problems remain an important motive for people's parti-
cipation, these can no longer be regarded as the only motive. In other 
words: The call for participation since the Seventh Plan reflects the 
more general development policy expressed in the second half of the 
1980s when a revitalisation of the local government structure (Pancha-
yati Raj) is hoped to lead to greater participation of the people in the 
planning and implementation of development programmes and activities 
and, thus, to more sustainable impact of these programmes. Participation 
has, in this light, an instrumental meaning as it is aimed at better 
implementation. More political significance is also implied under the 
local government structure known as the Panchayati system. 
4.1.2 Programmes and achievements 
With the establishment of the Environmental Hygiene Committee in 
1948-49, the Indian government acknowledged the importance of a safe 
water supply and the provision of sanitation.12 In 1954, a National 
Water Supply and Sanitation Programme (NWSSP) was taken up as part 
of the First Five Year Plan.13 This central programme was to supple-
ment the activities undertaken by the states which carried primary 
responsibility for water supply and sanitation. It was also then that the 
states started to set up separate departments for the sector (i.e., such 
state water agencies as the Jal Nigam in Uttar Pradesh and the Pancha-
yati Raj Engineering Division in Andhra Pradesh). In the Third Plan 
period (1961-1966), the urban bias in water supply and sanitation was 
reversed by the introduction of the Village Water Supply Programme 
(VWSP). This programme was mainly intended to cover backward areas 
and areas not covered by community development programmes.1'' The 
urban bias returned in the next Plan period when the Village Programme 
was abandoned and nearly 69% of the state funds for the sector were 
allocated to urban projects. The central programmes were at the same 
time reduced to a mere 1.4% of the total plan outlay for the sector. This 
again changed in 1972-73, however, when a new centrally-sponsored 
scheme (Accelerated Rural Water Supply Programme (ARWSP)) was 
introduced to again supplement the activities undertaken by the states. 
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This ARWSP was temporarily abandoned (until 1977-78) at the 
beginning of the Fifth Plan period (1974-1979) because of the introduc-
tion of the Minimum Needs Programme (MNP) with drinking water (and 
later also sanitation) as important activities.15 The introduction of the 
MNP in 1974 and the re-introduction of the centrally sponsored ARWSP 
in 1977-78 mark the growing tendency in India in the 1970s to give 
water supply and sanitation higher priority. This is also exemplified by 
the provision of an amount of Rs. 381 billion in the Fifth Five Year 
Plan, which is 32% more than the expenditure in all previous Plans 
taken together. The higher priority given to this sector was further 
strengthened in the 1980s and expressed by not only an expansion of the 
budget16 but also new programmes and changes in the organisational 
structure for the sector.17 Until the end of the 1970s, thus, the Indian 
policy towards the sector was characterised by 'constraint of resources 
in the states and competing demands for other programmes in other 
sectors' and also an 'appreciation of the complexity and magnitude of 
the problem which was far from adequate.' This changed in the 1980s as 
a result of not only 'increasing awareness, both nationally and 
internationally, of the importance of safe drinking-water supply in 
sustaining the processes of economic and human resource development 
and improving the quality of our environment'18 but also the 1979-80 
drought in India. 
In discussing the multitude of programmes at the central as well as 
the state levels initiated in the first Five Year Plans, Bijlani and Rao 
observe that the multiplicity of programmes and the variability in their 
nature and extent made things very complex.19 Progress was slow 
because of '(a) inadequate appraisal of local situations, (b) inappropriate 
project formulation, (c) organisational problems arising out of overlap of 
responsibilities of a host of government bodies, (d) insufficient state 
budgets, (e) procedural delays and absence of statutory arrangements for 
monitoring the overall situation.' In the Fourth and Fifth Five Year 
Plans as well, the progress in the field of drinking water and sanitation 
was criticised. The problem of fragmentation in tackling the situation in 
India was also more clearly seen in the 1980s.20 
As stated above, the targets set for the Drinking-Water Decade have 
not been reached by different developing countries. In the South and 
South-East Asia region, for instance, none of the countries has actually 
achieved its targets and certainly not with regard to sanitation. In India, 
where in 1980 around 31% of the rural population had access to drink-
ing water, the 75% coverage achieved by 1990 was 10% below the 
target set for the 1980s. In the field of rural sanitation, the target for the 
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period 1980-1990 was set at a modest 5% but even this was not reached. 
In reality, only 2.4% of the rural population had access to sanitation in 
1990.21 For the 1990s, the target of 7% coverage for rural sanitation 
thus seems quite ambitious although greater attention is being paid to 
this field nowadays. In the case of rural drinking water, 100% coverage 
is being contemplated for the 1990s, which seems within reach consider-
ing the achievements in the previous decade. 
To summarise: The developments in the official Indian policy towards 
the sector drinking water and sanitation not only reflect growing 
attention (also in terms of funding) to the sector itself but also to the 
non-technical aspects of providing drinking-water and sanitary facilities. 
The development of a policy with attention shifted from a merely tech-
nical strategy to an integrated approach can be clearly witnessed in the 
1980s together with a growing emphasis on sanitation, community parti-
cipation, health education and the cooperation with other programmes 
and activities in the field of rural development." 
4.2 Sector policies: DGIS and ICCO 
In describing the policy guidelines of DGIS and ICCO with regard to 
drinking water and sanitation, greater space is reserved for DGIS than 
for ICCO mainly because the latter does not have a clearly defined 
sector policy. For ICCO, therefore, the place of drinking water and 
sanitation as basic needs will be discussed as part of the more general 
ICCO policy (see also Chapter 3). For both DGIS and ICCO, a general 
sketch of their activities in India (and the developments therein) will 
then be given. 
4.2.1 DGIS policy on water and sanitation 
Although the Netherlands had been involved in preparations and plan-
ning for the Decade and showed 'great interest [...] in the beginning," 
this did not lead to a 'well thought-out and consistent policy in the 
domestic water sector' or to additional funds being made available.23 
Only in 1989 did DGIS present its water policy paper with the central 
objective of Dutch involvement in this sector being 'to contribute to a 
sustainable and efficient improvement of the living conditions and health 
of the deprived sections of the population in rural areas, regional centra, 
and intermediate cities.' This policy paper places drinking water and 
sanitation not only in relation to health but also to more general welfare 
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and economic progress; a broad concept of sanitation is also taken as the 
point of departure.24 After identifying the major bottlenecks,25 the 
paper sets out to provide general guidelines for overcoming them. 
The participation of users (presented as a means) is considered central 
to the activities in the field of drinking water and sanitation. Experience 
has shown drinking-water and sanitation activities implemented without 
the involvement of the users to lead to only temporary functioning of 
the facilities and sub-optimal use. As a consequence, the implemented 
activities have a low impact on the health situation of the target group. 
As a policy guideline, utmost involvement of the users in the preparati-
on, implementation and maintenance of the facilities was therefore 
identified. In financing activities special attention is to be paid to the 
active participation of women. The provision of information and educati-
on on the relation between the various facilities, optimal use, hygiene 
and health were identified as integral parts of programme preparation 
and implementation. 
Directly related to participation, the problem of poor institutional 
development and a lack of funds for operation and maintenance are the 
concept of Village Level Operation and Maintenance (VLOM) and 
watercharges. With this in mind, the Dutch policy is aimed at making 
the drinking- water and sanitation sector financially independent as far 
as operation and maintenance costs are concerned. This implies not only 
the necessity of introducing a cost-effective system for at least the O&M 
costs but also no support for projects/activities which 'cannot be finan-
ced [...] by the users or the responsible drinking water and sanitation 
organisations.'26 With respect to the aforementioned institutional deve-
lopment, DGIS sees possibilities in the decentralisation of national 
drinking-water and sanitation organisations to the level of the users. At 
the same time, the involvement of the private sector in, for instance, the 
production of hand pumps, other required materials and the implementa-
tion of construction is also stressed. The paper further points to the need 
for inexpensive and simple technologies, the need for greater attention to 
sanitation, and the need for better coordination and cooperation between 
the different parties involved in setting up and implementing drinking-
water and sanitation activities. Lastly, the need for a more integrated 
approach is mentioned. 
The central issues in the 1989 policy paper (i.e., participation, institu-
tional support, O&M and cost-recovery, coordination, technology) were 
largely touched upon back in 1983 when the IOV presented its recom-
mendations in the field of water activities.27 One of the main recom-
mendations made by the IOV concerned the integration of activities: 
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'projects dealing with domestic water alone should be given aid only in 
exceptional circumstances. Strong preference should be given to projects 
which are accompanied by measures to improve hygiene in the use of 
domestic water, the disposal of waste (e.g. faeces) and health educati-
on.'28 Already in 1983, the IOV stressed the need for participation (of 
women in particular) in the planning and decision-making stages of a 
project. At the same time, the IOV saw participation within the drinking-
water (and sanitation) projects as a means directed mainly at better 
operation and maintenance. The 1983 report, thus, provided certain 
guidelines for the Dutch aid in the sector. The 1989 report is, at best, a 
confirmation of the drinking-water and sanitation policy which DGIS 
had followed in the 1980s. In other words, the central issues presented 
in the 1989 official policy document were already part and parcel of 
Dutch aid.29 
4.2.2 DGIS policy and programmes in India 
As already seen in Chapter 2, the Netherlands has financed projects in 
the field of rural drinking water and sanitation since the late 1970s. 
Between 1977 and 1992, a total of nearly 341 million Dutch guilders 
was spent in this sector making it the second largest project aid sector. 
More than half of this amount was used to finance projects in the states 
of Andhra and Uttar Pradesh while the remaining funds were distributed 
across Kerala, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh and Kamataka (since 1991) 
and for monitoring and training. With the exception of Himachal 
Pradesh, where implementation problems led to a termination of Dutch 
aid in the early 1980s,30 these states also constitute the concentration 
states for Dutch aid to India. 
Up to the beginning of 1992, the Netherlands financed 11 different 
projects intended for the provision of safe drinking water to some 3,704 
villages and 7.8 million people. The majority of these projects were so-
called piped water schemes; in two of the projects (in Uttar Pradesh), 
hand pumps were installed. In April 1992, four of these projects were 
completed and five others were nearing completion. Although activities 
in the field of sanitation (for a larger part restricted to the construction 
of latrines) are part of several of the aforementioned drinking-water 
supply projects (see, for example, section 4.3.1 below), only one 
sanitation project as such has been undertaken to date (see section 4.3.2 
below). 'Village development activities covering the establishment of 
water committees and hygiene interventions'31 are even less frequent 
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than sanitation activities. Up to the beginning of 1992, village water 
committees were set up (or being set up) in 12% of the villages covered 
under the respective water-supply projects in the states of Uttar Pradesh, 
Andhra Pradesh, Kerala and Gujarat. Hygiene education activities have 
reportedly been established in only 11% of the villages. 
Up to the mid-1980s, Dutch support in the sector was mainly used for 
the physical implementation (construction) of piped water-supply 
schemes or hand-pump schemes and thus projects with a clearly techni-
cal orientation. Attention to the non-technical aspects of rural drinking-
water supply projects and particularly the sustainability of the facilities 
already occurred in 1981 when the first Drinking Water Coordinator 
(WACO) was appointed at the Dutch Embassy in New Delhi as part of 
'a rather pragmatic approach [for the introduction] of Netherlands views 
in the area of rural drinking water supply.'32 This pragmatic approach 
was found necessary not only because of the general hesitance and/or 
rejection of donor interference in any area but also because of the 
relatively slow acceptance in India of the need for a more integrated 
approach towards the sector. For the then Water Coordinator, this 
integrated approach involved community participation, income genera-
ting activities, awareness building and the active involvement (or esta-
blishment) of local organisations.33 
During the successive Annual Consultations since 1981, the Dutch 
delegation pointed to the need for a more integrated approach with 
health education, community participation, sanitation and income genera-
ting activities playing a dominant role. At the 1982 consultation, for 
instance, it was agreed (1) to broaden the future appraisal of projects to 
include health education and participation and (2) to pay specific 
attention to aspects of operation and maintenance. DGIS later concluded 
that the Dutch wish to broaden drinking-water supply activities into 
more extensive rural development projects had won ground despite the 
passive attitude of the Indian authorities on this point.34 
This drive towards more general rural development is also at the heart 
of the first country policy plan which takes the drinking-water supply 
programme to be a possible entry into rural development.35 In later 
country policy papers, this link between activities in the field of rural 
drinking water (and sanitation) and more general rural development is 
less clear. In the 1992 country policy paper, the development from 
purely technical projects in the field of drinking water and sanitation to 
more integrated projects is repeated but the activities undertaken in the 
field of socio-economic development remain largely within the drinking-
water and sanitation sector itself. In essence, drinking water and 
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sanitation constitute the starting point for the inclusion of additional 
activities and not for broader rural development.36 Despite this differen-
ce in presentation, the type of activities are the same in practice and 
include health education, people's participation, organisation, income 
generation and sanitation. 
4.2.3 ICCO policy on water and sanitation 
In the impact study undertaken by the MFOs in 1991, it is concluded 
that social services (i.e., drinking water, health care and education) form 
an important part of the Dutch Co-financing Programme. Social services 
provided were indeed used, but in particular the drinking water and sani-
tation sector met with the most technical problems relating to construc-
tion and maintenance of the facilities.37 Taking activities in the field of 
drinking water and sanitation as part of social services means that these 
activities are regarded as part of the fulfilment of basic needs. For the 
four MFOs, basic needs and economic programmes are the most impor-
tant activities for reaching the objective of direct poverty alleviation.39 
The discussion of the general as well as the India-policy of ICCO in 
Chapter 3 has shown the political dimension to have been of major 
importance. For the four MFOs, this was what they call the second 
policy-related phase in their existence with attention focused 'on the 
causes of underdevelopment in their mutual connection; it was tried to 
influence societal and political pre-conditions; human rights were high 
on the agenda, while basic facilities were met with a certain undervalua-
tion.'39 In funding NGDOs and projects, therefore, attention has been 
predominantly paid to activities falling under participation, organisation, 
education and/or awareness-building with the aim of self-reliance for the 
target groups. Put differently, the focus has been on the software aspects 
of development with activities undertaken in the field of economic 
development and social services to support the struggle towards self-
reliance for the poor.'10 
In the new Chairman's Statement from May 1995, access of the poor 
to basic facilities has been cited as essential. This is not to say that 
participation, organisation, education and awareness-building have 
become less important in the policy or strategies of the MFOs, for 
'pluriformity and organisation are the basis for civil society.'41 The 
MFOs intend to spend at least 50% of the available funds on social 
development (e.g., elementary education, health, clean drinking water 
and adequate food) despite continued emphasis on the responsibility of 
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the national government. This renewed attention for primary social 
facilities was already acknowledged in the ICCO policy-paper entitled 
'Signs of Hope' in 1993, when the organisation declared its preference 
for activities in the social sector.42 In 1994, ICCO committed 16% of 
its funds to the basic facilities sector which was nevertheless far from 
the 50% mentioned in the GOM paper in April 1995.43 
The above shows that ICCO, in contrast to DGIS, does not have a 
stated policy towards drinking water and sanitation. ICCO policy papers 
(see Chapter 3) are of a more general nature and do not specifically 
address the different sectors. This is not to say that no attention is paid 
to specific issues related to drinking water and sanitation at the regional 
or project levels.44 Taking activities in the field of drinking water and 
sanitation as part of the basic needs with a strong health component, it is 
clear that this Dutch MFO regards these activities as an important part 
of the development process (although many times not specifically 
mentioned as such). An integrated approach stands central with attention 
to the economic, social and political dimensions of poverty. Drinking 
water and sanitation principally form a sector which fits nicely into such 
a policy. 
4.2.4 ICCO policy and programmes in India 
Even within a single country such as India, it is impossible to determine 
the ICCO funds allocated to activities in the drinking-water and sanitati-
on sector. This is mainly because the projects co-financed by ICCO are 
predominantly so-called integrated projects covering a wide range of 
activities from education to irrigation and from organisation to income-
generating loans. Drinking water is, at best, only part of the total 
programme from an NGO. As far as known, only one NGDO supported 
in India initiated its activities with drinking water. Even in this case, 
however, a broadening of the activities can be witnessed in later years 
(see section 4.3.4 below). In its administration, moreover, ICCO only 
notes the sectors considered most important per project/NGDO. Even 
when drinking-water (and sanitation) activities constitute part of an 
ICCO-sponsored project or programme, thus, this may not always be 
reflected in the administration. Furthermore, ICCO is not the only donor 
or source of financing for a large number of its counterparts in India. 
Not only other (foreign) donors but also funds from the Indian govern-
ment and the target group itself may be used to finance different 
development activities. In order to get, among other things, a better 
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impression of the number of ICCO counterparts in India active in the 
field of drinking-water and/or sanitation activities, a questionnaire was 
sent to all (former) ICCO counterparts in the course of the present 
research (see Introduction). This questionnaire showed nearly half of the 
Indian ICCO-counterparts to be active in the field of drinking water and 
54.6% (also) active in the field of sanitation.45 
The survey further showed ICCO counterparts to view improvement 
of the health situation of their target groups as the most important 
objective of their activities in the field of drinking water and sanitation, 
while a large number of the counterparts also regarded the sector as an 
essential part of the (rural) development process. The percentage of their 
annual budget spent on activities connected to the sector ranges from 
1% to 25% in the case of drinking water and from 1% to 60% in the 
case of sanitation. The major problem in the field of drinking water is 
the scarcity and/or contamination of (drinking) water, followed by lack 
of maintenance and improper use of the drinking water by members of 
the target groups. Lack of an awareness of the importance of hygienic 
behaviour among the target group is considered the major problem in 
the field of sanitation, followed by scarcity of water and failure to 
maintain the sanitary facilities. In light of these problems, the activities 
in both the fields of drinking water and sanitation can be grouped under 
either construction or education and awareness. 
The construction activities in the field of sanitation are geared towards 
latrines for most of the NGDOs but also towards soakpits and drainage 
systems. In the case of drinking water, hand-pump installation is the 
primary construction activity although NGDOs are also active in the 
construction of piped water schemes, open wells, and rainwater harves-
ting or storage tanks. The education and awareness activities centre 
around personal hygiene, maintenance, proper use and the connection of 
such behaviour to health. The ICCO counterparts report the usage of the 
constructed facilities to be high and the number of facilities out of order 
to be correspondingly low.46 According to the responding NGDOs, 
around 20% of the constructed hand pumps were no longer functioning; 
43% of the piped schemes were no longer functioning; and only 1% of 
the open wells were no longer functioning. This shows maintenance to 
be more difficult in the case of sophisticated systems. Lack of 
maintenance knowledge is considered one of the main reasons for the 
non-functioning of facilities while lack of funds and lack of an 
awareness with regard to proper use of the facilities also score high. In 
the case of latrines, the traditional system of open defecation is also 
mentioned as a reason for the non-usage of these sanitary facilities.47 
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To summarise: A relatively small number of the counterparts have 
used ICCO funds to finance activities specifically in the field of 
drinking water and sanitation.48 ICCO-funds have mainly been used for 
health and hygiene education and awareness building with regard to the 
proper use and maintenance of the relevant facilities. Construction 
activities with ICCO funds are even more exceptional. Government 
funds, a contribution from the target group and aid from other (foreign) 
donors are reportedly more important for the funding of construction 
activities in this sector than NGDO funds. The opinion of the majority 
of NGDOs is also that the government has primary responsibility for 
activities in the fields of drinking water and sanitation.'19 
4.3 Projects of DGIS and ICCO in India 
We now turn to a few specific projects/activities financed by the two 
Dutch donors central to this study. The preceding descriptions of their 
policies showed the strive towards an integrated approach within the 
fields of drinking-water and sanitation activities to be a common 
denominator. Such an integrated approach covers many different activi-
ties and may be part of a strategy for the sector itself (i.e., better use, 
operation and maintenance of the facilities provided under the projects) 
or part of a more general rural development process. 
The integrated approach consists of both technical and non-technical 
aspects. It has been adopted by both the Government of India and DGIS, 
and it is supposed to be a part of the ICCO projects. In the description 
and evaluation of the DGIS and ICCO projects, the focus will be on the 
non-technical aspects of the drinking-water supply and sanitation acti-
vities. Within this non-technical part, attention will be further concen-
trated on those activities intended to bear directly on the use of the 
facilities by the target groups and/or the operation and maintenance of 
these facilities. In effect, attention will be paid to the organisational and 
educational activities at village level and thus community participation. 
Within the evaluation of the projects/activities, the village forms the 
central point of analysis. The history of the projects, three of which are 
situated in Uttar Pradesh and two in Andhra Pradesh, will first be con-
sidered: background, working area, activities, implementing agencies, 
objectives and funds. The main findings will then be presented of an 
evaluation specifically concerned with the use, operation and maintenan-
ce of the facilities provided and the role of community participation (i.e., 
Drinking water and sanitation 129 
organisation and education) within such use. The central questions to be 
answered for each projects are: Do the facilities constructed function? 
To what extent do the villagers make use of the facilities? And are the 
villagers actually involved in the operation and maintenance of the faci­
lities? When needed for a better understanding of the projects, attention 
may also be paid to the development of project objectives, strategies and 
activities in light of the general policy developments described in the 
previous two sections (also see Annex 2 for some socio-economic data 
on the states and districts in which the projects are/have been implemen­
ted). 
4.3.1 Andhra Pradesh / Darsi-scheme 
Andhra Pradesh is a state which suffers from a number of different 
problems in the field of drinking water. Salinity in the coastal areas, 
depleting ground- water levels (mainly in the south-westem districts) 
and excess iron in a few pockets throughout the state are major 
problems. Excess fluoride also causes severe problems for the people. 
'Excess fluoride in drinking water can lead to fluorosis, a disease that 
surfaces in a variety of symptoms' ranging from dental fluorosis to 
skeletal fluorosis.50 This excess of fluoride can cause lameness and, 
although different technological inventions are presently being field 
tested in order to overcome the fluoride problem, the fastest and 
theoretically most comprehensive solution is to avoid use of locally 
contaminated water and pipe in safe water.51 This was certainly seen to 
be the solution at the end of the 1970s when the Netherlands agreed to a 
project with the aim of providing 'safe domestic water in 171 villages, 
where people and animals were suffering from excessive fluoride levels 
in the existing water supplies.'52 In 1985-86, another 30 villages were 
added to this project which would come to be known as the piped water 
supply project AP-I.53 
The 201 villages were distributed across six different districts and 56 
different piped water supply schemes.54 One of these schemes (known 
as the Darsi-scheme) with a coverage of 111 villages is by far the 
largest scheme within АР-I and also one of the largest single-source 
piped water-supply schemes in India. This scheme, situated around the 
town of Darsi in Prakasam district, forms the central focus of this 
evaluation. All 111 villages (including the 30 added in the mid-1980s) 
were to receive their safe drinking water from the Sagar irrigation canal 
running just north of Darsi. In order to reach all of the villages, an 
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extensive infrastructure was set up. This included a Summer Storage 
Tank of more than 2.5 billion litres, seven slow sand filters, 400 
kilometres of pipeline, 22 pump houses, 48 Overhead Service Reservoirs 
(OHSRs), 65 Ground Level Service Reservoirs (GLSRs) and 944 taps 
for a population of some 243,000.5S 
The project was initially restricted to the physical construction of 
drinking-water facilities through a piped system.56 Only at the end of 
1986 an agreement was reached between the state of Andhra Pradesh 
and DGIS to broaden the project to include activities in the field of 
sanitation (latrine construction), health education, community partici­
pation, income generation and organisation.57 One-and-a-half years 
earlier (i.e., mid-1985), an evaluation report showed 'disappointing 
performance' by the state water authority.58 Cooperation with this 
Engineering Department was seriously questioned when they did not 
follow the recommendations made by earlier Missions.59 The report 
also showed serious problems with the Operation and Maintenance 
(O&M) of the recently installed water supply due to organisational 
problems, insufficient staff and, mainly, insufficient funds from the 
government.60 'In general the O&M of the schemes was inadequate and 
in some cases virtually non-existent. Specifically the individual schemes 
under the care of the Panchayats showed a poor performance as far as 
O&M was concerned.'61 
Taking the major (negative) conclusions of the 1985 evaluation 
together (i.e., poor O&M, weaker sections not covered, partial or non­
compliance with mutually agreed upon activities, delayed implementati­
on), DGIS was forced to play the game a bit harder. Discussion of a 
new project (AP-II) finally led to the inclusion of several software 
activities in the implementation of АР-I. At the end of 1985, DGIS had 
allocated funds for all supplementary activities, with the exception of a 
proposed dairy project for which further advice and information was 
required. In December 1986, the draft contracts for health and sanitation 
education, income-generating activities (i.e., dairy) and the establishment 
of a Dutch-financed monitoring and coordination unit (Netherlands 
Assisted Project Office - NAPO) were sent to Andhra Pradesh62 and 
subsequently agreed upon by the Government of Andhra Pradesh.63 
The inclusion of the so-called software parts was dictated by the 
insight that improved water does not automatically result in better 
health, that many people are unaware of the excess fluoride dangers and 
that maintenance of the installed system is impossible without the 
involvement of the users. The inclusion of software components was 
also motivated by the need to use the drinking-water projects as stepping 
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stones for more integrated rural development along the lines set out by 
DGIS. As a consequence of these considerations, the objectives of the 
programme changed. In addition to an improvement in the health positi-
on of the rural population and a reduction of the workload for women, 
the project was also now aimed at an improvement in the income 
position of women and at stimulating the local development capacity 
through active participation of the population in the identification, 
planning and implementation of sustainable improvements in their 
living-environment.64 In order to achieve these objectives, activities 
were undertaken in the field of water supply, sanitation, health and 
hygiene education, improvement in social and personal behaviour, 
stimulation of income generation at the village level, and mobilisation 
and strengthening of community resources.65 
Despite the delays in the sanctioning of the additional activities (from 
the Indian as well as the Dutch sides), some of the activities were 
already implemented in 1986. This accounts for instance for the (pilot) 
sanitation programme by an NGDO specialised in the construction, 
operation and maintenance of latrines. The work of this NGDO was 
already condemned in 1987/88 as being 'badly implemented and poorly 
supervised' without any attention to health education.66 The health 
education and participation components were also to be implemented by 
an NGDO. The staff of the NGDO contracted remained in the field until 
October 1993 when they were fired and consequently went on strike.67 
The activities in the different districts were then brought under several 
new NGDOs. The NAP Office was brought under the direct leadership 
of the Dutch consultancy-firm ETC in 1993/1994 while a further 
decentralisation of its tasks in the districts was envisaged.68 
Following the heavily criticised activities in the field of sanitation (or 
more specifically: latrine construction), the Government of Andhra 
Pradesh ordered the re-start of the sanitation programme in June 
1990.69 The official start in 1992 of Project Clean Village, as it came 
to be known, was preceded by a manual of more than 100 pages jointly 
prepared by three of the main organisations involved: the Panchayati Raj 
Engineering Department, the NAP Office and the so-called CEP 
(Community Education Programme) team or staff who had remained in 
the field since the second NGDO was contracted for the community-
participation and health-education activities). The long-term objective of 
the Clean Village Project was to equip the community 'with knowledge, 
skills and organisations for accepting and discharging their responsibili-
ties for the health of their villages.'70 An important element in the 
project would be the organisation of the target group in so-called Village 
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Action Committees (VAC). As such organisation was also part of the 
earlier activities under the banner of community participation, the manu­
al proposed using the existence of such a committee for the selection of 
villages. In May 1992, the first 18 villages (spread across the districts of 
Guntur (4 villages) and Prakasam (14 villages)) were selected.71 
Under the regular programme, DGIS initially allocated Dfl. 29 million 
for АР-I. In 1983, an extra grant of 4.5 million was made available due 
to increased costs and followed by another grant of 3.5 million for the 
30 additional villages under the Darsi scheme. The activities falling 
under the aforementioned software part of the project are largely 
financed under the non-regular programme (i.e., mainly categories I-a 
and I-f), while technical aid grants from DGIS have also been used (e.g., 
ETC missions and Sulabh International). The total disbursements from 
1980-1992 under the regular programme amounted to 40.4 million.72 
Financially, the software activities incorporated in the projects in the 
second half of the 1980s fell under the budget for AP-II. 
Findings 
Already at the end of the 1980s, the NGDO then responsible for the 
community-participation and health-education activities observed that a 
large number of hamlets inhabited by Scheduled Castes and/or Tribes 
were not covered under the Darsi scheme. Often living some distance 
from the main village, these people either had to walk to the village to 
fetch safe drinking water or rely on the old sources in and around the 
hamlets. Considering the distances between the hamlets and the main 
villages and the social distance between the relevant castes/tribes, it is 
likely that the majority of the hamlet inhabitants relied upon old sources. 
Starting in 1992, several of these hamlets received a connection to the 
piped scheme usually via the installation of a tap on the main lines. This 
was the case in Nagarajakunta, for instance, where the Scheduled Caste 
hamlet received two taps at the beginning of 1994. Of the 20 hamlets 
considered in connection with the 23 villages in this research, nine were 
not covered by February 1994 and two had taps which were not (yet) 
functioning. Seven of the hamlets not covered were part of villages at 
the end of a pipe line. 
Fifteen of the 23 villages are provided with drinking water via 
Ground Level Service Reservoirs (GLSRs) and seven via Over Head 
Service Reservoirs (OHSRs). The remaining village (Thummagunta) is 
one of the 30 additional villages under the Darsi scheme but not covered 
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at all. A GLSR has been constructed in this village of around 20 fami-
lies, but the connecting pipe line has yet to be laid for a very simple 
reason. The Panchayati Raj Engineering Department and the contractor 
hired to lay the pipeline to Thummagunta disagreed on the depth at 
which the pipeline should be buried. The contractor therefore left his 
job, and the village remains cut off from the supply of safe drinking 
water. The villagers themselves, seemingly unaware of the fact that their 
drinking water is contaminated by excess fluoride, have not undertaken 
any action. 
Of the 156 taps and standposts in 19 villages, 70 (or 45%) are broken 
and thus not in use. Several other taps have been replaced by a simple 
piece of wood to prevent the water from flowing freely out of the tank. 
All 8 of the taps on the GLSR in Chintalapadu, for instance, are broken. 
The villagers therefore tap the water through two holes in the tank 
closed by a wooden pen which leads to frequent overflowing of the 
tank. In villages having a GLSR and standposts on the main line, the 
latter are generally still working while the taps are frequently broken. 
There are also a few villages in which the taps and standposts are in 
nearly perfect working order. This is, for instance, the case in Kuchipudi 
(25 standposts), Sudanagunta (13 standposts), and Pothavaram, where 15 
of the standposts connected to the OHSR are all working. Standpost 
number 16 has never worked for the simple reason that it is not connec-
ted to any pipe at all.73 
With regard to the availability of the piped water, attention should 
first be brought to the discussions between the Netherlands and India 
with regard to the size of the Summer Storage Tank, the need to increa-
se its capacity, the growth of the population and the sabotage of pipes. 
In its maintenance manual for the Darsi scheme in 1992, the Engineer-
ing Department mentioned sabotage of the piped scheme in 16 different 
places. The wilful breaking of pipes seems to be mainly due to farmers 
using the water for irrigation purposes and/or for watering their cattle. 
For this reason, it was decided to construct water troughs for cattle 
along the main pipelines. Stories about the breakages of pipes can still 
be heard all over the project area, however, and constitute one of the 
reasons mentioned by villagers for the less than optimal availability of 
piped water. 
With regard to the availability of the piped water for the villages con-
sidered in this research, a distinction should be made between those at 
the end of a pipeline and those somewhere along a pipeline. With regard 
to the former, the availability (measured as the frequency with which the 
tanks, whether OHSRs or GLSRs, are filled) ranges from once per day 
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to not at all. Three of the end-villages reported the tank to be filled 
daily; two reported once every two days; and one reported weekly. The 
differences in the frequency of filling largely depend on the number of 
people for which the water is intended. In Devavaram, where the tank is 
filled every two days, the supply of water is considered sufficient by the 
villagers. This is also the case in Lankojanapalli, G. Agraharam and 
Chintalapalem. In other villages, the supply of water is clearly insuffi-
cient to meet the demands of the people. In Nagarajukunta, people 
mainly complain about the highly irregular supply of water which is, 
according to the local operator, simply due an insufficient supply of 
water. In Vemula, the OHSR cannot be filled due to low pressure; the 
villagers therefore depend on two standposts constructed on the main 
line. In Mannepalli as well, the tank (a GLSR this time) is not filled at 
all and the village has been supplied with one standpost (for around 100 
families) connected directly to the main line. 
The same constraints can be observed for Narasapuram, where pressu-
re is too low to allow the water to reach the GLSR. Despite the diesel 
motor supplied in 1993 after a visit from the Executive Engineer of 
PRED, the supply of water (via one standpost) remains irregular because 
of the motor being frequently under repair. The village of Vykuntapuram 
shows yet another story: The tank is filled once a week which should be 
more than sufficient for the 20 families still residing there. All of the 
taps are broken, however, which means that the water flows freely out 
of the tank and is sufficient for only about two days. 
The availability of safe drinking water in villages not at the end of a 
pipe line is much better. In none of these 12 villages the supply of water 
is irregular. The tank is filled daily in six of the villages and in three of 
the villages the tank is even filled twice per day. This holds for Kotha-
palem (a ward of Darsi town with its own OHSR), for instance. When 
the water in the tanks is insufficient to meet demand, moreover, there 
are still the standposts connected directly to a main pipe and thus a 
supply of water (nearly) all day long. 
In addition to the piped water supply, distance to the source and 
existence of old sources, the utilisation of the piped water scheme is also 
determined by the maintenance of the piped water scheme itself. 
Maintenance also points to the importance attached to the scheme by the 
people themselves. In the Darsi project, operation and maintenance are 
primarily the principal responsibility of the Panchayati Raj Engineering 
Department. Operators have been appointed for all of the villages under 
the scheme. Such operators are not only responsible for the release of 
water to the villages under their jurisdiction but also for the adding of 
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bleaching powder and the cleaning of the tanks. Although one of the 
objectives of the software components introduced at the end of the 
1980s was to stimulate participation by the villagers in the operation and 
maintenance activities, none of the villages has developed a strong and 
sufficiently dedicated water committee to take over the responsibilities 
of these operators (see below). 
The operators in the respective villages in principal have a high 
degree of decision-making with regard to the release of water. They are 
the ones deciding when and how often water is released to a specific 
village. As the above story with regard to water availability showed, 
there are enormous differences between the villages. Monitoring of the 
operators by their employer (i.e., the Panchayati Raj Engineering 
Department) seems to be far from institutionalised and manifests itself in 
non-adherence to the rules, for example, regarding bleaching powder 
(which is obligatory each time a tank is filled). Only one village 
reportedly adds bleaching powder each time the tank is filled. In other 
villages this ranges from 'never' to 'once per month.' The cleaning of 
the tank also seems to fall between these two extremes, and the people 
have cleaned the tank themselves in only one village. 
The villagers typically do not regard the cleaning of the tanks as their 
responsibility. As one villager put it: 'The water is from the government, 
so it is also the task of that government to clean.' Cleaning, here, refers 
only to the inside of the tank. Cleaning of the area surrounding the 
GLSRs, OHSRs and platforms proved to be nearly non-existent. Water 
logging around the standposts and GLSRs is almost universal because of 
insufficient drainage, no drainage or no platform at all. There is a sharp 
contrast between the maintenance of the pumping stations in Darsi and 
Podili and the maintenance in the majority of the villages, moreover. In 
Podili, where the pumping station is highly visible for officials visiting 
the scheme, no trouble or expense is spared to provide an excellent 
impression; neatly painted tanks and pumps and very clean surroundings 
with trees and flowers are the norm. In the majority of the villages, the 
tanks are hardly cleaned, taps are broken, valves and taps are leaking, 
tanks are leaking and the area around the taps is cleaned only occasion-
ally or not at all. 
In order to assess the impact of the software activities implemented as 
part of the Darsi-scheme since the end of the 1980s, people in the 23 
villages under consideration here were asked about health in relation to 
water and information was gathered on the possible existence and activi-
ties of committees set up in the villages. In the 23 villages, everybody 
seemed to be aware that water from the old sources causes 'heat' and 
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body aches. Inactivity, yellow urine and rice turning yellow were also 
mentioned as some of the other consequences of old water. In a majority 
of the villages, there is also general knowledge of the actual cause of 
these negative consequences: excess fluoride. Many other people are 
nevertheless completely unaware of this fluoride problem. In ten villa-
ges, there was no general knowledge of excess fluoride. Instead, dirt and 
insects were seen as the explanation for why the water from the old 
sources tastes so bad. Common knowledge is also that the water from 
the piped scheme does not taste as bad as the old water and does not 
cause the heat and pains associated with the old water. As already men-
tioned, this in no way means that use of the piped scheme became 
common practice. 
As also already mentioned, organisation of villagers in so-called 
Village Action Committees was considered a central part of the Clean 
Village Project. In an earlier period, the formation of such Committees 
(together with Mahila Mandais and Youth Clubs) was part of the addi-
tional activities occurring under the Dutch drinking-water projects in 
Andhra Pradesh. According to the progress reports from the relevant 
NGDO, 73 Mahila Mandais, 62 Youth Clubs and 22 Village Action 
Committees were formed in the Darsi area by January 1991. According 
to the NGDO, these committees also functioned actively. The existence 
of such committees was nevertheless not used as a selection criterion for 
inclusion in the Clean Village Project, which indicates some doubts on 
the part of the NAP-Office, the Panchyati Raj Engineering Department 
and the Dutch Embassy. Of the 23 villages surveyed here, five were 
among the 18 villages initially selected for inclusion in the Clean 
Village Project. People in 11 other villages can either recall a meeting or 
meetings related to the drinking-water project. In one or two of the 
villages, the CEP team (although this name is certainly not very famili-
ar) is reported to have visited their village more frequently for discus-
sions of the proper use of the water scheme and general cleanliness. 
Project Clean Village has been implemented in 18 villages with seven 
falling under the Darsi scheme. Five of these latter villages have been 
included in the present research: G. Agraharam, Gundlasamudram, 
Kothapalem, Ramabhadrapuram and Vempadu. These villages show 
Project Clean Village to have had little impact particularly with regard 
to the fostering of community participation via the establishment of 
Village Action Committees. This is mainly because the Committees 
initiated in the villages were in no way capable of dealing with the 
project (let alone undertaking new initiatives on their own). The fact that 
the CEP team went on strike and was dismissed from its duties at the 
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end of 1993, moreover, meant that the Village Action Committees were 
left on their own and quickly disintegrated. 
In Vempadu, such a Committee was formed in March 1992 (i.e., at 
the start of the project). The purpose of this Committee was to ensure 
proper usage of the piped water supply and undertake activities in the 
field of sanitation.74 The Committee counted 25 members (with 15 
from the ОС-community and 10 from the SC-community) although no 
more than 11 members ever attended the 14 meetings between March 
1992 and the strike/dismissal of the CEP team at the end of 1993. The 
majority of the activities undertaken by the committee also rested mainly 
on the shoulders of the appointed animator. In effect, thus, the animator 
was the Village Action Committee. The lack of Committee meetings 
after the CEP team left the field in July 1993 also indicates the 
impossibility of a one-person Village Action Committee. 
In order to stimulate active involvement in the Committee, the 
Vempadu villagers were promised assistance in a number of different 
fields. One of the most important fields involved latrines. In February 
1992, two model latrines were built in the village and the Village Action 
Committee received responsibility for motivating the villagers to build 
additional latrines; the materials would be provided via the project. The 
project was to monitor the supply of materials, collect the contributions 
of other beneficiaries and appoint a mason for the construction of the 
latrines. Up to February 1994, a total of 12 latrines had been built in 
Vempadu and only the superstructure was completed for 53 latrines. At 
that time, the construction of latrines came to a stand still; just when and 
how the construction would be resumed, moreover, remained unclear. A 
total of 120 families made their own contribution for a latrine and have 
been waiting for months with bricks and cement piled against their 
houses. The number of families was obviously disappointing for the 
CEP team, which later stated at a meeting of the Committee on 5 April 
1993 that they were contemplating making the Committee solely 
responsible for the latrine construction programme because of poor 
participation.75 Just before the CEP team was fired, the Vempadu 
Village Action Committee indeed received a letter from the CEP team 
making this contemplation a reality. 
Just as the Village Action Committee in Vempadu, the Village Action 
Committee in Kothapalem (presided over by the sarpanch of Darsi-town) 
is also in effect non-functional. The Committee itself has never 
conducted meetings; rather, the meetings were always organised and 
presided over by the CEP team. Furthermore, the people in this ward of 
Darsi were largely unaware of the existence of such a Village Action 
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Committee and the responsibility of the Committee for the latrine 
construction programme. When there were problems, thus, the people 
went to the CEP staff. The construction of latrines has started but none 
of them has been finished as of February 1994. Many of the latrines are 
still missing such essential parts as doors, seats and roofs. A large 
number of the beneficiaries for these toilets did not know that the CEP 
team had left the field, and they were all actually waiting for the con-
struction to be resumed. 
Though not expressed in so many words, the hostility towards the 
Project Clean Village (mainly because of unkept promises of the CEP 
team) was also obvious in the village of Ramabhadrapuram. The contri-
butions collected from villagers for smokeless chulas via a government 
scheme are still sitting in a bank as the animator does not know where 
to get the chulas and does not know which programme they should be 
delivered under. A Village Action Committee was also set up in this 
village at the beginning of 1992. The purpose of this Committee was to 
initiate social-awareness activities with regard to water and sanitation, to 
coordinate and monitor the construction of latrines, to collect the 
contributions of the beneficiaries and to distribute the necessary 
materials. The animator, appointed by the Committee, still has the 
materials for the latrines in his backyard. With the disappearance of the 
CEP team, the Committee members lost interest in the project. The 
animator, who is being accused of making money on the latrine project, 
is also thinking of quitting now the CEP team is gone. For the villagers 
or at least those aware of the existence of a Village Action Committee, 
the Committee simply is not active or as good as dead. 
The Committee in the village of G. Agraharam is beyond 'as good as 
dead.' As one of the villagers stated, 'it is all talk, they don't do 
anything.' In the Scheduled Caste colony of this village, 18 latrines were 
built by July 1993.76 Another 18 were supposed to be constructed soon 
thereafter, but the members of the Committee are simply lost without the 
guidance of the CEP team. They not only do not know where to turn to 
for materials but are also waiting for the CEP team to return. In the last 
village included in Project Clean Village, Gundlasamudram, neither 
evidence of a Village Action Committee nor activities related to latrines 
can be found. The best villagers can remember is a meeting at the end 
of 1992 when they were told about the necessity of using the piped 
water scheme and some information on latrines was disseminated. 
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Conclusion 
The АР-I project as implemented in Darsi and surrounding villages has 
failed to achieve some of its major objectives. In the field of water 
supply, the scheme has been so poorly maintained that major repairs are 
needed only a few years after completion. The rules regarding cleaning 
and bleaching powder are largely not adhered to by the personnel from 
the Panchyati Raj Engineering Department, and the water supply to the 
end villages is, at best, irregular. At the same time, it remains difficult 
to assess the extent to which the villagers make use of the piped water 
scheme and for what purposes (e.g., drinking, bathing, washing). It 
should be noted that part of the target area is not (yet) covered by the 
piped scheme, that the availability of the piped water is definitely less 
than optimal and that, even after several years of community-participati­
on and health-education activities in the area, a large part of the 
population remains unaware of the fact that the old sources of water are 
contaminated. The distance to the respective sources of water is report­
edly the major determinant of which source will be used and it therefore 
seems safe to state that a maximum of 50-60% of the villagers make re­
gular use of the safe drinking water provided through the piped scheme. 
A feeling of ownership among the beneficiaries of the piped scheme 
was not evident from the visits to the 23 villages. The scheme is still 
considered government property, and the villagers do not feel respons­
ible for maintenance of the facilities. The indifference of the villagers 
towards the facilities constructed under АР-I is exemplified by the large 
number of broken taps, vandalised tanks and washed-away platforms. 
There is hardly any evidence that the activities undertaken under the 
umbrella of community participation and health education have paid off. 
This holds for both the first and second NGDOs contracted for this job 
and also for the period following the dismissal of the second NGDO in 
July 1993. Project Clean Village turned out to be mainly a latrine 
construction programme and, as such, it is open to the same criticisms 
as expressed at the address of the latrine-NGDO in 1988. The dismissal 
of the CEP team in July 1993, whether justified or not, basically put a 
stop to the Clean Village Project. The establishment of Village Action 
Committees in selected villages in the Darsi area was quick and dirty 
with insufficient attention to the inclusion of a larger part of the 
communities in the project (or the Committees). 
Responsibilities (e.g., in the field of education, stimulation and 
coordination of latrine construction) were handed over to these VACs 
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without being strongly rooted in the local structure or providing a means 
of enforcing, for instance, the cleaning of the water points. The Village 
Action Committees thus remained alien and were doomed to disappear 
together with the CEP team. The years of community-participation and 
health-education intervention may not have had a clear impact on the 
utilisation, operation and maintenance of the water supply scheme, but 
they have certainly influenced the attitude of the villagers towards such 
intervention. After years of being told to use and properly maintain the 
water supply scheme and being promised additional government sche­
mes if they should organise themselves, the villagers have gained very 
little. It is therefore not surprising that a certain degree of hostility 
towards the project in general and towards the community-participation 
and health-education activities in particular can be encountered. 
To summarise: DGIS finally succeeded in getting the approval of the 
Government of Andhra Pradesh and the Panchayati Raj Engineering 
Department after the necessary struggles for a more integrated approach 
to rural water supply, but this approach has not produced the expected 
results. This is partly due to the haphazard manner in which the software 
aspects were implemented and a lack of coordination across the different 
agencies and NGDOs; АР-I was, at best, a multi-activity programme 
lacking clear integration of the relevant parts. The failure of АР-I is also 
partly due to a lack of guidance from the Netherlands Assisted Project 
Office. The history of the community-participation and health-education 
activities (with different organisations being responsible over the years) 
and the latrine debacle are proof of an ad-hoc decision-making structure 
lacking overall responsibility for the coordination and guidance of the 
various project activities. 
4.3.2 Uttar Pradesh / SP-III and SP-V 
Two DGIS projects in Uttar Pradesh will be discussed in this section. 
The first concerns a hand-pump project initially implemented solely as a 
construction project but later, at the end of the construction phase, 
broadened to include the first attempts at community participation and 
health education. The second is a sanitation project in which the soft­
ware aspects of the DGIS projects are further developed. The experien­
ces with these projects were then used in another hand-pump project 
(Sub Project-VI) which will be discussed in greater detail in the next 
section. A short description of the two projects is followed by the 
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findings of my research for each of the projects. Some concluding 
remarks with regard to the two projects will then be made. 
4.3.2.1 SP-III 
At the end of 1993, some 679 Problem Villages (PVs) in Uttar Pradesh 
were still in need of coverage and all of these villages were located in 
the hilly areas of the state. The majority of the villages identified as 
problematic in the 1970s and 1980s had by then been (partially) covered 
by hand pumps.77 These hand pumps reflect a change of strategy at the 
Uttar Pradesh water authority (i.e., Jal Nigam). Through the early 1980s, 
the focus of their work was on piped water schemes (the first drinking-
water project sanctioned by DGIS (SP-I) was also a piped scheme). This 
focus changed to hand pumps when it was acknowledged that, although 
more challenging and interesting from an engineering point of view, 
piped schemes had some major disadvantages. Not the least of these dis-
advantages were the operation and maintenance costs of piped schemes. 
As piped schemes constituted a growing burden on the budget of the 
government of Uttar Pradesh, it was decided at the beginning of the 
1980s to concentrate on the installation of hand pumps and only fall 
back on piped schemes when hand pumps were technically not feasible. 
The total number of hand pumps installed by Jal Nigam in Uttar Pradesh 
thus increased from 164,000 in 1987-88 to 358,000 at the end of 
1993.78 DGIS has also contributed to the installation of these hand 
pumps. The first hand pump project of DGIS became known as Sub-
Project HI. 
The villages incorporated in this SP-III project did not have an 
assured source of drinking water within a reasonable distance and thus 
met the first criterion for Problem Villages. The project proposal was 
handed over to the Dutch Embassy in April 1984; the side-letters were 
exchanged in August 1985; and implementation started in 1985-86. SP-
III was initially aimed at the installation of 3,172 hand pumps in 603 
villages in the districts of Agra, Mathura, Etawah and Allahabad. In 
1987, the number of hand pumps to be installed was increased by 1,211. 
At the same time, it was agreed to include zonal and mobile water-
testing laboratories for Agra, Mathura and Etawah as well as inspection 
houses in Mathura and Etawah.79 In May 1988, an expansion of the 
project to two more districts (Farukhabad and Firozabad) was proposed 
by Jal Nigam because of an acute drinking-water crisis in these districts 
and subsequently agreed upon by DGIS.80 
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In the side-letter for SP-III, the findings of the Review and Support 
Missions regarding the need for community participation were adopted: 
not only would community participation be an integral part of project 
execution, Jal Nigam would also oversee the construction of proper and 
continued drainage in close coordination with local leaders and 
community-based organisations. The operationalisation of the concept of 
community participation, however, remained very vague.81 Only the 
need for health education, sanitation and community participation in 
order to obtain fuller benefit from the project was endorsed, while 'an 
Indo-Dutch monitoring unit [...] will identify, design and implement the 
activities in close cooperation with UP Jal Nigam and in close liaison 
with appropriate Non-Govemment Organisations working in the project-
area.'82 Later, community participation with special attention to the 
involvement of women would take shape with the formation of so-called 
Jal Samitis or water committees. At the same time, the community 
participation part was largely restricted to drinking water and sanitation 
and thus to better use and maintenance of the facilities provided under 
the projects.83 
Although the side-letter stipulated community participation to be part 
and parcel of the project, this was certainly not the case in practice. The 
monitoring unit mentioned in the side-letter, for instance, was founded 
only in March 1988 with the installation of the Programme Support Unit 
(PSU).84 Initially, the PSU was supposed to develop an effective 
coordination system for Sub-Project V and to provide professional 
support in the field of community participation for all Indo-Dutch rural 
water-supply and sanitation projects in Uttar Pradesh.85 In March 1990, 
the PSU became an independent organisation within the drinking-water 
and sanitation projects in Uttar Pradesh responsible for the software 
aspects and directly financed via technical-aid funds. 
It took until March 1989 (i.e., one year after the official establishment 
of the PSU) for the first steps towards community participation to be 
taken with a pilot project in three villages in Allahabad district. These 
villages had been covered with hand pumps under SP-III with the aim of 
'developing a low cost community based maintenance system.'86 The 
first activity undertaken by the PSU in these three villages was to check 
the installed hand pumps and make sure that the necessary corrective 
interventions were actually carried out by Jal Nigam. The villagers were 
involved in these corrective interventions in order to increase their 
willingness to contribute to the maintenance of the facilities provided. 
As part of the pilot project, women caretakers were trained and educa-
tional activities were undertaken to increase the knowledge of the 
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population with regard to the water-health nexus. Participation of the 
population in the water project was also stimulated through the 
establishment of hand pump based water committees. The most import-
ant lessons from this Allahabad pilot project were later used,87 together 
with the lessons from a pilot project on environmental sanitation in a 
village in Rae-Barelli district to shape PSU's strategy with regard to 
community participation in SP-V (as well as SP-VI). 
As already clear in December 1988, the total costs of SP-1II were 
going to be less than originally anticipated. All of the proposed hand 
pumps could be financed and the proposed inspection bungalows and 
laboratories could also be constructed. In March 1989, all of the hand 
pumps for SP-III were installed; two years later, the bungalows and 
laboratories were also completed.88 The amount of Dutch assistance 
(after a deduction of the 15% tax component) was Dfl. 16.7 million with 
11.1 million as a loan and the remaining 5.6 million as a grant.89 In 
Rupees, the total cost of the project has been revised several times: from 
Rs. 65.3 million to 76 million in 1987 to 108 million in 1988 (due to 
the inclusion of additional work and expansion in the number of hand 
pumps) to approximately 121 million in November 1991. Nearly two-
thirds of the Dutch aid was used for civil works while materials and 
equipment accounted for approximately one-fifth. The remaining funds 
are spent as centage-charges to Jal Nigam.90 
Findings 
As already mentioned, the first activity undertaken under the banner of 
the pilot project was the checking of the hand pumps installed in the 
three villages. Corrective measures were undertaken by Jal Nigam 
mainly with regard to the construction and improvements of the plat-
forms and drainages at the hand pumps. Visits to the village of Mandali, 
where proper drainage for some of the hand pumps was still missing at 
the beginning of 1994, showed that such corrective measures had not 
always been taken. 
The most important activities in light of the main objective of this 
pilot project (i.e., to develop a decentralised community-based low-cost 
maintenance system) were the training of caretakers and the formation 
of hand-pump water committees.91 These water committees were 
intended to provide a forum for dissemination of health and hygiene 
messages and thereby create a feeling of ownership among the villagers 
and a means for sustainable and better management of the water 
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points.9 Although an end came to the pilot project with the official 
ending of SP-III in March 1991, the PSU has remained in contact with 
the villages. Activities are now placed under the responsibility of a so-
called scheme-level volunteer employed by the PSU. The main tasks of 
this volunteer are in the field of support to the Jal Samitis and health 
education through various cultural activities. The cultural group set up 
by this volunteer and consisting of school youth is, however, no longer 
active. According to the volunteer, there is still a lot of work to be done 
in the field of awareness raising, as only a part of the village Mandari is 
aware of the (importance of the) tasks of the Jal Samiti and of the need 
for safe drinking water and hygiene. The present research substantiates 
this opinion. There is, indeed, part of the village which has never even 
heard of Jal Samitis and consequently does not know what they are 
intended to do. 
The Jal Samitis set up in Mandari under the pilot project were repor-
tedly still active at the beginning of 1994, although one can wonder 
about the impact of these water committees on the cleanliness around 
the watcrpoints and the dissemination of health messages in many cases. 
Practically everybody in Mandari uses the hand pumps for all purposes. 
This has less to do with the safety of the water from these hand pumps, 
however, as with the drying up of the open wells used before the install-
ation of the hand pumps. In Pachdeora village, which was not a part of 
the pilot project and thus has no Jal Samitis, the majority of the people 
also use the available hand pumps. Nevertheless, part of the village (an 
estimated 20-30%) also uses an open well, which can be explained in 
part by the fact that there are open wells which are still functional (i.e., 
did not dry up). In such a case, convenience or distance become the 
most important criteria for the choice of water points. Furthermore, 
some of the people in Pachdeora complained about brackish water 
discharge from the hand pumps while two of the hand pumps were 
already out of order for a longer period of time.93 
In light of the problems highlighted above, it is important to note that 
Jal Nigam encounters serious (financial) problems in looking after the 
hand pumps installed under various programmes in the district. Action is 
only taken in case of break downs, while discussions in the villages of 
Pachdeora and Mandari showed Jal Nigam to take a long time to even 
react to breakdowns. Preventive maintenance is often completely out of 
the question for the Jal Nigam and is left to the villagers themselves. It 
was exactly this situation motivating the second most important part of 
the pilot project under SP-III: training of hand pump level caretakers. 
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Using funds from the government scheme TRYSEM, hand pump level 
caretakers were trained in preventive maintenance and provided with a 
small tool kit to perform their duties. Some of the caretakers were 
women, which meant that the objective of involving women was also 
fulfilled. The training of hand pump caretakers nevertheless met with 
several problems. The first 20 women to be trained were selected at the 
beginning of 1990, but the training itself was postponed twice and only 
actually started in October of that year.94 In December, the training of 
30 trainees, including nine women, ended. It was intended to contract 
the trainees in order to improve the maintenance system,95 but this did 
not work out for the trained women in particular. 
When project SP-III officially ended in April 1991, the PSU concen-
trated on providing back-up support to the trained mechanics. These 
mechanics were divided into groups and allotted a certain number of 
villages for major repairs. The trained women were praised for working 
quite efficiently and effectively. At the same time, however, the first 
cracks in the strategy could be seen. 'The existing resource constraints 
on the one hand, specially for O&M, and excessive staff on muster rolls 
for maintenance of hand pumps on the other in UP Jal Nigam has 
slowed down the process of establishing an efficient system for decen-
tralised maintenance. The trained mechanics are unable to receive 
payments regularly as the maintenance division of UP Jal Nigam is 
facing procedural problems in making use of their services.' In Septem-
ber 1991, it was already clear that the functioning of the trained 
mechanics was greatly jeopardised by the 'perennial shortage of funds 
for O&M and the recent termination of casual workers on a large 
scale.'96 The real problem, thus, occurred after the training of the 
women and when Jal Nigam refused to employ them as official careta-
kers/mechanics.97 
In August 1992, the social scientist in the district reported on a field 
visit to the three pilot villages for SP-III and came to some disap-
pointing conclusions. Firstly, the trained women 'are not getting any 
work and their tools have been taken away by the Junior Engineer.' 
Secondly, the 'maintenance of the hand pumps was in a bad shape' and 
the government (i.e., Jal Nigam) was less than responsive to complaints 
from the villagers. Thirdly, the PSU found the community in the three 
villages to be quite responsive but was disappointed by the attitude of 
the Jal Nigam engineers. It was, therefore, essential to revive community 
faith in the programme.98 Taking these observations to be true, the 
sustainability of the community participation and decentralised mainten-
ance-system associated with the pilot project can be questioned. 
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Instead of employing the trained caretakers under the pilot project, Jal 
Nigam employed six mechanics and a few assistants for the entire 
district. As a consequence, repair of hand pumps after breakdown took a 
very long time in most cases.99 In Mandali village, where five women 
were trained as caretakers under the pilot project, the villagers simply do 
not wait for the Jal Nigam maintenance team to show up. Instead, they 
either repair the hand pumps themselves (using home made tools) or 
hire a private mechanic and share the costs among the direct users of the 
relevant hand pump. The same has been done by the people of Pachdeo-
ra village where some of the villagers are even unaware that Jal Nigam 
is the agency to be contacted in case of breakdowns. 
According to the villagers in Mandari and Pachdeora, the main causes 
of disease in their villages are malnutrition followed by mosquitos and 
water. More of the people in Mandari than in Pachdeora are convinced 
of a decrease in the frequency of disease in recent years, and this 
decrease can be clearly attributed to an improvement in the field of 
drinking water. An improvement in sanitary conditions is also mentio-
ned, but the villagers can rarely point at the central item in many 
sanitation projects: latrines. In the last couple of years, the government 
(through the Block Development Officer) has offered to build a latrine 
with a contribution of Rs. 250 from beneficiaries. Hundreds (if not thou-
sands) of these latrines have been constructed in the district since 1991. 
Also in Mandari and Pachdeora, villagers have decided to participate in 
this latrine programme for privacy and comfort reasons. In almost all 
cases, however, the latrines are not in use or used only occasionally (for 
instance, during rains). Non-usage may be due to the provision of latri-
nes without a door and roof, to the construction of pits leaving much to 
be desired and/or a preference for the open field (because it 'is much 
bigger'). The first two reasons mentioned certainly do not apply to the 
latrines constructed under the DGIS sanitation project known as SP-V, 
however. 
4.3.2.2 SP-V 
The percentage of the rural population in Uttar Pradesh either not using 
or having a latrine is, with nearly 93%, above the average Indian figure. 
The majority of the latrines are used by the members of a single house-
hold only. Sanitation remains a non-item in Uttar Pradesh when looked 
at from the perspective of expenditures at the state level, moreover. In 
the Seventh Plan period, expenditures for rural sanitation amounted to 
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only Rs. 230 million. In the Eighth Plan and despite a growing attention 
to sanitation in the last decade, only an amount of Rs. 150 million was 
provided for. 
The increased attention to sanitation particularly in combination with 
drinking water is at the heart of the only sanitation project financed by 
the Netherlands in Uttar Pradesh. Baptised as SP-V, this rural sanitation 
project from DGIS was to cover 46 villages in the districts of Rae 
Barelli and Varanasi covered earlier under the piped water scheme SP-
j loo sp .y aimed ' t0 incorporate health education and effective partici-
pation of the local community in the sanitation programme to ensure 
regular use and maintenance of household sanitary latrines (HSL) and 
school sanitary latrines (SSL).'101 According to the original proposal in 
1985 the project was to be executed in six districts and should include 
construction of HSLs and SSLs, improvements in drainage, training, 
health education and an experiment with regard to the involvement of 
women in health and education. In this 1985 proposal, the nodal agency 
for the project would be the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development; construction would be in the hands of Jal Nigam; and 
coordination of the social and technical aspects of the project would be 
done by the Block Development Office. At the same time, it was 
suggested that a so-called Direction and Monitoring Unit within the 
nodal agency be established. This DMU was to 'take charge of the 
software component, to guide the programme, and to coordinate between 
and communicate with the various concerned agencies.'102 
In April 1986, both the Netherlands and India called for quick and 
unconditional clearing of the project.103 This does not mean that the 
project also quickly started. In December 1986, a Review and Support 
Mission was to 'investigate the existing organizational and coordinating 
structures for sanitation and health education/community involvement 
and to submit recommendations for the most appropriate organizational 
structure for implementing Sub-Project V.'104 Several changes to the 
original set-up of the programme were proposed. Greater emphasis was 
to be placed on household latrines (saturation approach) and the 
community latrines should be abandoned altogether. Greater attention 
should also be given to training, community involvement and coordina-
tion at the village/block level. Instead of the DMU, it was now sugges-
ted that a Social Extension Wing (SEW) of the Jal Nigam be established 
for the involvement of villagers in site selection, O&M and the planning 
of health education without responsibility for implementation.103 
Jal Nigam was at first the central executing agency for the 
construction part of SP-V, but this changed in April 1987 when the 
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Department of Rural Development & Panchayati Raj was put forward as 
the nodal agency for the construction of household latrines and Jal 
Nigam would take responsibility for drainage works.106 More changes 
in the programme set-up were made in the months following the exchan-
ge of side-letters in August 1987. The number of districts was reduced 
to two (Varanasi and Rae Barelli) and, in each of these districts, a 
cluster of villages would be totally covered which meant a target of 
13,441 household latrines and 48 school latrines. Greater emphasis was 
also to be placed on the participation of the potential users of the 
latrines either in the form of a cash or labour contribution from the 
beneficiaries.107 The organisational set-up also saw some changes. In 
Rae Barelli district, only state government departments would be 
involved in the project. More specifically, the Panchayati Raj 
Department would be responsible for the construction of household 
latrines; Jal Nigam for school latrines, standposts (at schools) and 
drainage facilities; and the Panchayati Raj (PR) and DWCRA machinery 
for the community-participation and health-education component of SP-
V. In Varanasi district, construction was also entrusted to PR and Jal 
Nigam while the software component became the responsibility of the 
Benares Hindu University. Lastly, the earlier proposed DMU and SEW 
were replaced by the Programme Support Unit (PSU) (see preceding 
section). 
Not much happened until the end of 1989 as the PR Department was 
simply not in a position to implement the programme according to 
schedule.108 For this reason in November 1989, the entire construction 
work was (again) entrusted to Jal Nigam which created a new rural 
sanitation unit a few months later under the Netherlands Assisted 
Programme. The year 1990 was used to construct numerous demonstrati-
on units and thereby test various super-structure options. Only in 
January 1991 an agreement was reached on the design of the household 
latrines to be constructed under SP-V. The new design had to be 
approved by the state government and the new design was accompanied 
by a 20% increase in the number of target households when compared 
to the baseline survey figures some years earlier. This expansion 
produced a sharp increase in the total project costs and the approval of 
both governments was then required. 
In order to use the then available and already committed funds as 
effectively as possible and not to delay the implementation of the project 
any further, it was decided to divide the project into different phases. 
Phase A (from April 1991 to March 1992) was to cover 13 villages109 
and followed by an interim phase (April-December 1992) in which 
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further construction of latrines and an in-depth review of the particular 
project approach was envisaged. Phase В was to start thereafter. Jal 
Nigam soon showed itself to be better equipped to perform the task of 
latrine construction than the Panchayati Raj Department: During Phase 
A, the target of 3,551 HSLs and 27 SSLs was indeed reached. In June 
1991, BHU was dismissed from its task and PSU took its place in 
Varanasi district.110 With this, PSU accepted a greater implementation 
role in the Dutch programme in Uttar Pradesh but also acknowledged 
that 'it [was] not realistic to go on building it into a growing 
implementation agency' because it was 100% Dutch financed.1" 
The normal 15% tax component of the Dutch contribution to SP-V 
was not deducted as such a deduction would simply slow down 
implementation, an alternative contribution from the GoUP was not easy 
to realise on short notice and the material component of the project 
could not be compared to that for rural drinking-water projects."2 
During the mid-term review in October 1985, a sum of Dfl. 6 million 
was reserved for SP-V. This was later reduced to a commitment of 5.21 
million."3 These funds were made available as technical aid grants 
and, as such, were the principal responsibility of DGIS. The funds made 
available for SP-V also covered the pilot activities for SP-III in 
Allahabad district. In addition to the actual financing of SP-V, training 
in the Netherlands in the areas of sanitary engineering and community 
participation, for example, was also offered to members of the staff at 
the Jal Nigam and PSU.1"1 
Findings 
Within the latrine (or: sanitation) project SP-V, use and maintenance 
were the central focus. Effective participation refers to a contribution 
from the target group for the construction of latrines. This contribution 
could take the form of money or labour depending on whether the 
household fell above or below the poverty line. It is nevertheless 
incorrect to characterise the SP-V project as merely a latrine constructi­
on project (as is possible for the sanitation part of the АР-I project, see 
section 4.3.2.1 above). SP-V was clearly aimed at changing the attitudes 
and habits of the local people with regard to personnel and environment­
al hygiene. For this reason, attention was also paid to the proper use of 
the installed water points (provided under the piped water schemes SP-I 
and SP-IV) and Water Committees were set up."5 In addition, soak 
pits and drainages were constructed and open wells repaired and 
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bleached."6 Health-education activities were aimed at creating greater 
awareness (e.g., through puppetry, film, magic shows, awareness camps 
and cultural programmes). As in other projects with a community 
participation component, group organisers (i.e., resource persons) were 
selected from among the villagers to motivate others to change their 
sanitary habits, to make sure that people contributed to the construction 
of latrines and to get people involved in the cleaning activities. 
At the start of Phase A in April 1991, only 38 HSL's had been 
constructed in the district of Rae Barelli and 29 in the district of 
Varanasi. Construction, thereafter, was speeded up. In Varanasi alone, a 
total of nearly 1,800 household latrines or 87% of the target had been 
constructed in the seven Phase A villages by June 1992. Under Phase A 
(April 1991-March 1992), it was intended to saturate the seven villages 
in Varanasi and the five in the district of Rae Barelli. During the Interim 
Phase (from April to December 1992), another two villages in Varanasi 
and seven in Rae Barelli were targeted for saturation. As already 
mentioned, the targets set for the first phase were not entirely reached 
by March 1992 although a boom in construction had occurred. 
The Interim Phase was supposed to be ended by the end of 1992 and 
followed by Phase B, but certain delays occurred. In Chattauni Kot, a 
Varanasi village and part of Phase B, nothing had been done by January 
1994 with the exception of the activities of the BHU which conducted a 
survey of the village. This survey has been repeated twice since then, 
and the third time was because the PSU forgot to ask for the income of 
the households. The villagers expressed their scepticism towards the 
programme and were found to openly wonder whether it would ever get 
started. At the same time, a certain degree of anger was encountered 
among those who had stated an interest in a latrine years before because 
their own contribution was very likely to be increased which created a 
feeling of being betrayed. When the majority of the villagers in 
Chattauni Kot had agreed to a latrine, the own contribution was much 
lower. Raising the own contribution means that they have to pay much 
more for the latrines to be constructed than the people from the villages 
included in Phase A and the Interim Phase. 
Research in four villages in the district of Varanasi117 showed the 
majority of the latrines constructed under SP-V to be used and 
maintained by the beneficiaries.118 Some of the latrines almost look 
like small bungalows: nicely white-washed with flowers planted around 
them and light supplied by (illegally) tapping electrical lines. In Napura 
Kalan, 350 latrines were constructed since the beginning of 1992 which 
means that around 50 households had yet to be covered under the 
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programme. Most of these latter households expressed a desire for a 
latrine after all which suggests that time and exposure creates need. At 
the same time, the social pressure from those families who already have 
a latrine cannot be underestimated. There are nevertheless villagers who 
are simply not susceptible to such social pressure, do not have the time 
or money to spend on a latrine or simply unwilling to spend the time or 
money because they are either not convinced of the need of these 
latrines or find the open fields more convenient."9 Those who have 
already constructed a latrine (or plan to in the future) have done so for 
mainly privacy reasons. Social pressure from other villagers and the 
PSU team also won over several households. Only a handful of 
households constructed a latrine for health reasons. 
The findings on the use and maintenance of household latrines are in 
most cases in sharp contrast to the findings for school latrines. 
According to the teachers, the six toilets constructed near the school in 
Napura Kalan are not in use because of a lack of water, despite the 
construction of a water tank at the school premises. The latrines 
constructed by the school authorities themselves (this time inside the 
school) are also hardly used and extremely dirty. The school in Tarapur, 
constructed in 1992-93, shows yet another picture. There is plenty of 
water available on the school premises, as there is not only a hand pump 
but also a water tank; the latrine, consisting of two urinals and two 
toilets, is nevertheless only partly in use. Considering the smell and filth, 
one of the urinals is certainly in use but the other is not. The doors to 
the two toilets are locked safely with a padlock and, according to the 
teachers, the children have to ask for the key in order to use the toilets. 
Asked accordingly, it took some 15 minutes to find the key and it 
proved impossible to open the doors because the padlocks were comple-
tely corroded. According to the PSU staff, the situation in these two 
schools is no exception: only two of the 18 school latrines in the district 
are actually in use.120 
In the project proposal for SP-V, a clear link was made between this 
sanitation project and the provision of safe water under SP-I. In essence, 
the sanitation programme can be seen as a second stage in the complete 
and integrated provision of safe water and sanitation. The attention paid 
in the SP-V villages to awareness raising, health education and the 
formation of water committees also indicates an integrated approach. 
Although the fear of problems in the supply of safe water having a 
negative effect on the willingness of the people to get involved in the 
sanitation project was expressed on several occasions during SP-V, this 
fear seems to have been unfounded. Despite the erratic provision of safe 
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water particularly via the piped water scheme, there is not only a 
growing desire for latrines among the population but also proper use and 
maintenance. Efforts are also being undertaken in the villages to 
eradicate the problems with the piped water scheme by installing hand 
pumps, repairing and cleaning the open wells and digging new wells. In 
the village of Napura Kalan, the piped water scheme provides water for 
about one hour per day at best and only two standposts are in working 
order. However, three of the 13 sanctioned hand pumps have already 
been installed and the villagers are not only using the latrines but also 
maintaining them. In the village of Tikiri, hand pumps are also being 
installed to either replace or supplement the piped water supply. In parts 
of the village of Tarapur, as well, the piped water supply is erratic but 
the 30 open wells are all reportedly in use. 
Conclusion 
Without a doubt, the pilot project in the district of Allahabad under SP-
UI provided a test case for many of the activities later undertaken in 
such projects as SP-V and SP-VI. Nevertheless, one can wonder about 
the direct impact of PSU's involvement on the people in the three pilot 
villages and particularly in the field of creating a village-level 
maintenance structure. Although the people in the three villages received 
maintenance training and were theoretically more capable of looking 
after the hand pumps than the people in the village of Pachdeora where 
no one received such training, little difference was found in practice. A 
clearer difference can be seen with regard to the degree of cleanliness 
around the hand pumps and the use made of the pumps although the 
activities undertaken by the PSU during the pilot project can still be 
questioned if only because the intervention was too limited and too brief 
to have a lasting effect on the behavioural patterns of the villagers. Not 
all of the villagers could be reached within the short time span of the 
pilot project and, although certain activities are said to be continued by 
the scheme-level volunteer, the response of the villagers is minimal and 
the activities seem to be very low profile. The major failure in the pilot 
project concerns the training of the caretakers. This failing also shows 
the dependence of such interventions on the willingness of government 
departments (in this case: Jal Nigam) to carry an important part of the 
pilot project beyond the initial stage. 
The sanitation programme SP-V effectively started in 1991 after some 
troublesome developments and shows good to very good results with 
Drinking water and sanitation 153 
regard to use and maintenance. The evaluation has shown the willing-
ness of the people to contribute to the construction of a latrine to have 
grown over the years in part because of the work of the PSU in the field 
of awareness raising. A large majority of households uses the latrine 
regularly and maintenance is also good in most cases. Some of the 
villages (such as Napura Kalan) look generally cleaner when compared 
to neighbouring villages. The people have obviously become more aware 
of cleanliness and sanitary issues, and this awareness can be attributed to 
the work of the PSU and the village- level volunteers in disseminating 
the sanitation message. 
There is never smoke without a fire, however. The so well-kept 
latrines are extremely expensive under Indian conditions. The choice of 
materials and structure has driven up the price of the latrines and, 
beyond a doubt, these materials and structures have contributed to the 
acceptance of the latrines by the villagers. The final decision was also 
made after several trials and consultations with the future beneficiaries. 
The question is whether the use of such latrines can be duplicated in 
other (government) projects. SP-V was also quite successful because of 
the high investments in various software activities. A new sanitation 
programme anticipated by the Jal Nigam without assistance from the 
Netherlands will therefore provide an important test because the own 
contribution from the target group is estimated to be in the order of 70% 
of the total costs.121 
In SP-V, the own contribution of the beneficiaries was slowly raised 
with villagers in later phases paying much more for their latrines than 
villagers in the first phase as a result. Coupled to delays in the imple-
mentation of the programme, this has led to dissatisfaction among 
potential beneficiaries. Whether it will mean the withdrawal of future 
beneficiaries from the project remains to be seen. All in all, one can ask 
whether SP-V has indeed paved the way for improved latrine constructi-
on and sanitation or simply created yet another donor-financed island of 
sanitary prosperity. 
4.3.3 Uttar Pradesh / SP-VI 
As mentioned earlier, a 1985 survey showed the number of Problem 
Villages (meeting mainly the first criterion) to be much larger than 
originally thought. This held for many of the districts in the North-
Eastem part of Uttar Pradesh where most of the villages had been 
covered by the drinking-water activities in the Minimum Needs 
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Programme or the Harijan Basti Programme. That one or even two hand 
pumps per village was not an ideal ending point was acknowledged in 
1987 when Jal Nigam forwarded a project proposal to the Dutch 
Embassy in New Delhi for the installation of 10,000 hand pumps in 
1,410 newly identified Problem Villages.122 At the end of 1991, these 
figures were adjusted to 13,559 hand pumps for 1,638 villages spread 
across six districts covering some 2.7 million people. 
In May 1988, when the proposal was still pending at the Dutch 
Embassy, the Department of Rural Development announced that 'Sub-
Project VI will be executed making use of experience and knowledge 
currently available on community participation.'123 When the Embassy 
finally and officially forwarded the proposal to DGIS in The Hague in 
September 1988, the latter gave expression to its appreciation of the 
facilities for proper drainage for each hand pump incorporated in the 
proposal.124 At the same time, questions were raised with regard to not 
only the lack of activities in the field of water quality monitoring but 
also the section on participation. As advisor to DGIS, the IRC found 
only limited room for community participation but nevertheless 
consented to the proposal mainly because of the speed with which the 
project was intended to be implemented.125 DGIS in principle agreed 
to project SP-VI and the Community Participation component in 
November 1988; the project commission from DGIS officially agreed to 
SP-VI in December 1989;126 but the side-letters were exchanged no 
sooner than October 1990. Making funds available for the Community 
Participation part (CP) also took quite some time and led to delays in 
the incorporation of CP into SP-VI.127 When PSU — as the implemen-
ting agency for the software parts of the project ~ finally got involved 
in the project at the end of 1989 more than 60% of the hand pumps had 
already been installed.128 
The first major task for the PSU (initially under the banner of a pilot 
project) was to check the hand pumps which had already been installed. 
Some 727 of the 1,799 hand pumps checked during the period Novem-
ber 1989-July 1990 had no drain or an inadequate drain; 348 were 
installed without a platform; 59 were out of order; and 87 were installed 
at a socially unacceptable site.129 The PSU was therefore to get 
involved in the site selection for those hand pumps waiting to be 
installed. In the selection of socially and technically acceptable sites, the 
PSU would work together with Jal Nigam and the potential users of the 
hand pumps.130 This pre-occupation with review and site selection 
meant postponement of many of the activities related to the formation of 
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Water Committees (or Jal Samitis) and the consolidation of the social 
mobilisation programme until the beginning of 1993.131 
In December 1992, PSU presented a paper on the 'expanded base of 
community participation (ECP).'132 This paper was dictated by the 
need to intensify the contact with the project villages 'which a single 
social scientist was unable to achieve,' the need to supplement the Dutch 
programme with health and education programmes, and the need to 
institutionalise the concept of community participation. Broadening of 
the software components of SP-VI was sought in two directions. Firstly, 
the involvement of government departments (such as DWCRA and the 
Department of Health) was envisaged and thereby the possibility of 
reaching a larger area than the PSU could. Secondly, local-level 
organisations should set out the lines for more general rural development 
together with government departments and agree on the specific 
activities to be undertaken in the respective villages. 
The ECP strategy was implemented in three developmental phases 
starting in March 1993. The main features of this new approach were: 
(1) clustering of villages in groups and blocks; (2) emergence of 
Intensive Mobilisation Villages (IMVs) to serve as model villages for 
the surrounding area; and (3) involvement of District Coordination 
Committees (DCCs) and Block Coordination Committees (BCCs). These 
latter committees (i.e., DCCs and BCCs) were meant to facilitate the 
integration of the drinking-water and sanitation projects with the other 
relevant development programmes at the district level through direct 
interaction with such organisations as the Jal Samitis at the village 
level.1" 
Over the years the PSU has taken up a greater implementational role 
than previously within the Dutch programme in the field of drinking-
water supply and sanitation. The activities of the PSU can be divided 
into three: (1) village-based activities; (2) institutional activities; and (3) 
documentation and monitoring activities. Within SP-VI the focus is 
clearly on the activities at the village level. These can be divided into 
what could be called project objective and non-project objective local-
level activities. The former include all those activities which take 
drinking water and sanitation not only as their point of departure but as 
their central focus: review of hand pumps, site selection, health 
education, group meetings, formation of Jal Samitis or training of 
caretakers.134 The non-project objective local-level activities may differ 
per district and seem to be largely dependent on the social scientist 
working in the field. Attention may be paid to literacy classes in one 
district and to income-generating activities in another district. In more 
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general terms, the non-project objective local-level activities are more 
directly aimed at the move towards more integrated rural development 
and therefore include activities in a variety of areas. 
The objectives of SP-VI are comparable to the ones outlined for AP-I. 
In addition to the construction of hand pumps, an improvement in 
health, economic position and general wellbeing of the rural populati-
on135 and a reduction in the workload for women, the project was also 
intended to contribute to village development through the active 
participation of the villagers in the planning and implementation of the 
development activities. This became particularly clear in 1993 when the 
expanded base for the community participation-strategy was develop-
ed.136 As such, health education, organisation and participation were an 
integral part of the project right from the start.137 As mentioned, 
however, PSU only became involved in the project after half of the 
construction was completed which means that their activities were not so 
integral after all. 
The objectives of community participation were more clearly 
presented under SP-VI, and consisted of 'assisting in selection of 
socially appropriate water points, ensure preventive maintenance, closer 
rapport/communication with concerned Jal Nigam staff for undertaking 
major repairs, effective social monitoring of water quality, waste water 
management and maintaining cleanliness around water point surround-
ings, social awareness/vigilance on water quality control, formation of 
hand pump based Jal Samiti or water committee for better management 
and utilisation of water,''3e and participation was thereby made 
instrumental to the better use, operation and maintenance of the facilities 
constructed under the DGIS projects. 
In order to reach increasing usage and a village-level (preventive) 
maintenance system, it was considered necessary to educate the villagers 
on the advantages of hand pump water over water from old sources and 
on the necessity of cleanliness via various health-education and 
awareness-raising activities (e.g., health camps, shows, songs). A feeling 
of ownership for the local population over the facilities could also be 
sought by involving the beneficiaries in the selection of the sites and by 
setting up village-level structures (water committees or Jal Samitis) for 
maintenance at the local level. The functioning of these Jal Samitis 
largely depends on the training of caretakers, as only local people 
capable of undertaking maintenance activities can make a start on 
(preventive) maintenance of the sources. 
The total Dutch allocation to SP-VI comes to nearly Dfl. 26 million 
with Dfl. 25 million (financial grant funds) for physical works and the 
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remaining Dfl. 1 million (technical aid funds) for the community 
participation component. As of 31 December 1991, 67% of the total 
allocation had been disbursed. The available funds cover all expenses 
including centage charges of Jal Nigam,139 but do not include the 15% 
tax reduction on reimbursement claims for the physical works.140 
Findings 
Site selection has been a major preoccupation of the PSU field staff 
since its involvement in the project.141 The importance of the proper 
location for a hand pump was clear from the review undertaken by the 
PSU in connection with the site selections for the new hand pumps. This 
review showed some of the hand pumps to have been installed in what 
are referred to as socially unacceptable sites leading to non-use by part 
of the community. As in other projects, the distance to the source is of 
major importance for actual use. Distance not only refers to distance in 
the metric sense but also to distance in the social sense. Certain groups 
within a village may refuse to use a hand pump when that same hand 
pump is also used by a group considered lower (or higher) in the social 
hierarchy. This was particularly a problem when the drinking-water 
projects in Uttar Pradesh did not initially cover all of the groups and 
lower-caste groups in particular. 
In addition to site selection, the proper installation of the hand pump 
(i.e., proper bolts, platform and drainage) is also of major importance for 
use and maintenance. Unplanned site selection may lead to 'an 
accumulation of waste water, thus spoiling roads and creating unsanitary 
conditions around hand pumps sites.'142 The pilot project undertaken 
in 1989 in Allahabad district under SP-III (see section 4.3.2.2 above) 
showed the improvement of hand pump conditions to enhance 'the 
importance of the potable water facilities in the minds of rural 
people.'143 The pre-occupation of the PSU staff with reviewing already 
installed hand pumps from a physical/technical as well as a social point 
of view must therefore be regarded as critical for (proper) use, operation 
and maintenance. 
Constant review of the condition of the hand pumps only pays off 
when those hand pumps found to be missing some essential parts or 
completely broken down are indeed repaired. During visits to several 
villages in the districts of Lakhimpur-Kheri, Bahraich and Gonda, the 
hand pumps were found on several occasions to be in different degrees 
of decomposition. In the Brahmin hamlet in the village of Santarpur in 
158 The same difference 
Bahraich district (recently included as an Intensive Mobilisation 
Village), the hand pump is not being used for its intended purposes (see 
below), the platform is broken and the pump itself is in need of bolts. 
The two hand pumps in the SC/ВС hamlet in this village are intensively 
used and also show it: drainage is practically non existent (leading to 
substantial waterlogging), the top of the hand pumps is completely loose 
and bolts are missing. 
In the village of Barhiya in the same district, some of the installed 
hand pumps are in a particularly bad condition. Of the six hand pumps 
in this village, five showed either minor or major deficiencies. The sixth 
hand pump situated next to the house of the pradhan and, in contrast to 
the other hand pumps, surrounded by a lot of open space was not only 
relatively clean but also had a bathing platform and a good drain (both 
installed out of the pradhan's own pocket). The same could not be said 
of the remaining hand pumps in the hamlet: missing bolts, broken 
platforms, inadequate or no drains leading to severe waterlogging, dirt 
and loose handles characterised these hand pumps. One hand pump had 
broken down more than one year prior as a result of sandy water 
discharge. While still waiting for the Jal Nigam mechanic, the hamlet 
switched to other hand pumps. The block mechanic, who is supposed to 
visit all of the villages regularly for preventive maintenance, has never 
visited the hamlet according to the people there. Cooperation between 
the villagers with regard to cleanliness and hygiene around the water 
points is also totally lacking.144 
In nearby Dharsawan, an Intensive Mobilisation Village from the first 
phase of the ECP, the condition of the hand pumps is quite different. 
Not only are the 21 hand pumps constructed over the last ten years in 
(perfect) working order, they are also (very) clean. Bathing platforms 
have been constructed near many of the hand pumps or were under 
construction.145 Bathing platforms have been constructed near eight of 
the twelve hand pumps in the village of Belwabally (district of Gonda) 
with financial assistance from the government scheme Jawohar Rozgar 
Yojana. The hand pumps are in perfect working order and well cleaned 
by members of the Jal Samitis established for each hand pump. The 
chain of the hand pump is regularly greased, and others are stimulated to 
use the hand pump in the proper manner and for the proper functions. 
As stated by some members of the Jal Samitis, activities have led to a 
mentality change exemplified by the reportedly sharp decline in use of 
the hand pump platform as a washing area. With regard to cleanliness 
and the maintenance of the hand pumps, marked differences can be seen 
between the Intensive Mobilisation Villages and those villages which 
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have hardly or not as yet been touched by the community-participation 
activities under SP-VI. 
The community-participation activities were (also) meant to create a 
feeling of ownership (and thus responsibility) among the people with 
regard to the drinking-water facilities. My own research indicates that 
such a feeling does not yet exists among a large part of the population. 
This is mainly because these people still regard the government as the 
owner of the hand pumps and thus responsible in case of problems.146 
As a consequence, one can hardly speak of proper operation let alone 
maintenance of the hand pumps in those villages where the majority 
sees the hand pumps as government property. The village of Barhiya 
(mentioned above) exemplifies this situation. In the village of Giullaula 
in Lakhimpur-Kheri district, the people living around a recently broken 
down hand pump not only stated that they were not trained to repair the 
pump but also that they regard the hand pump as government property. 
In contrast, there are certain villages where a feeling of ownership is 
much more common. These include practically all of the villages 
included as Intensive Mobilisation Villages in the first phase of the 
Expanded Base for Community Participation by the PSU. 
The formation of Water Committees is one of the ways in which it 
was attempted to create a feeling of ownership. From April 1992 to July 
1993, a total of 848 so-called Jal Samitis were formed under SP-VI with 
the majority (39%) in the district of Lakhimpur-Kheri.147 In the 
Intensive Mobilisation Villages (e.g., Koriyal, Agara, Manaura in 
Lakhimpur Kheri), knowledge of the tasks of these Jal Samitis is very 
common. More proper handling and use of the hand pumps also seems 
to have been attained in these villages when compared to those where 
there is less interaction with the activities of the PSU. Although some 
definitely are quite effective in keeping the surroundings of the water 
points clean and they are actively involved in disseminating the message 
of proper use, a question mark can be placed at the impact of these 
committees in the field of maintenance as long as no local-level 
mechanics have been trained.1,18 
As long as mechanics are not trained, the Water Committees remain 
informal at best. Neither the maintenance performed by the Water 
Committees in the villages now (e.g., greasing of chains and checking of 
bolts) nor the cleaning of the hand pumps has had a clear positive effect 
on the frequency of breakdowns. According to Jal Nigam in Lakhimpur 
Kheri district, preventive maintenance as carried out by the villagers 
currently has no impact on the frequency of breakdowns; it has only 
contributed to the beauty of the hand pump. Nevertheless, the 
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preventive-maintenance tasks performed by the villagers will, after 
caretakers are trained, definitely lighten Jal Nigam's task. The concept 
of community participation is called 'advantageous' if only because 
'more people are using the safe water now and know better about the 
importance of it.'149 
In most of the SP-VI villages included in this research, the majority 
of the people seem to be using the hand pumps installed under the Indo-
Dutch Programme as well as under other programmes. Discussions with 
villagers indicated that, on average, between 50-70% of the people use 
the hand pumps regularly for at least drinking-water purposes. This 
utilisation level had less to do with the state of the hand pump or the 
people's awareness of the (possible) health impact of safe water than 
with the availability of more convenient sources in the village. The 
general abundance of other water sources in the villages themselves in 
the districts of Lakhimpur-Kheri, Bahraich and Gonda is the most 
important reason for non-utilisation of the hand pumps. Other (minor) 
reasons include the religious sanctity of open wells. Greater proximity 
(together with the habit of not allowing women in some groups to go 
out of the houses, for instance, to fetch water) was nevertheless found to 
be the main reason for people not using the hand pump at all or not for 
all purposes. 
It should be noted that the general abundance of alternative sources 
mentioned above refers not so much to the open wells found in practi-
cally all villages and hamlets but to the prevalence of shallow hand 
pumps in or near houses.150 In some hamlets and particularly those 
inhabited by Muslims and higher-caste groups, the majority of the 
households have such a shallow hand pump. This is, for instance, the 
case in Sankarpur village in Bahraich district. Utilisation of the hand 
pumps for at least drinking purposes differs substantially across the 
different hamlets. In the hamlet inhabited by members of the brahmin 
caste, the hand pumps encountered stiff competition from the private 
shallow pumps which are found in nearly every house. The hand pump 
installed in the village in 1988 under SP-VI is reportedly used for 
bathing and performing ceremonies. The non-use of the hand pump for 
drinking purposes, however, has little to do with ignorance for most of 
the households seem to be aware of the better quality of the water from 
that hand pump. Such non-use rather appears to be dictated by the fact 
that women are not allowed to go outside the house freely and regularly. 
In the other three hamlets in Sankarpur, the hand pumps are used even 
with an open well closer to the houses. Of the five open wells in the 
village, only one is still in use for animals, washing and marriages. The 
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same was seen in the other villages as well, including Gajadharpur 
(Lakhimpur Kheri). In such villages as Behta, Kala-aam and Giulaula in 
Lakhimpur Kheri, both hand pumps and open wells are in use. Distance 
to the source appears to be the main reason for choosing a particular 
source. 
As was in Andhra Pradesh (АР-I), a direct link between the provision 
of safe drinking water and health could not be substantiated. Figures 
from the health departments in the areas visited were not of much use 
here because the compilation of the data is far from complete. Even if 
this were the case, making a direct link of drinking water and/or 
sanitation to health is still impossible. Improving the health position of 
people through the provision of safe drinking water and sanitation also 
requires the proper use and maintenance of these facilities. Although the 
above evaluation provides some insight into the use and maintenance of 
the drinking-water facilities, no clear indications could be found with 
regard to the handling of the water by the target group after tapping it 
from the pumps. What remains are the perceptions of the people 
themselves with regard to improvements in their health position. 
Although 13 of the 23 households interviewed in the four villages in 
Lakhimpur Kheri indicated such an improvement and the households in 
other villages were clearly convinced of this, it remains difficult if not 
impossible to directly link these perceptions to the activities in the field 
of drinking water as implemented under SP-VI. 
Finally, some remarks should be made with regard to the concept of 
community participation as used within SP-VI. Firstly and despite 
statements pointing to the opposite over the years, participation within 
the Dutch- financed drinking-water projects in Uttar Pradesh remains a 
means of reaching certain objectives within the projects themselves 
(most notably: usage, operation and maintenance). Secondly, in the 
formation of Jal Samitis and other village-level organisations as the 
counterparts of government departments and agencies within the 
Expended Base of Community Participation, there is a heavy reliance on 
the strong in the communities. The people playing an important role in 
the activities of the PSU (e.g., for dissemination of health messages, 
active committee work) are very likely to already be the more outspoken 
and/or influential villagers.151 Partly this can be explained by the speed 
with which the PSU has to work (if only in light of keeping up with the 
activities of Jal Nigam), in combination with the large number of 
villages, the restricted funds at their disposal, the limited number of staff 
and the fact that it concerns a bilateral project in which government 
departments play a major role as well. 
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The water committees set up in the villages under the Dutch projects 
were to hold no legal status and were supposed to be supportive to the 
existing Gram Panchayats. They were not supposed to assume a 
conflicting role or to pose a threat to the Panchayat system. As 
voluntary organisations, they could only make recommendations at an 
advisory level while their main task was to be actively involved in the 
selection of socially acceptable sites and ensure proper O&M by 
involving the local community. Their legal status was practically non-
existent and their tasks and responsibilities were quite restricted which 
clearly opened the possibilities for official agencies and structures (e.g., 
Gram Panchayats and Jal Nigam) to disregard the committees. 
Conclusion 
Considering the preoccupation of the PSU with site selection, review of 
previously installed hand pumps and relatively late initiation of 
community participation activities within the SP-VI project, it is far too 
early to draw conclusions about the sustainability of these activities and 
the attainment of the project objectives. The fact remains that a marked 
difference with regard to the cleanliness around the hand pumps and 
their maintenance could be witnessed and attributed to the activities of 
the PSU in the villages included in SP-VI. In comparing the average SP-
VI village with villages outside the project area, however, the 
differences in cleanliness and maintenance were far less obvious.152 
This observation is substantiated when one looks at the discrepancy 
between the number of social scientists in the field and the number of 
villages in the project area. A simple calculation from the three monthly 
reports of the PSU shows, on average, 65 villages to have been visited 
per month for all of the SP-VI districts considered together. With a total 
number of 1,638 villages, it will thus take slightly more than two years 
for all of the villages to have been visited on at least one occasion once 
by a social scientist.153 For this reason alone, the need for concentra-
tion on certain villages (i.e., Intensive Mobilisation Villages) is undisput-
able. Visits to villages in the project area and discussions with the 
villagers also clearly show the frequency of visits (and therefore the 
frequency of exposure to the activities undertaken by the PSU) to be of 
major importance for the dissemination of health and hygiene messages, 
changing the behavioural patterns of the villagers with respect to 
drinking water and sanitation and the performance of the Water 
Committees.154 The sustainability of these Water Committees thus 
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depends largely on further guidance from the PSU and the training of 
caretakers which still not occurred at the end of 1993. 
To summarise: As long as the community-participation activities 
(including health education, site selection, Water Committees and the 
training of caretakers) are part of the government machinery and/or the 
implementation^ capacity of the PSU is limited, major doubts can be 
raised about the capacity to go beyond the creation of some islands of 
better use, operation and maintenance to sustainable participation. 
4.3.4 Kassar Trust 
The Himalayan area of Uttar Pradesh, known as the Uttrakhand region, 
is characterised by a deteriorating drinking-water situation due mainly to 
the destruction of the Himalayan ecology as a result of population 
growth and continued deforestation. The old water sources are drying 
up. As a consequence, the people (i.e., women) have to go further and 
further from their homes to fetch water. The quality of the water in the 
area is also a major problem.155 Defecation near (natural) water 
sources creates a health hazard to the population with a large part of the 
population frequently suffering from water-borne diseases.156 It was 
mainly the quantity problem which prompted the NGDO Kassar Trust to 
start a programme focusing on drinking water.157 In 1987, Kassar 
Trust constructed the first hand pump under this programme in Almora 
district158 and thereby tapped sources of water previously unavailable 
to the population.159 
This first hand pump, being privately owned, was intended to demon-
strate the technique developed by the Trust for tapping ground-water 
layers in the hilly regions of the lower Himalayas. An additional 45 
hand pumps have been installed in the region under the supervision of 
Kassar Trust since then, and the technique using an adapted India Mark 
II hand pump for tapping underground streams has become known and 
appreciated by government departments as well as non-government 
organisations. A certain degree of scepticism nevertheless remains with 
regard to application across a larger area under a government scheme. 
There is some doubt about the quality of the water (i.e., possibilities for 
chlorinisation do not exist), and hand pumps frequently fall outside the 
distance from the habitat criterion used by the government.160 
Up to now, the government has only installed piped schemes in the 
hilly region of Uttar Pradesh. In Bageshwar block of Almora district 
alone, 162 of these piped schemes have been constructed over the years, 
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covering nearly all of the villages.161 Although exact information on 
the functioning of these piped-water schemes is hard to come by, many 
of the schemes visited during the present field study were found to be 
defunct. In a recent study, Kassar Trust concludes that 'a good 
proportion of the pipelines installed over the past 30 years either do not 
supply their designed capacity, or due to failure of some part or the 
system altogether, no longer supply water at all.'162 Although the Trust 
cites six different reasons for the generally poor performance of these 
government schemes, in the eyes of Jal Nigam there are two main 
reasons: (1) sabotage of piped schemes is common practice as villagers 
do not consider the schemes to be their own, and (2) the government is 
hampered in its operation and maintenance task by insufficient funds 
and staff. The difficult terrain also does not facilitate O&M or proper 
supervision during construction.163 
Kassar Trust seems to be aware of the limitations of the improved 
hand pump for hilly regions if larger areas have to be covered, 
particularly if this has to be done relatively quickly as in the case of a 
government scheme. In the eyes of the Trust, however, these limitations 
are not of a technical but of a social nature (i.e., depend on participation 
of beneficiaries in planning, implementation, operation and maintenan-
ce). In talking about those areas where adequate drinking-water sources 
do not exist and the habitats to be supplied are quite scattered, the Trust 
is convinced that hand pumps are the best solution, provided that 
planning, implementation and maintenance of the facilities is decentrali-
sed to the local level and the beneficiaries are actively involved in the 
process. As seen above, Jal Nigam itself regards the non-responsibility 
felt by the villagers towards drinking-water facilities as one of the main 
obstacles to proper operation and maintenance of the installed facilities. 
Drinking water is certainly not the only sector in which Kassar Trust 
(KT) is active. In contrast to the other NGDO projects discussed in this 
chapter, however, drinking water was the first activity to be undertaken 
by Kassar Trust and still forms one of the most important aspects of the 
Trust's work. Since its inception in the mid-1980s, the KT programme 
has been broadened to cover activities in the field of latrines, balwadis 
(kindergartens), polyhouses, plantations and solar lights with the long-
term objective of contributing to environmental protection and 
improvement of the Himalayan eco-system.164 The programme of 
Kassar Trust can be divided into a technical (construction) part and a 
non-technical (organisation and awareness-building) part. The latter is 
ultimately aimed at imparting the skills and knowledge to the target 
group necessary for them to take over the activities and programme in 
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the future without the supervision of Kassar Trust. Self-reliant people's 
organisations capable of independently striving towards development are 
thus the goal of the KT strategy. 
A central role in the KT strategy is dedicated to the so-called samitis 
(people's organisations) which are seen as the backbone of the 
programme. The samitis are a vehicle for interaction between the people 
and Kassar Trust but should also lead to the establishment of 'local level 
samitis that can understand some of the environmental problems, and 
who can then take up some effective local action in their villages.'165 
Participation of the members of the target group in these samitis and in 
the implementation of the programme is conceived as essential. Only 
through such participation can the problems of the people be made 
visible and solutions be sought. Such participation should also lead to 
the proper maintenance of the facilities provided under the programme. 
The funds for the Kassar Trust programme come from foreign as well 
as domestic sources. The latter can be divided into governmental aid, 
assistance from non-govemmental sources and contributions (in labour 
and cash) from the target group. The former includes ICCO and 
Christian Aid (CA). ICCO has been financing KT since 1988 while CA 
started funding as early as 1985. Between January 1990 and March 
1993, some 41% of the total expenditure under the programme came 
from domestic sources while 59% came from ICCO/CA. With the 
expansion of the KT programme (in number and kind of activities as 
well as in number of people covered), the expenditures have also 
increased. ICCO/ CA provide programme support to Kassar Trust in the 
sense that the total programme is funded and not separate parts. The 
relations between Kassar Trust and ICCO are not flawless, but not 
particularly problematic either. Discussions between the two 
organisations have been held with regard to: the involvement of women 
in the organisation as well as in the programme (all of the trained Jal 
Karmis are men), the number of trustees and the strategy of Kassar 
Trust towards the samitis. 
Findings 
Between 1987 and 1993, a total of 46 hand pumps, 22 gravity schemes, 
10 liftpumps, and 18 rainwater harvesting structures were installed under 
the programme of Kassar Trust. In providing drinking water, Kassar 
Trust aims at a double objective: (1) effectively combatting 'intestinal 
parasitical infection and other water-borne diseases from which the 
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people [...] are suffering' (see above) and (2) partly reducing 'the heavy 
burden on the women of collecting water from great distances.'166 Any 
assessment of the drinking-water activities of Kassar Trust must 
therefore examine (1) the distance to the source; (2) the quantity of 
(drinking) water available; and (3) the quality of the drinking water.167 
The actual use of the facilities must also be taken into account, along 
with the maintenance of the facilities. 
In Kassar Trust's programme, the installation of hand pumps (and to a 
lesser extent of lift pumps with tanks) is determined first of all by the 
availability of underground resources for tapping.168 As a consequence, 
the hand pumps are not necessarily situated closer to the habitations than 
the older traditional sources of water. According to the information 
available on the hand pumps/lift schemes in the village of Mankote, 
however, these schemes provide water nearer to the habitations than the 
previous sources. The water sources in this village have been 
constructed in the vicinity of the primary users and have therefore 
improved not only the quantity of available water but also the distance 
to the water source. The previous water sources consisted of six naulas 
at a distance of more than one kilometre for at least some of the 
households. The two hand pumps, three gravity schemes and one lift 
scheme all provide water at much closer ranges.169 The number of 
households using each facility ranges from 1 to 35 in the dry season. 
The quantity of water available has improved for Mankote village, with 
a discharge in the dry season of between 300 litres and more than 2,000 
litres per day.170 This, however, does not mean an end to the quantity 
problems in the village. According to one of the Mankote-samiti 
members, there is still a quantity problem in the dry season. 
Improvements in the distance to the source (and thus in the time 
needed by women to fetch water) also depend on the type of source 
constructed. Hand pumps may be situated at an even greater distance 
than the traditional sources, but the possibilities for decreasing this 
distance are much greater for gravity schemes as the water is collected 
in a tank. The improvement in distance to the source in the case of lift 
schemes is yet another story. Most of the lift schemes must be operated 
manually and the pump itself can be situated at some distance from the 
habitations. The tank in which the water is collected may nevertheless 
be nearer to the habitations of the users and thereby save on the load to 
be carried. The activities of the Trust in the field of rainwater harvesting 
from roofs should again decrease the fetching workload as the collection 
tanks are (necessarily) situated adjacent to the houses. The water from 
these tanks is not regarded as safe for drinking (and also not meant for 
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such use). Considering the fact that about 90% of the water collected is 
used for purposes other than drinking, these rainwater-harvesting 
structures should lead to a substantial reduction in the time needed to 
fetch water for daily uses. 
As already noted, the quality of water is also important. According to 
Kassar Trust, the advantage of hand pumps over the traditional drinking-
water sources (i.e., naulas) is that the hand pumps: (1) intercept deeper 
seepages; (2) allow water to be collected during a full 24 hours; and (3) 
protect the water from surface contamination. The safety of the drinking 
water is also, of course, determined by the proper handling of the water 
by the people after it has been pumped. In addition, the quality of the 
drinking water from the hand pumps provided by Kassar Trust has yet 
to be documented. For this reason, Kassar Trust — in cooperation with 
the Sanjay Gandhi Post-Graduate Institute of Medical Sciences - has 
'initiated a joint programme [...] for monitoring the water quality from 
all sources in selected villages in a pilot study region and relating that to 
the incidence of water- borne diseases among the users.'171 
Unfortunately, this study has only recently started. 
Other data on the incidence of disease in relation to drinking water 
are hard to come by and largely nonexistent. The hospital does not 
consider the water provided by the piped schemes of the government to 
be safe and does not, thus, consider the schemes a legitimate means of 
combatting water-bome diseases. The reasons for this are as follows. (1) 
The piped schemes are designed for a specific number of people, but by 
the time they are installed the number of people may be much greater. 
(2) Many of the schemes are old which leads to breakages and thus 
contamination of the water. (3) The water is not always purified before 
it is made available to the people. The hand pumps provided by Kassar 
Trust, in contrast, are regarded as providing safe drinking water because 
(1) the water is filtered through sand and stone, and (2) no organism can 
presumably grow in the water in the darkness underground and thereby 
cause diseases. 
All of the drinking-water facilities constructed under the KT program-
me were functioning at the time of this study. The cleaning of the hand 
pumps (and the platforms) is being done by the beneficiaries. 
Discussions revealed direct beneficiaries to feel responsible for the hand 
pump because they contributed to the installation of the facility. The use 
of the hand pumps is also restricted to those families having directly 
contributed (in cash and/or labour) to their construction. In the village of 
Simtoli, for instance, a hand pump was installed in June 1992 near the 
house of four families who took the initiative by requesting assistance 
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from Kassar Trast. These four families all contributed in labour and cash 
to the installation while around 10 other families, living some distance 
from the hand pump site, contributed in labour. In the wet season, the 
hand pump is used mainly by the four families; in the dry season 
members of the other families also make use of it. In neighbouring 
Birtoli, the hand pump installed in September 1993 for five families is 
presently being used only by those families. On average, the number of 
families using one hand pump installed under the programme of Kassar 
Trust therefore remains well below the average number of people in a 
government hand pump scheme. 
Practically all of the villages in the target area for Kassar Trust 
consist of scattered houses. This makes it difficult to install a hand 
pump for all of the villagers without making the distance to the source a 
major problem for part of the village. In order to provide all of the 
villagers within a reasonable distance with water through a hand pump, 
more than one hand pump will have to be installed per village.172 This 
is quite possible under the programme of Kassar Trust as the installation 
of a hand pump (or any other drinking-water facility) does not depend 
on previously set targets per village but on requests from (groups of) 
households and their willingness to contribute in cash and labour to the 
construction. In the gram sabha Deoli in Bageshwar block, different 
drinking-water facilities have been installed since 1988: one hand pump, 
two gravity schemes and two lift pumps. The same holds for about eight 
other gram sabhas where Kassar Trust has been active. 
The relatively low number of households using a hand pump, gravity 
scheme or lift pump when compared to the government schemes in the 
plains appears to be due to the specific geographical circumstances in 
the area and the strategy followed by the Trust. Comparison of the costs 
of a hand pump in relation to the number of people using the facility in 
the Kassar Trust programme and in a government scheme shows the 
hand pumps installed under the KT programme to be (much) more 
expensive. In the Kassar Trust programme, the total costs amount to Rs. 
15,000-20,000 depending on the distance from the road and the depth of 
the well (among other things).173 For a hand pump under a govern-
ment scheme in the plains of Uttar Pradesh, the costs are approximately 
Rs. 13,000.174 It is perhaps more important to look at the possibilities 
for maintenance and proper operation. In Kassar Trust's case, there is as 
yet no experience with major breakdowns of hand pumps and other 
drinking-water facilities in part because most of the hand pumps have 
been installed relatively recently and the number of people using a 
single facility is relatively low. The beneficiaries also clearly feel 
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responsible for the hand pumps, however. The fact that local people 
have been trained by Kassar Trust as Jal Karmis creates an informal 
system of maintenance in which people can contact one of the Jal 
Karmis when needed.175 
Kassar Trust is also involved in the construction of latrines. Between 
1989 (when Kassar Trust initiated a latrine programme) and December 
1993, a total of 321 latrines have been constructed. As these latrines are 
regarded as an individual family asset (not even brothers and sisters 
living next door are allowed to use the latrine), a total of 321 families 
have been assisted. Taking an average of five people per household, this 
leads to some 1,600 people now using latrines through the KT program-
me. Sanitation is seen by the Trust as a major programme directly linked 
to drinking water and aimed at improving the health condition of the 
people. 'Due to the paucity of water on upper slopes and the extremely 
small size of the sources tapped (often of the order of half a litre per 
minute - too small to be considered by conventional methods) and the 
fact that open defecation usually takes place near water if possible, 
contamination of the sources often occurs.'176 Women now have to go 
far from the village to defecate (often before daybreak), due to the 
shrinking forests. 
The installation of latrines also helps decrease the distance to be 
travelled by people for their daily toilet. Whether these latrines also 
contribute to a better health-position is almost impossible to determine. 
The people themselves were convinced that the building of latrines 
positively affected their health situation but no hard evidence could be 
found. Comfort or convenience is probably the major reason for people 
deciding to construct a latrine. Other reasons were the bad smell due to 
open defecation and such natural dangers as snakes. No space for a 
latrine and money problems are the reasons most frequently mentioned 
for not constructing a latrine. Money, however, seems to be the major 
reason. 
Although in Kassar Trust's calculations a latrine should cost around 
Rs. 3,000, the people in the working area of Mankote-samiti spend 
between Rs. 3,000 and Rs. 16,000 for a latrine.177 Many of them 
exceed the calculation made by the Trust because they contract the work 
out. This also seems to be the case within the government programmes 
for latrine building, which has led to the critique that the money 
provided by the Trust and the government is insufficient to build a 
proper latrine. The question then becomes whether the latrine pro-
gramme of the Trust is eligible for families with the lowest incomes or 
not. Although the calculations of the Trust appear to take the people's 
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own contribution into account, in practise the more educated and 
wealthier families mainly go for a latrine. Such an undertaking by the 
more educated and wealthier families may also create the feeling that 
building latrines is expensive. 
Theoretically, participation by the target group in the activities sup-
ported by Kassar Trust is assured by the general rules that (1) no 
activities are undertaken unless the people ask for them, and (2) the 
beneficiaries must contribute (in cash and/or in labour) to implementa-
tion. Participation in samitis, however, is something completely 
different. Over the years, a total of eight different samitis have been 
formed under the KT programme. Of these, four samitis are regarded by 
Kassar Trust as active local-level organisations. Nevertheless some 
remarks are in place with regard to 'active' as well as 'local level.' 
Kassar Trust presently works with only Sorag (Kapkote block), Jolgaon 
and Mankote samitis (Bageshwar block). These samitis, with the 
possible exception of the Sorag samiti, are not people's organisations; 
they consist, rather, of only one (in case of Jolgaon) or two (Mankote) 
individuals who are either the founder of the samiti (Jolgaon) or trained 
Jal Karmis (Mankote). 
The involvement of the communities in these samitis is either very 
restricted or non-existent. The strength of a samiti is measured on the 
basis of the activities undertaken and the number of members trained as 
Jal Karmis. Of the 16 people from the various samitis trained as Jal 
Karmis over the years, only four are regarded as effective from an 
organisational perspective (with 13 regarded as technically effective). 
These four are from the Mankote and Sorag samitis. With regard to the 
activities undertaken by the samitis, these two samitis are clearly the 
most important ones. Of the hand pumps constructed between 1987 and 
1993, 74% were installed by Mankote samiti and 15% by Sorag; the 
percentages in the case of latrines are 44% and 12% respectively.178 
The organisational and awareness activities under the KT programme 
have also been restricted to the areas of these two samitis, moreover. 
Conclusion 
The drinking-water/sanitation facilities provided through the programme 
of Kassar Trust are all being used. Up to now, maintenance has been 
taken care of by the people themselves in close cooperation with the Jal 
Karmis. The increase in the quantity of water is difficult to assess, just 
as the quality of the water. The installed hand pumps and other pumps 
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have to a certain extent increased the availability of water, particularly 
in the dry season when a greater number of families makes use of them. 
Two options are prevalent with regard to the quality of the water via the 
Kassar Trust's hand pump. The first, as expressed by Jal Nigam, states 
that the hand pumps do not provide safe water. The second, expressed 
by the Trust itself and the hospital in Bageshwar, states that the water 
from these hand pumps is not only safe to drink but even safer than the 
water from the piped schemes of the government. Until more data have 
been gathered by the Sanjay Gandhi Post-Graduate Institute of Medical 
Sciences, no definite answer can be given to the quality question. 
An assessment of the relation between improvements in water supply 
and health is equally difficult to make. Interviews with people in the 
villages around Mankote did not provide a clear answer to the question 
whether diseases occur less or more often nowadays. Whether a change 
in the health situation could be linked to a change in the water and 
sanitation situation was even more difficult to assess. This is mainly 
because the people are not always aware of the link between, for 
instance, an improvement in the quantity and quality of water and 
improvements in health. Other developments such as improved medical 
care may also take place and thereby obscure a clear link between 
water/sanitation and health. 
The main conclusion with regard to the participation of the target 
group is that the people certainly make financial contributions, labour 
contributions and participate in decision-making. Participation in the 
people's organisations or samitis is restricted to only a handful of 
people, however. There are as yet no people's organisations capable of 
taking up activities on their own. As such, the Trust has not yet 
succeeded in its primary objective. With regard to the specific activities 
of Kassar Trust, one can wonder whether closer cooperation between the 
families in a village is really necessary when most of the activities are 
meant for only one or a few families. In light of the Trust's main 
objective (i.e., the environment), the necessity of such cooperation and 
thus the people's organisations becomes more obvious. With these goals 
in mind, awareness and organisational activities will have to play a more 
prominent role in the programme of Kassar Trust. 
To summarise: The activities of Kassar Trust have somewhat 
improved the availability of water meant for drinking purposes. This has 
been done by installing hand pumps in a region where the installation of 
hand pumps was previously considered impossible. The hand pumps are 
all being used and are well maintained. This is not so much the result of 
an increased awareness of the health-water relationship as, firstly and 
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foremostly, the people in principal being the owners of the hand pump. 
The specific geographical circumstances of the hills combined with the 
scattered locations of the habitats make the installation of such hand 
pumps a relatively expensive enterprise. Although the Trust has not as 
yet provided a system for (breakdown) maintenance, the feeling of 
ownership among the people together with the training of the local Jal 
Karmis have provided sufficient back-up for proper (preventive) mainte-
nance. In the future, the Trust will have to pay greater attention to the 
level of maintenance. As the hand pumps can be considered small 
groups or privately owned, attention will have to be paid to these 
different groups and not so much to the formation of Jal Samitis at the 
village level. The formation of these samitis, however, remains 
important in light of the ultimate goals of the Trust. 
4.3.5 Youth Charitable Organisation 
In the coastal area of Andhra Pradesh, as in Vishakhapatnam (Vizag) 
district, brackiness of the drinking water is quite common. Coupled to a 
drying up of the water sources in the summer period, this brackiness 
makes the availability of drinking water a real problem in this area. 
Many hand pumps and open wells have been constructed over the years 
but cannot be used for drinking purposes. Nevertheless the water from 
these sources is not wasted as it is often used for cleaning, washing and 
bathing purposes. It is also quite common for people in this area to use 
more than one source of water. As good drinking water is a scarce item, 
it is also quite common for people to walk long distances to fetch such 
water. As it is the task of the women to fetch this water in almost all 
families,179 an improvement in the availability of drinking water has to 
be advantageous to women in particular. Improving such availability, 
however, is not an easy task as the activities of YCO have demonstra-
ted. 
In 1981, a few unemployed youth in the town of Yellamanchili 
founded the Youth Charitable Organisation with the long-term objective 
of 'improving the living conditions of rural poor by helping them to 
identify their problems, to organise themselves and to find solutions to 
attain a better socio-economic and health status.''80 In its first year, the 
organisation worked in four villages. Two years later, its activities were 
expanded to 15 villages and, in 1985, another 15 villages were added. 
No new communities/villages have officially been taken up since then, 
although project proposals forwarded to ICCO and Christian Aid have 
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frequently shown the eagerness of YCO to expand its working area.181 
YCO states that it does not work along caste lines. Part of the activities 
are intended for the entire target village while the economic activities 
are directed at the economically poorer sections of these communities 
(irrespective of caste). Scheduled Tribes do not form part of YCO's 
programme for the simple reason that there are hardly any tribals in the 
working area of this NGDO. Scheduled Castes form some 9% of the 
total population in the 30 relevant villages. With the exception of the 
cultural diversity of the target group, the area targeted by YCO is 
comparable to the other areas in the district and state with some minor 
differences.182 
The YCO programme consists of three parts: (1) a community-
development programme; (2) an economic programme; and (3) other 
programmes. The community-development programme, which is meant 
for the entire village,183 includes non-formal education, community 
health, community services, human resource development (i.e., training 
of staff members, animators, health workers) and organisation of the 
target group into Mahila Mandais, Youth Associations and Village 
Development Committees. These activities form the core of the YCO 
programme as they are intended to provide the means (awareness, 
education and organisation) for the initiation and implementation of 
other activities. The economic programme is, in quantitative terms, the 
most important part of the total YCO programme. The main objective 
here is to provide (additional) income to members of the target group. 
The activities range from the agro-forestry programme via water 
resource development (irrigation) to animal husbandry, and government 
funds are used in many of these activities. The other YCO programmes 
include housing and cyclone relief/rehabilitation which covers the 
building of cyclone shelters.184 
Drinking water falls under community services and is as such part of 
the community-development programme. The same holds for sanitation. 
As discussed earlier, drinking water and sanitation are closely related to 
health. In addition to the activities of YCO in the field of the construc-
tion of drinking-water sources, it is therefore important to consider their 
health programme as well. Attention to health, being one of the primary 
activities of YCO, mainly manifests itself in non-formal education 
activities and the activities grouped under the heading of community-
health programmes. Whereas the former includes such items as literacy, 
stimulation of social thinking and basic knowledge of — for instance — 
health and hygiene, the latter includes activities in the field of preventive 
health, immunisation, public and personal hygiene and sanitation.185 
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With regard to the relation between health, drinking water and sanita-
tion, YCO is primarily active on the educational front. Any assessment 
of the YCO programme in this field must therefore consider the 
knowledge and behaviour of the target population.186 
YCO is already an old acquaintance of ICCO which has been funding 
the YCO programme since October 1986. Up to March 1992, a total of 
eight project agreements were signed between YCO and ICCO for a 
total of some Dfl. 600,000. Up to 1989, different parts of YCO's 
programme have been financed through separate project agreements. 
Under the rubric of community development, three components (i.e., 
health, education and social forestry) were combined into a single 
project agreement for the period January 1990-June 1991. In the meanti-
me, the German donor EZE has been the main funding agency for YCO 
activities in the field of water resource development and housing. Since 
1992, ICCO and EZE have joined together to finance the YCO program-
me and the NGDO has continued to successfully tap many other funding 
sources (both domestic and foreign).187 The relationship between 
ICCO and YCO has not been without its problems, centred around the 
growth of the organisation, the liberation of the village committees, 
participation of women in the planning and implementation of the pro-
grammes, the staff and management of YCO, the impact of the YCO 
activities in light of its objective and the project approach as a result of 
no clear development philosophy. 
Findings 
In YCO's target area, open wells are the main source of (drinking) 
water, followed by hand pumps. There are more open wells than hand 
pumps, and YCO (in the construction part of its drinking-water 
programme) has devoted more attention to the former than to the latter. 
According to the 1991 YCO Evaluation Report, the organisation has 
been involved in the construction of 20 open wells, 6 borewells, 4 tanks 
and one piped scheme in 15 villages. Funds for these works, with the 
exception of the piped scheme (see below), have come from the govern-
ment.188 Drinking water is certainly not one of the more important 
parts of YCO's programme. Between 1985 and 1991, only 6.6% of the 
total expenditure went to the construction of drinking-water facilities. 
Although the working condition of the installed facilities was found to 
be either 'good' or 'satisfactory' in 1991, this was not the case in 1994. 
The piped scheme in the village of Govindapalem never once functioned 
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Box 4 3 Piped water scheme m Govindapalem village 
Govindapalem, a small village near the coast, suffers from a lack of fresh water 
All of the water sources in the village provide salt water, and people have to walk 
some 2 kilometres for fresh water In order to improve this situation, an 
agreement was reached between the Gram Panchayat on the one hand and YCO 
and the committees set up in the village for the installation of a piped scheme, on 
the other hand According to this agreement, YCO would take responsibility for 
the distribution system (pipes, GLSR) together with members of its target group 
and the Gram Panchayat would be responsible for getting electricity to pump the 
water to the village 
The villagers were paid by YCO for laying the pipes and building the GLSR, 
they also contributed one day's labour free (shramdan) After completion of the 
construction, it turned out that Rs 200,000 would be needed by the Electricity 
Board for providing a connection to the wells As the Gram Panchayat was not in 
a position to provide such a sum, a diesel motor was considered as an alternative 
Before a decision could be made, the pipes were washed away in a 1990 cyclone 
This happened again in 1992 After repairing the distribution system for the 
second time, still no solution had been found for the electricity problem In 1994, 
the village was still not connected to the piped scheme " ' YCO is known to 
have paid a bribe of Rs 25,000 to the Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board for 
a connection which has still not materialised YCO is now contemplating the 
purchase of a diesel motor The intention is to fill the GLSR twice per day, which 
should provide sufficient drinking water for the village It is also planned to 
appoint a person in the village for operation of the pump and cleaning of the 
GLSR This person will be paid by the villagers (Rs 1 per family per month, 
which means a total of Rs 700 per month) 
The history of the piped-water scheme in Govindapalem shows people to be 
prepared to contribute in time and money to a project intended to solve one of the 
problems confronting them Although the project has not worked up to now, one 
can wonder about responsibility for this The State Electricity Board obviously 
views the required connection as unfavourable from an economic point of view, it 
can certainly be blamed for accepting a bribe and also for no further response 
Constructing a piped system without being certain of the necessary power supply, 
however, is also not good policy Although the duration of the project could 
easily lead to disillusioned villagers, this does not seem to be the case in 
Govindapalem, which again shows the necessity felt by the villagers for 
construction of such a piped scheme. 
(see Box 4.3). Several of the other facilities were no longer functioning, 
including the three wells in Rajakoduru village.190 Of these wells 
constructed alongside a tank (which was cleaned once with financial 
assistance of YCO), one provides only salt water, one had only a layer 
of water at the time of the visit and one was completely dry. Although 
there have been plans to deepen the latter well (which according to the 
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villagers provides the best water), this has not been done up to now. 
Moreover, the bundth of the tank is broken. 
In the eyes of many of the respondents, the problem of available 
(drinking) water can easily be solved by the simple construction of yet 
another open well or hand pump. Depending on the water situation in a 
particular village, the people may also opt for a piped scheme. This is, 
for instance, the case in Krishnampuram and Gobburapalem where the 
salinity of the water is a major problem. The new facilities should be in-
stalled by either the government or by YCO, although there is no indi-
cation that the villagers are very successful with either of these two 
potential financiers. Moreover, there are very few Youth Associations or 
Village Development Committees and the Mahila Mandais seem to 
restrict their activities to saving (see below). Pressure from such com-
mittees on the sarpanch or government bureaucracy for the installation 
of (drinking) water sources is therefore rare. Although villagers in, for 
instance, Rajakoduru claim that the sarpanch has brought the water 
situation of the village to the attention of the relevant government 
departments on several occasions, nothing has happened up to now and 
a wait-and-see attitude has therefore been fostered. 
The construction activities of YCO are also restricted in the field of 
sanitation.191 None of the YCO target group has a sanitary latrine, 
although there are some community latrines. Most of the latter latrines 
are hardly, if ever, used by members of the community, moreover."2 
The majority of the target group (67% / N=189) has never considered 
building a private latrine. Most of the people consider a latrine too 
expensive (73% / N=122), while nearly 28% does not feel the need for a 
latrine and 11% never even thought about building one. Although nearly 
80% of the respondents can name one or more diseases common in their 
communities, unsanitary conditions are never once mentioned when 
asked about the causes of such communicable diseases as diarrhoea, 
dysentery and worms. 
The sanitary conditions around the water points are nevertheless better 
than in many of the other areas visited during the course of this 
research. Waterlogging seems to occur as a result of ineffective or 
simply no drains, but this waterlogging does not seem to lead to a 
situation in which one has to 'swim to reach the source.' As (drinking) 
water is a relatively scarce item in the area, people are less inclined to 
spill water. In addition, nearly 54% (N=102) of the YCO target group 
stated that they were (sometimes) involved in cleaning work around the 
water points. Nearly 25% has never been engaged in sanitary activities 
related to water supply. Smaller numbers of villagers indicated that they 
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would never wash clothes near the water source, that bleaching powder 
was added (regularly) by the panchayat or YCO, and/or that they 
themselves filter or boil the water prior to consumption. Members of the 
mahila mandai were reportedly involved in the cleaning of water sources 
in only one village. 
In contrast to the unsanitary conditions, the lack of safe drinking 
water is mentioned by the majority of the respondents as a clear cause 
of the aforementioned communicable diseases (next to mosquitos and 
lack of good food).193 The same pattern can be detected in the reasons 
mentioned for changes in the health situation of the families. Most of 
the respondents (78% / N=194) saw a change in the frequency of 
disease for their family. For the majority (74% / N=152), a positive 
change was observed in the sense that diseases occurred less often than 
a few years prior. A lower disease frequency is, according to most of 
the respondents, due to an improved water situation. Only eight 
respondents attribute less disease to greater knowledge in the field of 
health while a general improvement in health care is viewed by 18% of 
the respondents as the main reason for less disease and better food as 
the main reason by 10% of the respondents. 
That a better (i.e., safer) water supply is seen as the cause of less 
disease is hard to reconcile with the fact that only less than half of the 
target group uses a hand pump as a source of water. More than 90% 
(also) uses an open well, while seven families state that they use a river 
as a source of water. The number of people saying that they (also) use a 
hand pump for drinking and cooking purposes is very restricted: only 
7% of the target group cited a hand pump as a source of drinking water 
and another 7% cited a hand pump in addition to other sources (i.e., 
mainly an open well) for this purpose. There is no difference in the 
perceptions of the frequency of diseases for those who use a hand pump 
for drinking/cooking purposes and those who do not. 
There is at least one clear reason for the relatively low number of 
people using a hand pump for drinking and cooking purposes: many of 
the hand pumps provide salt water unfit for human consumption. Even 
in cases where the water from the hand pump is fit for human 
consumption, however, many of the people still do not use the water for 
drinking and cooking purposes. When use is made of a hand pump 
(nearly all of which have been installed in the last 10-15 years), the 
main reason for switching from the old sources has been convenience 
(i.e., distance to the water point) followed by the provision of safer 
water by the hand pump. Distance to the source is thus more important 
than the alleged safety of the water. 
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Hand pumps are prone to break down: 68% of the respondents using 
a hand pump reported the facility to be regularly out of order. 
Breakdowns, lasting on average of three weeks, are mainly taken care of 
by the government. Only in a few cases have the villagers either fixed 
the hand pump themselves or employed an outside technician. In case of 
a breakdown, the target group switches en masse to open wells and only 
a handful uses another hand pump. Hand pumps in the target villages 
have been installed under government schemes and therefore remain, in 
the eyes of the villagers, the responsibility of the government. Only a 
few respondents indicated involvement in the selection of the site for the 
hand pump (i.e., were asked whether they objected to a specific site). 
Even fewer families actually contributed to the installation of the hand 
pump.194 There is near uniformity in the treatment of the drinking 
water by the target group. Almost everybody covers the pots for the 
drinking water, and practically nobody uses a special instrument to 
remove the water for consumption. A simple cup is typically used which 
means that people dip their hands in the water and possibly contaminate 
the stored drinking water. 
The 1991 Evaluation Report did not address many of the issues raised 
by ICCO over the years, mainly because the report was very descriptive. 
Questions were also raised by ICCO and CA with regard to 'the manner 
of measuring the effectivity and impact, the efficiency and sustainability 
of activities, the strategy towards the target group, inclusive of the 
gender approach, the withdrawal strategy as well as the functioning of 
saving schemes and revolving funds.'19S On the basis of the present 
field research, it also became clear that some of the data provided in the 
Evaluation Report are somewhat or even far from the truth. This applies, 
for instance, to the committees set up in the villages under the YCO 
programme. As discussed above, these committees are meant to be the 
driving force towards a more self-reliant development process. 
According to the 1991 Report, in each of the 30 target villages Women 
Associations (Mahila Mandais), Youth Associations and Village 
Development Committees were formed and active. Visits to the villages 
and discussions with YCO staff members, however, revealed no Village 
Development Committees whatsoever, only 16 Youth Associations and 
at most 29 Mahila Mandais. The membership of the Youth Associations 
is also not the 9,000 reported in the Evaluation Report but around 880. 
Similarly, around 1,625 women are a member of the Mahila Mandais 
(and not the 10,595 women stated in the Report). The extent to which 
these committees are active in the sense meant by YCO remains unclear. 
Part of the Mahila Mandais are restricted to saving groups.196 
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Considering the shortcomings of this Evaluation Report, it appears to 
have - as expressed by an ICCO staff member after visiting YCO in 
1991 - mainly a legitimising function. Although YCO claims to be 
working with/for the entire village, this is clearly not the case in 
practice. Not only the ineffectiveness of the committees set up in the 
respective villages but also the restricted Mahila Mandai memberships 
indicate this. When asked whether they have benefitted from any of the 
YCO activities, more than 30% of the respondents answered negative-
ly.197 Loans by YCO for income-generating activities (mainly buffalos) 
score highest among the activities providing some benefit for the target 
group, followed by (non-formal) education, savings (through Mahila 
Mandais), balwadis (kindergarten), loans for housing construction or 
improvement and health activities.198 The activities of YCO in the 
field of drinking water were mentioned as beneficial by 13% of the 
respondents, despite the fact that the piped-water supply has never 
functioned in one village and the open well constructed in another 
village provides salt water.199 
Taking the benefitted-or-not as the point of departure, an examination 
of the attitudes and behaviour of the target group with regard to drinking 
water and sanitation shows the group claiming some benefit to have 
greater knowledge of and a more positive attitude towards drinking 
water, sanitation and their relation to health. With regard to the causes 
for some of the most common diseases in the villages (e.g., diarrhoea, 
dysentery, worms), 66% of the group claiming some benefit mentioned 
water as one of the causes of these diseases while 46% of those 
claiming no benefit mentioned water. The former group also made more 
use of hand pumps (51% as opposed to 40%), and a larger percentage 
used only a hand pump for drinking purposes. The only respondent to 
report using a ladle to remove drinking water from the storage 
containers was also found in the group claiming some benefit. This 
group was also more interested in a latrine. Whereas nearly 35% of the 
non-direct or non-benefit target group considered a latrine unnecessary, 
this percentage was found to be only 11% in the case of the direct or 
benefitted target group. 
Conclusion 
If health, water and sanitation related issues are part of the YCO (educa-
tional) programme and only those families who participated in the 
(educational) programme are found to say they benefitted from the 
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activities of YCO, then the above data indicate that the educational 
activities of YCO in the field of drinking water, sanitation and health 
were at least partially successful. Those exposed to the activities of the 
NGO in this field show a slightly different (and more perceptive) 
attitude than those who did not participate. With regard to the 
construction activities in the field of drinking water (as mentioned, no 
such activities were undertaken in the field of latrines by YCO), the 
organisation seems to be less successful. The functioning of the facilities 
and the use made of the water-supply facilities provided under YCO's 
programme appear to be guided firstly by the specific environmental and 
ecological circumstances in the area and secondly by (maintenance) 
failures inherent in the programme itself. 
With regard to the latter, it was already recommended in the 
Evaluation Report in 1991 that greater attention be paid to the training 
of villagers in (preventive and breakdown) maintenance of water points, 
but no activities have been undertaken up to now. There is also no 
institutionalised attention to the establishment of village committees with 
drinking water and sanitation as their prime responsibility. This is partly 
due to the preoccupation with more economically-oriented activities in 
the YCO programme but also to the general failure of the organisation 
to establish strong, active and self-reliant village committees (whether 
women's groups, youth clubs or village development committees), which 
contributes negatively to developing the own capacity of the target 
group in solving problems in the field of drinking water and sanitation. 
This absence seems to be worsened by the tendency of YCO to opt for a 
strategy of splendid isolation. The organisation tries to minimise the use 
of funds from outside in order to minimise interference from outside 
agencies.200 Also in approaching the target group, YCO has been slow 
to move to a situation in which the villagers are stimulated to follow the 
same path. Given strong and independently operating village-level 
organisations, such a strategy could possibly pay off. However, as there 
are no such organisations as yet, it seems more likely that the isolation 
strategy will mean only greater dependency of the target group on YCO. 
4.4 Drinking water and sanitation: A comparative evaluation 
At the end of the 1980s, when officially 75% of the rural population had 
access to safe drinking water and 2.4% had access to sanitation,201 
UNICEF concluded that Indian women spent between 1.2 and 3.5 hours 
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per day collecting water for household purposes. It was simultaneously 
concluded that a large majority of the Indians are unaware of the 
relationship between bad drinking water and bad health, and that two-
thirds regarded public hand pumps to be what the word public many 
times refers to: property of the government.202 At the same time, the 
general policy of the Indian government called for greater participation 
of the people in the planning and implementation of development 
programmes and activities with a view to enhancing the ownership and 
thereby reducing the costs for operation and maintenance for the 
government. 
The necessity of involving the target group in the projects (and 
thereby paying attention to health education and group formation) was 
already pointed out by the IOV in the early 1980s (and confirmed at the 
end of that decade in official policy documents for the sector). It 
nevertheless took until the second half of the 1980s for the so-called 
software aspects of drinking water and sanitation to be taken up more 
frequently. The DGIS drinking-water and sanitation projects in India 
were technically oriented and therefore subject to the familiar critique 
voiced in the many reports issued during the International Drinking-
Water Supply and Sanitation Decade: The projects were founded on an 
engineering approach in which the provision of water was perceived as a 
technical problem and thus resulted in the marginalisation of the target 
group with regard to planning, implementation, operation and mainten-
ance.203 The integration of the software aspects was directed firstly at 
better utilisation of the facilities provided and secondly at better 
maintenance of these facilities. Within some of the projects (notably SP-
VI), the non-technical aspects were also more clearly directed at the 
general rural-development process. In effect, DGIS has tried to raise 
their activities in the field of drinking-water supply and sanitation to a 
higher level by integrating the construction activities with activities in 
the field of community participation, health education and income 
generation and using this as a possible entry point for the rural 
development process. 
In contrast, ICCO takes the rural development process as its point of 
departure and emphasises participation, education and organisation right 
from the beginning. Drinking-water and sanitation activities can be but 
need not be part of the overall development strategy of the 
implementing NGDO.204 The fact that ICCO funds have been used by 
many counterpart NGDOs in India for mainly educational and 
organisational activities and not so much for the construction of 
drinking-water and sanitation facilities reflects this underlying emphasis. 
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Given such an emphasis, moreover, the activities of ICCO counterparts 
in the field of drinking-water supply and sanitation can be expected to 
contain at least some of the elements of a participatory approach and 
thus be better equipped than government projects to deal with the 
problems encountered in water supply: utilisation, operation/maintenance 
and sustainability. The question, of course, is whether such a 
presupposition is correct. Before turning to the major findings with 
regard to utilisation, maintenance and sustainability, it is necessary to 
take a closer look at the role of participation in the projects/activities 
financed by DGIS and ICCO in the field of drinking water and sanita­
tion (also see Annex 4 which contains some indicators of project 
performance based on the points of evaluation outlined in the Introduc­
tion). 
Participation in the DGIS projects was largely regarded as a means of 
securing better utilisation, operation and maintenance of the constructed 
facilities. This is particularly clear for the pilot project from SP-III, but 
also holds to a greater or lesser degree for the other projects as well. 
The target group was never involved in the preparatory phases for these 
projects, and only in the case of SP-V and SP-VI was the target group 
consulted with regard to, for instance, site selection. With the exception 
of SP-V, the target group was also not required to contribute (whether in 
kind or cash) to any of the facilities. Greater involvement of the target 
group was severely obstructed by the slow to change and basically 
negative attitude of the state water authorities towards participation, 
severe delays in the introduction of software aspects, a preoccupation 
with site selection and the checking of already installed facilities, a lack 
of funds and staff to cover the entire project area, a lack of coordination 
and monitoring of non-technical programme elements and/or difficulties 
in finding a suitable organisation for implementation of the non­
technical aspects of the programme. In effect, the activities under the 
umbrella of participation and education only contributed to better 
utilisation and maintenance in a very limited number of target villages. 
Participation as an end and thus the involvement and organisation of 
the target group with the aim of initiating a more general rural 
development process is only a recent phenomenon within the DGIS 
projects. Although АР-I was a pioneer project in this regard, the attempt 
failed miserably because of a lack of coordination and a haphazard 
implementation. In SP-VI, attempts to go above and beyond improv­
ement of the drinking-water situation only started in 1993 with the 
'expanded base for community participation.' Although the initial 
outcomes of this 'expanded base' appear to have increased interest 
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among the target group, the relatively small size of the activities 
undertaken may severely limit their impact. And the biggest obstacle to 
participation in rural drinking-water and sanitation projects in India is 
simply the fact that these projects are mainly implemented by state 
organisations consisting of engineers with little or no training in the 
social aspects of water provision. 
Within the ICCO projects, participation is taken to be an end in itself. 
For Kassar Trust and YCO, the major aim is to reach people's 
organisations capable of taking up their own development. This means 
attention should clearly be paid to awareness raising, education and 
organisation. The discussions of both projects/NGDOs nevertheless show 
the 'participation as an end' strategy to not be working. No people's 
organisations exist whatsoever in the Kassar Trust programme. YCO has 
set up such organisations in parts of its working area, but these 
organisations are not yet capable of taking up their own development. 
They largely depend on the NGDO, cover only a small part of the target 
population and are restricted in their activities. In practice, therefore, 
participation within the ICCO projects (in general and certainly with 
regard to activities in the field of drinking water and sanitation) is 
actually a means — a means for creating a feeling of ownership and, 
thus, better utilisation and maintenance of the facilities provided under 
the project. In contrast to DGIS projects, the target group in ICCO 
projects is expected to contribute either in cash or in kind (e.g., labour) 
which presumably fosters utilisation and maintenance. In the case of 
Kassar Trust, the target group is also expected to take the initiative with 
regard to the activities in the field of drinking water and sanitation. 
The differences with regard to the role of participation in the different 
projects clearly bear on the utilisation and maintenance of the facilities 
provided. Utilisation has been shown to depend on several criteria. 
Distance to the source remains one of the most important determinants 
together the availability of alternative sources for drinking water. The 
actual availability of water from the new facilities also largely deter­
mines the use made of these facilities. Many of the facilities provided 
under the projects are not used as extensively as was hoped for because 
the people are simply unaware of the health hazards associated with the 
old sources. This particularly holds for the АР-I project, where the 
traditional sources of drinking water are contaminated with excess 
fluoride, but also for open wells or shallow hand pumps in areas where 
the water is by definition a health hazard. The water from the deep hand 
pumps installed under several projects is thus safer. Finally, the extent to 
which the people are actually involved in the project has also been 
184 The same difference 
found to determine the utilisation level. Utilisation is the highest in those 
projects (or parts of projects) in which attention has been paid not only 
to health education but also participation. This accounts for drinking-
water facilities in the ECP villages under SP-VI, for sanitary latrines in 
SP-V and for drinking water and latrines in the Kassar Trust 
programme. 
The extent to which attention has been paid to participation (including 
education and group formation) is also of major importance for 
maintenance. The failure of the different software teams in the AP-I 
project, for instance, can be regarded as one of the major reasons for the 
virtual break down of the piped water supply system installed in the area 
around Darsi town. The maintenance of the hand pumps installed in SP­
UI was found to be somewhat better although this can be ascribed to the 
lack of alternative sources for drinking water rather than the activities in 
the areas of participation and the training of caretakers. Despite the 
general lack of such alternative sources of drinking water in the coastal 
areas of YCO, the feeling of ownership there is definitely less. In SP-VI, 
a marked difference could be observed between those villages on which 
the activities of the PSU were concentrated and those left mostly 
untouched by the organisation. In the former villages, the people were 
found to have a greater feeling of ownership and thus feel more 
responsible for their water supply. This leaves Kassar Trust where the 
people actually own the water point because they requested it and, more 
importantly, paid for it. This own individual contribution appears to be 
the single most important incentive for people to use and maintain new 
facilities and is underscored by the course of the various sanitation 
activities undertaken as well. Under АР-I, people were confronted with 
an organisation installing latrines which they did not request and did not 
contribute to. The outcome was clear: They only became interested after 
a slow process of motivation and only started using the latrines after 
making their own contribution. The majority of the latrines constructed 
under SP-V and under the Kassar Trust programme, in contrast, are 
intensively used because the beneficiaries had to pay to get them. It 
should be noted that sanitation has remained 'a neglected child' not only 
within the policy of the Indian government but also within the projects 
and programmes co-financed by DGIS and ICCO in India. 
A financial contribution from members of the target group — or more 
precisely: those members who will be using the facility — may be 
crucial for the creation of a feeling of ownership and thereby proper 
operation and maintenance but also extremely difficult to implement. 
This particularly holds for government projects, whether financed by 
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foreign aid or not, which are often used as leverage by politicians during 
elections and implemented by state water authorities with construction 
targets and thus a strong push for fast implementation. The large number 
of people covered by each project also raises questions with regard to 
the administration of the individual contribution and the generally 
greater diversity of the target group (e.g., castes, economic positions) 
within government projects covering entire villages. 
It is important to note that DGIS and ICCO both experience problems 
of insufficient staff and time. In the case of a project also aimed at a 
system for more easy participation and thus establishing the means for 
participation (e.g., awareness, organisation), these constraints become 
even more manifest. SP-VI is a clear example of this as the available 
staff and time were simply insufficient to reach the entire project area or 
even a substantial part of it. For АР-I, such problems were aggravated 
by the lack of a clear strategy and insufficient monitoring and guidance 
of the activities. With regard to YCO, the staff and time constraints 
mainly involve the large number of activities undertaken but also 
involve a lack of knowledge among the staff with regard to the 
implementation of activities in the areas of awareness raising and educa­
tion in particular. The latter also applies to the Kassar Trust programme 
although the situation there is quite unique if only because the staff is 
limited to the two directors and two part-time staff members. 
The ICCO and DGIS projects can also be compared with regard to 
the funds needed to install the facilities in relation to the utilisation of 
the same. Such cost-effectiveness, defined here as the costs per facility 
utilised, is nevertheless extremely difficult to calculate because of a lack 
of exact financial data. In DGIS projects, funds may come from 
different regular and non-regular budgets and also from other projects as 
in the case of АР-I. In ICCO projects, drinking water and sanitation are 
normally a part of the total programme of the NGDO and the financial 
reports are thus not specific enough. Calculation of that part of the 
expenditures devoted to organisation and education directed at drinking 
water or sanitation is virtually impossible. Considering the above, thus, 
we can only consider cost-effectiveness in more general terms. 
Rough calculation shows the investment costs per family under the 
Kassar Trust programme to be twice as high as the costs under SP-III 
and nearly four times as high as the costs under SP-VI. The piped-water 
scheme under АР-I, however, beats them all. The investment costs per 
family are just above those for the Kassar Trust programme, but 
utilisation is low which means extremely high costs. If the number of 
families actually using the constructed facilities is also taken into 
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consideration for SP-III and SP-VI, the investment costs rise but do not 
reach those for Kassar Trast. It should be noted that not all of the 
expenditures under a project (e.g., for software aspects) have been 
included in these investment costs. The costs for latrines under SP-V are 
not only much higher than for latrines constructed under DGIS projects 
in other parts of the country,205 but also much higher than for latrines 
constructed under the Kassar Trust programme. The Trust assumes the 
construction of a latrine to cost Rs. 3,000 although, as can be seen in 
section 4.3.4, these costs are likely to be (substantially) higher. The 
major difference between the latrines constructed under the Kassar Trust 
programme and those constructed under SP-V is thus not the costs but 
the fact that under SP-V the major part (up to 95%) is subsidised while 
the costs of latrines under Kassar Trust are for the most part carried by 
the beneficiaries themselves. 
Sustainability, defined as the capacity to continue the project after 
foreign funds have stopped, is relatively easy to evaluate. In essence, 
none of the projects discussed in this chapter will be able to continue 
after foreign funds have dried up. The only possible exception is YCO, 
which pays considerable attention to income-generating activities not 
only for the target group but also for YCO itself. Moreover, YCO has 
diversified its funds by using a larger number of donors and by using 
government funds to a certain extent. Kassar Trust has only recently 
undertaken such diversification and mainly from the government. 
The non-sustainability of the projects considered here particularly 
applies to the software aspects of the DGIS projects. Taken up at the 
instigation of DGIS but also totally financed by donor funds, the 
activities in the field of education, participation and organisation for 
such projects as АР-I and SP-VI will most certainly cease when DGIS 
withdraws. Although the principal implementing organisation for rural 
drinking water and sanitation in Andhra Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh (i.e., 
the water authorities) have somewhat changed their initially negative 
attitude towards these software aspects over the years, the DGIS projects 
have not succeeded in institutionalising these aspects within the water 
authorities. It can therefore be concluded that DGIS has created at best 
for some parts of some projects islands of better operation and 
maintenance. 
The sustainability of the projects is a critical determinant of their 
impact in the area of health. Similarly, the proper operation and 
maintenance of the facilities is also a critical determinant of their impact 
in the area of health. Major problems were experienced particularly by 
DGIS and YCO with regard to operation and maintenance. The lack of 
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attention in all of the projects to the proper handling of drinking water 
after being tapped and the failure of the target group to consistently use 
the improved drinking-water facilities further narrows the health impact 
of the projects. All in all, the effects of the drinking-water and sanitation 
projects on the health situation of the target group can be expected to be 
negligible. Only in those cases where some feeling of ownership has 
been created (i.e., in the Intensive Mobilisation Villages of SP-VI, the 
SP-V sanitation projects and among the beneficiaries of Kassar Trust) 
can better use and maintenance of the facilities be expected, greater 
awareness of the health-related aspects of drinking water and sanitation 
be observed and a generally greater impact on the health situation be 
achieved. Despite these restrictions, it is interesting to note that a large 
number of beneficiaries in all projects claim that the facilities 
constructed under the projects have had a positive effect on their health 
situation. The question, of course, is whether this feeling remains for an 
extended period or not. 
The question of whether the projects succeeded in reaching their 
target groups and the poor, in particular, still needs to be answered. It 
can be doubted whether the poor have been equally reached. Within AP-
I and SP-VI, for instance, certain pockets of the poor were initially 
missed. Only in a later phase of the project were those groups living 
outside the main village in separate hamlets provided with a water point. 
Within the Kassar Trust programme, the poor are unlikely to be the 
primary beneficiaries because the people must take the initiative 
themselves and also contribute themselves. And this certainly appears to 
be the case for the latrines constructed under the Kassar Trust pro-
gramme. The SP-V project seems to be more successful because it takes 
the economic situation of the beneficiary into consideration. In this case, 
however, the planned increase in the own contribution can cause poor 
families to withdraw from the project. In general, all of the projects 
appear to experience comparable problems in reaching the poorest 
sections of the population. This can be seen in the activities aimed at 
organisation with strong indications that none of the projects succeed in 
providing equal opportunities for the poor. 
To summarise: The drinking-water projects of DGIS and ICCO 
discussed in this chapter greatly vary with regard to the major indicators. 
At the same time, these projects show both ICCO and DGIS to 
experience extreme difficulties in reaching the poorest. Both 
organisations use participation as a means for enhancing O&M (contrary 
to the rhetoric of ICCO). The participation of the target population is in-
deed important for utilisation and maintenance of the facilities. Making 
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one's own individual contribution appears to create a feeling of 
ownership and thus a willingness on the part of the people to indeed 
maintain the drinking-water supply and sanitation facilities which is in 
line with the findings of a UNICEF survey in the late 1980s.206 
Utilisation and maintenance are not always determined by the extent to 
which the target group has been involved in the planning and 
implementation, however; the availability of alternative sources of 
drinking water also appears to play a major role and makes health 
education particularly important when it comes to more or less 'bad 
sources.' Maintenance is also determined by the extent to which the 
project has succeeded in organising the target group as illustrated by the 
effectiveness of the Intensive Mobilisation Villages under the SP-VI 
project. The general lack of attention to organisation of the target group, 
despite rhetoric to the opposite in the ICCO projects, is of importance 
when looking at the sustainability of the projects. With the possible 
exception of the YCO project, the projects discussed in this chapter are 
generally not sustainable and particularly with regard to the software 
activities. Finally, it is necessary to remark that water alone is not a 
sufficient 'point of entry' in a village and that activities in the field of 
drinking-water supply must be supplemented by other (preferably more 
economically-oriented) activities which again brings us to the need for 
an integrated approach. 
Irrigation 
The principle formula for irrigation is simple: water pumped up from 
underground or taken from rivers and streams is used to irrigate fields in 
order to increase agricultural production. Although technical changes 
(e.g., from manual to electric pumping) have altered the face of 
irrigation over the years, the formula remains more or less the same. At 
the same time, this formula appears to be of only minor importance in 
light of the problems faced all over the world in the development of 
irrigation. Providing irrigation is not simply a matter of construction, 
particularly when a number of farmers depend on the same source.1 
Irrigation alone is also insufficient for the attainment of increased 
agricultural production. In this chapter, some of the problems inherent to 
irrigation and the solutions sought for these problems are discussed. In 
doing this, a number of different projects financed by DGIS and ICCO 
in the field of irrigation in India will be described. 
The line of presentation in the previous chapter will also be followed 
here. The first section, thus, focuses on a description of developments in 
the policy and achievements in irrigation from the perspective of the 
Indian government. The irrigation policy of DGIS and ICCO and the 
main activities of these two donor agencies in this field in India are the 
subject of the next section. This is followed by a description and 
evaluation of five DGIS and ICCO projects. The chapter is then conclu-
ded with a comparison of the major findings of the evaluation in light of 
the policy developments presented in the first two sections and the two 
central issues of operation and maintenance, on the one hand, and 
utilisation of irrigation facilities and the importance of participation for 
this, on the other hand. 
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5.1 India: Problems, policy and achievements 
Over the last few decades, India has achieved major increases in 
agricultural production. The famines which haunted the country in, for 
instance, the 1960s seem to be something of the past. Major efforts in 
the field of irrigation contributed heavily to this agricultural success 
story although only a third of the agricultural land in India was irrigated 
in the early 1990s. Irrigation has been 'the key-note of agricultural 
development since the inception of planning'2 and thus the key-note in 
increasing agricultural production (also see Tables 1, 2 and 3 in Annex 3 
which shows some of the salient features of irrigated agriculture in 
India). The development of irrigation has also been aimed at creating 
employment directly through the undertaking of irrigation projects and 
indirectly through increased agricultural production. Irrigation can thus 
be regarded as part of the fight against economic poverty. According to 
the World Bank, 'water remains the most critical agricultural input 
which can raise labor demand and transform the production possibilities 
of even the smallest farm units.'3 
While 'maximilisation of the area under assured irrigation' continues 
to be regarded as 'the most important long term requirement for 
agricultural development,'4 it has always been clear to the Indian 
policy-makers that irrigation is not the only long-term requirement for 
agricultural development. It took, however, up to the 1980s before an 
integrated approach to irrigation in light of the objective of increasing 
agricultural production was brought forward as a concept in which next 
to the proper construction of irrigation works, operation and maintenance 
and organisation, a link was made with allied activities in the field of, 
for instance, seeds, fertilisers, pesticides, agricultural credit, marketing 
and extension services. In the following, the policy and programmes 
behind these efforts are briefly discussed and then the major problems 
encountered in constructing and utilising the irrigation facilities. 
Box 5.1 irrigation in India 
Within the Indian irrigation context, a differentiation has to be made between 
surface water and ground water, on the one hand, and between major, medium 
and minor projects, on the other. The dividing line between the latter three is 
formed by the Culturable Command Area: minor projects cover less than 2,000 
hectares, medium between 2,000 and 10,000 and major projects more than 10,000. 
Furthermore, major and medium irrigation projects use surface-water resources 
while minor projects mainly use ground-water resources but can also use surface 
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water Figure S 1 shows the major characteristics of this three-tier division in 
Indian irrigation 
The basic means for major surface water irrigation is diverting water from 
nearby rivers through canals to the area to be irrigated, either with or without 
construction of a storage reservoir for periods of water scarcity ' The same 
accounts for surface water use under minor irrigation but on a (much) smaller 
scale Lift irrigation schemes, diversion schemes and storage tanks are the main 
means of minor irrigation In the case of ground water being used as an irrigation 
source, all of the relevant schemes are minor irrigation schemes Open wells, 
pumpsets and a variety of tubewells (from shallow to deep and from hand-opera-
ted to diesel-powered) are the main irrigation facilities in this case 
Figure 5.1 
Characteristics of major, medium and minor irrigation 
Culturable Com- Surface water Ground water 
mand Area 
Major irrigation > 10,000 ha canal 
irrigation 
Medium irrigation 2,000 - 10,000 canal 
ha irrigation 
Minor irrigation < 2,000 ha lift irrigation tubewells 
tank irrigation open wells 
diversion pump sets 
schemes 
ha = hectare 
A major problem with many of the minor irrigation schemes remains the 
dependency on rainfall In years with a bad monsoon season, drying up of small 
streams, open wells and tanks is very likely Depleting ground-water levels can 
further decrease the water discharge from tubewells, a point already noted in the 
case of drinking water (see Chapter 4)6 In contrast, the organisational, technical 
and social complexity of large surface-water irrigation projects has led to many 
problems in major/medium projects in the past (see below) These schemes are 
also much more expensive and take longer to produce benefits when compared to 
minor irrigation projects In the eyes of the Indian government, large/medium 
projects not only utilise river water 'that would otherwise go to waste' but also 
benefit larger areas and give surer protection in years of scarcity Minor schemes 
cost much less, are faster to construct, tap more adequately into local resources 
and yield quicker results7 
The ultimate potential for irrigation development was thought to be some 82 
million hectares in the 1960s In the 1970s, new data raised this ultimate potential 
to 107 million, a few years later the figure was raised to 113 5 million hectares 
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with 55 million under minor irrigation and the remaining 58.5 million under 
major/medium irrigation.8 By the end of 1991-92, a total of 83.09 million 
hectares (or 73% of the ultimate potential identified) in India was brought under 
irrigation with 50.29 under minor and the remaining 32.80 under major/medium 
irrigation (also see Annex 3). 
5.7.7 Problems and policy 
According to A.K. Mitra, 'the irrigation sector is beset with a large 
number of problems.'9 Firstly, there are those problems connected with 
the construction phase: '(i) cost and time overruns (due maybe to 
inadequate project finance), (ii) faulty design, (iii) rehabilitation of the 
project-affected people, and (iv) environmental degradation.' In the 
respective Five Year plans from the Indian government, these 
construction problems have always been a major concern. Rising costs, 
for instance, have contributed heavily to problems in attaining the targets 
set for the creation of irrigation potential, particularly in major/medium 
schemes.10 These rising costs were not only due to an increase in the 
costs of such materials as cement and steel but also to the 'availability 
of comparatively better sites for construction in earlier Plans,' 'larger 
provisions for measures to rehabilitate people affected as well as for 
preservation of environment and ecology,' and 'adoption of sophisticated 
but expensive criteria for irrigation project planning in conformity with 
requirements of external aid agencies.'" Already in the Third Plan, it 
was concluded that 'in the past, under pressure of local or regional 
demands, some projects have been commenced despite incomplete 
investigations and inadequate surveys and this has resulted in these 
projects lingering on with consequent delays in accrual of benefits from 
them.'12 In the Economic Survey of 1986-87, it was concluded that 
'inordinate delays in the completion of projects and the severe costs 
escalations in the major/medium projects probably indicate that new 
projects have been taken up without adequate organisational planning 
and the assurance of the funds required for timely completion.'13 This 
lack of proper preparation (particularly in major/medium schemes) led to 
substantial modifications in the scope and design of the schemes during 
construction and, thus, to cost escalations.14 
The second cluster of problems and those creating the most harm arise 
after construction. A.K. Mitra groups these problems together under 
operation and maintenance: (i) under-utilisation of irrigation capacity 
(potential), (ii) iniquity in irrigation, (iii) lack of dependability of 
irrigation, (iv) indifferent quality of irrigation, (v) wastage of irrigation 
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water, (vi) waterlogging, soil salinity and alkalinity, (vii) sustainability 
of irrigated farming, and (viii) financial losses and pricing of water.15 
Most of these problems have been dealt with in the respective Five Year 
Plans in the field of irrigation. This certainly holds for the under-
utilisation of the created irrigation potential, for waterlogging and 
salinity and for financial losses. The First Five Year Plan, for instance, 
called for a programme for soil conservation in relation to irrigation.16 
Financial losses already received major attention in the Third Plan which 
pointed at insufficient financial returns.17 'The issue of financing 
irrigation management and pricing of water are so crucial and are of 
such overriding consideration that all the other problems stated [...] are 
largely the fallout of the problem of financing irrigation manage-
ment.*18 With regard to the sustainability of irrigated agriculture, C.H. 
Hanumantha Rao and A. Gulati point out that the largest problems in 
major/medium schemes can be found in the 'pricing of canal waters [...] 
along with institutional reforms in ownership and management.' The 
largest problems in minor irrigation, however, pertain to the depletion of 
ground-water levels19 and to problems of scale.20 
Perhaps more important than not attaining the target irrigation poten-
tials is the fact that full utilisation often lagged behind the creation of 
irrigation potential.21 As Table 3 (Annex 3) shows, slightly more than 
91% of the created irrigation potential was actually being utilised at the 
end of 1991-92. The corresponding figures for major/medium irrigation 
are somewhat lower than this average, and the figures for minor irrigati-
on are somewhat higher than this average.22 Although only 9% of the 
created irrigation potential is reported as not utilised, this figure should 
be viewed with great caution. It can be seriously doubted whether this 
figure presents a correct picture of utilisation as the criteria for reporting 
differ per state. Furthermore, there is no uniform interpretation of 
irrigation potential and its utilisation by the reporting agencies; 
monitoring and verification of the information is also inadequate and 
often casual leading to substantial errors in the data.23 A.K. Mitra 
concludes that the reported data are overestimates.24 
Over the years many different reasons have been given for the under-
utilisation of irrigation potential. In the case of minor irrigation works, 
reference has been made to depleting ground-water tables (as already 
mentioned) and also to the lack of maintenance and repair. As a large 
part of these minor irrigation schemes are individually or community 
owned, these owners are - according to the Indian government — to 
blame for this neglect. At the same time, it is acknowledged that the 
states have not lived up to their own responsibilities. In the field of 
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major/medium schemes, incomplete distribution systems (particularly the 
lack of field channels) have been mentioned over the years as one of the 
main reasons for non-utilisation. Seepages and deficiencies in water-
distribution and water-management systems have also contributed.25 
Related problems of waterlogging and salinity which are for the most 
part due to improper drainage of irrigation water are also encounte-
red.26 The time required by farmers to change their agricultural 
techniques and adopt these to irrigated agriculture has also contributed 
its share to the non- and under-utilisation of the irrigation potential. 
Maintenance of irrigation facilities is taken up as one of the central 
components of irrigation development in the Sixth Five Year Plan. It 
took, however, up to the Seventh Plan for responsibility for maintenance 
to no longer be consigned to the state governments and financed by 
'irrigation charges [...] from the beneficiaries.'27 More direct 
involvement of farmers in groups organised to take responsibility for the 
proper functioning of major/medium irrigation schemes is only proposed 
in the late 1980s/early 1990s (compare to 4.1.1). The goal of such 
participation is quite clear: enhancing the responsibility of the users and 
simultaneously reduce the pressure on government funds for operation 
and maintenance and, in the process, ensure better utilisation of the 
created facilities. According to the Eighth Plan, there has been little user 
participation in the past mainly because the large irrigation systems have 
been completely state managed. Based on experiments with the creation 
of water-user organisations for the regulation of water allocations, 
maintenance and revenue collection, the Eighth Plan calls for a 
strengthening of efforts to involve farmers in the operation and mainten-
ance of irrigation schemes by making the farmer 'central to all consider-
ations.'28 With regard to minor irrigation schemes, the Plan calls for 
intensification of traditional local systems for construction, maintenance 
and management. 
5.1.2 Programmes and achievements 
From 1951-52 to 1991-92, a total of 60.5 million hectares were brought 
under irrigation with a major part of this total (nearly 62%) receiving 
minor irrigation. On average, 1.47 million hectares were added to the 
Indian irrigation potential each year. This achievement was (far) below 
the targets set during the different Plan periods. For the Fourth Plan 
period (1969-74), for instance, an increase of 30% in irrigated area 
under major/medium projects was set as the target while only 14.4% 
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was reached. The Sixth Plan targeted an additional irrigation potential of 
5.7 million under major/medium projects and ultimately reached 3.4 
million hectares or nearly 60% of the targeted potential. The achieve-
ments under the Seventh Plan stagnated at 35% of the targets. The 
achievements under minor irrigation were much higher. The targets were 
nearly reached in the Fourth and Sixth Plan periods while the target set 
for the Seventh Plan was exceeded by some 500,000 hectares (also see 
Table 4 in Annex 3). 
Investments in Indian irrigation stem from four types of programmes: 
(1) major and medium irrigation, (2) minor irrigation, (3) command area 
development (CAD) and (4) flood-control and drainage works. Whereas 
the former two are mainly used to construct irrigation facilities, the other 
two are aimed more at the enhancement of utilisation. The most import-
ant of these latter programmes is the CAD programme. This programme, 
initiated in 1974-75, 'was taken up with a view to accelerating the pace 
of utilisation of existing [major/medium - LS] irrigation potential.'29 
This was to be done via the promotion of an integrated approach for the 
construction of field channels, field drains and land levelling in 
combination with extension work among farmers, marketing (e.g., con-
struction of link roads, godowns and market centres) and the introduct-
ion of a so-called Warabandi system. The CAD programme has not been 
very successful due to the 'absence of up-to-date land records, resistance 
of farmers to land consolidation, inadequate flow of institutional credit 
and organisational weaknesses' (among other things).30 
Table 5 (Annex 3) provides an overview of the funds made available 
under the different Five Year Plans and periods since the 1950s. In 
determining the sources of these finances, it is again necessary to make 
a distinction between major/medium and minor irrigation schemes. In 
the case of major/ medium irrigation schemes, the funds come from the 
government only and are therefore part of the normal budget outlays 
presented in the Plans. As the entity responsible for the creation of 
major/medium irrigation, the states provide the majority of the funds. 
Only a relatively small part is supplied by the central government in 
New Delhi. The case of minor irrigation is more complex. The funds for 
the development of minor irrigation potential stem from the central 
government, state governments, banks (i.e., institutional financing) and 
also individual farmers. Data are only available for the first three 
sources, however.31 According to the Plan outlays for the period 1951-
1990 (also see Annex 3), the total investment in minor irrigation 
amounted to Rs. 144.7 billion with 51% coming from public funds and 
the remaining 49% from institutional funds. Plan funds for minor 
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irrigation are mainly used for the construction of river lift irrigation and 
deep tubewells, 'for provision of technical assistance in case of ground 
water projects and for payment of subsidy to weaker sections of far-
mers.' The development of ground-water irrigation, thus, falls largely 
under the private sector and is financed 'by loans from the land develop-
ment and commercial banks with re-finance facility from NABARD.'32 
In addition to these plan and private funds through banks, activities in 
the field of minor irrigation have also been undertaken under other pro-
grammes. These schemes fall largely under the banner of Poverty Alle-
viation Programmes (PAPs). Under the most important of these PAPs, 
the Integrated Rural Development Programme, both individual and 
community irrigation projects have been financed. Activities related to 
irrigation have also been conducted under the Drought Prone Areas 
Programmes (DPAP) (e.g., small dams and open or bore wells), the 
Desert Development Programme (DDP) (e.g., water harvesting structu-
res, rural electrification for energising tube-wells and pump sets) and 
different rural employment programmes (e.g., construction of field 
channels, renovation of irrigation tanks). 
Two other possible sources for the development of irrigation have not 
been mentioned as yet. The first source are foreign bilateral and 
multilateral donors. Exact data on development assistance for irrigation 
are not available after 1981 and also not for a single country." Of the 
total Official Development Finance (ODF) provided by bilateral and 
multilateral donors to India, a total of 24% went to agriculture in 
1986.34 This figure was down to 13% in 1987 and to 3% in 1988. Sin-
ce 1989, donor interest in agriculture in India has shown signs of 
recovery. In 1992, 14% of ODF to India was provided for activities in 
the field of agriculture. With regard to irrigation, donors 'have preferred 
to invest in new irrigation schemes rather than to provide financing for 
the improvement of existing schemes.'35 Furthermore, donors have sho-
wed a strong preference for large-scale projects in the field of irrigati-
on.36 
The second source consists of NGDOs which became more important 
in the general policy of the Indian government during the 1980s and 
have also played a role in the field of irrigation. Specific data on the 
involvement of these organisations in irrigation development are not 
available, however. This also holds for the funds being used to finance 
the irrigation activities of Indian NGDOs. As in the case of drinking-
water and sanitation activities, these funds come primarily from the 
target groups, foreign donors and Indian government (see section 5.2 
below). With regard to the government source of funds, reference can be 
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made to the different schemes established in the 1980s and 1990s to 
foster greater NGDO involvement. These include programmes falling 
under the responsibility of CAPART: for example, the Integrated Rural 
Development Programme and the rural employment scheme known as 
Jawahar Rozgar Yojana." 
5.2 Sector policies: DGIS and ICCO 
As in the case of drinking water and sanitation, ICCO does not have a 
clear cut policy in the field of irrigation. More surprisingly, DGIS also 
has no written document with policy guidelines for this field. Both of 
these donors consider irrigation part of agriculture and/or rural 
development. Because of the lack of specific irrigation policy papers it 
is necessary to examine the more general policy guidelines from both 
these donors. For DGIS as well as ICCO, a general sketch of their 
policy on irrigation will be presented along with a description of the 
relevant programmes in India. 
5.2.1 DGIS policy on irrigation 
Irrigation is not a concentration sector within the Dutch bilateral aid. It 
is therefore impossible to determine the precise amounts allocated or 
disbursed for activities in the field of irrigation.38 From the general 
policy papers of the 1980s and 1990s, however, some broad guidelines 
with regard to irrigation can be distilled. The 'Reverification Paper' of 
1984, for instance, pleaded for primary attention to increased agricultural 
production. Activities had to be implemented with regard to extension 
services, research and development, land reform, agricultural industry, 
credit, marketing, dryland farming, and irrigation and drainage. It was 
also argued in this white paper that 'these agricultural development 
activities [...] should not be undertaken incidentally or on an ad hoc 
basis but in an integrated manner.'39 
The 1984 white paper showed the main problems with regard to infra-
structural development in rural areas (which includes irrigation and 
drainage) to concern (the financing of) operation, maintenance and 
repair. The construction of the relevant facilities should meet the needs 
of the population and, in doing so, greater ownership on the part of the 
target groups and thus greater responsibility for the maintenance of the 
facilities also established. Irrigation and drainage facilities are 
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specifically mentioned as clear examples of the need for such an 
approach.40 
The 1990 white paper entitled 'A World of Difference' was far more 
explicit with regard to the need for participation (also see Chapter 2).41 
This paper confirmed the role of rural development in general and 
agriculture in particular. Central to the rural development strategy of 
DGIS was the notion of strengthened participation and independence for 
the rural population.42 Irrigation is only mentioned as a means of 
increasing agricultural production in Asia, but the Dutch strategy for 
rural development outlined in 'A World of Difference' still includes the 
possibilities for activities in the field of (small-scale) irrigation. 
5.2.2 DGIS policy and programmes in India 
With the start of project aid at the end of the 1970s, DGIS opted for 
stronger involvement in the agricultural sector. Dutch programme aid 
(fertiliser import and, since 1980, substantial funding of NABARD) had 
already made agriculture an important sector in quantitative terms. 
Despite the presentation of agriculture as a concentration sector in 1982, 
not much headway was made with agricultural projects by the mid-
1980s.43 Agriculture had been taken up as a concentration sector in 
order to broaden relations with India,44 and an agricultural Memoran-
dum of Understanding was signed between the Netherlands and India in 
the spring of 1984. 
While agriculture remained a concentration sector (and DGIS 
continued activities in the field of agricultural research, animal 
husbandry and horticulture), it was mainly in the field of irrigation that 
progress was made. This situation was remedied during the Annual Con-
sultations in 1987 when the Netherlands decided to abstain from further 
agricultural activities due to manpower constraints. Agricultural projects 
were referred to the new sectoral programme for rural development, and 
irrigation became one of the four concentration sectors for Dutch project 
aid under the regular programme. At the end of the 1980s, the irrigation 
sector was officially 'rechristened' as the land and water sector. 
Within this land and water sector, emphasis was placed on improve-
ments in the distribution of irrigation water and improving operation and 
maintenance. 'Cooperation is aimed at the introduction of small-scale 
groundwater development, improvements in the management of existing 
irrigation systems and combatting salinity,' according to the DGIS 
Annual Report in 1989.45 Congruent with the present focus of Dutch 
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aid on irrigation, the irrigation portfolio includes 'planning and 
implementation of schemes for irrigation, land reclamation and soil 
conservation/improvement; operation and maintenance of these works; 
complementary research on water resources and management; désalinisa-
tion of soils, crops and specific socio-economic issues; and training of 
project staff and farmers, particularly women.'46 
As in the case of drinking water, an integrated approach to irrigation 
was put forth at the end of the 1980s. During the Annual Consultations 
in October/November 1990, for instance, the Netherlands emphasised the 
need for such an integrated approach within the irrigation projects. The 
1989-1992 Policy Plan for India had already called for better coordinati-
on of the training, research and implementation aspects of Dutch aid for 
irrigation works. Greater attention to such non-technical aspects as water 
distribution, maintenance and the participation of women and small/mar-
ginal farmers in particular had also been called for along with attention 
to such non-irrigational inputs as credit, fertilisers and seeds. Finally, in 
December 1988, a report on the 'land and water development' activities 
of the Netherlands in India was drafted.47 The final version of this 
report was handed over to the Indian authorities at the end of 1989 and 
became part of the discussions between the two countries.48 The report, 
however, was officially never used as a guide-line for assistance in the 
field of irrigation. 
This report provides a justification for the already established concen-
tration of Dutch aid to the sector: minor irrigation development on the 
one hand and improvement of salt-affected land on the other.49 The 
report, of course, also calls for more integration of the different 
irrigation and agricultural activities. Within this, special attention was to 
be paid to crop diversification, on-farm water management practices and 
preparation of extension messages on irrigated agriculture. Furthermore, 
a few special issues were mentioned which should be taken up in any of 
the Dutch financed irrigation projects: the role of women, environment, 
irrigation-water management, research, training and monitoring and 
evaluation. According to the report 'farmers' participation in the process 
of project preparation is still an item of much neglect' in India, although 
hardly anything is done with this insight when the paper continues with 
discussing Dutch irrigation aid. 
At the end of the 1980s the irrigation sector counted some ten 
ongoing projects. The sector, however, remained a relatively small 
concentration sector within Dutch project aid. Between 1980 and 1992, 
only 4% of the funds made available under the regular bilateral 
programme was spent in this sector.50 The total disbursements over this 
200 The same difference 
period of Dfl. 115 million were divided across seven different states in 
addition to some All India projects and approximately Dfl. 2 million for 
project preparation and monitoring.51 Two states, Uttar Pradesh and 
West Bengal, received 60% of the total funds disbursed for this sector. 
This 60% was spent on only two projects: the North Bengal Terai 
project in West Bengal (12%) and the Uttar Pradesh State Tubewell 
project (48%). Both will be discussed in greater detail in the third part 
of this chapter. 
Not all of the projects grouped under land and water were or are 
necessarily irrigation projects. This, for instance, accounts for the 
bioconversion project which has been supported since 1986 and also for 
the agro-forestry project (1986-1987) and the Vegetable and Food 
project in the same years. As discussed above, moreover, only a few of 
the irrigation projects include construction activities for irrigation 
facilities. This accounts for the two projects in Uttar Pradesh and West 
Bengal already mentioned and for the Andhra Pradesh minor irrigation 
scheme, the community irrigation scheme and the Kuttanad project 
(which are both in Kerala). Some construction was also undertaken in 
the salinity ingress prevention scheme in Gujarat and the Hypofors 
project in Karnataka.52 Other projects, such as the All India WAM-
ATRA project or the operational pilot project in Haryana, were either 
training or research projects devoted to the problems of irrigation 
management, salinity and drainage or hydrology. 
5.2.3 ICCO policy on irrigation 
The Impact study concluded that 'activities in agriculture are mainly 
directed at removing bottlenecks in existing production processes by 
providing, for instance, water for irrigation or animals and grain mills in 
situations where labour is scarce or labour pressure has to be diminish-
ed.' Although the study judged the credit and agricultural projects 
positively, it also stated that sustainability is threatened by the fact that 
most of the investments come from NGDOs. 'In addition, little attention 
is paid to running costs, especially concerning maintenance and repair, 
and depreciation.'53 These conclusions show both operation and 
maintenance, and the limited responsibility taken by the target groups to 
also be central issues in the irrigation activities supported by ICCO. 
As in the case of drinking water and sanitation, ICCO has no policy 
document specifically dealing with irrigation or agriculture for that 
matter. In its 1987 policy paper, ICCO confirmed its integrated approach 
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to development while also emphasising the importance of awareness 
building, participation and organisation.54 This integrated approach is 
also evident in the most recent general policy paper which also targets 
awareness- and organisation-building, establishment of primary social 
facilities, income generation and rural development as preferential 
sectors. Irrigation activities are mainly located in the rural development 
sector. Within rural development, ICCO 'gives special attention to 
agriculture. Emphasis is placed on legalizing land tenure, promoting 
sustainable land use and increasing food security.'55 
Attention to irrigation is nevertheless largely restricted to specific 
projects in part because the implementing NGDOs are responsible for 
deciding on the types of development activities to be undertaken. 
Although irrigation forms an option within the development projects co-
financed by ICCO, actual funding depends on environmental concerns 
because of the ICCO focus on sustainable land use. Irrigation activities 
should also be part of a broader and more integrated programme cover-
ing the different dimensions of development. The policies regarding 
irrigation appear to be project and region specific. This is clearly the 
case for India to which we will now tum. 
5.2.4 ICCO policy and programmes in India 
In the India-programme evaluation report on sustainable agriculture in 
1991, some clear (and official) criteria bearing on agricultural or 
irrigation projects in India were laid down for the first time.56 This 
report essentially warns of unprecedented investment in activities (e.g., 
irrigation) limiting the carrying capacity of an area. At the same time, 
specific strategies in the field of agriculture depending on the ecological 
situation in the area are called for.57 This points to the need for proper 
knowledge of the area in which the NGDO is active. At the same time, 
the need for technical, ecological and social knowledge within ICCO is 
pointed to. The recommendations with regard to investments in, among 
other things, irrigation and the observation that NGDOs should not 
subsidise recurring costs also point in this direction.58 The latter has to 
be seen as a call for greater responsibility/participation (expressed, for 
instance, as a larger contribution) on the part of the target group; 
irrigation from wells or tanks mainly improves the production potential 
of farm households and is thus aimed at increasing the income of this 
target group.59 
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Although part of the recommendations made by the programme 
evaluation team found their way into the policy profile for India for the 
period 1993-1995,60 it should be noted that the above-mentioned 
recommendations and points of attention in the field of agriculture in 
general and irrigation in particular only became part of the policy of 
ICCO (both officially and unofficially) after 1991. The recommendations 
cannot have much bearing on the period under scrutiny and reiterate the 
lack of official guide-lines with respect to the funding of irrigation 
activities for the larger period considered here.61 Simultaneously, the 
number of projects with an irrigation component co-financed by ICCO is 
unknown.62 A survey conducted among ICCO counterparts in India 
showed 30% of the NGDOs supported by ICCO up to 1992 to be or 
have been active in the field of irrigation. A second survey among these 
NGDOs provides the following picture of irrigation within the ICCO 
programme in India.63 
The ICCO counterparts active in the area of irrigation tend to follow 
an integrated or at least multi-component programme with attention paid 
to such elements as credit, fertilisers and extension with the aim of 
providing income to the target groups and raising agricultural production 
in addition to the construction of minor irrigation facilities. The 
percentage of the annual budget spent on the sector ranges from 5% to 
50% for these organisations. In most cases, the minor irrigation facilities 
pertain to borewells, tubewells and open wells, although some NGDOs 
are (also) involved in the construction and/or renovation of tanks, check 
dams and river lift irrigation schemes. Four NGDOs stated that they 
were involved in canal irrigation.64 Although construction of irrigation 
facilities was an integral part of the programme for the majority of 
ICCO counterparts surveyed, it is certainly not the only activity under-
taken in this field. Training of the target groups in maintenance and 
repair, training in cultivation and other related activities were also 
mentioned. 
The major problem reported with regard to irrigation concerns the 
scarcity of water and depleting ground-water levels. Lack of money 
and/or knowledge of the irrigation source constitute another important 
problem along with the lack of (secured) electricity in the case of deep 
tubewells and lift irrigation. Other problems are the lack of maintenance, 
credit and the small landholdings of the target group. Finally, individual 
NGDOs were found to complain about a lack of government irrigation 
policy, improper irrigation management practices and limited knowledge 
of the target groups. 
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The funds required for activities in the field of irrigation stem from 
different sources. Government sources and contributions from the target 
group are mentioned by most of the NGDOs.65 Foreign donors occupy 
the third place followed by bank loans and the sources of the 
organisation itself. ICCO funds for irrigation have only been used by 
one-third of the NGDOs. The ICCO funds are mainly used for 
awareness-building and the training of farmers with regard to irrigated 
agriculture and not so much for construction activities. The NGDO 
strategy for irrigation is comparable to the strategy set out by the Indian 
government over the last 40 years and this also accounts for the 
diversity of funds being used to finance such activities. Only a relatively 
small part of these funds are provided by foreign donors, whether 
multilateral, bilateral or NGDO. 
5.3 Projects of DGIS and ICCO in India 
After the preceding introduction to the policies and general activities of 
the Indian government, DGIS and ICCO in the field of irrigation, we 
will now tum to a description of five projects financed by these two 
Dutch donors in India. Two DGIS projects in Uttar Pradesh and West 
Bengal respectively and three ICCO projects in the state of Andhra 
Pradesh will be of concern. As indicated in the methodology section, 
extensive field work was only conducted for two of these projects (one 
from ICCO and one from DGIS). The data for the three other projects 
have mainly been collected from files in The Hague and Zeist and were 
further substantiated by interviews with the staff of the implementing 
organisations. 
In the preceding sections, several problems with regard to the 
utilisation of the created irrigation potential have been mentioned. 
Among the donors and the level of the Indian government as well, there 
is basic agreement on the need for an integrated approach to irrigation 
with participation of the beneficiaries deemed necessary if only for 
operation and maintenance purposes. Participation is also aimed at 
creating a feeling of ownership among the fanners involved in the 
project and thereby securing better utilisation of the facilities. Utilisation 
of the irrigation facilities not only depends on the proper functioning of 
the facilities (and thus on proper operation and maintenance) but also on 
the availability of marketing, credit and extension services. The various 
interrelationships between these components call for an integrated 
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approach with irrigation coupled to the other necessary infrastractural, 
organisational and supportive activities (also see Annex 2 for some 
socio-economic data on the states and districts in which the projects 
are/have been implemented). 
5.3.1 Uttar Pradesh Tubewell project 
Uttar Pradesh is by far the most populated state in India and also 
accounts for the largest share of the production of foodgrains (most 
notably wheat and rice) and sugar cane. Simultaneously, Uttar Pradesh 
has a high net irrigated area.66 Tubewells form the major source of 
irrigation (see Table 3 in Annex 3). The first of these tubewells was 
constructed in Uttar Pradesh in 1931 which makes Uttar Pradesh a 
'pioneer State in the use of tubewell technology in India.' At the end of 
the 1950s, private tubewells were a common sight and with the introduc-
tion of high-yielding seeds varieties in the mid-1960s, a boom in the 
construction of these private irrigation facilities was witnessed. 'Between 
1966 and 1980, the number of tubewells increased from a mere 5,000 to 
nearly' 1,300,000. Most of these were private tubewells with a 
concentration in the Western region. The Eastern region, although not 
the least developed region in this regard, lagged behind in this period.67 
A substantial increase in (mostly privately owned) tubewells can also 
now be seen in this region, however.68 By 1980, when tubewells 
constructed and operated by the government constituted a mere 1.2% of 
the total number of tubewells in the state,69 the World Bank sanctioned 
the first public tubewell project, followed by the second in 1983. 
In 1987, the World Bank decided to terminate its problem stricken 
tubewell irrigation project in Uttar Pradesh. The most important 
problems prompting this decision were: (1) delays in the construction 
activities due to problems in staffing, procurement and energisation; (2) 
water shortages due to irregular power supply, defective outlets, water 
logging, field located at tail end; (3) infrequent representation of small 
and marginal farmers in committees and, as a consequence, overruling 
by the more influential farmers and insufficient quantities of irrigation 
water; (4) acreage irrigated remaining far below command area targets; 
and (5) inadequate extension services.70 Three years earlier (i.e., in 
1984), India had forwarded a project proposal for a Uttar Pradesh State 
Tubewell Project to the Netherlands. The proposal concerned the 
'construction of tubewells, modernisation and improvement of old 
tubewells in various parts of the state.'71 The proposal was first 
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officially discussed during the Annual Consultations in 1985 and when 
an average of 74% of the cultivated area in the proposed project districts 
was irrigated by other sources.72 
With the twofold objective of (1) increasing agricultural production 
and (2) improving the living conditions of particularly small and 
marginal farm households, the UP State Tubewell Project proposal 
targeted the construction of 750 tubewells, modernisation of 125 old 
tubewells and improvement of 200 tubewells.73 The project was to be 
implemented in eight (later: ten) 'relatively backward' eastern districts 
of Urtar Pradesh.74 Based on the characteristics of the selected districts 
as well as the site selection criteria to be applied, a Formulation Mission 
concluded in March 1987 'that there is no doubt whatsoever that small 
and marginal farmers will benefit from the project.'75 Some supporting 
activities were nevertheless deemed necessary to insure proper utilisation 
of the irrigation facilities. 'To support the project, programmes will be 
carried out in the field of agricultural extension and development, 
agricultural research, and training of women extension workers.'76 
Furthermore, a Monitoring and Appraisal Cell (MAC) would be set 
up.77 Responsibility for these supporting activities was to rest with a 
variety of governmental and non-governmental organisations.78 
In April 1988, the project officially started. The anticipated project 
duration of three years was extended in November 1990 by one year to 
March 1992 and later by yet another year. These extensions were found 
necessary mainly because of the slow implementation rate in the first 
two years.79 Two conditions accompanied the extension recommendati-
on by a Dutch mission in the beginning of 1990. First, 'at least 80 old 
state tubewells should have been rehabilitated before October 1990.' 
Second, 'a request for extension [...] should be accompanied with a well 
documented review of incurred expenditure and the balance of funds 
available for the extension [as well as] a firm proposal how to select the 
remaining number of old tubewells to be rehabilitated.' The mission 
further recommended to terminate the project 'by the end of March 
1991, as per current agreement' 'if these two conditions are not met.'80 
In June 1993, the first phase (including the extensions) came to an 
end and was followed by the second phase in which major changes were 
undertaken in the strategy of the project. In this second phase simpler 
tubewells were to be constructed on a pilot basis to cover a much 
smaller command area than the 100 hectares in the previous phase. At 
the same time, the focus was aimed at participation of the farmers 
concerned. The advantages of these new Intermediate Deep Tubewells 
(or Shallow Tubewells as they are called in India) were manifold. 
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Investment costs would be substantially reduced, and an operator would 
no longer be needed as the farmers themselves would take care of this. 
The distribution system was also much simpler, and 'the much smaller 
command area [would] make it possible to be more selective' (e.g., 
exclude the land of private pump owners and other large farmers not 
interested in joining the scheme more easily). Following the new design, 
it would also be possible to select areas with predominantly small and 
marginal farmers. The much smaller groups of farmers, finally, would 
hopefully lead to more homogeneous groups and thereby fewer social 
conflicts.81 
A total of 50 so-called Intermediate Deep Tubewells were to be con-
structed. The project, baptised by the Department of Irrigation as the 
Indo-Dutch Integrated Tubewell Project, was further restricted to three 
districts: Bahraich, Gorakhpur and Sultanpur. In the latter district, a so-
called Farmers Participation Unit (see Findings section) was already 
operational since the end of 1991 and fell under the responsibility of the 
NGDO Kamla Nehru Memorial Trust. The Monitoring and Appraisal 
Cell, by then 'freed from the clutches of UPDESCO,'82 became the 
implementing agency for such Units in the two other districts. By the 
end of December 1994, the pilot project and Dutch assistance for the 
project came to an end because the Department of Irrigation turned out 
to be largely unreceptive to such changes.83 
Prior to 1987, a total of Dfl. 247,000 under technical aid had been 
spent on a formulation and an identification mission for this project. In 
the same year, amounts of Dfl. 85.S million under financial aid grants 
and Dfl. 4.5 million under technical aid grants were allocated84 along 
with the disbursement of Dfl. 20 million in pre-fmancing.85 At the end 
of the original project period of three years, a proposal was adopted for 
an extension of the technical aid component. At the beginning of 1991, 
a total of Rs. 2,064,750 was needed for the Monitoring and Appraisal 
Cell, the Dutch experts, the Farmers Participation Unit and the Women 
Extension Programme.86 Up to February 1990, the total expenditures 
under this project had amounted to Dfl. 36.52 million, followed by 
another Dfl. 17.5 million up to December 1992. This amounts to slightly 
more than Dfl. 54 million or 46.8% of all expenditures under the sector 
'land and water.' 
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Findings 
Implementation of the various activities (whether construction or 
supportive) got off to a slow start. After the official inception of the 
project at the beginning of 1988, delays are reported as a result of the 
unavailability of staff for the selection of tubewell clusters, no separate 
wing within the Department of Irrigation and still no clarity concerning 
the criteria for the selection of tubewell clusters.87 The existing high 
percentage of irrigated area raised problems with meeting the criterion 
that 'the area already irrigated by private tubewells should not exceed 
25% of the command area of a cluster.'88 Of the 83 tubewell clusters 
proposed by the Department of Irrigation up to June 1992, a total of 38 
did not meet the general criteria and 26 of these were found to be 
unacceptable as the area was already irrigated for a large part. The latter 
problem particularly applied to the districts of Gorakhpur, Maharajganj, 
Deoria, Basti, Siddarthanagar, Faizabad and Sultanpur. In other districts, 
such as Ballia, the high average farm size proved to be a constraint on 
finding suitable clusters as the average farm size mentioned in the 
criteria could be no more than 0.65 hectare.89 
The problem of finding cluster areas and tubewell sites meeting the 
selection criteria went hand in hand with a preoccupation with the 
construction of new tubewells and thereby less attention (and initially no 
attention) to the modernisation and improvement of old tubewells. At the 
end of 1989, nearly two years after the official start of the project, the 
Monitoring and Appraisal Cell noted that no headway had been reported 
with regard to modernisation and improvement of the tubewells.90 
According to the mid- term evaluation in March 1990, no old tubewells 
had been rehabilitated.91 No firm proposal for the selection of old 
public tubewells for modernisation/improvement evolved during the visit 
either.92 By June 1992, however, 133 old tubewells were selected for 
modernisation and 100 for improvement; by the end of Phase I in June 
1993, a total of 101 old tubewells had been improved (as opposed to a 
target of 200) and a total of 102 had been modernised (as opposed to a 
target of 125).93 After more than four years, thus, only part of the 
targets set for these activities were indeed met. 
In the case of new tubewells, the target originally set in the Plan of 
Operations was not met either. The targets were adjusted in 1990 when 
it became clear that the expansion of private irrigation facilities had 
severely limited the possibilities for new tubewells under the project.94 
It was agreed to restrict the construction activities to the then accepted 
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15 clusters with the possibility of another four clusters. The first newly 
constructed tubewell became operational in the last three months of 
1989 (i.e., one-and-a-half years after the inception of the project). 
Operational, however, does not necessarily include completed field 
channels.95 At the end of its involvement in the Tubewell Project, the 
Dutch consultancy firm Euroconsult painted an even clearer picture of 
the discrepancy between Operational' and 'completed.' Euroconsult 
pointed at the 'pressure by higher officials to speed up the declaration of 
tubewells being in operation' and at the loss of interest once a tubewell 
was declared operational.96 A total of 547 tubewells had been drilled 
by June 1992 and a similar number of pumphouses was also constructed. 
All of these, except for two, were provided with a pumpset, and 540 
were energised. A total of 498 were declared to be in operation at that 
time which meant 66% of the target of 750 new tubewells. None of the 
clusters were, however, completed at that time. About a year later, a 
total of 547 of the 750 tubewells originally targeted were indeed 
constructed and declared in operation.97 
The utilisation rate for the tubewells is below the target due to 
electricity problems, faulty constructions leading to leakages and a less 
than equal distribution of irrigation water in the command area.98 Not 
all of the farmers grow crops in need of irrigation because of a lack of 
agricultural knowledge.99 The lack of field channels and often inferior 
construction of the trenches and pipes are also reported as major 
obstacles to full utilisation.100 The data available on the running hours 
for the tubewells (i.e., on the number of hours a tubewell or a cluster of 
tubewells provides water to the command area) show the capacity of the 
tubewells to provide a sufficient quantity of water to the command area 
to still be limited. Of the 547 tubewells constructed and declared in 
operation in 28 clusters at the end of 1992,"" a total of 536 were 
indeed utilised during the winter season of 1992-1993. Slightly more 
than half (52%) of these tubewells had less than 1,000 running hours 
over the six-month period from 1-10-1992 to 31-3-1993. More than 
2,000 running hours was only reached for 30 tubewells (6%). In essence, 
this means that of the 536 tubewells constructed under the project, none 
reached the target of 15 running hours per day.102 
A consequence of the relatively low number of running hours is that 
the target command area of 100 hectares could not be reached. The 
observation of ETC in 1987 with regard to the tubewells in Uttar 
Pradesh as having 'a poor functioning [...] water distribution system' 
and, as a result, creating 'a struggle about who gets the water and who 
not' also thus applies to the tubewells constructed under the Dutch 
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tubewell project. 'The small- and marginal farmers do often not receive 
the required amount of water, while the larger and more influential 
farmers receive enough.'103 It should be noted that the number of run-
ning hours differ substantially across clusters104 and that the number of 
running hours tends to increase with time passing. It takes 'on average 9 
to 12 months to reach 200 running hours' after the tubewell is declared 
in operation.105 With regard to public tubewells constructed under the 
World Bank projects in Uttar Pradesh, the ETC mission report of 1987 
notes that it takes some three years before the average number of 
running hour reaches the 'switching value' of 1,610 hours.106 
Delays in the implementation of the project were not restricted to the 
construction part. In the case of agricultural research and the 
involvement of the Department of Agriculture, serious delays occurred. 
It took up to 1990 for the first research project to get started and by 
mid-1992, only part of the initial or subsequent studies and surveys were 
completed.107 The involvement of the Department of Agriculture 
lagged even further behind. In the Plan of Operations for the project, the 
capacity of the Department to provide extension services was simply 
taken for granted.108 Soon after the start of the project at the beginning 
of 1988, it became increasingly clear that it would have been wiser to 
doubt the extension capacity of the Department of Agriculture. Not only 
was it seemingly impossible for the department to provide extension 
workers (in June 1992 only 55 extension workers were in the field as 
opposed to a target of more than 200), but the impact of the 
departmental demonstration fields was seriously being questioned. It 
took the department up to the second half of 1990 to lay out the first of 
these fields, which were then criticised as amounting 'to virtual 
"dumping" of seed and fertilisers, without the required follow-up due to 
lack of staff, but also to the lack of interest of the staff available.'109 
The training of women extension workers, in contrast, got off to a 
rather good start. In April 1989 (i.e., one year after the official start of 
the project), the training of the first batch of 14 women as extension 
workers commenced. By the end of 1990, a total of 54 women were 
trained and stationed in the project area. The follow-up proposal presen-
ted at about the same time110 was not intended to train more women in 
Phase II but to strengthen the capacities of the 54 women already 
trained. This strengthening of capacities was not only aimed at extension 
services in agriculture but also at forming self-managed and self-reliant 
groups of women for income generation.1" The women extension wor-
kers were to become more all-round workers in order to strengthen the 
position (both economically and socially) of women farmers in (part of) 
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the project area. This was not to be done by providing all kinds of 
(financial) support to women through the project itself but by awareness-
building, education/training, organisation and demonstration.112 At the 
end of June 1992, the women worked in the districts of Sultanpur and 
Faizabad and covered a total of 154 tubewells. By that time, a total of 
140 women groups had been registered through the Women Extension 
Workers. 
In addition to the construction and support activities, two other issues 
(and their interrelationship) remain to be discussed: (1) farmer 
participation and (2) operation and maintenance. Operation and 
maintenance (O&M) was hardly elaborated upon in the project proposal 
although significant O&M problems were known to plague the major 
irrigation schemes over the years. The proposal simply declared these 
activities to be part of the usual workload of the Tubewell Circles. More 
precisely, O&M was the shared responsibility of the state government 
and the users. The Irrigation Department was thus responsible for the 
tubewells while the farmers were to maintain the field channels and 
regulate the water distribution.113 
In practice, the possibilities for the government in the field of oper-
ations and maintenance were restricted due to a lack of manpower, a 
lack of interest and a lack of funds for O&M (also see section 5.1). It 
should therefore come as no surprise that the Department of Irrigation 
announced the main problem with operation and maintenance in 1990 to 
be 'a large gap between revenues obtained and required 
expenditure.'"4 This gap is partly due to only a handful of the 
tubewells being operational. Those tubewells which were operational, 
moreover, were only in the initial phases of exploitation. Payments of 
water rates were erratic and not always enforced. And even if the 
farmers paid the appropriate rates, the revenue would most probably 
cover only part of the expenditure on operation and maintenance. It is in 
light of this discrepancy between revenues and expenditures that the 
tendency towards privatisation and greater involvement of the farmers in 
the 1990s should be placed. 
In 1987, the Formulation Mission had already concluded that the 
involvement of small- and marginal-farm households in decision-making 
with regard to the distribution of irrigation water constituted 'the most 
serious challenge.' It is therefore striking that very little was done with 
this insight during the first years of the project. In the entire Plan of 
Operations set up with the assistance of a Dutch consultancy firm only 
3.5 pages are spent at the end on 'water distribution and the 
management thereof.' Although the proposal makes some suggestions 
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for improving the functioning of the water- user committees, a clear 
strategy is spelled out nowhere. Reference is nevertheless made to a 
study to be undertaken during the implementation of the project thereby 
surpassing the insight that 'popular bodies [in this case: water-user 
committees - LS] get off to a better start if they are involved in planning 
and implementation of a new facility.'"5 
It takes up to June 1989 for a first proposal directed at farmer partici-
pation. The Farmers Participation Unit is further discussed during 1989, 
and the final proposal is forwarded at the end of that year. The mid-term 
review mission which discussed the proposal at the end of 1989 
recommended scaling the unit down to a pilot programme. It then takes 
another six months for the revised proposal to be submitted to the 
Department of Irrigation, a reduction to two districts (Sultanpur and 
Faizabad) and a reduction to a period of two years."6 The proposed 
Farmers Participation Unit aims at increasing the technical knowledge of 
the farmers, helping them organise themselves and providing them with 
information regarding efficient irrigation practices. In essence, the Unit 
should provide suitable support for the responsible agency, the 
Department of Irrigation, by setting up Tubewell Management 
Committees (TMCs) and Area Day Committees."7 
At about the same time that the revised proposal for the Farmers 
Participation Unit was submitted in 1990, the Department of Irrigation 
produces a pamphlet in which it describes its view on farmers participa-
tion."8 The point of departure in the pamphlet is that the tubewell has 
already been constructed. Participation is thus a later activity. The most 
important points brought forward by the department refer to the election 
of the Tubewell Management Committee and to the fixation of 
outlets."9 The Department proposal leaves no time or space for a 
training of the five members of the Tubewell Management Committee or 
the rest of the farmers within the command area. It is with regard to this 
preparation that the Farmers Participation Unit (FPU) comes in. For the 
Netherlands, participation of farmers in the preparation, implementation 
and operation and maintenance of tubewells was considered essential, 
not only for 'improving the marginal income position of large groups in 
the eight districts of Urtar Pradesh' but also because such participation 
can lead to a 'greater involvement of the population in water manage-
ment with the aim of creating a certain feeling of responsibility' among 
them for the proper functioning of the irrigation facilities. The ultimate 
aim, however, was to reach a situation in which the financial burden of 
operation and maintenance could be taken over by the users and thereby 
alleviate the need for heavy subsidies from the government.120 
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A Farmers Participation Unit was also considered necessary as the 
general feeling was that the Department of Irrigation, which was the first 
agency responsible for the promotion of participation through the 
formation of Tubewell Management Committees, was not up to the task. 
This was partly because the Department was essentially technical with 
no experience or knowledge in the field of participation and, what could 
be called, social mobilisation work.121 When the department found it 
'impossible [...] to recruit/make available qualified staff,' it was decided 
to contract the NGDO Krishi Vigyan Kendra (the organisation also 
responsible for the Women Extension Programme) as the implementing 
agency for the Unit. 
In December 1991, participation activities were started with four staff 
members. Up to the beginning of 1993, the activities of the Farmers 
Participation Unit were restricted to one tubewell cluster in the Sultan-
pur district.122 The recommendation of the mid-term review mission to 
scale down the area had been taken very literally. In the eyes of the 
Monitoring and Appraisal Cell, even to such a 'dwarfed pilot scale' that 
it bore 'no relation to the size of the project.'123 The mentioned 
activities mainly referred to the organisation of proper elections for the 
Tubewell Panchayat Committees (the term which replaced Tubewell 
Management Committees). One of the main problems in starting the 
participation unit was finding qualified personnel and/or staff training. 
At the end of 1991, for instance, there was still no 'principal expert' to 
take charge of the unit.124 As part of the participation activities, a new 
forum was created in the specific tubewell cluster. This forum, which 
met for the first time in June 1992, was meant to provide a get-together 
for the chairs of the different Tubewell Panchayat Committees to discuss 
common problems and possible remedies. 
As already mentioned, the focus of the Indo-Dutch Tubewell Project 
changed dramatically starting in 1993. The conclusions of the so-called 
Timmer mission in 1992 certainly contributed to this change. This 
mission swept the floor with the Tubewell project by concluding that the 
Netherlands should not agree to finance any more new tubewells or the 
rehabilitation of old ones. The first conclusion was based on the fact that 
(1) the tubewells met with large technical problems due to the erratic 
provision of electricity and lack of maintenance; (2) the tubewells are 
not cost-effective because of a lower 'production of water' than 
anticipated and much higher costs; (3) the tubewells are not in the long 
run feasible as a government undertaking because of O&M problems; 
(4) the form of privatisation started on a pilot scale is no solution as 
electricity costs are still carried by the government, farmers refuse to 
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pay charges as long as the electricity problem is not solved and the 
organisational structure is lacking; and (5) the tubewells do not 
contribute to poverty alleviation but lead instead to increased social 
inequality.125 The mission also advised no further financing of the 
software aspects of the project — participation, the women extension, the 
monitoring and appraisal unit and agricultural research — because the 
project to which these activities are attached is technically and 
economically not feasible and, thus, not sustainable. It would take 
another two years for the Netherlands to follow-up on these conclusions. 
In the wake of this critique, the concept of participation (and thus the 
activities of the Farmers Participation Unit) were brought into a different 
light. At the Annual Consultations in January 1993, it was decided to 
build future tubewells only for already existing Water Users 
Associations or Tubewell Panchayat Committees. This all happened 
under the motto of privatisation which had already been put forward in 
the Eighth Five Year Plan as a possible solution to not only the 
discrepancy between created and utilised potential but also (and mainly) 
to the problem of the financing gap in the field of operation and 
maintenance. Within the Indo-Dutch Tubewell Project, this also meant 
scaling down the command area for a tubewell (and thus the number of 
farmers using a single tubewell) in order to provide a better environment 
for cooperation between the farmers.126 It would take until 1993 for 
the command area to be reduced from the 100 hectares on the basis of 
the technical and social problems cited by the Monitoring and Appraisal 
Cell in 1989 as leading to the provision of insufficient irrigation water 
for all of the farmers in the command area of a tubewell. 
Conclusion 
Although the Urtar Pradesh State Tubewell Project is somewhat unique 
among the projects sanctioned in the sector land and water,127 it 
nevertheless fit in nicely with the Dutch objectives for development aid: 
increasing agricultural production, special emphasis on small- and 
marginal-farming households and an integrated approach. The changes in 
the project at the instigation of DGIS must also be regarded as essential 
in light of the problems encountered in the World Bank supported 
tubewell projects in Шаг Pradesh. The project proposal finally 
sanctioned by the Netherlands included some aspects of a more 
integrated approach to irrigation.128 Including these additional activities 
did not automatically lead to more integrated implementation or, for that 
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matter, remediation of the shortcomings and problems encountered in 
earlier projects. This can be seen on the basis of the different activities 
actually incorporated into the implementation process and the 
agencies/organisations responsible for these activities. 
The Indo-Dutch State Tubewell Project provides a prime example of 
the many problems encountered by irrigation projects. There is a 
preoccupation with the construction of new irrigation facilities and 
thereby a neglect of older facilities. There is insufficient attention to the 
finalisation of the total construction including field channels. A lack of 
extension services, problems in the field of electricity and difficulties 
reaching small and marginal farmers also exist. Delays in implementati-
on were typical as well as widespread doubt about the impact of the 
tubewells on the agricultural production and economic position of the 
target groups. Data provided on the running hours for the tubewells 
indicate that the performance of the tubewells (and therefore their 
impact on agricultural production) is in many cases relatively low and 
that there are major differences between the tubewells in this regard. 
The question, then, is whether the project ultimately scored any better 
than its predecessor (i.e., the World Bank II project).129 That the 
implementation of the construction part met with severe difficulties has 
been clearly shown. The proposed changes in this part of the project 
also did not materialise. This means that 'the objective of the [pilot] 
project, installation of 50 small irrigation pumps and setting up of 
farmers organisations, has not been reached. As such, the project has 
failed."30 
This failure coupled to the difficulties of implementing a more partici-
patory approach produced continual problems in the field of operation 
and maintenance. The problem of slow progress cannot be blamed upon 
lack of insight or lack of commitment on the part of the Monitoring and 
Appraisal Cell.131 Such delay has more to do with internal Indian 
circumstances (e.g., a technical preoccupation within the Department of 
Irrigation, lack of clear policies on participation, dysfunctioning within 
the Department of Agriculture). In addition, the role of the relevant 
Dutch authorities has to be taken into account. The lack of a clear policy 
seems to have been a major constraint on the push for greater 
participation and integration. Such activities as the provision of 
extension services and the organisation of the farmers were originally 
not envisaged. They were assumed to fall outside the responsibilities of 
the project and covered by the activities of various government 
departments. As early as 1987, the project was found to depend too 
much on government machinery and pay insufficient attention to what 
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was considered its major challenge: that is, the participation of small and 
marginal farmers in decision making with regard to water distribution. 
The project in fact violated the assumptions behind Dutch development 
policy which considered participation and integration crucial.132 
In light of the above, it is interesting to note that those project activ-
ities which have been and are being implemented by government 
departments meet with many more constraints and much more critique 
than those activities implemented by non-govemmental agencies. The 
activities of the non-governmental agencies also shared a feature which 
basically made them highly unlikely to be sustainable in the long run 
(i.e., after donor funds dry up). This holds for the studies and surveys 
undertaken within the project, the Monitoring and Appraisal Cell and 
also for the Women Extension Programme.133 The fact that with the 
ending of the Dutch assistance the activities of the MAC also came to 
an end is a clear example of the problems of introducing a donor-funded 
agency without succeeding to integrate the agency into the (project) 
environment. Whether the end of the Dutch aid to the project after only 
two years of experimenting with the newly adopted strategy also means 
an end to participation remains to be seen. Changing policies at the 
central level in India are bringing greater attention to participation if 
only because a response to the felt need for privatisation may decrease 
the costs of operation and maintenance. 
To summarise: In essence the conclusion of a staff member from the 
consultancy firm DHV at the end of 1992 characterises the results of 
this project: 'The activities related to privatization, farmers participation, 
O&M, agricultural extension and Women in Development (the 
software)' have to be judged positively from a qualitative point of view, 
but 'the performance in the construction activities is still far below 
acceptable standards.'134 Taken together, as elements in an integrated 
approach, the various activities have to be judged more negatively. The 
project has not succeeded in establishing an integrated approach. The 
decision of the Netherlands to end support to the project after 1994, 
whether justified or not, meant an end to the sustainability of the project 
and particularly the software-aspects as well. It can be concluded that 
the Uttar Pradesh State Tubewell Project is a project with a "high white 
elephant content." 
216 The same difference 
5.3.2 North Bengal Terai project 
West Bengal, a state in the North-Eastern part of India, is probably best 
known for its capital Calcutta, the communist state government and for 
the district Darjeeling where some of the finest tea in the world is 
grown. The southern part of this district, together with the neighbouring 
districts of Jalpaiguri and Cooch Behar, form the Terai region of West 
Bengal. Strapped in between Bhutan on the north, Bangladesh on the 
south, Nepal on the west and the Indian state of Assam on the east, the 
Terai region is a predominantly agricultural region 'dominated by small 
holdings.'135 Landholdings are normally under rain-fed cultivation, 
although about 22% of the cultivated land is irrigated by various sources 
which are mainly of the minor irrigation type.136 Irrigation plus 
occasional but substantial rainfall lead to a cropping intensity of nearly 
200% in the region. The largest part of the cultivated area is used for 
rice cultivation followed by jute, vegetables and potatoes cultivation. 
Agricultural production is geared 'to household consumption and local 
petty trading.' It is this region which constitutes the working area of the 
second largest irrigation and agricultural development project co-finan-
ced by the Netherlands in India: the North Bengal Terai Development 
Project (NBTDP). 
In 1980, the Netherlands received the first proposal for a comprehen-
sive rural development programme for the North Bengal Terai region 
with a total budget of Dfl. 150 million and a duration of five years. 
Although the Netherlands, in order to show their interest, had already 
reserved Dfl. 24 million for the NBTDP in 1981,137 it would take up 
to 1985 for the project to get started.118 The main activities in this first 
phase of the project concerned the 'selection and execution of a number 
of irrigation works, training of staff and drafting of a masterplan.'139 
Phase I officially ended in September 1986, but 'some of the items 
continued along with the phase-II programme which was started' in 
September 1987.140 The second phase officially ended in July 1993 but 
was extended up to December of that year in order to allow evaluation 
and enable a decision with regard to continuation of the Dutch bilateral 
aid to this non-concentration state or not. In January 1994, the third 
phase of the North Bengal Terai Development project with a duration of 
five years was initiated. 
The long-term objective of the NBTDP is 'to induce a better income 
and income distribution among the marginal and small farmers in the 
Terai region through increase of production and productivity of 
Irrigation 217 
individual crops and also to increase the cropping intensity.'141 The 
focus would thus be on small and marginal farmers. Moreover, special 
attention was to be paid to community participation, the involvement of 
rural women and research, training and monitoring. In the second phase, 
these latter points were given greater attention.142 Community 
participation in the project is restricted to the creation of water-user 
committees for the irrigation facilities provided under the project (except 
for the individually owned and operated hand tubewells - see below). 
The involvement of rural women concerns not only their involvement in 
water committees but also the selection of women as the beneficiaries of 
the irrigation facilities and the training of women as extension workers. 
Training mainly refers to the training of the farmers in the field of 
irrigated agriculture but also to the training of extension workers and 
technical staff. Finally, research is aimed at a proper 'monitoring of the 
socio-economic impact of the project' in order to provide the data 
necessary to adjust the project for implementation.143 
The Netherlands agreed to fund the provision of minor irrigation 
facilities (see Box 5.2 for the different types of facilities included in the 
project), soil conservation works, training of extension workers, 
monitoring and research and a marketing study. The Government of 
West Bengal (through the Department of Agriculture which also carried 
the overall coordination) would take responsibility for such supportive 
interventions as the provision of high quality seeds, fertilisers, pesticides 
and also credit and marketing facilities. The Departments of Minor 
Irrigation, Soil Conservation and Agriculture were responsible for the 
execution of the major parts of the project co-financed by the 
Netherlands.144 Agricultural training was provided by an NGDO up to 
the beginning of 1991. Thereafter, the Department of Agriculture took 
over and the 'only non-departmental organizational aspect of the project' 
consisted of the research unit, which was separately funded by the 
Netherlands under technical aid grants.145 
At the end of Phase I, all of the planned deep tubewells (DTW) and 
river lift irrigation (RLI) facilities were constructed while the number of 
shallow tubewells (STW) surpassed the planned number of 150. The 
same could not be said for the hand tubewells (HTW), pump dugwells 
(PDW) and 4-ha units.146 In the second phase of the project, 
implementation of these latter irrigation facilities in particular was 
speeded up. A few months before the start of Phase III (i.e., in 
September 1993), nearly 24,000 hand tubewells were constructed as 
opposed to a target of 20,000 while only one of the planned number of 
300 pump dugwells was not completed by that time. In addition, all 150 
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of the shallow tubewells planned for the second phase were indeed 
constructed along with 11 of the 16 deep tubewells and 28 of the 30 
river lift irrigation facilities. The construction of 434 field channels 
(called 4-ha units) lagged far behind the planned number of Ι,ΟΟΟ.147 
Box 5 2 Minor irrigation facilities m the North Bengal Term project 
Five different facilities are distinguished within the North Bengal Terai 
development project These are directed at individual households (hand 
tubewells), small groups of five farmers (pump dugwells, shallow tubewells), 
groups of 50 farmers (deep tubewells) or groups up to 100 farmers (river lift 
irrigation) Except for the latter facility, all of the irrigation uses ground-water 
resources which have a 'vast potential' in area m Other differences between the 
facilities pertain to the fact that the hand tubewells, the shallow tubewells and the 
pump dugwells are privately owned while the deep tubewells and the river lift 
irrigation facilities constitute public property This also means that responsibility 
for operation and maintenance rests with the beneficiaries in the case of the first 
three and with the government in the case of the latter two facilities For the 
shallow tubewell and the pump dugwell, a contribution of 25% of the total costs 
is demanded from the beneficiaries The other facilities are completely subsidised. 
In order to improve the water distribution within the two largest schemes (l е., 
deep tubewells and river lift irrigation), investments were made in so-called 4-ha 
units which included the construction of field channels Soil conservation work 
was to be undertaken within the working area of the project. Specific criteria 
were also set for the selection of the beneficiaries in order to make sure that small 
and marginal farmers would be the primary beneficiaries For instance, hand 
tubewells were only meant for marginal farmers while at least 65% of the 
command area for a deep tubewell or a π ver lift irrigation should consist of small 
and marginal farmers Furthermore, at least 50% of the beneficiaries should 
belong to Scheduled Castes or Tribes 
As already mentioned, the Netherlands committed Dfl. 24 million in 
financial aid in the early 1980s. Technical aid grants were also made 
available to finance missions, training and research. For Phase I, a total 
of Dfl. 4,869,000 was allocated in 1984 with 89% falling under financial 
aid.1 4 9 The total expenditure under this phase up to the end of 1988 
amounted to Dfl. 2.2 million. For the second phase in 1987, DG1S 
allocated a total of nearly Dfl. 21 million with 9 1 % falling under 
financial aid. The amount allocated under technical aid was later reduced 
to Dfl. 1.32 million.150 Of the former amount, a total of Dfl. 
16,755,000 was meant for the construction of irrigation facilities and 
soil-conservation activities. The total expenditure for these items per 
March 1993 amounted to nearly Dfl. 9 5 million leaving a budget of Dfl. 
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9.6 million at the end of Phase II, whereas total expenditure under 
technical aid amounted to 0.56 million (remaining funds: 0.76 
million).151 In addition to the Dutch contribution, the Government of 
West Bengal also earmarked funds for the financing of their part of the 
project. For the second phase, the Indian contribution was set at Rs. 
24,419,208 (or: Dfl. 4,069,868 at the 1987 exchange rate of Dfl. 1 = Rs. 
6) for engineering and administrative costs, organisation strengthening, 
staff incentives and project allowances and price contingencies. The 
West Bengal government was also responsible for the supplementary 
activities and services mentioned earlier. 
Findings 
The North Bengal Terai project is, to my knowledge, one of the best 
documented projects from DGIS in India. Reports are available from the 
research unit connected with the project, the Department of Agriculture, 
the Dutch consultancy firm Euroconsult, several (evaluation) missions 
and studies by students from Wageningen University. In many of these 
reports, specific attention is paid to what can be called the larger 
irrigation facilities: deep tubewells and river lift irrigation. My own 
research is concentrated on two of the smaller facilities: hand tubewells 
and pump dugwells. Based on a survey of the beneficiaries of these 
facilities,152 I intend to provide greater insight into the impact of the 
irrigation project in the only non-concentration state for Dutch project 
aid. The major findings with regard to the hand tubewells and pump 
dugwells will be compared to the major findings of the reports men-
tioned above. 
The 36 hand tubewell beneficiary families irrigate a total of some 6 
hectares. On average, each family (and thus each handpump) irrigates 
0.17 hectare which is in accordance with the planned command area for 
the hand tubewell. In light of the fact that these farmers grow on 
average three crops annually, the gross irrigated area is 0.5 hectare.153 
In only 26% of the cases was the hand tubewell used to irrigate all of 
the land farmed by a single family. In all of the other cases, the amount 
of irrigated land was (much) less. The 36 families own and farm a total 
of 19 hectares which means that, on average, 32% of the land owned or 
farmed is being irrigated by the hand tubewell. In the case of the pump 
dugwell beneficiaries, the average area irrigated per principal beneficiary 
is 0.48 hectare and per pump 1.7 hectare.154 In reality, the area is 
larger (up to 2.6 hectares) because the pump (and well) may be rented to 
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other farmers. Even with this unofficial extra land, however, it is clear 
that the pump dugwells remain below the command area of 3 hectare set 
for these facilities. 
The discrepancy between command area and actual irrigated area for 
the pump dugwells (PDWs) can be explained by the fact that the 
number of beneficiaries actually ranges from three to five and 
sometimes as many as nine farmers may make use of the facility.155 
The majority of the PDW beneficiaries are small farmers although 25% 
of them actually appear to be medium (2-4 hectares) or even large (> 4 
hectares) farmers. On average, the farmers own and farm on 1.7 
hectares, with a range between slightly less than 0.5 up to 4.2 hectares. 
For all of the farmers, the land to be irrigated should be adjacent to each 
other, they should have experience in vegetable growing and they should 
contribute 25% of the investment costs for the pump dugwell. 
The own contribution of the farmers was indeed 25% or more. In 
some cases, the farmers wanted another motor and the costs were 
thereby increased. The own contribution for one of the groups was 
raised to more than 31% for this reason and to almost 30% for another 
group. Considering the fact that the real costs of the well plus motor 
were around Rs. 22,000, a 25% own contribution means Rs. 5,500 or 
Rs. 1,100 per target beneficiary. The actual own contribution per 
beneficiary varies greatly and depends to a large extent on the acreage 
owned or being irrigated. In some cases, moreover, the own contribution 
is advanced by one or two of the beneficiaries and to be repaid by the 
others. The impression from the interviews is that this is not only a 
structure set up in order to get the pump dugwell at only 25% of the 
real costs but also representative of the high level of cooperation 
between the members in other fields. Regularly making loans to each 
other and assisting each other in farming are mentioned as examples of 
this cooperation. 
This cooperation among the PDW beneficiaries indicates participation 
and organisation which were central issues from the start of the project. 
The activities in this field were nevertheless restricted to the setting up 
of farmers organisations with mainly the aim of reducing the costs of 
O&M but also providing for a proper utilisation of the irrigation 
facilities.156 Within the command areas for pump dugwells and shallow 
tubewells, where the number of farmers involved in any one facility is 
limited, the farmers themselves grouped together. Agreements with 
regard to, for instance, the share of the own contribution paid per 
beneficiary and the use of the irrigation facility (water distribution) were 
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made by the farmers without the direct involvement of any outside 
organisation or agency. 
Participation is not an issue for the hand tubewells because these are 
used by individual families. The hand tubewells were specifically meant 
for marginal farmers (i.e., those who farm up to one hectare of land). 
Not all of the beneficiaries fell within this category, however, as 6 (or 
17%) of the respondents owned slightly more than one hectare (up to 
1.3 hectares). Other selection criteria were that the land to be irrigated 
should be adjacent to the house, that the beneficiaries should have 
experience in producing vegetables (or be willing to grow them) and 
that no other means of irrigation should be available. In principle, all of 
the respondents satisfied these three criteria although the hand tubewell 
is (presently) not the only source of irrigation for all of them. Field 
dugwells are (still) being used by part of the beneficiaries, and a few 
others indicated that they buy water from other farmers. One farmer also 
indicated that he received government assistance for the construction of 
a shallow tubewell at the end of 1992. Although all of the respondents 
reported utilisation of the hand tubewell for irrigation purposes, this is 
not always the case. According to a survey conducted by the Department 
of Agriculture, in some areas up to 14% of the nearly 2,000 hand 
tubewells were not being utilised for this primary task. Furthermore, 
there are always some hand tubewells temporarily not being used as a 
means of irrigation (in the Department of Agriculture survey this 
accounts for 6% of them).157 
Considering the investment costs, the created irrigation potential and 
the O&M being carried by the beneficiaries, the evaluation mission of 
1993 concluded that PDWs are 'very appropriate in social as well as 
economic and financial terms.' At the same time, it was also concluded 
that 'considering the investment costs involved at nearly Rs 21,000/ha 
(all of which constitutes a subsidy by the government/project) an HTW 
can hardly be seen as an economically justifiable investment.'158 
Investment costs per hectare are indeed the highest for the HTWs but 
nevertheless the lowest per beneficiary.159 Furthermore, the hand 
tubewell 'is the only one of the technologies deployed in the project that 
can be given a more direct gender focus.'160 This focus on women is 
definitely known within the project area and illustrated by the fact that 
fanners will put their land in the name of the woman in order to obtain 
a hand tubewell more quickly and/or easily. Between 1986/87 and 
1990/91, slightly more than 10% of the hand tubewells were given to 
female farmers who were also the legal owners of the land. Up until 
1989/90, women had only formed around 4% of the beneficiaries. In 
222 The same difference 
1990/91, however, their share had increased to 25%161 and it is 
expected to at least remain at this level. 
The hand tubewells may not only be used for irrigation but also for 
other purposes (e.g., drinking, cooking, washing, bathing). In project 
documents, this provision of an individual "safe" drinking-water source 
is considered to be one of the positive side-effects of the project. The 
actual safety of the water from the hand pumps has not, however, been 
guaranteed by any scientific study. Given the fact that the ground-water 
levels in the project area are high, the hand tubewells are not tapping 
water from deep layers. A risk of contamination of the ground water in 
the upper layers by, for example, fertilisers and pesticides used in the 
fields adjacent to the pumps thus exists. Furthermore, no specific 
attention has been paid in the project to the proper handling of the 
drinking water and health education. Finally, the fact that a hand 
tubewell has been constructed near their houses does not mean that all 
households refrain from using the old sources.162 Notwithstanding 
these points, the majority of the respondents is of the opinion that it is 
mainly the change in water source that has contributed to their general 
feeling of an improved health situation (i.e., nearly 75% of the 
respondents is of the opinion that diseases occur less frequently since 
they started using the hand tubewell). The pump dugwells are also 
reportedly used for all kinds of domestic purposes, including drinking-
water use. Utilisation also does not seem to be restricted to the principal 
beneficiary families in the case of pump dugwells. 
In discussing costs, it is insufficient to look at investment costs alone. 
One should also include operation and maintenance costs. In the case of 
the smaller facilities (i.e., hand tubewells, pump dugwells and shallow 
tubewells), operation and maintenance are the responsibility of the 
beneficiaries. As these facilities are meant to increase the agricultural 
production and thus the income of the beneficiaries, moreover, they 
should be prepared to handle the costs of such O&M. Responsibility for 
the O&M of RLI and DTWs lies with the government. It is difficult to 
say anything conclusive about O&M given the relatively short period of 
use for most of the irrigation facilities.163 In the case of river lift 
irrigation and deep tubewells, however, the 1993 evaluation mission 
stated that 'both [...] pose problems in this sense, because of the high 
operating and (re)investment costs required as well as the larger number 
of households involved which makes common action difficult.'164 
The maintenance of the hand tubewells and pump dugwells has not 
been a major problem, but several of the hand tubewells in the survey 
showed signs of wear and a few of them were held together by ropes. 
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Most of the irrigation facilities were installed in the early 1990s and 
thus relatively young at the time of the survey. The frequent use of the 
hand tubewells for irrigation, drinking water and other household 
purposes will certainly lead to major breakdowns in the future. 
According to a survey of hand tubewells by the Department of 
Agriculture, major repair was more an exception than the rule up to the 
fourth year of operation. Up to now, maintenance expenditures have 
been primarily for washers and bolts. In my own survey, the majority of 
respondents (54%) spent less than Rs. 30 annually on the hand tubewell. 
Only in a few cases did the yearly expenditure exceed Rs. 100 and all of 
these cases concerned hand tubewells installed before 1990. 
Despite the relatively low amounts spent on maintenance, 20% of the 
respondents still stated that they encountered difficulties in covering the 
annual expenditures. In the case of pump dugwells, the maintenance is 
mainly restricted to the motor. The farmers are also afraid of theft and 
the motor will not be left in the field without at least one farmer looking 
after it. When the motor is not required for irrigation purposes, it will 
also be safely locked away. As the motors included in this survey were 
only in operation for a maximum of two years, there was no report of 
major maintenance costs. Only in one case (where the motor was 
installed at the end of 1992) some costs were incurred by one of the 
beneficiaries. In four of the six cases, it took up to 1.5 years after the 
digging of the well for the motor to be delivered. In one case, the well 
was dug in December 1991 and the motor arrived at the end of 1992; in 
another case, the well was dug in March 1991 and the motor arrived in 
June 1993. Of the two wells in the survey dug in 1993, the motor was 
available within a couple of months. 
The availability of irrigation water is certainly of major importance 
for the number of crops grown per year. In the survey, the majority of 
the farmers (86%) grew three or more crops on the piece of land 
irrigated by the hand tubewell or pump dugwell per year. At best two 
crops were grown on other non-irrigated fields. When the farmers use 
the irrigated land to grow only vegetables, more than three crops per 
year is possible. The most important crops grown are vegetables 
(potatoes, cabbage, cauliflower) and paddy (rice).165 The latter is 
mainly grown during the rainy season when the hand tubewell is 
specifically used for seedbeds. An increase in production and, as most of 
the produce is sold, in income was stated by the majority of the 
respondents. More production, more income and more water for house-
hold and drinking purposes are the main advantages mentioned by the 
respondents in the survey. Probably the best way of indicating the 
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economic impact of the irrigation facilities is by quoting one of the 
farmers, who stated that the hand tubewell had made it possible for him 
to pay the dowry for his two daughters. Other advantages stated by 
individual farmers are that other people can use the facility for drinking 
purposes or that the water is used for a small fish pond. Only one 
respondent stated that the irrigation facility enabled him to purchase 
some assets (a cow, in this particular case). Four farming households 
bought some extra land after the installation of the hand tubewell, while 
in the case of pump dugwells only one farmer stated that he obtained 
extra land after the installation of the facility. 
All of the surveyed farmers consume part of their produce and sell the 
remainder. Selling is mainly done to a middleman, although a considera-
ble number of respondents (particularly in the case of hand tubewell 
beneficiaries) also go to the market themselves. Middlemen are often 
complained about but remain an important chain in the marketing of 
agricultural produce. This is particularly the case when the yield 
increases and the farmers find it more difficult to transport their produce 
to the market and/or are unwilling or unable to find the time to sell the 
produce themselves, as was the case with some of the respondents. 
Marketing their produce was not a problem for the majority of the 
respondents. Those who do experience problems mainly mention trans-
portation and money problems. Whereas middlemen are and remain a 
major partner in the marketing of produce, this does not hold for 
government-regulated marketing. In principle, the middlemen have no 
regulations with regard to the quantity or type of produce purchased 
from the farmers. The fact that farmers are unaware of the possibilities 
of the government machinery with regard to the storage and pricing of 
produce should also be mentioned as a reason for the non-utilisation of 
the government-marketing facilities.166 
With regard to some of the other supporting activities in the North 
Bengal Terai development project which were the responsibility of the 
government of West Bengal, the survey showed the following. Obtaining 
seeds is not a problem for the majority (86%) of hand tubewell 
beneficiaries or the farmers with a pump dugwell. In the case of hand 
tubewells, this is mainly because some of the farmers simply do not use 
hybrid seeds (29% do not), retail shops are plentiful and/or the extension 
officer is part of the seed-purchasing chain. The government also 
distributes so-called mini-kits which include seeds. Fertilisers and 
pesticides, two important ingredients in any scheme in India directed at 
increased agricultural production, are likewise not a major problem for 
farmers.167 All but one of the farmers reported using fertilisers as well 
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as pesticides. One-third of the farmers encountered problems in obtain-
ing the same. In most cases, the problems pertain to the costs of the 
resources although some complain about non-availability or the fact that 
a specific brand is not always available. 
Credit is yet another story. Considered important in agriculture and 
the responsibility of the West Bengal government, more than 75% of the 
respondents had never taken out a crop loan, at least not via the 
government or banks. This is not to say that some of the farmers had 
never tried to get a loan. They were either simply refused or judged 
ineligible because of an outstanding loan. Some of the farmers have 
taken out loans to purchase such assets as cows and bullocks. The latter 
is of major importance in light of the fact that nearly one-third of the 
hand tubewell farmers complain about the high costs of renting a plough 
and the accompanying bullocks. 
Plant diseases and a lack of electricity are some of the remaining 
problems encountered by the farmers. A few of the hand tubewell 
respondents also indicated that they regard their irrigation facility as too 
small (i.e., as discharging too little water) and that they were thus 
looking for ways to obtain a shallow tubewell. Pump dugwell beneficia-
ries mainly complained about the time needed to plough their land and 
came up with the tractor as a solution. Lack of fodder for the animals 
was also considered a major problem. 
Up to now, only one of the hand tubewell respondents managed to 
purchase such a shallow tubewell with the assistance of the government. 
This made him a double irrigation beneficiary at the same time. Many of 
the beneficiaries have benefitted from other government schemes. The 
most important of these government schemes (in terms of the number of 
beneficiaries) is the mini-kit mentioned above. Some of the farmers have 
also received fertilisers and pesticides at subsidised rates. Two farmers 
benefitted from a loan for the purchase of a cow; one received a crop 
loan from the government; and another received a loan to set up a poul-
try farm. It was interestingly this latter farmer, who owns 2.5 acres of 
land and received three consecutive crop loans, who stated that it pays 
off to go to the panchayat on your own and to apply for government 
schemes. 
Training was included in the project as one of the activities co-
financed by the Netherlands, but the majority of hand tubewell benefi-
ciaries did not participate. Only 29% acknowledged receipt of specific 
training since the start of the project. In the case of pump dugwells, one 
of the farmers from each of me six groups surveyed had received 
specific training within the project.168 In contrast, some 75% of the 
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hand tubewell respondents were frequently visited by an extension 
worker from the Department of Agriculture, and this was the case for all 
of the pump dugwell owners. These figures seem to be on the high side 
considering the fact that the T&V system (Training and Visit or, as 
some critics would say, Touch and Vanish system) for agricultural 
extension does not appear to be running particularly smoothly. Only nine 
as opposed to the target of 52 women were appointed as extension 
officers. There were also many vacancies within the Department of 
Agriculture for extension work which left entire areas uncovered or only 
partially covered. As one of the extension officers working in 30 
villages stated: 'The number of villages to be covered by a single 
worker is simply too high.'169 A further point of concern is that the 
extension workers are concentrated in only those areas covered under 
the project. 
Conclusion 
Like the Uttar Pradesh State Tubewell Project, the NBTDP nicely fit the 
Dutch development policy.170 The North Bengal Terai project also 
provides a more positive picture. The construction activities were 
reached or even surpassed. Some of the supporting activities taken up 
under this Dutch- financed irrigation project were also more or less 
successful. By reducing the original rural development project to 
irrigation and soil conservation, it could be argued that DGIS opted for a 
technical project. However, the attention devoted to training, women, 
participation and the fact that the project constituted part of a total 
programme with the Government of West Bengal taking responsibility 
for other parts counter such an argument. The project represented an 
integrated approach right from the beginning. This integrated approach, 
however, did not manifest itself equally well. 
This is clear from the outright failure of the women extension workers 
programme but also from the unsatisfactory training activities. The lack 
of a clear strategy towards participation in the larger irrigation facilities 
(and therefore the failure of these) should also be mentioned here. For 
the DTWs and RLIs, farmers organisations were set up by the govern-
ment as originally done in the Uttar Pradesh Tubewell Project. Together 
with the five farmers per facility, government officials were also part of 
the committees. Considering the vague responsibilities of these organisa-
tions and the fact that the government took responsibility for all of the 
operation and maintenance costs, it can be doubted that the elections for 
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these organisations offered equal opportunities for small farmers. The 
(government) operator was a central figure in the working of the scheme 
and as these schemes are sensitive to electricity cuts it can be doubted 
whether these farmers organisations are functioning properly. 
The present survey showed participation to be less of a problem in the 
case of pump dugwells. The fact that the beneficiaries own the irrigation 
facility, are responsible for the proper functioning and maintenance of 
the facility and the groups are much smaller seem to be the major 
reasons for this. Nevertheless, a fear was expressed by the evaluation 
mission that, due to the 'relatively substantial local contribution,' 'the 
"captain" of the beneficiary group not only [puts] up the largest share of 
the contribution but also [appropriates] a disproportionate share of the 
benefits accruing from the installation.'171 Such evidence, however, 
was not found. What became clear, though, is that the HTWs and PDWs 
provided under the project are being used by the beneficiaries for 
irrigation purposes (and in the case of the HTWs for other household 
purposes as well) and that the farmers themselves state that they have 
benefitted from the facility. This is despite some complaints about the 
low discharge of water from the HTWs and/or lack of supportive activi-
ties. 
It is with regard to the latter point that the integrated approach 
encounters some deeper problems particularly in light of the major 
objective of increasing production and thereby contributing to poverty 
alleviation. Although the data provided above with regard to the 
provision of seeds, fertilisers/pesticides and credit seem impressive, they 
have nevertheless been insufficient to contribute significantly to an 
increase in production. This also holds for the marketing of agricultural 
produce and for the extension services provided by the Department of 
Agriculture. The latter point has been part of the critique from many 
missions over the years and remains a major barrier to increased 
production under irrigated agriculture. The picture with regard to the 
impact of the project in the field of created potential and utilisation is 
diffuse. Data with regard to actual command areas per facility were 
hardly available at the beginning of 1993, and the available data are 
often contradictory. 
The failure to attain an integrated approach in many of the projects in 
India seems to be due to a large extent to interdepartmental struggles 
and a general unwillingness to cooperate with each other. This 
nevertheless proved to be less of a problem in the North Bengal Terai 
project. This, in turn, seems to be attributable to the personalities in 
charge of major parts of the project. The contribution of the research 
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activities in this regard is doubtful, if only because that team was not 
intended to provide practical guidance during project implementation. As 
a consequence of the attention to research and monitoring in Phase 11, 
however, the North Bengal Terai Development project has been relative-
ly well documented.172 Despite the fact that the marketing study 
proposed in the first phase was never executed, the research team produ-
ced a considerable amount of data with regard to the impact of the pro-
ject and the problems.173 The findings of this research team together 
with technical data were used to prepare extensive monitoring reports. 
The problems encountered in the larger schemes — such as low 
pumping capacity, low farmer participation and improper field channels 
~ are essentially familiar and general problems. It can thus be concluded 
that the implementing organisations in the North Bengal Terai project 
have not succeeded in overcoming these problems either. This is much 
less the case for the pump dugwells and hand tubewells, however. Satis-
faction concerning these facilities prevails among the beneficiaries who 
claim to have indeed benefitted from the project. Furthermore, although 
the investment costs for hand tubewells are quite high in comparison 
with other facilities, they are nevertheless considered as a very fine 
aspect of the project. The hand tubewells are directed at small and 
marginal farmers who are thereby able to increase their production;174 
the facilities are also used as drinking-water sources; and they are the 
only facilities in which an active women policy has been given shape. 
To summarise: This project once again shows that large irrigation 
facilities (in this case, deep tubewells and river lift irrigation), although 
more cost-effective in theory, meet with many more problems than 
smaller irrigation facilities. This is particularly the case when viewed 
from the perspective of increasing O&M costs at a time when the 
government finds it more and more difficult to finance these costs. The 
project also shows the importance of supportive activities for farming 
and once again provides an example of the fact that the government 
machinery, even in a relatively open situation, finds it difficult to 
implement the project in an integrated manner. 
5.3.3 Centre for Rural Development 
Some 250 kilometres south-east of the capital of Andhra Pradesh lies the 
city of Guntur in a district with the same name. Bordering on the Bay of 
Bengal, this district is prone to such natural disasters as floods. At the 
same time, the area is known for its tobacco, chilies and cotton which 
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are cash crops for which Guntur is an important (international) trading 
centre. North of the city, canal irrigation is widespread. For the more 
interior parts of the district, water for irrigation purposes can be difficult 
to find due to depleting ground- water levels. It is in three areas of this 
district that one of ICCO's counterparts, the Centre for Rural Develop-
ment (CRD),175 started its activities in 1977. Activities of the CRD 
have diversified over the years and also include assistance for irrigation 
in a specific manner. In order to understand this 'specific manner' it is 
necessary to first examine CRD's philosophy and strategies which differ 
in many ways from those of the other non-governmental organisations 
supported by ICCO in India. 
In addition to an economic dimension, CRD's philosophy also has 
social and political dimensions. The political dimension of poverty (and 
then mainly the lack of people's participation in decision-making) is 
regarded as the most important dimension. CRD's main objective is thus 
to reach active participation of the people in decision-making for 'the 
basic defect with the conventional development approach is that the 
poor, specially rural poor, are rarely involved in the planning and 
implementation of development efforts.'176 In order to provide some of 
the means for reaching this objective, developmental activities in both 
the economic and social spheres must be simultaneously undertaken. 
Economic development is necessary to assist people in entering 
mainstream society and the market system. People must become part of 
mainstream society in order to have a say. Economic development, 
awareness-building (e.g., on human rights, government programmes, 
functioning of the political system) and organisation of the people are 
considered pre-conditions for reaching the goal of political development. 
Following this philosophy, CRD emphasises the participation of the 
members of the target group in its programme along with the tapping of 
government funds for specific developmental activities.177 Participation 
is not only expressed by the fact that a contribution (whether in kind or 
in cash) is demanded for practically all (and certainly all economic) 
activities, but also primarily by the fact that activities are as a rule only 
undertaken and supported when requested by the target group through 
the decision-making structures set up within the CRD programme (see 
below). Furthermore, members of the target group have to be willing to 
provide time and energy in getting the activities financed under different 
government schemes. 
CRD is presently working with some 11,000 people in 142 target 
communities. The target groups mainly consist of Scheduled Castes 
(SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs), although in recent years Backward 
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Castes (BCs) have also been included.178 The majority of the target 
group works in agriculture, either as small cultivators or as agricultural 
labourers. The working area of CRD is divided into three regions: 
Chowdavaram (64 communities), Rajupalem (64) and Pittalavanipalem 
(14).179 Between 1980 and March 1993, the number of communities 
under the CRD programme increased from eight to 142. With the 
exception of 1981, new communities were taken up every year although 
the number of new villages differs substantially per year. According to 
CRD, the relatively rapid expansion in the number of communities since 
1990 is mainly due to the growing capacities of the staff and the 
growing demand from new villages/communities for support.180 
The 142 target communities are distinguished according to the phase 
of intervention: extension, active and autonomous.181 The distinction 
between the three types of communities has less to do with economic 
development or with the activities undertaken and the number of people 
reached by the programme than with the capacity of the people in these 
communities to act on the behalf of their development independent of 
CRD. Presently, there are 24 extension communities, 78 active 
communities and 40 autonomous communities within the CRD program-
me. The extension phase includes initial exposure to the CRD program-
me, philosophy and strategies and determination of whether the commu-
nities are willing to cooperate to the fullest extent in their development 
(i.e., are willing to initiate certain activities). In this phase, some CRD 
activities are implemented mainly in the field of health and education. In 
the active phase, the full CRD programme is implemented, including 
economic activities and the formation of three committees at the level of 
the community (i.e., women sangham, youth association and community 
committee). Once these communities have shown themselves capable of 
making decisions on their own, finding solutions to some of their 
problems and able to tap funds (government or otherwise) with little or 
no CRD interference, they are promoted to the autonomous phase.181 
A few of the activities under the CRD programme have already been 
mentioned in the preceding. A distinction can be made between 
economic, social and organisational/awareness activities. Like in other 
NGDOs, the latter activities form the backbone of the programme and 
constitute the principal vehicle for reaching the major objective of the 
programme. In this process of awareness-building and organisation, 
personal interaction between the CRD staff and members of the target 
group is important. During visits to communities, the CRD staff explains 
development, new government schemes and tries to encourage people to 
come forward. In addition to this personal interaction, the structure set 
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up by CRD is intended to guarantee a constant flow of information to 
the target group and formalise the participation of these people in the 
decision-making within the CRD programme. There are three tiers: 
community, area and programme. 
Representatives of the target-group participate in the committees on 
the three tiers. At the community level, three different committees are 
formed with new members elected by the community every two years. 
The committees are the women sangham, youth association and 
community committee.183 The community committee consists of seven 
so-called community representatives.184 It is not the ultimate decision-
making committee as decisions (with regard to, for instance, the 
selection of beneficiaries for specific programmes) are made at the 
village-level by all of the people attending the general meetings. The 
same holds for the Women Committee (three members) and the Youth 
Committee (three members).185 The main tasks of these local-level 
committees is to prepare meetings, discuss different programmes, 
follow-up on decisions and (if any assistance from CRD is required) 
forward the decisions and plans of the community to the area committee. 
The area committees consist of one community representative and 
either the animator or the health worker-cum-women guide from each 
community in the area. The representatives are elected every year. The 
CRD staff for the specific area is also present at the two monthly 
meetings. The main tasks of this committee are to provide a forum for 
the exchange of experiences between the different communities, to 
assess the feasibility of the programmes proposed by the communities 
and to guide an equal distribution of the programmes. As in the case of 
the village-level committee, the area committee does not make the 
ultimate decision with regard to the implementation of programmes. This 
is the task of the programme committee which normally meets every 
three months and consists of seven members from the target group 
(selected by and from the area committee) for each area and the area-
coordinators (CRD staff). The members of this programme committee 
are also elected every year. The same procedure (i.e., planning and 
primary decision-making at the local and area levels and final decision-
making at the programme level) is obligatory for all programmes and 
activities receiving CRD assistance. This means that the activities 
undertaken in active communities follow the same procedures as the 
activities undertaken in autonomous communities. 
As mentioned above, the economic activities undertaken and/or 
supported by CRD should be viewed in light of the objectives of the 
organisation. It should also be recalled that substantial use is being made 
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of government funds and that a contribution from the beneficiaries 
(whether in cash or labour) is required in almost all cases. The activities 
undertaken/supported by CRD in the field of (economic) development, 
range from irrigation to milch animals and from mike sets to fishing 
tanks. Over the years, a total of 1,989 target families (or 15% of the 
total number of families) have received a crop loan, making it the most 
important economic asset provided under the CRD programme. The 
second most important asset is the milch animal, from which 1,945 
families (14.6%) have reportedly benefitted. Poultry is clearly less 
wanted, with a coverage of 0.5% of all target families in the three CRD 
working areas. 
The social activities of the Centre for Rural Development are, in 
addition to legal assistance, directed at the creation of community 
amenities and also health, nutrition and environmental activities for 
improving the living conditions of the target group. One of the amenities 
is housing, which is also regarded by the target group as a priority area. 
From the plans of action for the first six months of 1994 presented by 
representatives of 81 CRD communities during a meeting in December 
1993, for instance, the majority of the communities (54%) mentioned 
housing as the most important activity followed by borewells for 
irrigation or drinking-water supply (48%). Up to 1993, a total of 2,835 
families (or 21.3% of all target families) had received assistance under 
the heading of permanent rural housing. Legal assistance is, according to 
the 1987 ICCO project, mainly the submission of applications for 
government schemes but also the provision of legal advice. CRD has a 
permanent (but external) lawyer at its disposal.186 
The Centre for Rural Development has been supported since 1983 
when a comprehensive rural health project was sanctioned for the period 
May 1983 to December 1985. This health project was later extended up 
to mid-1987 via an interim project. After that, ICCO took over the 
financing of the total CRD programme under the name 'Rural 
Development Programme.' ICCO's German sister-organisation Bread for 
the World also withdrew at this time after financing CRD since 1980. 
Between 1983 and 1992, ICCO has sanctioned a total of ten projects, 
including two emergency-aid projects. The total ICCO contribution from 
its own funds amounted to Dfl. 602,287 or 16.4% of the total project 
costs. Some Dfl. 1.7 million (47.1%) came from DGIS and was 
channelled through the ICCO organisation. As no other donors to the 
CRD programme existed in this period, the own contribution amounted 
to more than Dfl. 1.3 million or 36.5% of the total project costs. This 
relatively high own contribution reflects not only the insistence of CRD 
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on a contribution from the target group but also the focus of CRD on 
the tapping of government funds. 
Findings 
As part of the economic programme, irrigation forms one of the means 
for the creation of solidarity among the target group. CRD does not 
support irrigation activities for single families but activities under the 
heading community irrigation wells. The support from CRD for these 
community wells may not necessarily be in the form of funding. As 
mentioned in the previous section, the tapping of government funds is an 
important criterion for determining the autonomy of the communities 
within the CRD programme. Within the irrigation activities, substantial 
use is therefore made of the government funds available for this sector. 
The funds tapped by members of the target communities may come 
from the Scheduled Caste Corporation, the Minor Irrigation Department 
and the District Rural Development Agency (among others); all of these 
organisations have schemes to finance such activities as the construction 
or deepening and renovation of irrigation wells and the purchase of 
pump sets or oil engines. 
Whenever such government funds are used to finance such irrigation 
activities, the assistance from CRD mainly consists of education and 
guidance in applying for these schemes. At the same time, CRD may 
occasionally act as a representative for the applicants when problems 
with the schemes occur. Discussions with the members of the target 
groups in the different communities showed the CRD strategy in the 
field of irrigation to indeed be adhered to. The assistance from CRD in 
this field (and in many other economic activities) is concentrated on: (1) 
stimulating cooperation between different families with regard to the 
irrigation facility; (2) making people aware of existing government 
programmes with regard to irrigation; (3) assisting people in applying 
for government funds and (4) recommending the application to the 
relevant government departments or executing agencies. This support 
may also be directed at the construction of new wells, the deepening or 
renovation of existing wells and/or the provision of pumpsets or motors 
for pumping the water from the wells (i.e., facilities analogous to the 
types of facilities financed under other government schemes). 
Over the years, CRD has supported 103 community irrigation wells in 
54 target communities. The number of wells per community ranges from 
one to eight.187 In addition, a total of 383 families in 89 communities 
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benefitted from the provision of a pumpset or oil engine. The activities 
undertaken largely depend on the communities themselves; this explains 
the differences between the communities and also the differences 
between the areas of Chowdavaram and Rajupalem. In Chowdavaram, 
75% of the autonomous communities has received CRD assistance in the 
field of community irrigation wells as opposed to 50% of the 
autonomous communities in Rajupalem. Of the 34 target communities in 
the active phase in Chowdavaram, a total of 44% has received such 
CRD support while 35% of the active communities in Rajupalem has 
received such support. In the Rajupalem area, no support for community 
irrigation wells was provided in the extension communities; in 
Chowdavaram, two (20%) of the communities in the extension phase 
received assistance in the field of irrigation. A total of 88 communities 
do not have a community well or at least no community well under the 
CRD-programme. With regard to pumpsets/oil engines, the Chowdava-
ram area is by far the most important target area with 287 beneficiaries 
as opposed to 80 for Rajupalem and 16 for Pittalavanipalem. 
Of the 165 farming households covered in the survey, exactly 100 or 
60.6% uses one or other source of irrigation. Of these 100 households, 
33 are in the Chowdavaram area and the remaining 67 are in the 
Rajupalem area. This fact alone shows some striking agricultural 
differences between the two main CRD working areas. In the 
Chowdavaram area, the average acreage per farmer with an irrigation 
facility is higher than in Rajupalem. The farmers in the Chowdavaram 
area also have a longer tradition of irrigation. Nevertheless more of the 
farmers in the Rajupalem area irrigate their land which is entirely due to 
the government irrigation canal: Of the 55 farmers (also) using the canal 
as an irrigation source, 50 are from the Rajupalem area. During the 
interviews, it became clear that part (perhaps even the majority) of the 
households use this irrigation canal illegally. That is, these households 
do not have an outlet to their fields which is part of the government 
scheme. Walls around the official outlet are simply broken, and the 
water is (either by pump or by gravity) led to the fields. The open well 
(either with or without a motor) is clearly the second most important 
source of irrigation. Of the 41 farmers using an open well, 27 do not 
have a motor to go with it. They hire a motor during the periods that the 
fields need to be irrigated. Tanks, streams and borewells are hardly used 
for irrigation purposes by the CRD irrigation target groups. 
Of the 100 households with an irrigation facility, 37 (37%) have 
received assistance from CRD with regard to irrigation. This has been 
either in the form of support for the construction, deepening and/or 
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repair of the well and/or in the form of a pumpset/oil engine. When 
compared to target- group members who have not benefitted from CRD 
assistance in the field of irrigation, the women in these 37 fanning 
households have a higher 'crude education rate.'188 The number of 
children below the age of seven is slightly lower than for non-
beneficiaries, and the households are less frequently engaged in 
agricultural labour in addition to their own farming when compared to 
the other groups. This group of 37 irrigation beneficiaries also tends to 
farm on a larger piece of land than the other farming households and 
also own more of that land themselves.189 With the exception of 
irrigation, the 37 households have not benefitted more from government 
or CRD activities and not experienced fewer problems in the fields of 
credit, marketing, fertilisers/pesticides and seeds (see below). All in all 
and despite some differences in education and land ownership, the 37 
irrigation beneficiary households do not stand out as an easily 
distinguishable and separate group within CRD's target communities. 
Assistance from CRD in the field of irrigation does not, as mentioned 
above, mean that CRD also provides funds for the digging of the well. 
Some of the farmers already have an irrigation well. The CRD assistan-
ce is in most cases aimed at the desilting or cleaning of existing wells 
and/or the purchase of a motor/oil engine. In most cases, moreover, the 
CRD assistance has been restricted to the creation of an awareness of 
government schemes for irrigation and help in applying for these sche-
mes. A few of the respondents also mentioned that CRD may bear the 
costs of a one-way ticket to meet with government officials. A few of 
the respondents stated that assistance was also rendered with regard to 
how to contact and meet government officials; as one of them put it: 
'how to tackle the government officials.' In some cases, CRD invested 
its own funds in the construction, deepening or desilting of irrigation 
wells. This was done, for instance, when the funds available from the 
government were insufficient to meet the expenses. Four of the respon-
dents noted that the only assistance from CRD in the field of irrigation 
was to explain the procedures of the government programmes in this 
field. 
Although the term community-irrigation well is used within the CRD 
programme in order to accentuate the irrigation facilities being used by 
more than one family, five respondents (14% / N=35) still stated that 
they are the only beneficiaries of the facility. This means that the 
majority of the households share their irrigation facility (and/or motor) 
with other farming households. On average, the facilities are used by 
four different households to irrigate 2.8 acres. A dispute over the 
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utilisation of the irrigation water led in one instance to a court case 
between the users. The cooperation between the users is certainly not 
without its problems, but no evidence could be found to suggest that 
these problems are common. To the contrary, the data collected through 
the interviews show disputes between the different users of an irrigation 
facility to be rare. Only four respondents (N=26) stated that conflicts 
(sometimes) occur over an irrigation facility. 
The total expenditure for the irrigation activity ranges between Rs. 
5,000 and 60,000. Considering the fact that the irrigation facility already 
existed in the majority of cases before CRD rendered assistance, the 
total expenditures reflect construction costs in only a few cases. In most 
cases, the expenditure reflects the costs of deepening, cleaning or repair 
of the facility; the costs of purchasing a motor; or a combination of 
these activities. Whether the target group contributed to such activity is 
also of interest here. Only a small percentage (3% / N=28) stated that 
they did not contribute at all. The rest contributed either labour and cash 
(79%) or only cash (18%). The annual expenditures for maintenance of 
the irrigation facility (ranging from a few hundred to a few thousand 
Rupees mainly depending on the need for deepening and strengthening 
of the walls) seems to be distributed across the users according to the 
use made of the facility and the area irrigated. Once again, no major 
problems between the different users were reported. As some of the 
farmers stated, thus, cooperation in irrigation appears to strengthen a 
spirit of community. 
Most of the farmers within the CRD target group grow only one crop 
per year. This also holds for those who say they use an irrigation 
facility. Of the 100 farmers with an irrigation facility, 60% sticks to one 
crop annually; 37.5% grows two crops annually; and only 2% grows 
three crops annually. Despite the available irrigation facility, water 
remains a problem for some of these farmers.190 The facilities 
sometimes provide insufficient water as a possible result of depleting 
ground-water levels. Water is, however, not the only problem 
encountered in farming and thus not the only problem contributing to 
less productivity. More than half of all the farmers, for instance, 
experience problems with seeds and mainly insufficient availability of 
seeds from the market. There are also farmers who find it difficult to 
distinguish good from bad seeds. More than one-third of all the farmers 
(and nearly 40% of all the fanners using an irrigation facility) uses High 
Yielding Variety seeds.191 More than 90% of the farmers apply fertili-
sers and pesticides to their crops. Around 75% of the farmers has 
problems with fertilisers/pesticides. These problems do not involve the 
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price of these additional products but mainly the adulteration of the 
product by the industry. 
Credit is one of the other problems experienced by the farmers in 
Chowdavaram and Rajupalem areas. Most of the farmers state that they 
have never taken out a loan for agriculture (and those who do mainly 
obtain it from money lenders). Simultaneously, around one-third of the 
farmers complain about the non-availability of credit at times when they 
need it the most. Other problems are experienced after harvesting. Most 
of the farmers sell (part of) their produce. In light of the fact that most 
of the farmers are also involved in cash crops (mainly cotton and 
chilies), this is logical. Around 80% sells their produce to middlemen 
while the rest either sells it on the market themselves or to the 
government. Satisfaction with the prices which they get for their produce 
was found among only one-third of all the farmers. Money is the most 
important problem mentioned in the field of marketing, followed by 
storage and transportation for some. Training and extension should also 
be mentioned. Only around 10% of all the farmers stated that they had 
received any training. Of those who had, virtually all of them mention 
CRD as the trainer. Extension, finally, seems to be something quite 
uncommon with only 24% of all the farmers stating that they are 
occasionally visited by an extension officer. 
Despite all the problems ranging from credit to marketing and the fact 
that most of the fanners (including those using an irrigation facility) do 
not grow more than one crop per year, economic advantages score 
highest among the benefits attached to the irrigation facility. An increase 
in production and/or in income was the biggest benefit for the majority 
followed by no longer having to work outside their own farm. Other 
benefits were increased food consumption, less money needed for the 
purchase of food and greater assets. Two of the respondents reported no 
benefit at all, because the water in the well was insufficient (even after 
assistance from CRD) for use in agriculture. These respondents were 
thus dependent on rain water again. 
Although 23 respondents reported an increased income, a closer look 
at this income shows the increase to mean increased profits in only a 
few selected cases. Of the 21 respondents clearly stating that their 
income had increased as a result of the irrigation facility, only 11 
showed increased profits. This seems to be a result of the high 
investment costs associated with an irrigation facility. The extra 
expenses for the irrigation facility itself (cleaning, hire of motor and/or 
diesel) and the need for increased labour, fertilisers and pesticides 
appear to drive the investment costs up. For a few, the irrigation facility 
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represented no benefit mainly because it did not provide sufficient water. 
Finally, others found it difficult to state whether the facility was 
beneficial in financial terms or not because they had been using the 
facility for so many years already. 
Conclusion 
Irrigation within the working area of the Centre for Rural Development 
is definitely not uncommon and also not uncommon for the direct target 
group of the organisation. A relatively large part of the target farming 
group makes use of an open well or one of the canals constructed under 
a government scheme for irrigation. The use of an irrigation facility does 
not guarantee greater production and/or a greater income, however. This 
is partly due to difficulties in obtaining seeds, fertilisers/pesticides and 
credit and partly due to the open wells providing insufficient water. 
Within the irrigation-related activities of CRD, the focus is therefore on 
the deepening of the wells and the obtaining of motor/oil engines in 
order to increase the water discharge and proper use of the facility. 
The emphasis on community instead of individual wells seems to 
increase the capacity (in financial terms) of the target group to properly 
maintain the irrigation facilities. The desilting of the wells should occur 
every year and in practically all of the cases examined here, the users of 
the facility were found to contribute. The irrigation facilities are in use 
although not always to the full extent (as when the water discharge 
remains insufficient even after cleaning and/or deepening). The actual 
economic benefit from the irrigation facilities is nevertheless 
questionable. This is not so much a question of production but of 
increased costs. Coupled to the problems in obtaining seeds and 
fertilisers/pesticides, half of the irrigation beneficiaries experienced an 
increase in income but not in profits. 
As most of the fanners examined in the present survey partly 
consume their agricultural produce themselves, an increase in production 
can nevertheless mean increased food consumption for the household. 
Many of the farmers also expressed satisfaction with the fact that CRD 
insists on cooperation between the farming households, and problems 
between the different users of an irrigation facility are indeed not very 
common. The CRD insistence on a contribution from the beneficiaries 
themselves and the CRD preference for tapping into government funds 
seem to be widely accepted among the target group. When asked about 
the CRD activities from which they benefitted the most, nearly 23% of 
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the irrigation beneficiaries also stated knowledge of how to apply for 
government schemes. 
The above suggests that the most important contribution of CRD in 
the field of irrigation should be sought in the organisation of the 
farmers, improved cooperation, learning how to deal with government 
officials and applications for government schemes. This brings us back 
to the point of departure for the work of CRD which is to develop self-
reliance in socio-political and not in economic terms. 
5.3.4 Two other ICCO counterparts 
In discussing the problems in irrigation in India at the beginning of this 
chapter, the dilemma of depleting ground-water levels was also brought 
to the fore. With the Centre for Rural Development, we saw that this 
ground-water problem can indeed have consequences for the utilisation 
of the irrigation facilities and, thus, for the economic impact of such 
facilities. It can be expected that in areas where the recharging of 
ground-water (e.g., through rainfall) is less, this problem will be most 
acute. Two ICCO counterparts working in the eastern part of Andhra 
Pradesh are confronted with depleting ground-water levels. For one of 
them, the Rural Development Trust (RDT), it was a reason to put a stop 
to their extensive irrigation programme years ago. A so-called eco-
employment programme was then started with the conservation of water 
as one of its main aims. The other ICCO counterpart, Action for 
Integrated Rural Development Society (AIRDS), still implements its 
irrigation programme although with water-conservation clearly included. 
In the following section, the programmes from these two ICCO 
counterparts will be briefly discussed.192 
5.3.4.1 Rural Development Trust 
Travelling through Anantapur district in the south-west of Andhra 
Pradesh, one gets the distinct impression that this is an area suffering 
from 'desertification.' Vast fields with hardly a tree in sight are 
interrupted by small villages and the occasional bare hill. Situated in the 
rain shadow of the West Ghats, Anantapur district is part of the Rayala-
seema zone in Andhra Pradesh which is characterised by a low annual 
rainfall and depleting ground-water levels."3 Anantapur is one of the 
districts for which a proposal was written under the Dutch drinking-
water programme in Andhra Pradesh and for which a district-level water 
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policy seems to be an absolute necessity. As such, Anantapur fits 
perfectly into the first category of the 1993 ICCO programme evaluati-
on. In this category, irrigation is considered 'wicked' (see section 5.2.3 
above). Nevertheless, the government still promotes irrigation and the 
Rural Development Trust has been involved in this for some time.194 
Founded in 1969 by a former Jesuit priest, RDT at present works in 
around 260 villages in the western part of the district. Since 1990, the 
target villages have been divided into six different areas known as AA 1 
to 3 and AeA 1 to 3. The target group consists first of Scheduled Castes 
followed by Scheduled Tribes and Backward Castes. As will be discuss-
ed below, these groups still form the principal target group but with the 
programme initiated to tackle the environmental degradation mentioned 
above other social and economic groups have also been included. 
Initially the main objective of RDT was to create employment and 
improve irrigation facilities in order to increase food production. Their 
activities were mainly conducted through Food for Work Programmes. 
In addition to irrigation, high-yielding and hybrid seeds (Green 
Revolution seeds) were introduced and the organisation subsequently got 
involved in house construction. Between 1975 and 1977, a new 
development strategy emerged; the sectoral and family-oriented approach 
followed up to then was changed into a comprehensive community-
based approach in 1978. The focus was now on community organisation, 
health and children's education. Village (male) sanghams were followed 
by women sanghams in 1982. The long term objectives also changed: 
'to form the backward families into organized social bodies that are 
capable of self-governing, socially and economically. Short-term goals 
were the organisation of the target group, the covering of their basic 
needs and provision of health care."95 
The programme of RDT can be divided into two different though 
interrelated programmes/activities. The first is the so-called Community 
Development Programme which is mainly financed by Action Aid from 
the United Kingdom and Aide et Action from France. This programme 
is being implemented under the aegis of the Women Development 
Trust.196 The Community Development Programme consists of five 
different parts: (1) education (e.g., awareness meetings for parents, adult 
literacy, supplementary schools, pre-schools, provision of reading 
material, sponsorship for secondary school-going children and training of 
teachers); (2) health (e.g., training of community health workers, 
immunisation, nutrition for children, drinking water and sanitation, 
school health education, health awareness camps, mobile clinics and 
hospitals); (3) women programme (e.g., organisation, education/aware-
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ness building, leadership training, mini banks and such income genera-
ting activities as tailoring, mat weaving and groundnut training; (4) skill 
training (e.g., automobiles, motorcycles, masonry, electrical wiring, elec-
tronics, cane weaving and cement moulding); and (5) community organi-
sation. 
Within the community-organisation part of the programme which is 
generally aimed at 'promoting self-reliance among the target population 
through the formation of village associations (sanghams) for the 
Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Castes,'"7 a central 
role is reserved for a credit scheme. This credit scheme is intended to 
provide funds for individual investment in agriculture and meeting 
household needs among the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and 
Backward Castes. The credit fund has been mainly used by the target 
groups to purchase seeds and fertilisers and indeed reduced the depen-
dency of the target group on money lenders. At the same time, however, 
it has proved difficult to improve the status of the very poorest who lack 
land and other productive assets. The credit fund also remains highly 
vulnerable to drought and is unlikely to sustain itself in the long ran. 
The caste- and group-specific sanghams formed in the second half of 
the 1970s are intended to 'facilitate action and discussion on issues and 
activities for the benefit of the community, to practice democratic 
processes in decision-making and to develop local leadership qualities.' 
In reality, the sanghams act primarily as credit groups 'bringing farmers 
together to discuss issues such as size of contributions and problems of 
repayment.' The sanghams thus 'fall well short' of their objectives 
within the RDT programme.198 The conclusion of the ODI evaluation 
in 1991 was that the Community Development Programme 'has not 
succeeded in creating strong and self-reliant [sanghams] which are able 
to articulate and act upon a range of social problems confronting the 
rural poor,'199 that the impact of the programme 'has been largely 
economic, rather than social, in nature,' and that this is partly due to the 
fact that 'the eco-employment programme has now taken centre stage 
within the project, with the result that field staff spend a greater 
proportion of their time supervising the construction of dams and bunds 
(embankments) than on sangham development.'200 
The latter leads us to the second part of the RDT-programme: the 
Eco-Employment Programme which is financed mainly with funds from 
ICCO and the German EZE. With the twofold objective of providing 
employment to members of the target group in the lean season and 
preserving as much water as possible in order to improve the ecological 
balance in the area which was severely damaged by soil erosion and 
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depleting ground-water levels, this programme was set up in the late 
1980s after some years of severe drought. In the short run, the program-
me was intended to improve agricultural production by the preservation 
of ground water. Dams and bunds thus form an important part of this 
Eco-Employment Programme as do contour bunding and tree plant-
ing.201 
The interconnections between the Community Development Program-
me and the Eco-Employment Programme can be seen in the need for 
awareness raising and education.202 The interconnections can also be 
seen in the organisation of the target group for the construction of 
checkdams and percolation tanks. A contribution (in cash and labour) is 
demanded from the people for these structures. Two problems should be 
noted in this regard. First, RDT (at least up to 1991) has not succeeded 
in setting up self-reliant sanghams in the target villages and the 
sanghams which have been set up are mainly active in the field of the 
credit fund. Second, the sanghams and the entire structure of the 
Community Development Programme have been set up along caste lines 
(i.e., there are separate sanghams for each of the different groups within 
the target group). The latter is a problem because the ecological 
measures undertaken under the Eco-Employment Programme and 
particularly such large structures as checkdams require the cooperation 
of all the people in the area and thus those who do not belong to the 
principal target group as well.203 
As mentioned above, irrigation was one of the main items in the early 
years of RDT's involvement in the area. Up to 1977, some 6,000 
families reportedly benefitted directly from the irrigation programme of 
RDT while 'on an average about 15,000 people found regular employ-
ment in this programme during the seven years of its implementati-
on.'204 With the change from an individual approach to a community 
approach in 1977, the importance of irrigation development dwind-
led.205 In the 1980s, ecological degradation and particularly the fact 
that water was becoming the main constraint on agricultural production 
became an extra reason for this dwindling. Although RDT/Af had been 
quite active in the construction of irrigation facilities in the past, the 
irrigation in Anantapur covers only a small part of the agricultural area. 
According to RDT itself, only 15-20% of the cropped fields in their 
working area are irrigated. Moreover, most of these irrigation facilities 
are in the hands of the bigger farmers and higher castes who are not part 
of the principal target group of the organisation.206 
The above change of approach did not mean that RDT was no longer 
involved in the field of irrigation. What stopped was direct financing for 
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irrigation purposes. Close contact between RDT and the banks led to 
loans for 'new wells, deepening of old wells, [and] energisation of 
wells.'207 Even today, these activities continue although at an even 
lesser level.208 The indirect support to irrigation provided under the 
Eco-Employment Programme is more important today. This accounts for 
the larger structures such as checkdams which are also meant to raise 
the ground-water level in the watershed. 
To summarise: It should be noted that (1) water preservation is one of 
the main objectives of the Eco-Employment Programme; (2) this 
preservation of water (mainly in the case of the larger structures built 
under the programme) is also intended to raise agricultural production 
through, among other things, raising the level of water discharge from 
the irrigation wells; and (3) the irrigation wells are mainly in the hands 
of the better off farmers who do not belong to the principal target group 
of the organisation. Considered together, it can be seen that the primary 
beneficiaries in the short run of checkdams and percolation tanks are 
those already better off. This can hardly be prevented, however, for the 
measures undertaken under the Eco-Employment Programme are regar-
ded as essential for improving the long-run ecological situation in the 
area. In order to make these activities a success, moreover, as many 
people as possible must be reached — including those already better off. 
The preservation of water can actually benefit small and marginal 
farmers without an irrigation well as it tends to raise the ground-water 
level in the area as well. Such activities as contour bunding, wasteland 
development and backyard horticulture are also primarily aimed at the 
principal target group along with activities in the fields of health and 
education.209 
Although RDT has not been directly involved in irrigation for a long 
time, the activities undertaken under the Eco-Employment Programme 
are partly aimed at improving the irrigation potential of the area. The 
problems encountered in this regard seem to be of an organisational and 
educational nature which brings us back to the integration of the 
activities undertaken under the Community Development Programme 
and the Eco-Employment Programme. The necessity of such an integra-
tion is acknowledged by the NGDO. The reorganisation undertaken at 
the beginning of the 1990s, in which RDT was turned from a sectoral 
organisation into an area-wise organisation, is a clear example of this 
acknowledgement. The ICCO/DGIS programme evaluation in 1991 
showed a positive impact of the RDT activities in Anantapur district, 
particularly with regard to the participation of women, growing faith in 
the own capacities among the target group, decreased migration, growth 
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of agricultural production and improvements in the ecological structure 
of the area. The main deficiency noted in this report concerns the need 
for more thorough and explicit involvement of the target group in the 
planning and monitoring of the activities. In other words: Greater 
participation will be needed to establish greater self-reliance and a target 
group capable of taking up its own development. 
5.3.4.2 Action for Integrated Rural Development Society 
Some 40 kilometres south of the state capital, Hyderabad, one enters the 
district of Mahbubnagar.210 Like Anantapur, this district is part of the 
dry zone of Rayalaseema in Andhra Pradesh. Some forty years ago, the 
district was still covered with thick forest. Nowadays, the entire area has 
been completely deforested. The amount of rainfall is higher than in 
Anantapur district and the soils have also suffered less. The ground-
water tables are, however, slowly dropping and thereby threatening 
agricultural production and the water discharge from irrigation wells. 
The situation in Mahbubnagar district now is comparable to the situation 
in Anantapur district twenty years ago. With a total population of 3.1 
million in 1991, Mahbubnagar district is an average district in the state 
and the home base for the NGDO and (former) ICCO counterpart Action 
for Integrated Rural Development Society. AIRDS has its headquarters 
in the town of Shadnagar, situated in the north of the district on the 
main road from Hyderabad to Bangalore (Karnataka). 
In 1978, AIRDS started its work in Mahbubnagar district among the 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes which have constituted the 
principal target groups for the organisation up to now. AIRDS presently 
implements its core programme in 79 communities; the NGDO is also 
active in the field of biogas and has been hired to implement the 
software part of the DGIS programme AP-II in the southern part of the 
district. Prior to 1992, AIRDS had officially withdrawn from six 
communities as they were 'sufficiently developed' and there was no role 
any more for AIRDS.211 A clear withdrawal strategy was not 
developed, however, and visits to two of these communities showed 
AIRDS to still be involved in a variety of activities.212 
Education, awareness-building and health are considered stepping 
stones in the AIRDS strategy aimed at creating self-reliant communi-
ties.213 The strategy of AIRDS was originally aimed at individuals. In 
1984, a shift took place and group development became the new ideolo-
gy. This meant that all activities were now complemented by group 
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formation at the village or community levels.214 The strategy further 
stipulates that economic activities must be undertaken to further 
facilitate the development of the target group by providing them with 
economic means to tackle their problems. The formal objective of the 
organisation reflects this strategy: To improve the general welfare of the 
poor by providing them with the means (in organisational, social and 
economic sense) to become self-reliant (i.e., the target group itself 
should become capable of finding and implementing solutions to their 
problems). 
The programme of the NGDO can be divided into three parts: educa-
tional activities, economic activities and social/organisational activities, 
with health constituting part of the latter type of activities. The 
social/organisational activities further include group formation (e.g., 
village committees, women sanghams and youth clubs) and such 
community amenities as drinking-water facilities and community halls. 
The educational activities include items like supplementary education for 
school-going children, adult literacy classes and non-formal education 
and awareness classes. The economic activities are quantitatively the 
most important part of the AIRDS programme and mainly aimed at the 
provision of assets to the target group in order to raise their income. 
Hundreds of target group members have been reached by these activities 
which have been partly financed by a revolving-loan fund from ICCO 
and partly through funds from the government.215 
The revolving-loan fund in fact shows AIRDS to follow, in contrast to 
its stated strategy, an individualised approach.216 In 1984, AIRDS 
started a scheme in which funds from the organisation are provided as 
loans to individual members of the target group for the purchase of 
economic assets. Although the scheme is comparable to, for instance, the 
Integrated Rural Development Programme of the Indian government, it 
differs in being a revolving-loan fund in which repayments are loaned to 
other members of the target communities. Over the seven year period 
from April 1984 to April 1991, a total of 247 of these loans were 
provided.217 None of these loans had been completely repaid by 1991. 
Between 1985 and 1991, a total of 73 repayments occurred covering 
27.8% of the loans.218 
The revolving-loan fund was simply not possible in practice. One 
could say that the pressure from AIRDS on the beneficiaries to repay 
the loans was insufficient. Similarly, the pressure from other members of 
the target group who refrained from a loan because of possible non-
repayments was also obviously insufficient. These observations 
substantiate the conclusions of one of the 1989 evaluation reports: 
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namely that AIRDS is primarily a service deliverer and that the village 
committees set up by the NGDO are not very strong. At the same time, 
this report highlights the attitude of the target group to AIRDS. In all 
discussions held with members of this target group, the importance of 
AIRDS was brought forward. This importance is obviously not linked to 
a feeling of responsibility within the same group. 
The loans provided by AIRDS have been mainly used to purchase 
economic assets. Plough bullocks, sheep, milch animals and bullock 
carts are among the main items procured. Number one on the asset list, 
however, is an irrigation well (and a motor) which makes irrigation one 
of the most important parts of AIRDS economic programme. Up to 
1991, a total of 106 irrigation wells were installed with the assistance of 
the NGDO. The majority of these (64) were financed through the 
revolving-loan fund (possibly in combination with bank loans) which 
turned out to be less revolving than anticipated. The remaining 42 
irrigation wells were installed using bank loans. ICCO has in practically 
all projects sanctioned since 1983 reserved funds for the financing of 
AIRDS activities in this field.219 Despite the individual nature of the 
loan scheme, the irrigation wells constructed under the AIRDS pro-
gramme are not necessarily individually owned or utilised. 'Since the 
beginning of this programme, irrigation facilities were provided to 424 
families,'220 meaning that each irrigation facility is utilised by an aver-
age of four families. In practice, nine wells are owned by individual 
farm households and the remaining 97 wells are owned by joint families 
or groups of individual farm households.221 In 1989, a total of 742 
acres (an average of seven acres per facility) were irrigated. 
The AIRDS programme includes technical and financial assistance to 
farmers in the fields of, for instance, credit, seeds and fertilisers. The 
maintenance of the irrigation wells is the sole responsibility of the farm 
households. According to the ICCO/DGIS programme evaluation on 
sustainable land-use conducted in 1991, the AIRDS irrigation 
programme definitely influenced land-use patterns (conversion of 
wastelands into cultivable lands, rainfed slope lands brought under more 
permanent cultivation), cropping patterns (replacement of sorghum, 
castor and ragi by paddy, hybrid sorghum and maize) and the 'social 
and economic conditions of the farm households concerned' (increased 
income and stabilisation 'of lifestyle of the beneficiaries, who otherwise 
would have been migrating out after the harvest of their first and only 
crop').222 At the same time, however, it is stated that these changes do 
not necessarily contribute to sustainable land-use. The focus on irrigation 
and short-term increase of agricultural production within the AIRDS 
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programme has obscured and hampered activities aimed at environ-
mental sustainability. In the eyes of the evaluation team, it was therefore 
imperative that the NGDO invest more in activities intended to halt the 
increasing degradation of the land and thereby secure the usefulness of 
the irrigation wells constructed under the programme.223 
Summarising: It remains unclear who exactly benefitted from the 
irrigation programme as the selection of the beneficiaries was done by 
the village-level committees which are still far from being self-reliant 
organisations capable of taking up their own development. Moreover, 
the dependency on AIRDS is still very clear, even in those 
villages/communities where AIRDS has officially withdrawn. The 
activities in the field of irrigation appear to have influenced the 
economic position of the beneficiaries, but the utilisation of these 
facilities may cause problems in the future unless activities in the field 
of water conservation and soil conservation are taken up more 
intensively. In essence, the AIRDS programme is a programme faced 
with the problem of matching actual strategy to philosophy. This is 
apparent in the community/ individual discrepancy, the lack of strong 
village committees and also the lack of an integrated approach in which, 
for instance, irrigation activities are clearly linked to activities in the 
field of organisation and education.224 
5.4 Irrigation: a comparative evaluation 
Irrigation is big business in India. The Indian government has devoted 
large portions of its annual budget to the development of irrigation since 
Independence and although it has increased agricultural production, it 
has also created new problems such as those arising from salt-affected 
lands. In addition to these problems, the development of irrigation has 
not kept pace with the funds poured into it. Nonutilisation of the created 
irrigation potential is still a major problem in India. This is partly due to 
lack of maintenance. The Indian government also now clearly acknow-
ledges that irrigation is not sufficient to raise agricultural production, 
and the call for a more integrated approach to irrigation has become 
louder over the years. Important to such an integrated approach is the 
participation of the users. Greater participation is said to increase 
operation, improve maintenance and thereby decrease government costs. 
The problems encountered by the government in the creation and 
maintenance of irrigation and in the provision of such allied require-
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ments as fertilisers, pesticides, seeds, marketing and credit are also 
encountered by the Indian NGDOs which also put increased participati-
on and organisation forth as the best solution. 
Although irrigation is big business in India it is not the major sector 
for the foreign donors, whether multilateral, bilateral or private 
signature. The activities of DGIS in the field of irrigation, for example, 
are restricted to a small number of major projects and thus some of the 
major problems encountered in Indian irrigation. This accounts for the 
activities financed in the area of salt-affected lands which constitute a 
growing problem in India. It also accounts for the development of minor 
irrigation and the integrated approach envisaged for this. ICCO activities 
in the development of irrigation are more difficult to grasp because the 
implementing NGDOs generally follow a multi-component approach. 
The specific attention paid to irrigation in a ICCO policy-cum-evaluation 
paper in the early 1990s illustrates this. Irrigation activities, according to 
this report, could only be justified when they went hand in hand with 
environmental protection activities (e.g., soil and water conservation, 
tree planting), when investments were made by way of (soft) loans or 
partial subsidy and when the beneficiaries were made responsible for 
operation and maintenance. Participation of the target group was 
regarded as essential. 
Policy-wise, a large degree of agreement appears to exist among 
DGIS, the Indian government, ICCO and the implementing NGDOs. In 
order to make irrigation successful, it is necessary to (1) see that the 
irrigation facilities are technically sound; (2) see that the potential 
beneficiaries are involved in the project from the beginning; (3) see that 
these beneficiaries feel responsible for operation and maintenance; and 
(4) see that such allied services as extension, training, credit, seeds and 
fertilisers are provided. All this should lead to not only increased 
agricultural production but also to increased income for the relevant 
farm. With this in mind, we will now turn to a comparison of the major 
findings for the projects described in this chapter and thereby use the 
same indicators as for the drinking-water and sanitation projects in 
Chapter 4: participation, cost-effectiveness, maintenance, poverty-reach, 
utilisation, sustainability and impact (also see Annex 4 which provides 
some indicators of project performance for DGIS and ICCO in the field 
of irrigation). 
The extent to which attention has been paid to participation differs not 
only between DGIS and ICCO but also between projects. In the Uttar 
Pradesh Tubewell Project, for instance, the farmers were not involved in 
the project until construction was finished. Even then, the manner in 
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which this participation was given shape can be questioned as the 
establishment of many of the Tubewell Management Committees 
appears to be more of a facade than anything else: 'Tubewell fanner 
committees are hardly found and, where existing, committee members 
have been appointed rather than elected.'225 In the Uttar Pradesh State 
Tubewell Project, lack of participation is regarded as one of the major 
reasons for the failure to achieve a more even distribution of the benefits 
of irrigation. For this reason, moreover, it was attempted to construct 
smaller units with fewer farmers to organise before a tubewell would be 
constructed in the final stage of Dutch involvement in the project. The 
organisation and motivation of the farmers now constituted the phase 
prior to construction and not, as previously the case, the other way 
around. 
The pump dugwells in the North Bengal Terai Project show that the 
farmers can be actively involved even when specific attention is not paid 
within the project to participation. The beneficiaries grouped together, 
applied for a pump dugwell, decided on the type of motor required in 
some cases and paid their contribution. These farmers also, in contrast to 
those in Uttar Pradesh, own the irrigation facility not only in the legal 
sense but also in their minds. The fact that one farmer often provides the 
bulk of the own contribution could lead one to conclude that this 
'money provider' reaps most of the benefits of the well. As already 
stated, there are as yet no indications of this among the members of the 
self-established PDW groups. Also in the case of hand tubewells, the 
farmers generally regard the facility as their own and are generally keen 
to maintain it. 
The involvement of the farmers also appeared to be of major import-
ance for the community irrigation wells under the CRD programme in 
Andhra Pradesh. The relatively strong sense of community institutionali-
sed through the establishment of a system of committees both within 
and between the communities targeted by NGDO can also be observed 
for the irrigation wells. The farmers are heavily involved in the planning 
of the wells and the conduct of the necessary works (be it the deepening 
or digging of the irrigation facilities). The same basically holds for the 
imgation beneficiaries of the programme from AIRDS. They also own 
the facility, but their contribution to the construction was less evident. 
Within the RDT programme, participation is no longer possible for 
irrigation. The people are nevertheless actively involved in those 
activities of the eco-employment programme which bear on the 
irrigation facilities already existing in the area and the ground-water 
level in general. This participation is largely stimulated by the fact that 
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the people get paid to work on the construction of the check dams, for 
instance. The difficulties in creating the necessary backing from the 
communities are also thus quite clear in this project. As the facilities 
constructed under the Eco-Employment Programme are relatively alien 
to the farmers and the direct benefits of these facilities are not always 
clear, RDT clearly experiences problems in actively involving the target 
group outside of the income provided for labour. 
In general, participation of the target group in the planning, execution 
and operation of irrigation activities is regarded as essential for the 
creation of a feeling of ownership. The assumption is that people who 
have been involved in the initial activities will want to use and maintain 
the facilities properly. And, indeed, in the case of the Uttar Pradesh 
State Tubewell Project, the farmers have not been involved, do not 
regard the facility as their own and, as a consequence, do not utilise and 
maintain the facility. In contrast, in the North Bengal Terai project the 
farmers are utilising the facility to a large extent and are also very much 
aware of their responsibility for the maintenance of the facilities. 
Nevertheless, the irrigation facilities have only been installed quite 
recently which makes it hard to say anything conclusive. Within the 
CRD programme as well, the farmers generally appear to use the facility 
and to be keen to maintain it. 
Maintenance of constructed facilities in the field of irrigation is thus 
clearly linked to the extent to which the farmers own the facility and 
thus to their involvement in the project. In general, maintenance is 
higher in those cases where the farmers feel that the facility is their 
responsibility. The difference between major and minor irrigation also 
appears to be of importance. In major irrigation projects, a feeling of 
ownership is much more difficult to establish in part because the 
government remains responsible in the end for operation and maintenan-
ce. In the smaller units under the NGDO and the DGIS project in West 
Bengal responsibility for maintenance is laid in the hands of the 
beneficiaries right from the beginning. All of this does not mean that 
maintenance is not a problem or may not become a problem in the 
future as maintenance does not just depend on the farmers feeling 
responsible. The farmers must also feel that they benefit sufficiently 
from the irrigation well to incur the extra costs associated with keeping 
the facility in good working order. 
This brings us to the impact of the irrigation facilities on the 
economic position of the farmers involved. Although most of the 
farmers in all of the projects claim they have benefitted economically, 
the question of whether this also means actually earning more money 
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than before the facility was constructed remains open. In the case of the 
HTWs and PDWs in the North Bengal Terai Project, the farmers indeed 
seem to earn more money as a result of irrigating part of their land. The 
investment costs and maintenance costs have also been relatively low for 
these facilities up to now, although the intensive use of, for instance, 
HTWs is expected to cause maintenance problems in the near future. 
Whether the farmers are able to finance major repairs or the replacement 
of their irrigation facility on their own remains unclear up to now. 
Within the CRD programme, there is already certainty that all of the 
constructed or improved irrigation facilities did not deliver the expected 
results. This is mainly because the expenditures for the maintenance and 
use of the wells are relatively high and the profit created by larger 
production thus cut. In this case, moreover, depleting ground-water 
levels can be expected to substantially increase operational costs in the 
future. This means that the majority of the irrigation facilities will not be 
able to run in an economic manner. 
One of the issues in need of further consideration are the allied 
activities to necessary for greater impact of the irrigation facilities on 
agricultural production and the financial positions of the farmers. 
Reference is primarily made here to the provision of seeds, fertilisers, 
pesticides, training, extension services, marketing facilities and credit. In 
all of the projects, these allied activities are regarded as essential. This is 
not to say that the allied activities lead to the same result or meet with 
the same problems in different projects. Comparison of the North Bengal 
Terai Development Project and the CRD programme, for instance, 
shows the problems experienced by the farmers in the field of irrigation 
to be much less in North Bengal than in Guntur district of Andhra 
Pradesh. 
Probably the most important explanation for these differences stems 
from the fact that the government has much more control over the 
various allied activities than most NGDOs. Given the number of 
different departments cooperating on the allied activities (as in the North 
Bengal Project), the problems for the farmers in the fields of seeds and 
fertilisers clearly decrease. The possibilities of an NGDO such as the 
Centre for Rural Development, in contrast, are by definition less. 
Although they have some kind of extension services and can make use 
of different kinds of government schemes for credit, the farmers in the 
CRD programme nevertheless experience considerable credit problems. 
Specific attention to the allied activities should therefore be requested as 
credit remains one of the major problems for farmers in all of the 
projects discussed in this chapter. As noted above, irrigation brings 
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greater maintenance and utilisation costs with it. Simultaneously, it 
creates a greater need for funds to finance fertilisers, pesticides, seeds 
and, possibly, labour. 
The lack of resources to invest in inputs such as better seeds is an 
important constraint on poorer farmers. Considering the fact that the 
projects discussed here are intended to (also) reach poorer farmers this 
lack of resources should be of major concern. Reaching the very poorest 
is a fairly delicate question when talking about irrigation, if only 
because the poorest do not have land and thus nothing to gain from an 
irrigation facility. None of the present projects were specifically aimed 
at the very poorest, and reaching the poorer farmers can only be doubted 
in the Uttar Pradesh Tubewell Project. It can be expected that the 
smaller farmers in the UPSTP benefit less from the irrigation facilities 
than the somewhat larger and certainly the more influential farmers. The 
relatively low number of running hours reached by the tubewells up to 
1993 indicate that a large part of the target beneficiaries do not or 
hardly benefit from the project. This becomes even more apparent when 
the reported lack of participatory and organisational activities is 
considered along with the non-completion of field channels. In the other 
DGIS project in West Bengal, the small farmers have definitely 
benefitted from the project. 
The same holds for the CRD programme although there are striking 
differences between those who have benefitted from the CRD activities 
in irrigation and those who have not. These differences show farmers 
with a somewhat higher acreage to benefit more. Also within the AIRDS 
programme, farmers with more clout in the community can be seen to 
gain more from the activities in the field of irrigation than other farmers. 
This is not to say that these farmers do not belong to the poor for they 
do. The RDT activities are less clear in this regard as they are directed 
at specific areas and not specific groups within that area. This means 
that such activities as check dams mainly benefit those farmers already 
in possession of an irrigation well. Small and marginal fanners can 
undeniably be counted among the poor; they nevertheless have an asset 
which other poorer families do not have and that is land. And there is 
not much difference in the reach of the projects supported by ICCO and 
those supported by DGIS. 
As in the case of drinking-water and sanitation projects, cost-
effectiveness is extremely difficult to calculate as exact financial data 
with regard to the irrigation projects are hard to come by. This 
particularly holds for the ICCO projects in which irrigation is part of a 
larger multi-component programme and many of the activities involve 
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not only the construction of facilities but also the deepening of wells, 
provision of motors or — as in the case of CRD — dissemination of 
information regarding government schemes. This basically leaves the 
DGIS projects for consideration. Rough calculation for the Uttar Pradesh 
Tubewell Project shows each tubewell to have cost some Dfl. 72,000 in 
Dutch aid.226 Although these tubewells were designed to irrigate 100 
hectares each, none of them have reaches this amount. Over the winter 
period of 1992-1993, the 535 new tubewells for which data are available 
were found to irrigate an average of 45 hectares at most.227 If use 
should remain at this level, the investment costs per hectare will come to 
some Dfl. 1,600 which is considerably more than the investment costs 
for the HTWs under the North Bengal Terai Development Project. It 
should be noted that the evaluation mission which visited the North 
Bengal project in 1993 had already concluded that the investment costs 
for the HTWs 'can hardly be seen as an economically justifiable invest-
ment.'228 Moreover, no attention has been paid in the above 
calculations to the costs involved for operation and maintenance which 
are considerably higher for the tubewells in Uttar Pradesh than for the 
HTWs and PDWs in North Bengal. 
Whether projects are able to continue after donor funds dry up (i.e., 
are sustainable) is normally a tough question to answer. Nevertheless, it 
can be stated that the projects discussed here will not be sustainable at 
the same rate when donor funding stops. This not only holds for the 
software activities within the DGIS projects but also for the Eco-
Employment Programme from RDT and the AIRDS programme. AIRDS 
has been financing irrigation wells largely through its 'revolving fund' 
which was heavily subsidised by ICCO, and the same holds for RDT. A 
possible exception may be CRD which has tapped significant amounts 
of government funds and thereby diversified the funding of activities 
initiated by the target group. 
Sustainability in irrigation is not only a question of the availability of 
donor funds. In general, it can be stated that the sustainability of 
irrigation projects depends for a large part on the functioning of the 
irrigation facility (i.e., the extent to which the irrigation facility provides 
water) and the extent to which the farmers are capable of maintaining 
the facility (e.g., because they earn more money). Looking at it from 
these two perspectives, the irrigation facilities constructed under the 
Uttar Pradesh Tubewell project are not sustainable if only because of 
erratic water supply (which is largely due to erratic power supply). The 
farmers also do not feel responsible for the maintenance of the facilities. 
Likewise, the irrigation facilities constructed or improved under the 
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CRD programme ran into problems when it comes to sustainability. In 
this case, a lack of proper functioning of the facilities is not exacerbated 
by a lack of participation or ownership. Depleting ground-water levels 
also threaten the sustainability of the facilities constructed under the 
AIRDS programme. Unless the environmental degradation can be 
brought to a halt, the irrigation facilities will lose their potential benefit 
for the farmers. And unless the NGDO undertakes action in this regard, 
its investment will become worthless in the future. 
To summarise: The variety of projects discussed in this chapter 
provides a mixed picture as far as the major indicators are concerned. 
Although the role of participation in the early stages of an irrigation 
project is found to be acknowledged in all of the projects, it is clear that 
participation is certainly not of overriding importance in all of the 
projects. It was of importance in the Tubewell project in Uttar Pradesh 
but it was less clear for the hand tubewells in the North Bengal Terai 
Project and the AIRDS programme. High participation did not guarantee 
use of the irrigation facilities because of the question of sufficient water 
availability. With the exception of the tubewell project in Uttar Pradesh, 
the farmers in all of the projects were generally found to feel that the 
irrigation facility was their own and that they should therefore maintain 
it. As shown, this does not necessarily imply that the farmers also 
benefit from the facility. The major difference between the ICCO and 
DGIS projects can be seen in those activities falling outside direct 
irrigation activities. The government projects can offer more allied 
activities such as extension services, credit, fertilisers and seeds than the 
NGDO projects for the simple reason that the government machinery is, 
at least in principle, better equipped to perform these duties. That this 
need not always be the case is illustrated by the tubewell project. With 
the exception of the irrigation facilities within the North Bengal Terai 
Project, the end result with regard to increased agricultural production 
and a higher income is in practice not much different for facilities 
falling under DGIS or ICCO projects. 
Conclusions 
For some countries in what is still called the Third World, development 
aid is an important source of financing. This particularly holds for many 
African countries where aid may finance up to 70-80% of national 
investments. In India, however, development aid plays — certainly in 
quantitative terms — only a marginal role. Although aid used to contrib-
ute substantially to the total Indian budget in the 1960s, it has been 
reduced to a very small percentage of the total budget in the 1980s and 
1990s. In this context, Dutch bilateral aid is even less important. Slightly 
over 4 billion dollars have been disbursed as development aid to India 
by the Netherlands under the regular programme up to 1992, but the 
total contribution per person or as a percentage of total investments is 
almost negligible. This is even more the case for aid routed through 
ICCO. The bilateral aid from the Netherlands amounted to Dfl. 5.20 per 
capita across the period 1971 to 1992 (or Dfl. 0.24 per year) while 
assistance from ICCO amounted to only some Dfl. 0.25 per capita for 
the same period. Although these figures show the total Dutch aid (in this 
case: bilateral plus ICCO) to basically be 'peanuts' for India, the fact 
remains that India has been and still is one of the major recipient 
countries for the donor organisations DGIS and ICCO. ICCO sanctions 
the greatest number of its projects and disburses the largest amount of 
its money to India on an annual basis. The same basically holds for 
DGIS. In 1990, for instance, the disbursements under category II of the 
DGIS budget for development cooperation amounted to Dfl. 1.38 billion 
with 18% for India. 
Dutch development aid (particularly bilateral aid from the Dutch 
government but also, later, aid routed through so-called co-financing 
organisations) was heavily criticised at the end of the 1980s for its 
relatively low impact in the field of poverty alleviation. The apparent 
lack of proper preparation and monitoring and, in the case of DGIS, the 
strong links to Dutch business were also part of this critique. The 
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present study has shown DGIS and ICCO to be organisations capable of 
learning from their mistakes. Changes became apparent already in the 
early 1980s for DGIS when the restructuring of the Ministry for Devel-
opment Cooperation went into effect and the monitoring expertise of the 
Embassies was strengthened. The influence of Dutch business slowly but 
steadily made room for more attention to direct poverty alleviation 
activities. And within these poverty alleviation activities, greater atten-
tion was gradually paid to those aspects which have been shown to be 
essential: participation, organisation, education (among others). Changes 
were observed somewhat later for ICCO. In the second half of the 
1980s, a policy discussion within the ICCO India desk prompted not 
only further fine-tuning of the policy but also increased attention to 
project assessment which led to the breaking of financial relations with a 
large number of counterparts on the basis of poor performance, strategy 
and impact on the poor. As such, the actions of the ICCO India desk 
foreshadowed the outcomes of the 1991 Impact Study and the discussi-
ons these would prompt. 
In addition to being learning organisations, DGIS and ICCO have 
both been shown to be organisations capable of reaching substantial 
numbers of poor with relatively small amounts of aid. As mentioned 
already, the programmes and projects supported by these two Dutch 
development organisations substantially improved in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. This is not to say that all went well and that we can now 
sit back and boast about the accomplishments. Keeping the above said in 
mind, rather, the major findings with regard to the policies and projects 
in India will be reviewed in the following for DGIS and ICCO respect-
ively. The two aid channels will then be considered and compared at the 
levels of policy and implementation. 
DGIS 
General DGIS policy clearly reflects the changes in thinking about 
development over the past 40 odd years and the issues which have stood 
central in the discussions prompting such changes. This general policy 
which is also clearly linked to the successive Ministers and what they 
considered central to the field of development aid moved from technical 
aid and capital investment in the 1950s and 1960s to direct poverty 
alleviation under the banner of self-reliance and international policy 
addressing such issues as redistribution, basic needs and the New 
International Economic Order in the 1970s. De Koning was Minister in 
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the transition from the 1970s reformist period to the no-nonsense 
attitude of the 1980s resulting in a two-track policy of direct poverty 
alleviation, on the one hand, and greater attention economic devel-
opment, on the other hand. De Koning was followed by Schoo and a 
period in which development cooperation again became development aid 
and the reduced role of government expressed itself as the socialisation 
of aid. A second reformist period in the late 1980s and early 1990s is 
clearly reflected in the white paper entitled 'A World of Difference' in 
which poverty alleviation returns as the central objective of Dutch 
bilateral aid and such issues as démocratisation, empowerment, partici-
pation and the environment take on clear importance. 
These general policy trends are also reflected in specific India policy 
papers: broadening under De Koning; socialisation and the division 
between rural and industrial development under Schoo; and then women 
and the environment under Pronk. The actual influence of these general 
policy changes on the DGIS India portfolio was marginal, if at all. Most 
of the issues introduced in India policy because they were part of the 
general policy of the respective Ministers at the time were removed 
again a few years later. Such central issues as the broadening exercise 
did not materialise, moreover, with the exception of the supply of a 
dredger for Dfl. 25 million. The division of the aid programme into rural 
and industrial development also had no significance for Dutch aid to 
India as already existing sectors were simply placed under one of these 
categories and removed again after Schoo left to become ambassador. 
The attention paid to the environment under Pronk also had no signifi-
cance for India as the environment had already been a concentration 
sector since 1984. In effect, India policy and Dutch aid to India devel-
oped irrespective of the general policy guidelines set out by the different 
Ministers. 
In order to understand the loose relation between general policy and 
actual developments in Indo-Dutch development cooperation, it is 
necessary to consider those issues that have characterised the cooper-
ation since the mid- 1970s: the state and sector concentration efforts of 
the Netherlands, the dichotomy between project and programme aid, and 
disbursement problems. With regard to the non-project priorities formu-
lated in the India policy of DGIS, it can be stated that the Netherlands 
to a large extent succeeded in reaching them. In many cases, it took 
quite some time but a more equal balance between project and program-
me aid, for instance, was realised. Already part of the policy in the 
1970s, it took up until the late 1980s for some 50% of the Dutch aid to 
indeed be directed at project aid. This also holds for the sector concen-
258 The same difference 
tration which was finally settled at 4 project and 4 programme sectors. 
Most of these sectors existed previously, and many even in the late 
1970s: water transport, rural water supply, part of the miscellaneous 
projects, import support and budget support. 
As easily disbursed aid, budget support and, particularly, import 
support have been used to reach the cash ceiling and expedite disburse­
ments. In those years when disbursements of the former slackened, 
moreover, disbursements of the latter tended to increase. Disbursement 
problems have plagued Dutch aid to India since the mid-1970s when the 
Netherlands expressed its desire to move towards more direct poverty 
alleviation. These problems became even more acute with the introduc­
tion of the cash ceiling in the mid-1980s which required allocated funds 
to be spent in the same year. India also seemed to be well aware of the 
fact that a lack of projects and disbursement pressure could prompt the 
Netherlands to reallocate funds to programme aid. 
The value of reaching certain more general policy priorities can at 
times be questioned. This accounts, for instance, for the concentration on 
specific states. Although the Netherlands and India finally agreed to 
concentrate Dutch aid on five states in the mid-1980s, a closer look at 
the disbursements under the regular programme shows this state concen­
tration to only hold for rural drinking water and sanitation. The activities 
under the other project and programme sectors were geographically 
much more diverse. The selection of Uttar Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, 
Kerala, Gujarat and Kamataka as concentration states included, more­
over, a population larger than the total of the populations in Tanzania, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Kenya, Sudan and Northern Jemen 
(which were all concentration countries for Dutch bilateral aid in the 
mid-1980s) taken together. The fact that DGIS intended to concentrate 
its activities in specific districts within these states did not mean much 
for the period up to 1992. The SP-I through SP-VI projects in the field 
of rural water supply covered 5,000 villages scattered across 14 different 
districts in Uttar Pradesh while the АР-I and AP-II projects in Andhra 
Pradesh covered 489 villages in 8 districts. 
The present study shows Indian rules and regulations along with 
persistent requests for programme aid to have more or less kept the 
Dutch from pursuing their policy aims. In fact, DGIS India policy 
appears to be a reaction to actual developments in the programme in 
many cases. As such, the India policy seems to have largely served a 
'legitimising' function and not a 'creating' one. At the same time, the 
bilateral aid to India must be judged for the largest part against the 
economic self-reliance track of Dutch development policy. For the 
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period 1974-1992, nearly 72% of the bilateral-aid disbursements went to 
activities in the field of economic self-reliance. This leaves 28% for 
poverty alleviation activities. In the early 1980s when only 6-7% of 
Dutch aid to Sri Lanka was used for poverty alleviation,1 the India pro-
gramme of DGIS was already above the 20% mark. Since 1987, the 
percentage of the annual aid disbursements used for direct poverty 
alleviation can be seen to fluctuate between 25% and 45% with an 
average of 39% for 1985-1992, which is clearly up from 19% for 1974-
1984. Although disbursements aimed at poverty alleviation thus picked 
up in the 1980s, these figures nevertheless show the possibilities of 
Dutch bilateral aid to alleviate poverty in India to be quite limited.2 
The pursuit of a policy with overriding attention to poverty allevi-
ation was hampered from both the Dutch and Indian sides. From the 
Indian side, the persistent preference for import support should be 
mentioned along with the delay tactics applied while building up a 
project pipeline. Indian rules and regulations, such as the ones with 
regard to additionality and the concentration on specific states, largely 
limited the possibilities for DGIS to follow its policy. From the Dutch 
side, the persistent threat of under-utilisation proved to be a major 
obstacle for increased poverty alleviation activities. Both import support 
and budget support were and are used to prevent such under-utilisation. 
And the pressure from the Dutch corporate sector (backed by the Minis-
try of Economic Affairs) should also be mentioned. Finally, the agree-
ment between DGIS and BEB with regard to local cost financing limited 
the possibilities for not only project aid but also poverty alleviation. 
Indian rules and regulations also exerted their influence at the level 
of specific projects. Projects in the areas of rural drinking-water supply 
and irrigation are of particular importance because these sectors are the 
sectors in which DGIS has tried most to give substance to its poverty 
alleviation policy. From the general DGIS policy papers, India country 
papers and both formal and informal sector-policy papers, it can be seen 
that a few key issues appear to be considered essential for poverty 
alleviation: active participation of the target group in project planning 
and implementation, increased productivity and income with an eye 
towards responsibility for operational costs, training of local staff and a 
significant own contribution. The question of whether DGIS actually 
followed its policy with regard to specific projects thus particularly 
holds for the 'software aspects' of implementation and an integrated 
approach to such implementation. 
The history of the SP-VI project is a point in case. Despite the 
Netherlands and India agreeing that community participation, health 
260 The same difference 
education and organisation should be part and parcel of this drinking-
water supply project, more than half of the relevant facilities were 
constructed before such software activities were initiated. The drinking-
water supply project in Andhra Pradesh simultaneously shows the 
implementation of such software activities in a government programme 
to not be an easy task. In an environment in which the principal imple­
menting organisation (in all projects: government departments consisting 
of engineers) is initially hostile to any such activities, a clearly capable 
and rigorous guiding force is needed. Although these engineering 
departments were found to slowly recognise the need for participatory 
activities within the relevant projects, they nevertheless remain technical­
ly oriented organisations whose first and foremost task is to construct 
drinking water or irrigation facilities as quickly as possible. 
The occasional outright rejection of software activities by engineers 
in the field, left the Netherlands with no other option than to set up 
separate units for the promotion of local participation: NAPO in Andhra 
Pradesh, PSU and MAC in Uttar Pradesh and the monitoring and re­
search unit in West Bengal. In addition to these units financed by Dutch 
aid, specific parts of the software activities might also be contracted out 
to NGDOs. The inclusion of such organisations sometimes and particu­
larly in the case of АР-I led to severe coordination problems. In addi­
tion, these Outside agencies' remain outsiders and will generally cease 
to exist when the Dutch aid for a specific activity comes to an end. 
Although the short-term importance of such organisations is more or less 
clear, their long-term importance is in light of such unsustainability is 
highly questionable. This is even more the case when the general size of 
the Dutch bilateral projects and the actual possibilities for covering the 
project area are taken into consideration. The simple size of many of the 
projects together with the many problems encountered in getting the 
software activities off the ground were found to reduce the relevant 
activities to dwarf-sized proportions in a number of cases. 
As already hinted at, the involvement of NGDOs in the bilateral 
projects was not always positive. Apart from the frequent difficulties in 
finding suitable NGDOs, the demands were also unrealistic at times. 
These non-governmental organisations had to implement specific activ­
ities but also maintain good contacts with the government machinery 
which was not always charmed by their involvement. DGIS basically 
saw the NGDOs as a means for improving project implementation and 
the impact of its work on the target group. Such cooperation was also 
one of the few manners available for working together with the NGDOs 
because India was not in favour of the direct financing of NGDOs under 
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bilateral aid. The stories of MAC, PSU and the monitoring and research 
unit in West Bengal are somewhat different because they were not 
NGDOs. All three were found to positively influence project perform-
ance although, as mentioned, on a small scale. In this regard it should 
also be mentioned that the drive towards a more integrated approach did 
not work out in most projects mainly because the different departments 
or organisations involved were not particularly keen on working 
together. Only in the case of the North Bengal Terai project could 
clearer cooperation between the different departments be observed (in 
this case: agriculture and minor irrigation) and mainly because of the 
personal cooperation between the heads of these departments. 
The difficulties with the incorporation of software activities into the 
projects studied here is not only a result of Indian resistance to outside 
interference but also due to an unclear conceptualisation of such issues 
as participation on the side of the Netherlands. The Dutch view of 
participation as expressed in the general water policy paper of 1989 is 
reflected in the different projects in India. In both cases, participation is 
largely viewed as a means of securing better implementation, operation 
and maintenance of the installed facilities. As indicated above, however, 
DGIS never really instigated participation until after the decision to start 
the project had been made and implementation was already in progress. 
This means that the target group was (with the exception of the sanita-
tion project known as SP-V) quite suddenly confronted with the project 
and simply not in a position to alter the course of implementation. Such 
non-involvement of the target group need not be a major obstacle as 
shown by the irrigation project in West Bengal where farmers grouped 
together, paid their share of the facility and are both officially and in 
their minds responsible for operation and maintenance. In other projects, 
the non-involvement of the target group in the preparatory phases 
proved to be a major drawback. It meant that more intensive work in the 
field of organisation, awareness building and education was required. 
The fruits of such increased effort can nevertheless be observed in the 
Intensive Mobilisation Villages of SP-VI. By creating a system in which 
villagers are able to work more closely with the government machinery 
and thereby influence the activities being undertaken, villagers also 
proved to be willing to cooperate in the operation and maintenance of 
the drinking water facilities. 
The strategy followed by the PSU incorporates the political dimen-
sion of poverty alleviation as it provides the contours of a system, no 
matter how fragile and incomplete, which involves the target group in 
the decision-making process with regard to the activities to be under-
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taken in the respective villages. A more political dimension can also be 
observed within the Uttar Pradesh State Tubewell Project and the 
proposal made by MAC at the beginning of the 1990s to change the 
course of implementation. The proposal was that farmers should 
organise themselves (with assistance from the project) and apply for an 
irrigation facility. In such a manner, their participation was to be secured 
right from the beginning but, as already seen, the Netherlands withdrew 
its support before this new strategy could prove itself. 
ICCO 
Moving to the Dutch co-financing organisations in general and ICCO in 
particular it should first of all be repeated that the political discussion in 
the Netherlands with regard to the MFOs centred around a few recurring 
themes, of which the increase in funds was probably the most important. 
Discussions of the actual functioning and impact of the co-financing 
organisations were marginal in the political and scientific community 
and practically non-existent among the general public. Although this 
changed in the late 1980s and the MFOs gained greater public attention, 
this attention was only short-lived. And despite some fierce debate in the 
Dutch parliament, the basic attitude towards these donor NGDOs has not 
changed very much over the past 30 years: The MFOs were regarded as 
important in the 1960s and are still regarded as important today. This 
particularly holds for two of the themes closely associated with NGDOs: 
participation and reaching the poor. This positive attitude towards MFOs 
nevertheless seems to be mainly based on political considerations and 
not the actual impact of the MFOs in the field of poverty alleviation. 
Although hardly anything could be said with regard to the impact of 
the then three MFOs in a 1969 evaluation, the MFP was judged to be 
positive and would receive more funds. The positive assessment of De 
Koning at the beginning of the 1980s was similarly not based on any 
analysis of the impact of the four MFOs at that time. Pronk's reaction to 
the Impact Study in the late 1980s is also illustrative. Although Pronk 
adjusted the agreement between the Dutch government and the MFOs on 
certain points, he had already agreed to a higher structural contribution 
before the Impact Study was officially published (and the MFOs had a 
chance of commenting upon the outcome of the study).3 The fact that 
the four MFOs initiated such a study seemed to be sufficient grounds for 
reward. The MFOs continued to present themselves as organisations 
directed at the poor and as organisations with definite impact in the 
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areas of poverty alleviation and démocratisation. That is, their message 
remained the same as before the Impact Study although the tone was a 
bit more modest. 
Under the banner of 'social justice and self-reliance,' the target group 
approach combined with a more integrated approach (or multi compo-
nent approach) has been at the heart of the Co-financing Programme 
since the Zandvoort I conference in 1974. This target group approach 
has been geared at paying greater attention to the poor, initiatives from 
the local communities, activities intended to stimulate local leadership 
and thus greater self-reliance among the poor. Participation, awareness-
raising and organisation were considered essential to such an approach. 
At the end of the 1980s, the target group approach was replaced by the 
overall objective of sustainable poverty alleviation in order to bring it 
more in line with the general objectives of Dutch development cooper-
ation. This shift reflects the fact that the MFP (and thus the MFOs) have 
always been regarded as a part of the Dutch bilateral aid machinery. For 
the MFOs themselves, however, the shift had no consequences. Different 
themes have in fact been incorporated (e.g., the environment, women), 
but such official changes have consistently had no consequences for 
ICCO's general point of departure or for other MFOs. Poverty allevi-
ation with basic needs, economic development and political struggle as 
its components remains centre stage. 
Moving to ICCO's India programme there is a clear parallel to DGIS 
in that India often constituted a test case for developments in ICCO pol-
icy. This is reflected in the ICCO financing of NGDOs which did not 
fall under the 'natural partner' concept, for instance. The first secular 
NGDO was already supported in the early 1970s and over the years 
such secular organisations gradually became the largest category of 
counterparts. The same process is reflected in the decentralisation of 
decision-making under the banner of the Reverse Consortium at the end 
of the 1970s which would be regarded as a dead end by the India desk a 
few years later and for the discussion with regard to BINGOs. Following 
the visit of the then ICCO director to a few of these BINGO program-
mes in India, it was proposed that ICCO expand its involvement in India 
through more extensive support of large rural-development organisations. 
Although such increased attention to BINGOs did not occur and the 
accompanying Dfl. 20 million budget was never reached, the discussion 
nevertheless led to wider acceptance of programme and organisation 
funding. It should be noted that the India desk had already established 
its own type of BINGOs or organisations supported for years and 
receiving the majority of ICCO funds by that time. Across the period 
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1971-1992, 27 of the 276 NGDOs supported by ICCO received more 
than 55% of all ICCO funds. In effect, programme financing was part 
and parcel of the India portfolio by the second half of the 1980s but 
then in terms of projects. 
The successive policy-cum-review reports produced by the India desk 
since the second half of the 1970s also show the India desk to clearly 
contribute to the further refinement of ICCO policy towards India. In the 
reports in the late 1970s and early 1980s, broad priorities were set out 
but remained largely descriptive. The mostly internal reports in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, however, showed an increasing number of more 
strictly formulated priorities which eventually cumulated in the 1993 
India policy profile. The priorities formulated by the India desk over the 
years include such issues as clear criteria for target group selection (i.e., 
priority for the poor), building up a network of support organisations, 
relations to Churches and concentration efforts (states, sectors and 
counterparts). 
While the India desk succeeded in reaching some of these more 
general priorities over the years, it could not reach all of them. Certain 
priorities also took quite some time to realise or simply involved confir-
mation of already existing priorities. Within the selection of target 
groups, the preference has consistently been for rural areas, for slum 
projects in the case of urban projects and for Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes. Rural areas have always been an important part of the 
target group and little change has taken place in this. The same basically 
holds for slum projects and Scheduled Castes and Tribes. As such, the 
policy priorities in the area of 'priority for the poor' can be seen to 
simply be confirmation of already existing practice. The search for 
support organisations which was already a priority in the 1970s was 
particularly evident from 1983 onwards in the form of increasing 
numbers of projects, a more diverse set of organisations and increased 
ICCO commitment. The issue of relations to Churches and Church-
related organisations came to an impasse in the mid-1980s and was 
revived later in the decade. In contrast to DGIS, the concentration on 
specific sectors was not of particular priority for ICCO in the period 
under review. The integrated or multi-component approach as followed 
by most Indian NGDOs and preferred by ICCO was evident in the high 
number of community development projects and a more clear specifica-
tion of particular sectoral priorities was only reached in the early 1990s. 
The India desk succeeded in changing the states in which assistance 
was concentrated, but this change was basically trivial for the period up 
to 1990 as the number of projects increased in almost all of the states 
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and not, thus, in only those earmarked as concentration states. Com-
parable to DGIS, ICCO also shows a substantial distribution of resources 
across the entire Indian subcontinent. Over the period 1972 to 1992, 
projects were sanctioned in 16 states excluding the All India, North East 
India and Delhi projects. For 15 of the 16 states considered together, the 
total population falling below the poverty line was more than 297 
million people in 1987-88." The ICCO desire expressed in the early 
1990s to concentrate their assistance on a more limited number of states 
can well be understood in light of the Dfl. 10-15 million to be disbursed 
each year. Also comparable to DGIS, the selection of states by ICCO — 
at least through the early 1990s — was not the outcome of deliberate 
policy but the available supply of projects and NGDOs. Finally, no 
significant changes were found to occur in the size of the NGDOs sup-
ported in India. The majority of the ICCO counterparts continue to be 
relatively small organisations when looking at the number of people 
covered, their staffs and their annual expenditures. 
Under the banner of social justice and self-reliance, the target group 
approach adopted by the MFOs at the Zandvoort conference in 1974 
was directly related to the participation of the people in all phases of an 
activity. The ICCO India desk interpreted the application of the notion 
of societal justice as changes in the political-power concentration in 
favour of the powerless. Simultaneously, the India desk acknowledged 
that this political interpretation was a bit too far-fetched for the NGDOs 
in India and basically stated that the formulated priorities should be 
taken with a grain of salt. A more personal examination of the NGDOs 
and their programmes by individual staff members from the India desk 
in practice determined whether an NGDO was considered fit for ICCO 
co-financing or not, and such issues as the sincerity of the NGDO and 
the participation of the people took centre stage in these 'evaluations.' 
The lack of clear and objective criteria for building up a network of 
implementing NGDOs and the lack of clear monitoring guidelines came 
to the fore in the mid-1980s. An internal ICCO evaluation of all 
organisations supported in India since 1972 showed not only some 20% 
of the organisations to be judged negatively but also and more import-
antly the India desk to have insufficient knowledge of some 40% of the 
NGDOs. This internal evaluation triggered intense policy discussion 
within the India desk which was further strengthened by an enlargement 
of the staff at the desk. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the policy 
discussion also led to the removal of a large number of NGDOs from 
the India portfolio and to further refinement of ICCO policy. More 
clearly defined priorities were introduced to such an extent that one 
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could wonder about the possibilities of implementing such policy. In 
effect, one can state that the India experiment started in the second half 
of the 1970s and lasted not until 1984 but actually until the end of the 
1980s when the more subjective assessment of project proposals and 
NGDOs was replaced by more objective assessment. 
Improved assessment and monitoring alone are not the solution to all 
of the problems at the India desk or ICCO, of course. As in the case of 
DGIS, ICCO was also not always in a position to follow through with 
its policy. This is mainly because ICCO regards the NGDOs as self-
reliant and autonomous entities capable of making their own decisions 
and setting out their own strategy. Taken to an extreme, such a perspec-
tive actually brings the validity of an overriding Indian policy into 
question. Such policy was nevertheless considered necessary from the 
late 1980s onwards when the soft stand on implementing NGDOs was 
hardened and a more business-like attitude began to prevail at the India 
desk. In the process, major attention was paid to the NGDOs them-
selves, their internal functioning and their reporting structure. Although 
the relevance of such attention seems clear in light of the 
aforementioned problems, it should not distract from the fact that 
NGDOs are not the end station. The NGDOs are a means of reaching 
the poor and creating possibilities for the poor to actually take charge of 
their own lives. The task of the NGDO is to facilitate such a process 
and, in principle, all of the NGDOs described in the preceding chapters 
adhere to this stand. 
In reality, the facilitating task of the NGDOs is not that easy to 
implement. The manner in which the NGDOs give meaning to a partici-
patory approach differs substantially. Taking participation as an end, as 
empowerment and as involvement of the target group in decision-
making and taking organisation as an essential element in this process, 
the evidence provided in Chapters 4 and 5 shows substantial differences 
between the NGDOs. As mentioned, the political interpretation of 
poverty alleviation found at the heart of the ICCO India policy is 
actually only followed to a significant extent by a single NGDO. Within 
the CRD programme, that is, the target group has a clear and institutio-
nalised say in what happens. The involvement of the target group in the 
preparatory phases of an activity, project or programme is one of the 
major characteristics of the CRD programme which has set up a system 
in which the target group in dialogue with the NGDO decides on which 
activities are to be undertaken and who is going to be the beneficiary. 
This system has provided the target group with a feeling of self-reliance 
and the ability to act upon their problems almost independent of CRD. 
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Such self-reliance is less clear or virtually absent for the Kassar Trust, 
YCO, AIRDS and RDT programmes. In most of these programmes, the 
target group is not involved in the preparatory phases for activities and 
projects and the programmes therefore do not meet the demands with 
regard to participation and organisation outlined in Chapter 1. In the 
terms of David Korten, these ICCO counterparts are somewhere between 
the first and second generations.5 
Considering the latter conclusions, and in contrast to the claims of 
the combined MFOs in the Netherlands, it can be seriously doubted 
whether ICCO substantially contributes to démocratisation through its 
counterparts in India. As already mentioned, most ICCO counterparts are 
relatively small organisations working in specific localities with limited 
relations to other NGDOs and development players. One can say that a 
large part of the ICCO counterparts still work in 'splendid isolation.' It 
is also important to note that lack of participation of the target group in 
the preliminary phases of an activity need not mean that the activity has 
no impact on the lives of the target group. The drinking-water supply 
and irrigation activities described in the preceding chapters, for example, 
showed participation right from the start of the programme to be of 
greater importance for the former than for the latter type of activity. 
This can be explained by the fact that if and when members of the 
target group have a feeling of actually benefitting from an activity, they 
are also predisposed to feel responsible for its operation and mainten-
ance. Economic benefits appear to be of more importance to the target 
group than, for example, health benefits and particularly when the 
(intended) beneficiaries are unaware of the latter benefits or the prob-
lems giving rise to such benefits. 
Comparison of aid channels 
The aim of the present research was to provide a contribution to the 
quality debate in the Netherlands by comparing two different channels 
of Dutch aid. Comparison of such different channels for development 
cooperation was found to be extremely difficult for a number of reasons. 
DGIS is part of the government structure, has a total annual budget of 
about Dfl. 6 billion, an extended implementation structure in which 
embassies and consultants play an important role and operates primarily 
through government agencies in the developing countries. The private 
development organisation, ICCO, has a budget of some Dfl. 130 million, 
approximately 100 staff members and no staff in the developing coun-
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tries. ICCO works through non-governmental development organisations 
but is nevertheless part of Dutch bilateral aid. The two channels share 
the objective of sustainable poverty alleviation. In addition, both donors 
provide substantial aid to India, both experience problems in conceptua-
lising the starting points for their strategy, both disperse their funds 
across a wide range of activities and sectors and both are working in a 
large number of states in India. Both DGIS and ICCO also emphasise 
participation and an integrated approach to poverty alleviation. The 
similarities revealed in the present study show a channel comparison to 
not be impossible. There are strong indications with regard to the 
efficacy of DGIS and ICCO at the levels of policy and implementation. 
The policy evaluation of DGIS and ICCO has shown both of the 
organisations to incorporate general policy recommendations into their 
specific India policy. It should be noted, however, that the policy docu-
ments are of such a general nature in the case of ICCO that the extent to 
which they provide guidelines for operationalisation can be questioned. 
In the case of DGIS, the general policy papers are more specific but 
there is still a lot of room for interpretation when moving down to levels 
of programmes and activities in a specific country. The fact that the 
general policy guidelines for the two organisations are reflected in the 
more specific country plans does not mean that these general guidelines 
had any substantial influence on the formulation of the country policy 
and programmes. This holds for DGIS in particular but also for ICCO 
where the India policy developed almost separately from the less than 
clear general policy and actually served as a test case for some of the 
developments in general ICCO policy. 
With regard to policy, DGIS was found to be faster than ICCO on 
many occasions. Issues such as the environment and women but also 
more sector- oriented policies were addressed more quickly DGIS than 
by ICCO. Policy- making at DGIS is also more sophisticated and 
centralised than at ICCO.6 This centralisation provides for clearer 
guidelines than in the case of ICCO although the general guidelines still 
have to be adjusted to specific project and country circumstances. The 
country-specific policy documents have indeed become much more 
refined and to-the-point over the years, and they also show the priorities 
of DGIS and ICCO more clearly. Not all of the priorities outlined in 
such policy documents are reached and many mat take a relative long 
time to reach, but such country documents nevertheless provide more 
specific guidelines and thus constitute an important steering mechanism, 
for the long term in particular. 
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Turning to the implementation level, there are a few general con-
clusions that can be drawn with regard to ICCO and DGIS. First, both 
of the donors strongly focus on rural areas. Both also pay substantial 
attention to direct poverty alleviation activities. ICCO appears to be 
more straightforward in this regard mainly because DGIS also has the 
objective of 'economic self-reliance' in mind. Although a large part of 
the DGIS programme in effect should be judged in light of this second 
objective, evaluation in light of the first objective shows DGIS to have 
successfully directed more of its aid to direct poverty alleviation inter-
ventions over the years. The Indian government has nevertheless been 
shown to often direct the Dutch aid in the direction it wants. This 
includes specific rules and regulations with regard to additionality and 
state concentration and the associated problems with setting up a project 
pipeline but also the persistent pressure for more programme aid (which, 
as seen, was not always regarded as a problem by the Netherlands). 
The room for ICCO to manoeuvre was also found to be restricted at 
times. These restrictions were largely due to the functioning of the co-
financing organisation itself, however. Disbursement problems plagued 
ICCO along with the tendency to regard its counterparts as organisations 
with a high level of autonomy. Only in the second half of the 1980s 
when the India desk 'discovered' that many of the NGDOs did not live 
up to the task were changes initiated. These changes not only involved 
termination of financial relations with less effective organisations but 
also increased attention to the screening of NGDOs, project appraisal 
(consistency and viability) and monitoring. It took until the early 1990s 
for some of these issues to gain a more central role within the function-
ing of the India desk, and the increased attention to project appraisal and 
monitoring starting only in the late 1980s is just another example of the 
fact that DGIS was (and probably is) a lot faster than ICCO in many 
areas. 
It was already observed in the preceding that DGIS and ICCO see 
poverty and poverty alleviation as having not only an economic dimen-
sion but also clear social and political dimensions. The projects dis-
cussed in Chapters 4 and 5, however, show the political dimension — as 
expressed by the use of such concepts as participation and, later, empo-
werment ~ to get more or less snowed under during implementation. In 
practice, thus, participation appears to be used as a 'co-opting practice, 
to mobilize local labour and reduce costs,'7 and the critique of putting 
aside the 'empowerment rhetoric' and reverting to traditional beneficiary 
or target group participation in the practical implementation of develop-
ment policy holds not only for DGIS but also for ICCO.8 Such a prag-
270 The same difference 
matic stand is particularly characteristic of ICCO which basically treats 
the counterparts as 'all-knowing' and in essence geared towards empo-
werment. The revelation in the second half of the 1980s that the quality 
of the work of some 40% of the NGDOs supported in India could sim-
ply not be evaluated and that the impact of 21% of the NGDOs had to 
be judged negatively painfully exposed the lack of clear policy guide-
lines, monitoring capacities and project assessment (also see Chapter 3). 
In only a few projects was participation found to be an aim in itself 
and thus elevated above such co-opting practices. In the CRD program-
me, the involvement of the target group in decision making has been in-
stitutionalised by setting up village-, area- and project-level committees. 
In the SP-VI project in Uttar Pradesh, village-based organisations have 
successfully come into direct contact with the government delivery sy-
stem in a few villages. Both the CRD and SP-VI projects show organi-
sation of the target group (i.e., group formation) and awareness raising 
to be of extreme importance in the creation of a system in which the tar-
get group is able to get involved in not only the implementation, opera-
tion and maintenance of projects but also in the decision to start a 
project. 
The sole use of participation to improve project performance, the 
frequent failure to involve the target group in the basic decision to 
undertake specific activities and little or no attention to the organisation 
of the target group shows that, despite rhetoric to the opposite, DGIS 
and ICCO are not generally concerned with the political dimension of 
poverty alleviation or empowerment (see Chapter 1). By concentrating 
on the economic and social dimensions of poverty alleviation (whether 
or not successfully) and omitting the political dimension, both DGIS and 
ICCO fall well short of the goal of sustainable poverty alleviation. This 
lack of attention to the political dimension and thus empowerment 
shows DGIS and ICCO to be severely restricted in following through on 
their general policy guidelines in part because they are obliged to work 
through organisations on which they have restricted influence. 
In this regard, special attention should be paid to NGDOs. The 
UNDP regards these Non-Governmental Development Organisations as a 
major opening for greater participation9 and the MFOs also present 
themselves and their counterparts in the Third World as such.10 
NGDOs are 'ideal vehicles and agents for participatory development and 
key actors in strategies to empower the poor and excluded'" and thus 
regarded as 'instrumental' in the creation of democracy. Looking at the 
ICCO counterparts discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, there is a lot to be 
said about this image of NGDOs. The ICCO counterparts, with the 
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exception of CRD, show a general lack of organisation of the target 
group and thus little involvement of the target group in decisions. The 
target group generally has no say with regard to the functioning of the 
NGDO which means that the NGDO is not answerable to the target 
group. The projects of the ICCO counterparts tend to be small and 
localised and thus indeed projects: activities within a specific area, with 
a specific budget and implemented within a specific time frame. In most 
cases, the NGDO also has no clear withdrawal strategy. Finally, the 
cooperation between the NGDOs is at best informal and they tend to 
stick to their own constituencies. The claim that ICCO contributes to the 
empowerment of the target group through its counterparts in India can 
be doubted just as for DGIS. The question is justified whether DGIS and 
ICCO should try to formulate a more realistic policy or whether they 
should improve actual practice. 
Despite the practical stands of DGIS and ICCO with regard to 
participation, the projects discussed in this study indicate that more 
structural attention to participation and the software aspects (i.e, partici-
pation, organisation, education and/or awareness-building) can produce 
greater impact. Attention to the software aspects seems to be of overrid-
ing importance for the sustainability of projects in terms of not only 
being able to continue after donor funds dry up but also more generally. 
Projects in which the target group is involved in the preparation and 
implementation tend to be those with greater impact in the longer run. It 
should be repeated that this particularly holds for drinking water and 
sanitation and less for irrigation. Also, such increased effectiveness and 
impact does not necessarily make these projects more cost-efficient. 
In sum: Assuming that the software aspects of a project and the 
extent to which the target group is involved in the implementation and 
maintenance of the activities largely determine the effectiveness and 
impact of the projects, the results of the present comparison show the 
choice of aid channel to make no difference. Which organisation actual-
ly finances the project simply does not matter. ICCO as well as DGIS 
have been shown to finance activities in the field of irrigation and 
drinking water/sanitation which can be criticised for lack of attention to 
the software aspects. Both ICCO and DGIS have also financed projects 
in which greater attention has been paid to participation, education and 
organisation and thereby greater effectiveness achieved. It could just as 
well be stated that a straightforward preference for large versus small 
projects is not produced by the present study. Both types of projects 
have their pros and cons. For the poor in India, therefore, the distinction 
between DGIS and ICCO is a question of the same difference. 
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the gaps - that between domestic savings and investments or between foreign 
exchange (earned by export) and import. P. Hoebink (1988: 21) adds that 'a third 
problem for developing countries was their absorption capacity: only a limited 
quantity of capital can be taken in by developing countries as the possibilities for 
applying it lucratively are small because of a lack of social and physical infrastruc-
ture.' Knowledge-transfer and building-up institutional capacity are mentioned as 
ways of enlarging this absorption capacity, and emphasis is thereby placed on 
technical assistance. 
21. OECD 1986: 45-49. 
22. G. Köhler 1995: 54. This is despite the fact that in 1962 the United Nations 
announced the first Development Decade and tried to 'insist on a balance between 
economic and social development [...] Within a few years, however, this attempt to 
insist on the importance of social objectives had failed. Economic growth had 
continued, but the need to reduce hunger and malnutrition, end poverty and bring 
about improvements in health [...] was greater than before.' The outcome was clear: 
'the economic dimension of development had dominated' (D. Reid 1995: 44-45). 
23. See, for example, R.L. Rothstein 1977: 253-254. 
24. See, for example, R. Riddell 1987: 93 and C.P. Oman and G. Wignaraja 1991: 
98. 
25. OECD 1986: 49. 
26. In such an approach, the state has a much more active role to play in the 
provision of health and education services, but also in the economic field (e.g., 
support for industries and the infrastructure). Economic growth nevertheless remains 
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a prerequisite for development in this line of thinking, and the approach thus 
remains within the modernist model. 
27. It should be noted that by the end of the 1960s, the World Bank had taken, as A. 
v.d. Laar (1982: 249) put it, 'a leading role in development lending' and also 
widened its influence 'through its chairing of numerous aid consortia.' While 'its 
country economic reports [...] tended to reinforce the Bank's role when combined 
donor leverage was exerted on aid recipients,' a changing focus within the World 
Bank (for instance, after the Bank adopted the basic needs approach in 1977/78) 
towards more direct poverty alleviation had a major impact on other multilateral, 
bilateral and private aid-donors (see also Chapters 2 and 3). 
28. World Bank 1973: 6-7. McNamara (president of the Bank from 1968 to 1981) 
made a distinction between relative and absolute poverty which is still used. 'Relat­
ive poverty means simply that some countries are less affluent than other countries, 
or that some citizens of a given country have less personal abundance than their 
neighbours. That has always been the case, and granted the realities of differences 
between regions and between individuals, will continue to be the case for decades to 
come.' In this thesis, the word poverty is used in reference to absolute poverty. The 
World Bank presented poor people as those who 'suffer from hunger or malnutriti­
on' with 20% to 25% of the children dying before their fifth birthdays, a life 
expectancy 20 years less than in the affluent world, and widespread illiteracy. In 
addition, the poor are also those who 'are neither contributing significantly to 
economic growth nor sharing equitably in economic progress.' 
29. The World Bank followed the world employment programme of the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) which had already been declared in 1969. For the ILO, 
the problem of poverty was a problem of employment and the emphasis should shift 
from the formulation of a development strategy based on economic growth with 
employment resulting from this as the residual, to a focus on employment as the 
policy objective in its own right. 
30. World Bank 1973: 13. 
31. Within this focus on direct poverty alleviation, attention was mainly paid to 
'increasing the productivity of small-scale subsistence agriculture.' Note that the 
basically economic thinking behind the poverty alleviation strategy put forth by the 
World Bank in the 1970s is that 'greater access to public services' such as health 
and education will increase the productivity of small holder agriculture. In essence, 
'economic growth and prosperity' are considered 'a sine qua non for coming out of 
poverty' (M. Rahmena 1992: 163). 
32. World Bank 1973: 17-18. 
33. J. Friedmann 1992: 59. 
34. World Bank 1973: 10. 
35. H. Chenery et al. 1974. 
36. В. Rich, 1994: 86. The 'most important single assumption in the Bank's poverty 
strategy,' as expressed in the Redistribution with Growth Report, 'was that there 
would be no, or very little, trade-off between social equity and economic growth; it 
was thought that not only did the two goals not conflict, but that the same policies 
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could promote both simultaneously' (p 84) S George and F Sabelh (1994 147) 
reiterate the central critique, which is according to them valid for the 1990s as well, 
when they state that an 'exclusively market-oriented philosophy and a "poverty 
focus" with a hope of success are mutually exclusive ' 
37 S George and F Sabelh 1994 143 According to the authors, McNamara was 
'among the first to see that the self-interest and ultimately the security of the United 
States and the West depended on raising the living standards of the poor in the Third 
World ' 
38 R L Ayres 1983 226 
39 В Rich 1994 87 
40 С Payer 1982 360 
41 A vd Laar 1982 250-251 
42 S George and F Sabelh 1994 147 
43 The major difference between the basic-needs approach of the ILO and the 
redistribution-with-growth approach of the World Bank was that the latter was an 
income centred approach, as it sought to raise productivity and incomes sufficiently 
to allow all groups to purchase the goods and services they required from the 
market The state provides those services which cannot be purchased The redistnbu-
tion-with-growth approach was also an incremental approach In contrast, the basic-
needs approach of the ILO was seen as a more direct and rapid attack on poverty 
Growth was also considered important for achieving development but not the focus 
Asset redistribution (particularly land), social transformation and the channelling of 
specific resources to particular groups were stressed because it was believed that the 
incremental approach was simply too slow to benefit the poor The basic-needs 
approach also encompassed both economic and non-economic needs Some adherents 
of the basic-needs approach emphasised the shopping list approach while the more 
progressive adherents emphasised asset redistribution, mobilising the poor and giving 
them a voice in the political process The basic human needs included two elements 
(1) the minimum requirements for a family for private consumption adequate food, 
shelter, and clothing are obviously included as well as certain household equipment 
and services, (2) essential services provided by and for the community at large 
including safe drinking water, sanitation, public transport, and health and education 
facilities 'To these rather materially focused needs' were 'added human rights, 
employment and participation of the people in making decisions that affect them' 
(See, for example, С Ρ Oman and G Wignaraja 1991 104-106) 
44 D Ρ Ghai 1977 3 
45 Participation in decision-making is meant here as it is 'the people themselves 
[who] should decide on the scope, content and priority of their own basic needs' 
(D Ρ Ghai and Τ Alflhan 1977 19-59) (also see 1 2 2 below) 
46 The latter alludes to yet another important outcome of the reformist period the 
emergence of Non-Govemmental Organisations (NGOs) as important actors in the 
donor community in terms of both political pressure and financing (see 1 2 3 below 
for a more thorough discussion on NGOs) 
47 I Little 1982, quoted in С Ρ Oman and G Wignaraja 1991 117 
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48 D Lai 1983, quoted in С Ρ Oman and G Wignaraja 1991 117 
49 Figures presented here are based on my own calculations using data from OECD 
1977, 1978, 1982, 1986a, 1987, 1990, 1992, 1995, Worldbank 1978, 1982, 1986, 
1990, 1992, 1994, UNDP 1992, N Keyfitz and W Flieger 1990 For both the 
income groups and HDI groups, net ODA disbursement figures for 133 countries 
were collected The countries were divided as follows (1) for the income groups 
high income = 10 countries, upper-middle income = 22 countries, lower middle 
income = 48, and low income = 53 countries, and (2) for the HDI groups high HDI 
= 22 countries, Medium HDI = 46 countries, and Low HDI = 65 countries 
50 This does not mean that the aid reaches the poor themselves As H White 
(1996 94) correctly remarks 'problems of leakage are of course most severe with 
country allocation measures Depending on the policies of the recipient government, 
aid to a poor country may reach very few poor people indeed ' 
51 These countries either received massive aid in the period 1969-1993 relative to 
their population (l e, Israel), or have such huge populations that the per capita net 
disbursements of ODA in their category of countries decreases considerably (ι e , 
India and China) Israel, with an average population of 3 9 million for the period 
1969-1993, is one of the largest aid-receiving countries in the world With over 
1,370 million dollars of net ODA in 1990, Israel ranked sixth among aid-receiving 
countries (after Egypt, Bangladesh, China, Indonesia, and India) Israel received 
nearly US$ 250 per capita in 1990 which is far more than any other country China, 
for instance, received only US$ 1 88 ODA per capita in 1990, and India even less 
(US$ 1 67) 
52 The concept of basic needs and the success of this concept was also connected 
to worldwide changes reflecting not only the strengthening of world peace and 
disarmament but also the establishment of a New International Economic Order 
(NIEO) with 'a fundamental restructuring of the international economy for the 
benefit of the nations of the South' as its focus This restructuring should be based 
on 'equality and cooperation' (J Toye 1993 179), and the basic-needs strategy can 
be regarded as a first phase in a redistributive global growth process The call for a 
strategy based on the satisfaction of basic needs can be seen as a Western reaction to 
the Southern call for a NIEO and an attempt to take the wind out of the NIEO 
53 In the words of R Rtddell (1987 130), the 1980s saw a 'swing back [ ] to a 
concern for growth [which] lessened the visibility of redistribution questions among 
certain donors ' See also, for example, С Colclough 1991 4-5 
54 This happened despite counter studies which emphasised other reasons for the 
growth of the economy in these countries (ranging from the large amounts of aid to 
Korea to the strong involvement of the state in trade and production) (C Ρ Oman 
and G Wignaraja 1991 81) 
55 World Bank 1993 10 
56 Τ Kilhck 1989 9, 16-19 According to Killick, the disenchantment with what he 
calls 'dirigisme' is not restricted to 'those of a conservative disposition ' Also 
'radical writers are scarcely less dismissive of interventionism,' if only because they 
'are inclined to agree with Adam Smith that, Civil government, so far as it is 
instituted for the security of property, is in reality instituted for the defence of the 
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neh against the poor, or of those who have some property against those that have 
none at all" ' Also experiences in developing countries (e g, 'medium term develop­
ment planning has in most Ides [least-developed countries - LS] almost entirely 
failed to deliver the advantages expected of it.' 'many ldcs did over-emphasize 
industrialisation and neglect agriculture,' 'many ldcs did themselves damage by an 
inward-looking approach to development') make this retreat from dirigisme an 
almost universal retreat 
57 G Kohler 1995 56 
58 I Toye 1993 181, 190-191 
59 M Edwards and D Hulme 1995 4 
60 According to N Uphoff (1995 19), who distinguishes three sectors in society 
(ι e , public sector, membership sector, and private sector), NGDOs belong for the 
most part to what he calls 'service organisations' and thus the private sector As 
service organisations, NGDOs 'deal with clients and beneficiaries' which 'did not 
create the organisation they are dealing with and cannot hold it accountable for its 
actions in the same direct way members can Clients and beneficiaries of NGDOs 
are in a "take it or leave it" relationship that is similar to that of customers and 
employees of private firms ' 
61 The World Bank SALs were basically a follow-up on the short-term stabilisation 
measures established by the IMF in the mid-1970s to tackle the emerging balance-
of-payments crisis in the Third World 'According to the IMF analysis, the crisis of 
individual Third World countries was caused by excessive government spending (an 
unbalance between spending and revenues), resulting in budget deficits and inflation, 
over-valued currencies, disproportionate imports in relation to exports, and insuffi­
cient attention to factors on the supply side ' The remedy was clear from such an 
analysis and boiled down to economic reforms These reforms 'reflected a neo­
liberal economic perspective and were therefore highly political' (O Stokke, 1995a 
8-9) 
62 J Toye 1993 196 
63 According to J Toye (1993 197-199), 'the outcome [of the SALs in economic 
sense] is quite disappointing compared with the advance claims and expectations 
raised by the development counter-revolutionaries In particular, the claim that all 
the economic troubles of developing countries stemmed from bad internal policies 
looks hollow when one sees how small are the benefits to be derived by the 
wholesale reversal of these policies The development counter-revolution clearly 
over-sold its policy proposals ' 
64 This includes the work of Ρ Streeten, who continued along the lines of the 
basic-needs approach of the ILO (Ρ Streeten et al 1981), and the work of M 
Hopkins and R vd Hoeven (1983) 
65 One-dimensional characterisation of poverty were also not part of the past, 
particularly when it came to measuring the extent and depth of the problem The 
World Bank, for instance, continues to use GNP per capita as the main standard for 
determining poverty For discussions on the measuring of poverty see, for example, 
M S Ahluwalia 1974, Chenery et al 1974, Ρ Glewwe and J ν d Gaag 1988, J 
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Fnedmann 1992 Although J Fnedmann (1992 65-66) is of the opinion that the 
basic-needs approach became 'virtually inoperative' in the early 1980s, he also 
argues that 'the debates of the seventies were not all in vain ' This is mainly because 
these debates 'have left us with some firm conclusions about poverty,' of which the 
most important are (1) growth-maximising strategies are not in themselves sufficient 
to satisfy basic needs, which in turn are 'essentially political claims for entitle­
ments', (2) 'poverty is a multi-dimensional phenomenon and does not signify merely 
a relative lack of income', (3) 'the poor must take part in the provisioning of their 
own needs rather than rely on the state to solve their problems', (4) 'to become 
more self-reliant m the provisioning of their own needs, the poor must first acquire 
the means to do so', and (5) 'effective anti-poverty programs cannot be devised at 
the top for implementation downward' (also see 1 2 1 below) 
66 R Riddell 1987 95 Riddell states that 'while some donors, the largest and most 
influential, reasserted their belief in the growth route to poverty alleviation, some did 
continue to base their aid policies on direct targeting of aid funds to the poor ' The 
latter certainly holds for the private aid sector (ι e, NGDOs) and to a certain extent 
for the Dutch bilateral aid programme (see Chapters 2 and 3) 
67 M Stiefel and M Wolfe 1994 22 
68 Adjustment with a human face was the title of a book published in 1987 under 
the auspices of UNICEF The objective of this UNICEF approach was 'to combine 
adjustment with protection of the vulnerable and the restoration of economic 
growth ' Experiences with adjustment policy had shown 'how standards of health 
and nutrition may be undermined unless a specific attempt is made to protect the 
vulnerable during adjustment' (A Corma, R Jolly and F Stewart 1987 131-132) 
69 Women (in development) and environmental issues were also not new issues in 
the 1980s and 1990s With regard to the environment, the early 1970s saw several 
international conferences held on the subject and also the establishment of the 
United Nations Environment Programme UNEP) At one of the conferences 'conve­
ned in October 1974 at the behest of UNEP and the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) [ 1 two major strands of the alternative 
movement [were brought together] those who had argued that priority should be 
given to satisfying the 'basic needs" of people for food, water, and shelter rather 
than to simple growth-maximisation, and those who were concerned with the "outer 
limits" of the planet's resources and its environment to sustain such growth' (J 
Fnedmann 1992 2) Such a discussion on 'a people-centred development in 
harmony with the environment' is basically still on the agenda in the 1990s 
70 See, for example, Ρ Shaffer 1996 23 
71 For aid agencies, this new stand in development thinking also meant that 
interference in the political, social and economic affairs of an aid-receiving country 
were no longer regarded as taboo Whereas the conditions for aid in the early 1980s 
carried a 'strong neoliberal baggage, boosting the market and reducing the role of 
the state, with structural adjustment as the major tool,' the conditions for aid in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s were aimed 'above all at policy reform, involving the 
system of government, democracy and participation, and human rights, m particular 
civil and political rights' (O Stokke 1995 vm) For further discussions on aid 
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conditionality, see Ρ Hoebink, 1988 24-28, O Stokke 1989, К Gnffin 1991, M 
Moore 1993, I Smillie 1995, and DGIS 1995 All this attention to the internal 
structures of developing countries took place under the banner of ownership which is 
a term introduced in the 1990s to emphasise the fact that it is primarily the aid-
receiving countries (l e , the government, private firms, civil society, and individuals) 
which determine whether a project or programme will succeed or not For Toye 
(1993 200-201), ownership relates to the 'issue of neo-colonialism' and the fact that 
'conditionahty is extended from economic policy to the broader and more politically 
sensitive area of "governance" To some extent, this potential conflict has been 
defused by efforts to ensure that the recipient government "owns" the adjustment 
programme ' 
72 F Fukuyama 1992 
73 J Toye 1993 10 
74 In the early 1990s when the western capitalist or neo-hberal road to development 
was about to be pronounced the only feasible one, others were less sure that it was 
the best way of achieving development or that a single best way exists at all This 
disenchantment with all-encompassing theories and development paradigms has been 
labelled the 'crisis in development,' the 'impasse in development theory' or even the 
'era of agnosticism ' For Schuurman (1993 1), this impasse can be attributed to (1) 
the post-modem critique of theory formation per se, (2) disappointment with the 
economistic growth objective which is not reconcilable with notions of sustainable 
development, and (3) the loss of the socialist paradigm Kohier (1995 57-58) 
presents seven causes for what she calls the agnostic approach (1) 'Disenchantment 
with the result of development interventions which had not succeeded in fundamen­
tally altering "underdevelopment', poverty and destitution in the developing world' 
combined with 'obvious shortcomings in policy prescriptions and theoretical analy­
sis ' (2) The 'conventional divide between developed and developing countries has 
become hollow' as 'reports on the state of the world reflect on unemployment, 
poverty, and marginalisation in the developed as well as the developing nations ' (3) 
'The purely "economistic" understanding and shapening of the development process' 
which has been brought into question by 'pleas for adjustment with a human face 
and for "human development'" which 'reopened the discussion on the sense and 
direction of "development" ' (4) Development is increasingly construed as a 'broade­
ning of choices' and thus as 'a departure from a single prescribed, "universal' 
approach to the objectives of development ' (5) 'The environment and gender causes 
have "undermined" mainstream economically-inspired thinking ' (6) Post-modemism 
'has begun sensitizing development interventionists to the problématique of their 
endeavour ' And (7) 'The demise of the Soviet system opened attention to democ-
racy and human rights as central to development, topics that had been taboo in 
development discourse for decades ' 
75 J Gray 1996 11 
76 Τ Killick 1989 21-25 
77 I Smillie and Η Helmich 1994 7 
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78 It should be mentioned here that increasing local conflicts in the world have not 
only called for a major increase in emergency aid but also for greater attention to 
peace keeping operations These developments and the pressure on aid to respond to 
them can possibly mean an end to renewed attention for direct poverty alleviation 
For DGIS, who followed its 'A World of Difference' with 'A World in Dispute' in 
1992, these conflicts are 'spreading like a bushfire' and led to the conviction that 
establishing collective security should come before poverty alleviation and develop­
ment (P Hoebink 1995 132) In 1994, the ODI published a study under the title 
'Crisis or Transition in Foreign Aid' and noted revived concern about aid effective­
ness, the emergence of new donors and 'competing contenders asserting success as 
agents of development' (ι e , NGDOs) A 'dilution of development aid budgets by 
other demands no longer just trade promotion and strategic considerations, now also 
environmental spending (not just global environmental activities), peace-keeping and 
the promotion of political transitions to democracy' (A Hewitt 1994 2-4) was also 
noted In his contribution on Dutch aid in this study, L Box sees a financial crisis 
(decrease in aid volume), a political crisis (pleas from Parliament for increased 
commitment to the South combined with pressure to make cuts in the budget), and 
an intellectual crisis (absence of intellectual leadership allowing politicians to 'fill 
the void') Box calls for a new framework under the rubric human security For 
DGIS, the 1990s can be characterised as 'transitional years in which political 
stability, conflict control, and social integration are central concepts ' Some other 
concepts emerging in the late 1980s can nevertheless be left intact human develop­
ment, sustainable (ecological) development, transformation of institutions, and 
changes in policy (DGIS 1995' 3-4) 
79 The dual role for the state emerging from this is due to what G Köhler (1995 
58) called the convergence between the 'post-Keynesians' and the 'neo-monetarists ' 
'While the former are devoting more research and technical assistance to genuinely 
private sector actors, the latter have begun to soften their stance as to the role of the 
market, conceding that "market friendly policies" (as opposed to pure market 
mechanisms) were appropriate in developing country contexts, and thus acknowledg-
ing the role of government ' 
80 The logic behind the combination of a 'neo-liberal market economy' with a 
'liberal democracy' is clearly spelled out by JD Pedersen (1993 103) when 
discussing the imposition of political conditionality on aid Citing L Diamond 
(1992 25-46), Pedersen argues that 'a liberal market economy only works on the 
basis of 'liberated market agents, hence the liberalising effects of the ' retreat of the 
state"-conditionalities imposed on recipient countries' economic policies Liberal 
democracy similarly needs, in order to work properly, a respect for individual 
political freedoms such as the observance of basic human rights, rights of individuals 
to organise in political parties, freedom of speech, etc A multi-party democracy then 
is simply regarded as the natural companion to a market-based economy ' 
81 SM Lelé 1991 607 
82 J Pronk and M Haq 1992 6 
83 Compare the discussion paper from the policy branch of the Canadian Institute 
for Development Assistance (CIDA 1991) m which five pillars of sustainable 
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development are noted environmental, economic, political, social, and cultural 
sustainability 
84 The data here are derived from OECD, Reporting Systems Division (personal 
communication) The ODA commitments are divided into four so-called sectors 
(social infrastructure and services, economic infrastructure and services, production 
and multi-sector) and seven non-sectors (general programme assistance, debt relief, 
food aid, emergency aid, administrative costs of donors, support to NGOs and 
unallocated) Each sector, with the exception of the multi-sector, is again divided 
into sub sectors (such as 'agriculture' and 'industry, mining and construction' under 
the sector production or 'education', 'health' and 'water supply and sanitation' under 
the sector social infrastructure and services) For the entire period 1973-1993, 
sectoral aid accounted for well over 50% of the total bilateral ODA commitments 
from DAC countries (with a low of 52% in both 1973 and 1990 and a high of 
slightly over 80% in 1982) 
85 The division of bilateral ODA commitments from DAC countries per dimension 
is restricted to the sectoral aid Under the social dimension the following sub-sectors 
from the sector 'social infrastructure and services' are grouped education, health, 
water supply and sanitation, population programmes Under the economic dimension, 
the following sub-sectors from the sector 'economic infrastructure and services' are 
grouped transport, communications, river development, energy, and other, along 
with the following sub-sectors from the sector 'production' agriculture, industry, 
mining, and construction, trade, banking, and tourism, and other Finally, under the 
political dimension, the following sub-sectors from the sector 'social infrastructure 
and services' are grouped public administration and development and planning 
services Items related to 'empowerment' in the sense of enabling people to take part 
in decision-making processes (see 12 2 below) are not distinguished within the 
OECD/DAC categorisation The only sub-sector not included here is 'other social 
infrastructure and services' because the elements fall under different dimensions 
(e g, housing falls under the social dimension and trade unions conceivably fall 
under the political dimension), a break-down of the funds for this sub-sector was not 
available It should be kept m mind that the data regarding the bilateral ODA 
commitments presented here concern the sectoral aid commitments and not the non-
sectoral aid commitments This means that only part of the total aid commitments 
from the DAC countries for the period 1973-1993 are examined 
86 I Jazairy, M Alamgir and Τ Panuccio 1992 53-64 and 90-91 
87 To indicate just a few of the possible interlinkages between the Five clusters 
'Poverty contributes to physical weakness through lack of food, small bodies, 
malnutrition, [ ], to isolation because of the inability to pay the cost of schooling, 
to buy a radio or a bicycle, [ ] , to vulnerability through lack of assets to pay large 
expenses or to meet contingencies, and to powerlessness because lack of wealth goes 
with low status the poor have no voice' (see further, Chambers 1983 112-114) 
88 R Chambers, N C Saxena and Τ Shah 1989 13-14 
89 R Chambers (1983 144-145) states in this regard that 'it is no coincidence that 
poverty [ι e, lack of wealth or assets, and lack of flows of food and cash] is the most 
commonly mentioned dimension of deprivation, and used as a proxy for the others 
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[ ] it seems that most poor rural people seek first an adequate independent source 
of food and income under their control, or in other words, a secure and decent liveli­
hood ' 
90 UNDP 1993 104 In later reports, this definition is broadened In 1991, for 
instance, 'to make development more democratic and participatory' is added to the 
definition (L Boer and A Koekkoek 1993 428) This is an elaboration of the 
additional choices (political freedom, guaranteed human rights and personal self-
respect) and a confirmation of the importance of 'good governance' as a prerequisite 
for development (UNDP 1990 1) 
91 The three essential choices distinguished by the UNDP are included in the 
original Human Development Index 'real gross domestic product per capita, as an 
indicator for the resources available, life expectancy at birth, as an indicator of 
length of life, and the degree of literacy, as an indicator of the level of education' 
(L Boer and A Koekkoek 1993 428) With this Index, the UNDP relied on the 
work of Moms who developed the Physical Quality of Life Index in 1979 (See, for 
example, С Ρ Oman and G Wignaraja 1991 115 and Ρ Streeten 1994 23) For 
further discussion of the Human Development Index as developed by the UNDP see, 
for example, К Griffin and Τ McKinley 1994, UNDP 1995 121, M McGillivray 
1991 1461-1468, VV Bhanoji Rao 1991 1451-1460, and Mahbub ul Haq 1994 
The latter has correctly observed that 'something tragic happened to development 
economics on its way it became dehumanised In the [ ] obsession with measuring 
national accounts, human lives were forgotten In a way, the new emphasis on 
human development during the last few years arose as a protest against this unnec­
essary and unforgivable neglect ' 
92 In describing the concept of Human Development Ρ Streeten (1995 28) states 
that 'Abraham Lincoln's definition of government could be shorthand for this 
development of the people, for the people, by the people Of the people implies 
adequate income generation through jobs and the generation of primary incomes, for 
the people implies social services for those who need help and the generation of 
secondary incomes, and by the people means participation It could also be inter­
preted as the economic, social and political dimensions of development' (emphasis 
added LS) 
93 DGIS 1991 145 
94 M Rahmena (1992a 116) describes the word participation as a stereotype, a 
fanciful construction, without any content, and as an ideal word for 'manipulative 
purposes' 
95 World Bank 1990 See also M Lipton and J ν d Gaag 1993 1-2 
96 К Griffin and Τ McKinley 1994 χι 
97 UNDP 1995 117 
98 Central to this people-centred strategy of development are concepts such as 
participation, civil society, and empowerment with a definite role to be played by 
government as well With regard to the latter, it is what the government does and 
not how big it is that matters (K Griffin and Τ McKinley 1994 xii) The major 
difference from the World Bank strategy for the 1990s is that the UNDP places 
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greater emphasis on the political dimension m the sense that development is 
characterised as 'a process not just for people, but a process organised, guided and 
undertaken by people ' Such a development strategy explicitly calls for active 
participation and for institutional changes 'that permit and indeed encourage that 
participation' (p xu) These developments clearly show aid donors to be gradually 
moving 'beyond technical economic conditions into much broader areas of social 
policy and "governance"' (J Toye 1993 200) 
99 UNDP 1995 123 
100 R Chambers 1995 30 Two years earlier, E Dudley (1993 7) noted that 
'participation used to be the rallying cry of the radicals, its presence is now effec­
tively obligatory in all policy documents and project proposals from the international 
donors and implementing agencies ' For S С White (1996 6), participation is clearly 
linked to 'the language of democracy [which] dominates development circles [these 
days] At national level it is seen in the rhetoric of "civil society' and "good 
governance' At the programme and project level, it appears as a commitment to 
"participation" ' See also M Steifel and M Wolfe 1994 221-222 
101 See, for example, I Lane 1995 182 
102 WP Lineberry 1989 3 
103 Ρ Oakley and D Marsden 1984 21 
104 J Lane 1995 183 See also Ρ Wignaraja 1991 202 
105 M Stiefel and M Wolfe (1994 182-183) note that the term empowerment 
within the neo-hberal resurgence of the 1980s involves 'a removal of obstacles to 
individual choice and initiative ' At the same time, empowerment is clearly linked to 
good governance and responsibility for the creation and enforcing of laws 'suppor­
ting and harmonizing the striving of individuals to better their lives ' 
106 Ρ Oakley and D Marsden 1984 25 
107 UNDP 1993 21 
108 M Karl 1995 14 
109 J Fnedmann 1992 139 
110 SC White 1996 8-9 Transformative participation is one of the four forms of 
participation distinguished by this author The other three are nominal participation 
(which serves the interests of inclusion and legitimation), instrumental participation 
(which serves the efficiency interests of outside funders and may be viewed as a cost 
by the local people), and representative participation (which serves as a means for 
the people to express their interests) 
111 R Chambers 1995 30 E. Dudley (1993· 6-7) distinguishes between four 
functions of community participation as a goal, as a political tool, as a physical 
tool, and as a word used by 'development workers to persuade themselves that the 
activity in which they are involved is not paternalistic.' 
112 J Lane 1995 186 
113 Ρ Oakley and D Marsden 1984 26,29-30 
114 UNDP 1993 28 
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115 According to N Nelson and S Wright (1995 17) the majority of the participa­
tory approaches at this time are 'participation as means ' 
116 M Stiefel and M Wolfe 1994 225 
117 World Bank 1995 7 
118 UNDP 1993 21-22 Participation from the human development perspective is 
presented as both a means and an end Participation 'helps maximize the use of 
human capabilities and is thus a means of increasing levels of social and economic 
development But human development is also concerned with personal fulfilment 
So, active participation, which allows people to realize their full potential and make 
their best contribution to society, is also an end in itself ' 
119 According to south-Asian scholars in the UNU Programme, participation is 
democracy 'Participation means commitment to a more egalitarian society which 
permits equal access to resources -not only land- but also to food, education, health, 
and other basic human rights ' (P Wignaraja 1991 202) 
120 UNDP 1993 24 
121 M Stiefel and M Wolfe 1994 220-223, 229-230 The vagueness and ambi­
guity with which the term participation is used by aid donors and international 
organisations are part of what 'make it difficult for international organisations to 
promote participatory projects ' Other factors are (1) lack of time and patience to 
promote participatory projects, (2) the nature of the project cycle is not conducive to 
the introduction of popular participation, even in the limited sense of 'beneficiary 
participation', (3) in the implementation phase of supposedly participatory projects, 
the 'inevitable contradictions between bureaucracy, technocracy and participation [ ] 
are manifest ' 
122 M Stiefel and M Wolfe 1994 226-228 The latter point 'is symptomatic of a 
general inability, or rather unwillingness, of international organizations to perceive 
and understand local reality in its full complexity ' All in all, the authors conclude 
that there is a wide gap between rhetoric and practice when it comes to participation 
and, in particular, more than the mere contribution of the target group in the form of 
money, responsibility and labour 'Future beneficiaries of projects - the "target 
group"- are as a rule still not consulted about the need for the project, they do not 
participate in project design and preparation, and their participation in implementa­
tion usually takes the form of "free and voluntary" contribution of resources and 
labour [ ] What remains is in most cases a traditional top-down and non-participa-
tory approach which focuses on the achievement of physical and financial project 
targets, sanctified in appropriate statistics, albeit within a new rhetoric ' 
123 Ρ Wignaraja 1991 202 This view is shared by J Famngton et al (1993 107-
108), who state that 'in an ideal world, empowerment would not be achieved 
through top down structures or by being imposed by outsiders Rather it would be 
brought about through people's own involvement in development, as they leam 
increasingly to articulate their needs and their established rights However, given the 
constraints encountered by the poor in organizing themselves, there remains a valid 
role for outsiders in strengthening and, at times, creating groups in response to 
identified needs in the context of a broader empowerment strategy The role of 
Notes 287 
external agencies such as NGOs is perceived as that of a facilitator - assisting the 
emergence of capabilities, where invited to do so.' 
124. P. Wignaraja 1991: 202-203. 
125. G. Huizer 1989: 17-18. 
126. Participatory action research (PAR), according to G. Huizer (1989: 1-9), is a 
'methodology of rural development.' PAR is — in contrast to the as top-down 
classified 'conventional academic survey and policy research' — a bottom-up method 
which in general has the purpose 'to find solutions to concrete problems and 
conflicts.' At the same time, this research is intended to contribute 'greater knowl-
edge and problem-solving methods as such' and to awake or heighten poor people's 
awareness of 'the conflicts and contradictions existing in their situation and ways to 
overcome these.' Central in the PAR method is that the 'research should be under-
taken in close dialogue with the people concerned.' According to P. Wignaraja 
(1991: 204) 'PAR attempts to combine social investigation, analysis and change (of 
reality) in a single process.' 
127. G. Huizer 1989: 18. See also, for example, F. Lisk (ed.) (1985: 9) who stresses 
the need 'for institutions within the planning system that make it possible for the 
poorer segments of the population to participate fully and effectively in the decision-
making process at all levels.' 
128. R. Chambers 1983: 140-141. 
129. E. Dudley 1993: 160. 
130. P.L. Berger 1974: 148, cited in E. Dudley 1993. 60. 
131. J. Friedmann 1992: 3. 
132. J. Lane 1995: 181. 
133. According to N. Webster (1995: 407-408), there is currently 'a strong tendency 
[...] within development theory and development policy [...] to link rural develop-
ment with the democratic process. Demands for participatory local democracy and 
participatory development projects are justified on the grounds that these will 
"empower the poor", improve planning and implementation, and will generally make 
rural development more efficient, more effective and more accountable.' Although it 
is acknowledged that 'decentralisation and démocratisation of the government and 
the encouragement of non-state institutions to represent the marginalised and 
excluded sections of the population [can be] necessary prerequisites for better, and 
also more egalitarian, development,' Webster makes clear that 'the contemporary 
arguments for decentralised democracy' have a 'powerful ideological assumption' 
behind them, 'whose roots lie primarily in western liberal philosophy.' The same 
accounts for greater attention to NGDOs which have subsequently been imbued 
'with development qualities and abilities that they do not in fact possess.' The 
assumed coherence between démocratisation and economic prosperity is 'something 
of an ideological trap with particular implications for NGDOs. It assumes a concept 
of democracy that is an individualistic and individualising representative democracy. 
It calls for decentralised governance, for an active civil society in which a wide 
range of local institutions function, and for both politically and economically active 
individuals or "citizens". NGDOs are coming to be seen as key actors in this 
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transition towards a more liberal political arena and in promoting better rural 
development In this way, NGDOs are becoming fetishised and their real, albeit 
more limited, potential is being obscured ' 
134 M Stiefel and M Wolfe 1994 206 According to R Riddell and M Robinson 
(1995 2-3, 29, 32-33), there are 'various reasons for the increasing importance of 
NGOs in development ' These include the 'growth in number of NGOs, due partly 
to the increase in official funding,' 'the failure of official aid programmes to reach 
down and assist the poor.' and 'donor pressure on recipient governments to reduce 
their direct involvement in development programmes ' As far as Northern NGDOs 
(or donor NGDOs) are concerned, two sets of reasons are mentioned for their growth 
m recent years (1) 'the increase in media exposure of famine and disasters' provid-
ing a 'major stimulus for increased levels of private contributions' and (2) several 
reasons outside the world of the NGDOs including a 'growing disillusion among 
official aid organizations about their own ability to alleviate poverty through their 
often large-scale rural development programmes' and 'increasing prominence given 
to private initiatives in development ' For Southern NGDOs, an entire range of 
'comparative advantages' (or, as others would say, "articles of faith") are mentioned, 
ranging from their 'success in reaching the poor' and 'participation of the poor in 
their projects' to 'their ability to deliver emergency relief and development services 
at low cost' and interventions which are 'characterised by flexibility and experimen-
tation in large measure because they tend to be small-scale ' Writing about the 
relevance of NGOs for social development research, D Hulme (1994 252-254) also 
notes several reasons for the growth of the NGDO sector in the 1980s (1) the 
'sector merits attention because of the light that it can throw on weaknesses of the 
state and the market as mechanisms for meeting the needs of society', (2) the 'sector 
claims to be able to address [poverty - which is not purely an economic condition, 
but also a condition of political powerlessness] through the processes of "conscienti-
zation", "mobilisation", "empowerment', "policy advocacy", and, sometimes, "social 
transformation'", (3) 'the sector has managed to gain support from a wide range of 
sources', and (4) 'the sector has a wealth of knowledge about the nature and 
operations of local elites, about strategies for by-passing, weakening, co-opting or 
coping with elites and about the responses of those elites to such strategies ' 
135 See, for example, A G Drabek 1987 ix 
136 Different studies from the late 1980s and early 1990s have contributed to this 
more realistic view A Dutch study on the impact of the co-financing programme 
(see also Chapter 3) concluded that NGOs generally have a participatory approach 
and that they succeeded in contributing to the empowerment of the target group 
Quantitative evidence for this conclusion could, however, not be given (Stuurgroep 
Impactstudie Medefinanciering 1991 35) An evaluation by the Overseas Develop-
ment Institute (ODI) of sixteen NGO projects in the field of direct poverty allevi-
ation showed the formation of grassroots organisations — generally seen as important 
for participation and empowerment — in some to not surpass in some cases similar 
efforts by non-NGO projects In five of the sixteen cases, community participation as 
a concept was regarded as insufficient (R Riddell and M Robinson 1992 20-21) 
The ODI evaluation also showed NGOs to not necessarily reach the very poorest, 
although they generally score better than the programmes from governments and 
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both bilateral and multilateral donors The UNDP laconically states in this regard 'If 
government and official aid programmes usually fail to reach the poorest 20% of 
income groups, most NGO interventions probably miss the poorest 5-10%' (UNDP 
1993 96) RC Riddell and M Robinson (1995 37-42) provide a comprehensive 
overview of the more critical studies of NGDOs, highlighting such items as weak 
management, non-sustainabihty, 'little sign of replicability,' little attention paid to 
leadership development and their small scale nature which can also be seen as 
insignificance, the low-cost character of the NGDOs is also challenged Writing 
specifically on the Dutch co-financing organisations (that is, Northern NGDOs), F 
vd Velden (1995) points out such weaknesses as the inability to reach the poorest 
of the poor, Eurocentric and paternalistic behaviour of these donor NGDOs, exten­
sive spending pressure and quantity prevailing over quality 
137 For discussion of the first three relationships, see L Schulpen 1996 
138 See, for example, M Stiefel and M Wolfe 1994 209-211, M Edwards and D 
Hulme 1995 Also see D С Korten and AB Quizon 1995, for a discussion of the 
relationship between NGDOs, government, and donors with specific reference to 
people-centred development 
139 Cited in J Clark 1991 92 
140 L Schulpen 1994 33-40 
141 R С Riddell and M Robinson 1995 33 
142 M Stiefel and M Wolfe (1994 207) in this regard state that 'NGO action and 
alliances with "organized efforts of the excluded" easily lead to manipulation and 
may create new bonds of clientelistic dependency ' 
143 S С White 1991. cited in M Stiefel and M Wolfe 1994 208 
144 A distinction can be made here between operational and non-operational 
agencies Operational NGDOs 'implement projects directly in developing countries 
using their own staff and resources, whereas non-operational agencies finance 
projects from their headquarters or regional office, often channelling funds through 
partner organizations with whom special relationships are frequently developed ' 
'The trend [ ] is away from hands-on involvement and towards working directly 
with indigenous NGOs' (R С Riddell and M Robinson 1995 28) 
145 'Advocacy is the term used to describe a cluster of activities aimed at influenc­
ing and altering opinions, decisions, structures and institutions which, in their 
different ways, impinge upon and influence development and development policies, 
and thus have an impact on the poor ' The activities mentioned in this definition 
refer to, among other things, 'development and public education work, awareness-
raising, lobbying, networking, dialogue and campaigning' (Riddell, R and the DWT 
(Discerning the Way Together) reference group 1993 41) 
146 Not all organisations understood under the term donor NGDOs are by definition 
organisations which finance projects or programmes, nor do they implement all of 
the activities mentioned above AH Northern NGDOs active in the field of develop­
ment (be it through fund-raising, funding of projects/programmes, education and/or 
lobbying) are understood here under the term donor NGDOs 
147 M Edwards and D Hulme 1995 3 
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148 A division of NGDOs which appears to be relevant to their influence on 
government policy is on the basis of the area of specialisation Although the 
majority of the NGDOs appear to implement a so-called integrated (or at least multi-
component) programme, there are NGDOs which specialise in a specific area, such 
as health care 
149 D C Korten 1987 145-149 This NGDO categorisation can also be found in 
the country which stands central in this study In India, NGDOs (or 'voluntary 
organisations' as they are called there) are generally divided into three groups The 
first group consists of welfare organisations aimed at meeting an immediate defi-
ciency or shortage The second group consists of organisations aimed at economic 
and/or social development and is characterised by income-generating programmes 
and a basic-needs strategy The third or 'social-action' group consists of programmes 
aimed at increased awareness and the empowerment of the target population, 
participation is also a central theme This division is far from static, organisations 
can have characteristics belonging to each of the three groups More recently, a 
fourth category of NGDOs can also be distinguished In contrast to the preceding 
three groups, these NGDOs do not work directly with members of the target group 
but provide services to other NGDOs In a Dutch evaluation study, this type of 
NGDO is referred to as 'intermediate organisation' (Stuurgroep Impactstudie 
Medefinanciering 1991 15) In light of the fact that some of these intermediate 
organisations actually sell their expertise, these NGDOs should probably be seen as 
'commercial companies in disguise' (UNDP 1993 88) 
150 D C Korten 1987 148 
151 L Schulpen 1994 33-36 
152 J-P Thérien 1991 263-280 
153 D Lai 1994 1. 
154 See, for example, Actionaid 1995 15 and DGIS 1994 
155 OECD 1996 4 
156 G S Fields (1994 3) defines poverty as the 'inability of an individual or a 
family to command sufficient resources to satisfy basic needs' and thereby brings the 
discussion of the 1970s back to the fore 
157 OECD 1996 21 
158 For the major donors in development aid, capacity development (on a national, 
regional, local and individual level) is the new catchword Central here are the 
notions of human and social capital Both relate to the capacity to make 'competent 
decisions' with the first on an individual basis and the second on a collective basis 
(OECD 1996 21-22) 
159 See, for example, J Toye 1993 31-32 
Notes Chapter 2 
1 Ρ Hoebink 1988 47-74 Four years later an update of this overview was also 
presented (P Hoebink 1992 213-243) The division of aid history into distinct 
periods is a difficult undertaking and appears to depend on the issues considered 
central by the authors M Kuitenbrouwer (1994 133-177), for instance, divides the 
history of Dutch development cooperation into two periods 1950-1973 (policy 
building) and 1973-1990 (extension and consolidation of policy) The thesis of the 
present Dutch Minister of Defense, J Voorhoeve (1979 251-284), covered the 
period up to 1977 and divided the history of Dutch aid 'roughly [ ] m three phases 
foundation (1947-1962), growth (1963-1973), and structural change (1973-1977)' 
The penodisation according to Hoebink is taken as the starting point in the present 
chapter because it extends through the early 1990s, is concentrated on bilateral aid, 
shows the policy intentions of the different Ministers more clearly than other 
perrodisations, and provides concrete indications of the major issues at stake within 
development aid and development cooperation 
2 This is excluding the development loan of Dfl 280 million extended to Indonesia 
in 1950 as part of the 'Dutch-Indonesian Union' (Kuitenbrouwer 1994 134) 
3 Ρ Hoebink 1988 49-50 
4 The emergence and subsequent growth of bilateral aid do not characterise this 
turning point in Dutch aid policy alone In 1963, New Guinea was handed over to 
Indonesia and the Dutch Volunteers Programme, based on the American Peace 
Corps, was also started Moreover, in 1963 the first State Secretary for Development 
Aid was installed Dutch development aid (later renamed development cooperation) 
was previously under the responsibility of the Foreign Ministry or, more precisely, 
under the Directorate International Organisations and the Bureau International 
Technical Aid As such, it fell under the responsibility of the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs 
5 M Kuitenbrouwer 1994 139 
6 Udink (Minister for Development Cooperation between 1967 and 1971) intro­
duced the term 'concentration country ' He also formulated the first selection criteria 
for concentration countries although, as Ρ Hoebink (1988 55) states, 'the Minister 
in fact had a "lucky bag" of entena at his disposal ' In the early 1970s, Pronk 
reduced this 'lucky bag' to three entena (degree of poverty, the as yet unmet need 
for aid, and the extent to which a country followed a policy aimed at improving the 
lot of the poor) Prank's successor, De Koning, changed these criteria yet again and, 
from that point forward, whether a country had a national income per capita of less 
than US$ 550 (at that time) became the main criterion for the provision of aid 'The 
extent to which a country followed a policy aimed at redistribution' and the 'extent 
to which human rights were respected' were also mentioned Despite these changes, 
only minor changes in the list of concentration countries have occurred over the 
years The question of whether this concentration policy has indeed succeeded in 
keeping the number of aid-receiving countnes at a manageable level has also been 
frequently raised In 1995, for instance, the National Advisory Council for Develop­
ment Cooperation (NAR 1995) proclaimed that, in light of 'management and 
quality', Dutch bilateral aid should be concentrated on fewer countries The NAR 
proposed about ten countries for the establishment of a broad development pro-
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gramme and about twenty countries for the financing of only thematic or sector 
programmes For Minister for Development Cooperation Pronk, however, such a 
concentration was simply unacceptable 
7 Ρ F Maas 1986 35 
8 В J Udink 1986 93-97 The power struggle between the Ministry of Finance and 
the Ministry for Development Cooperation with regard the World Bank, the IMF and 
regional banks was a different matter, Udink nevertheless states that his civil 
servants participated intensively in the negotiations in this case as well 
9 Ρ Hoebink 1988 57 Before Pronk, the Ministry of Economic Affairs (or more 
precisely one of the desks within this Ministry called BEB - Bureau for Economic 
Relation) had a strong say in the allocation of aid, as this Ministry 'administered a 
large part of the aid, coordinated the spending consultations in which "shopping 
lists" (with goods from Dutch industry) were presented from which the developing 
countries could order ' According to M Kuitenbrouwer (1994 149), this 'withdrawl 
of the spending of bilateral aid from the BEB' has to be regarded as one of the most 
progressive adjustments during Pronk's first Ministry as it enabled a gradual, partial 
or total untying' of aid 
10 For Pronk, this broadening of the responsibilities of the Minister for Develop­
ment Cooperation was essential In his opinion, aid was only one of the means and 
certainly not the most important means for meeting the development needs of the 
Third World More essential than aid were structural reforms in international trade 
Pronk expressed himself most strongly in this field and in his support for a New 
International Economic Order (see also H Beerende 1981 51-56) J Voorhoeve 
(1979 258-263) provides a short overview of the importance of 'structural reforms' 
in the policy of Pronk According to Voorhoeve, Pronk 'succeeded in changing the 
formulation of Dutch aid policy, but made little direct impact on the policies of 
other donors ' This led to 'great publicity and enhanced the reputation of the 
Netherlands among the representatives of many non-aligned countries At the same 
time, his strongly pronounced views and unconventional tactics strained relations 
with the U S , West Germany, and other Dutch allies ' According to Udink, develop­
ment cooperation was simply taken off the international agenda in the mid-1970s 
and the Americans had no faith whatsoever in Pronk 'Not only because he was a 
socialist, but mainly because he did not come across as friendly He is fanatical, 
tiresome whereas you have to be friendly in international politics' (M Brandsma and 
Ρ Klein 1996 70) The term development cooperation was introduced in the late 
1960s According to В J Udink (1986 91), 'more and more pretty words [came up] 
to describe the same issues So "aid" was not good, "cooperation" was better I did 
not mind as it did not change the execution of the task ' 
11 The Netherlands and Sweden attained this target 'by the original target date (the 
middle of the 1970s) ' According to J Voorhoeve (1979 278-283), several factors 
contributed to the rapid growth of Dutch aid and the attainment of the target of 0 7% 
by the mid-1970s (1) a 'political commitment', (2) the 'multi-year budgeting' 
providing 'considerable time to adjust to producing a surplus more or less perma­
nently for the Third World', (3) 'protection of the aid budget' which 'was expressed 
as a percentage of national income and could not be used for short term budget 
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balancing operations'; (4) 'support from public opinion'; (5) political pressure from 
public interest groups and the media; (6) 'absence of strong criticism' due to the 
humanitarian motives behind aid; (7) a political culture which 'emphasizes state 
intervention in socio-economic processes to protect the weak and the underprivile-
ged'; (8) 'domestic tranquillity' and no Overwhelming external problems'; and (9) 
'the size of the Dutch state [...] in the sense that development cooperation offered 
the Dutch an opportunity to build a dynamic constructive role in a policy sector 
which was not pre-empted by eager Great or Super Powers.' With regard to the last 
point 'the notion of gidsland (being a guide to other nations that are locked up in 
their power and status quo interests)' is also mentioned. 
12. From 1974 to 1978, the amount of programme aid grew by more than 1,500%. 
Programme aid was part of a new category in the budget created by Pronk: direct 
aid for the relief of acute suffering and thus distinct from long-term development 
aid. 'The rapidly rising aid budget facilitated the introduction of fast-disbursing 
emergency assistance, while existing long-term programs could continue to expand' 
(J. Voorhoeve 1979: 260). 
13. Policy paper 1976. 
14. See, for example, J. Voorhoeve 1979: 258 and 268. Pronk made a direct 
connection between meeting the basic needs of the poor and basic human rights, 
which became one of the criteria for the selection of concentration countries. 
15. Suffice it to say that for many (see, for example, H. Beerends 1981 and P. 
Hoebink 1988), Pronk's speeches were more radical than his policy and his policy 
more radical than development practice. According to H. Beerends (1981: 54), Pronk 
did not succeed in a 'real restructuring' but managed to score some 'progressive 
points': a political criterion for the selection of concentration countries and thus 
inclusion of some countries with more progressive policies (Cuba, Jamaica, Zambia), 
aid to socialist countries (Vietnam, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau), aid to 
liberation movements, reduction of the influence of the Ministries of Economic 
Affairs and Foreign Affairs, resistance to further integration of Dutch aid into the 
European Community, and functioning as a fore-runner of reforms at international 
conferences. 
16. According to De Koning (Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal 1981: 65-66) 'the 
programmatic approach moves between traditional project and programme aid and is 
mainly characterised by: [1] more fundamental analytical research preceding the 
formulation of activities; [2] more participation of the concerned target groups in 
formulation and implementation of activities; [3] more flexibility in implementation 
in the sense that there are more possibilities for adjustment in activities on the basis 
of continuous evaluation and monitoring; [4] enter into long-lasting cooperation 
without laying down exactly which activities will be executed within a given time 
frame.' 
17. De Koning also presented a white paper reflecting his thoughts on development 
cooperation. The title of this paper speaks, in fact, for itself: 'Development cooper-
ation in global economic perspective.' A paper on 'improving the quality of bilateral 
aid' was also presented at the same time (Policy paper 1979 and Policy paper 
1979a). 
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18 'Also [Van Dijk] underscored that Dutch export to developing countries lagged 
behind and that Dutch investments in developing countries, even in Indonesia, could 
not compete with those of other countries like Japan' (P Hoebink 1988 65) The 
remark of Minister Van Dijk in a current affairs TV programme in February 1982 
clearly showed his intent 'the line of policy is to look for ways that lead to a better 
involvement of the Dutch private sector ' (quoted in A Melkert 1986 back flap) 
19 A point worsened by Van Dijk's approval of the Apartheid regime in South 
Africa in publications during his stay in South Africa in 1956-1960 
20 J Pronk 1986 106 
21 Policy paper 1984 and Policy paper 1984a The Re verification Paper was 
accompanied by several publications highlighting the role of the Dutch private sector 
in aid One of these publications, the result of a symposium on the direct and 
indirect effects of aid on the Dutch economy, was in many ways sceptical Tying of 
aid to procurement in the donor country, for instance, is not considered particularly 
effective because of the so-called substitution effect, and the impact of aid on 
employment in the Netherlands has relatively little value (H de Haan, С J Jepma 
and M С Quist 1984) 
22 Contracting out held for not only the private profit sector but also for the private 
non-profit sector Schoo appears to have mainly been thinking of greater involve­
ment for commercial firms This point in particular and the fact that such contracting 
out became the rule was heavily criticised (see, for example, J Breman 1986 353-
363) In 1988, the evaluation department from DGIS presented a report under the 
title 'Contracting out bane or blessing7' (IOV 1988) According to this report, the 
proportion of work contracted out was expected to lead to (1) qualitative improve­
ment, (2) greater involvement of non-governmental circles in development cooper­
ation, and (3) reduction of the workload The main findings in the case of rural and 
regional development activities were (1) 'whether projects were implemented by 
DGIS or contracted out to non-profit-making organisations and small consultancy 
firms, the results were comparable in quality Projects which were contracted out to 
large commercial consultancy firms were generally less successful as regards aspects 
such as the participation and organisation of the target group, institution building and 
fitting in with local structures', (2) 'the extent to which growth in contracting out 
has helped to increase the involvement of the Dutch and the local community in 
development cooperation is a somewhat vexed question The number of Dutch 
experts on long-term postings abroad is declining The number of organisations 
supplying DGIS with experts is increasing [ ] the supply of local experts is 
growing', and (3) 'the workload of employees at DGIS and the relevant embassies 
has not been noticeably affected by the increasing proportion of work which is 
contracted out ' 
23 Ρ Hoebink 1992 237 
24 Ρ Hoebink 1989 
25 Policy paper 1990 
26 Ρ Hoebink 1992 230 
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27. In 1993, Pronk presented a follow-up paper under the title 'A World in Dispute.' 
The optimistic attitude that prevailed in 'A World of Difference' is lost as a 
consequence of, among other things, increasing intrastate tensions and conflicts. As a 
consequence, some other areas of concern for development cooperation are added to 
the new white paper. One of these is 'priority for attaining peace and fighting 
(preventing, controlling, and solving) violent conflicts, also those of a non-economic 
(religious, nationalistic, cultural, ethnic) nature, between and within societies.' With 
this, one of the central issues emerging in the second reformist period for develop-
ment aid in the late 1980s/early 1990s is addressed (see Chapter 1). Politically, the 
most important part of the white paper 'A World in Dispute' is dedicated to what 
has been called the 'departition' of development cooperation. 'Development cooper-
ation is no longer the soft sector of foreign relations, a form of international welfare 
policy to correct or compensate the harsh reality of international politics. Develop-
ment cooperation is becoming more and more part of that reality' (Policy paper 
1993: 141-143). This call for 'departition' is also the basis for the 'reverification 
report' in 1995, although the issue pertains to the entire foreign policy of the 
Netherlands in this case (Policy paper 1995). The central message of this 
reverification report is, according to many critics, that Dutch foreign policy should 
be more explicitly aimed at the strengthening of Dutch economic interests (see, for 
example, P. Hoebink 1995a: 132-140). 
28. A. v.d. Graaf and H. Holthuizen 1990: 47. At the height of the Cold War, this 
was considered a 'legitimate' motive for aid (see, for example, P. Hoebink 1992). 
29. The USAID representative once stated that the role of the AIC is 'in essence 
limited to the exchange of information from the World Bank to the donors' and that 
'the AIC has never had any influence on India's policy' (Interview USAID, New 
Delhi, June 1992). Other donors have confirmed the limited role of the AIC as a 
coordinating organisation. Japan, for instance, simply regards the consortium as a 
medium for the exchange of views between India and the donors (Interview Japanese 
Embassy, New Delhi, June 1992). Sweden considers the AIC important when it 
comes to the exchange of information but a 'zero' when it comes to coordination 
(Interview Swedish Embassy, New Delhi, June 1992). Canada, the United Kingdom, 
and Germany have all expressed similar views with regard to the role of the AIC 
(interviews at respective embassies/aid agencies, June 1992). Looking at the annual 
changes in the ODA commitments over the period 1979-1992, moreover, large 
discrepancies can be observed between the major AIC donors. At best, thus, the 
influence of the AIC on the aid commitments of its individual members has been 
very limited. Put differently: Aid commitments appear to depend on the policy of the 
individual donor and not on the policy of the combined donors within the AIC. 
30. This is not to say that Dutch aid to India only started in 1962. In fact, the first 
Dutch development aid to India was offered in 1950 'by way of a contribution of 
Dfl 1.5 million to the Technical Assistance Programme for "low-developed coun-
tries" which was launched by the United Nations' (P. Hoebink 1988: 48). 
31. Letter (9-6-1961) from the Indian Secretary of Finance to the Indian Ambassador 
in the Netherlands (quoted in: IOV 1994a: 83/note 3). 
32. A. v.d. Graaf and H. Holthuizen 1990: 49-50. 
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33. Cited in P. Hoebink 1988: 55. Udink exaggerated but only to a small extent. 
Figures from the ΝΙΟ (1969, 1970) show at least 92% of the total spending of 
development loans for goods and services in 1967 to be disbursed in the Netherlands 
and 93% for the years 1968 and 1969. 
34. N10 1970: 6-7. 
35. A. v.d. Graaf and H. Holthuizen 1990: 58-64. The exports by Philips and IHC 
and for fertiliser through 1972 account for 50% of the total disbursements under 
financial aid from the Netherlands to India. 
36. Of the development loan of 50 million for 1971, 23% was used for supplies to 
Dutch companies in India; for 1972 and 1973, the percentages are 26% and 13% 
respectively (Internal Communication, 27-8-1973). 
37. P. Hoebink 1988: 71. 
38. These annual consultations were known in the 1970s as 'spending consultations' 
(bestedingsoverleg) and in the 1980s as 'policy consultations' (beleidsoverleg). 
39. IOV 1994a: 84. See also F. v.d. Velden 1980: 52-56. One might also simply 
argue that the Dutch were carefully listening to the World Bank, which had already 
argued in 1962 that 'the most valuable form of aid which India can receive is aid 
which can be used quickly to finance additional imports of materials and compo­
nents for agriculture and industry' (IBRD/IDA 1964). 
40. Internal Communication, 1983 (no date). 
41. B.A. ten Tuinder 1992: 38. In this evaluation report, several reasons for striving 
towards a more diversified aid programme are mentioned and include policy 
stipulating greater emphasis on poverty alleviation and basic needs while phasing out 
miscellaneous import financing. The interest in 'fertilizer as the carrier of develop­
ment' was reduced in response to the observation that 'the new technologies of the 
Green Revolution were less neutral in spreading wealth as expected' and 'fertilizer 
programs [polarised] the rural areas, instead of being an instrument in alleviating 
poverty.' Possible fluctuations in the demand for fertiliser (e.g., in years of drought 
and because of India's stride towards self-sufficiency in fertiliser production) 
together with the introduction of a cash-ceiling policy in the early 1980s made 
spending of aid on mainly fertiliser a tricky business. 
42. During the annual consultation in 1977, the Indian delegation proclaimed that 
'social projects, by their very nature, are slow disbursing' and that 'an increase in 
the allocation for such projects in the current annual aid frame beyond some 
reasonable levels may have an adverse impact on resource transfers' (Agreed 
Minutes Annual Consultations 1977). As later developments would show, this 
prediction was fairly accurate (see 2.2.4 below). 
43. This delay was mainly due to DGIS itself which wanted more detailed informa­
tion as well as some four to five specific projects under this SFDA/MFAL-pro-
gramme. DGIS preferred to earmark the aid for specific parts of the programme, but 
the funds were eventually disbursed as a contribution to the overall programme. This 
SFDA/MFAL programme thus constitutes the first budget-support provided to India 
(see also: IOV 1994a: 86). In 1977, the funds were transferred to India; in Novem­
ber of the same year, the Embassy reported that the money was spent. 'Case closed' 
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was the laconic final remarle on this first Dutch 'social project' (Internal Communi­
cation, November 1977). 
44. Agreed Minutes Annual Consultations, April 1976. As a consequence of this 
Indian policy, 'donors provide funds for social projects, which will already be 
implemented to the extent to which funds are reserved in the budget.' The SFDA/-
MFAL programme is an example of the non-additionality of the Dutch aid, as the 
funds were not used to extend the scope of this programme but only to implement it 
according to planning. 
45. During the consultations in 1976, 15 million was again earmarked for 'social 
projects' without further specification of the type(s) of project(s). Of the 50 million 
for 'social projects' committed in 1977, 10 million was set aside for 'new projects to 
be identified'; the remaining 40 million was committed for rural drinking-water 
projects in Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh. In 1978, the projects for 30 million 
(of a total of 101 million committed for social projects) were still not identified. 
46. Agreed Minutes Annual Consultations, 1978. 
47. DGIS 1982: Chapter 5. 
48. Agreed Minutes Annual Consultations, 1980. 
49. DGIS only funded 85% of the project costs from then on, which made Dfl. 7.2 
million from the funds previously reserved for drinking-water projects available for 
reallocation (Agreed Minutes Annual Consultations, 1984). 
50. The 40.5% for the states to contribute is reached as follows: An (estimated) tax 
component of 15% is deducted from any claim before reimbursement. Hence 
projects are funded for only 85%. In keeping with the additionality-principle, the 
Gol deducts 30% from all reimbursements provided by DGIS. The state thus 
receives 70% of the reimbursements: that is, 70% χ 85% = 59.5% of any claimed 
amount. 
51. Internal Communication, 22-4-1989. 
52. Agreed Minutes Annual Consultation, 1978. This agreement on concentration 
sectors did not mean that project proposals for other sectors would not be rewarded, 
and India's double minded attitude towards concentration is also, thus, apparent. 
53. Concentration on agriculture was motivated by the fact that a substantial part of 
the Dutch aid already went to this sector (fertilisers, NABARD) and by the results of 
an agricultural identification mission in February 1981. This mission proposed 
several agricultural areas where projects could be funded. Two of these (irrigation in 
the North Bengal Terai region and a project for mushroom cultivation) were 
considered in the consultations in 1981. The North Bengal Terai project is discussed 
in Chapter 5. In 1981, DGIS stated that drinking water and agriculture would be the 
main project sectors for concentration of the Dutch aid, although it was acknowl­
edged that little had been done in agriculture up to that point (DGIS 1982). Mention 
of slum improvement as a concentration sector reflects the assistance rendered by 
DGIS for such a project in Calcutta under the non-regular programme (Cat Ill-a of 
the budget 'Direct aid to poorest countries and groups'). 
54. Dutch 'summary' of the outcome of the annual consultations in May 1981. 
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55 Agreed Minutes Annual Consultations, 1987 With regard to agricultural projects, 
DGIS pointed at the sector programme for rural development which is not part of 
the regular programme for India In the Country Policy Plan from 1984, DGIS stated 
that the agricultural sector had absorbed the largest part of the aid budget for India 
up to then mainly through the supply of fertiliser and support for rural credit 
(NABARD) Specific projects in the field of agriculture were, however, hard to 
come by mainly as a consequence of the bureaucratic structure of the Indian 
Ministry of Agriculture In order to initiate more projects, attention shifted to the 
Ministry of Irrigation which proved to be more cooperative Irrigation (under the 
heading of 'Land and Water') later became one of the four concentration sectors for 
project aid 
56 While the concentration on sectors did not pose too many difficulties from the 
Indian side, a 'policy aiming at regional concentration of the aid meets with major 
objections ' These mainly concerned the fact that the 'central government is [ ] 
responsible for an equal division of foreign aid across the entire country' (DGIS 
1982) 
57 Agreed Minutes Annual Consultations, 1979 
58 Agreed Minutes Annual Consultations, 1980 
59 A vd Graaf and H Holthuizen 1990 81 
60 The idea that India could actually be in a position to cancel aid was also brought 
forward in different memoranda in the late 1970s At the same time, DGIS 
recognised that it would not be easy for India to put a stop to its receipt of foreign 
aid This was also the opinion of Dr W Tims, who observed in a reaction to the 
broadening exercise that 'this is hardly a realistic point of departure considering the 
negative developments in the last 30 years and the gigantic magnitude of the 
development problems in the coming decennia It is therefore more plausible that 
[ ] the possibilities for non-aid bounded trade and private investments will remain 
limited for a long time ' The concept of broadening has been placed under different 
headers as relevant to 'improving the quality and management of bilateral aid' 
(Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal 1981 66), as part of the self-reliance track or 
as a consequence of the De Koning's white paper 'Development Cooperation in 
World-Economic Perspective' (Policy paper 1979 70) 
61 A vd Graaf and H Holthuizen (1990) calculated Dutch export to India to be 
carried for nearly 50% by supplies under development aid between 1976 and 1981 
with little change in this in later years 
62 E Frank and G vd Molen 1986 120 
63 The fact that the recommendations of the Working Committee seconded some of 
the central themes in De Koning's policy paper ('Development Cooperation in 
World-Economic Perspective') is not that strange De Koning was of the opinion 
that development cooperation operated too much in isolation and that integration 
with other relations was necessary India can thus be regarded as a guinea pig (see 
also A ν d Graaf and H Holthuizen 1990 82) 
64 DGIS (DAL/ZZ) 1984 3 
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65 According to the Directors General from the respective Ministries, this lack of 
enthusiasm was mainly due to uncertainties with respect to the possibilities under the 
broadening and the fact that India was still viewed as a 'difficult country' (Internal 
Communication, 8-2-1982) In contrast, A vd Graaf and H Holthuizen (1990 82-
83) report that the 'companies were under the impression that in the future it would 
be a lot easier to supply under the aid budget to India' and that the companies were 
'running in and out of the door' of DGIS 
66 IOV 1994a 21 In 1982, certain agreements were reached between DGIS and 
other Dutch Ministries with regard to 'parallel co-financing' of projects under 
broadening DGIS would provide aid funds to partly finance transactions or projects 
implemented by Dutch trade and industry preferably in cooperation with Indian 
companies Broadening activities should (1) be relevant from a development 
perspective, (2) contribute to the economic self-reliance of India, (3) contribute to an 
increase in the production capacity of the Indian economy, (4) not be negative for 
target groups of the Dutch aid, and (5) initiate long-term cooperation (Tweede 
Kamer der Staten Generaal 1982 88) The last condition was of particular import­
ance in the first broadening project 
67 This first broadening project revived the controversy between DGIS and BEB 
which had been in the background since Pronk A ν d Graaf and H Holthuizen 
(1990 92-94) provide an intriguing description of the sanctioning of the dredger 
under broadening funds Pressure from IHC on the Dutch Ministries of Finance, 
Economic Affairs and Foreign Affairs resulted in Premier Lubbers contacting 
Premier Indira Gandhi about the order and the threat that the 25 million would 
eventually be lost if India did not agree to the supply of the dredger by IHC India 
was not pleased with the fact that 10% of the aid allocation was reserved for 
broadening activities The accompanying note stating that the amount of 25 million 
had to be used within a certain time span for suitable activities or it would be totally 
or partly deducted from the allocation for the next year did not go down very well 
with India, which regarded such an attitude as a narrowing of Dutch policy and 
having nothing to do with broadening (Internal Communication, June 1982) 
68 A row took place in Parliament because the then Minister for Development 
Cooperation (Schoo) did not sign the agreement Schoo had been warned by her 
department that signing the agreement 'could create the impression that giving shape 
to the broadening of the bilateral relationship should happen for an important part 
with the support of Development Cooperation ' In such a way, the Minister's policy 
space would be 'needlessly restricted' (Internal Communication, 10-2-1984) 
69 IOV 1994a 20 
70 Internal Communication, 16-2-1988 
71 DGIS (DAL/ZZ) 1984 1 Reference is made here to the two-track policy of 
Dutch aid economic self-reliance and poverty alleviation Successive Indian 
governments have also strived towards a self-reliant development of their country 
and 'participation of the whole population, including the very large group of people 
under the poverty line, in the development process ' In this paper, it is simultaneous­
ly noted that India has reached 'good results' with regard to self-reliance while 
'poverty alleviation [ ] has been less successful ' 
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72 Rural and urban development were formulated as the main programmes in the 
'Revenfication Paper' of Minister Schoo The division of aid funds between these 
two programmes depends largely on 'the quantity and type of programme aid and 
[ ] the available means for local cost financing' (LCF) The LCF funds in tum 
determine the possibilities for realising projects aimed at the poor A large part of 
the 55% for rural development was to be used for fertilisers, although a decrease of 
this type of import support to around 25% of the allocation was envisaged The 
remaining 30% was for LCF funds for 'rural drinking water, agricultural credit 
programme and regional development programmes ' 
73 This basically means that the Netherlands regards the drinking water programme 
as an entry into rural development 'More attention is being paid to the socio-
economic aspects of drinking-water supply and projects with regard to sanitation, 
health, extension, etcetera while additional projects will start aimed at productive 
employment in which, among others, use will be made of the improved water 
supply ' 
74 It was particularly for these types of activities that the funds from the sector pro-
gramme for rural development were to be used Sectoral funds will be used to 
finance local cost projects when insufficient funds are available from the regular 
allocation 
75 Additional Dutch financing instruments relying on aid were in principle available 
for the industrial sector programmes These included the so-called 'restructuring 
programme as preparation for Dutch private sector investments in India,' the mixed 
credit schemes, the FMO, the import support programmes and the programme for 
sending out managers It was envisaged that these programmes could strengthen 
Dutch involvement in the five concentration sectors for industrial development, 
although it was also acknowledged that 'the Indian government is not very much 
inclined to let aid go directly to the private sector ' In the years to follow, this 
problem indeed became reality as the use of the programmes mentioned above 
remained at a very low level 
76 This has been particularly important in dnnking-water projects where the 
possibilities for introducing some kind of levy and/or tax to finance the operation 
and maintenance of the constructed system have been part of the ongoing discussion 
between the Netherlands and India (see also Chapter 4) 
77 Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal 1986 78-90 
78 Where the broadening exercise manifested itself more favourably was m creating 
a 'consultation structure' and in the commercial field 'Up to now it has not been 
possible to give a strong stimulus to cooperation in the cultural and scientific fields ' 
79 DGIS 1988 
80 This does not mean that the sector programmes for rural and industrial develop-
ment no longer exist 'Funds from the sector programme for rural development will 
be used over the period 1988-1992 for those parts of the policy which cannot be (or 
are less) efficiently implemented bilaterally' population, women and development, 
socialisation, rural employment, reforestation, energy, ecology, and food production 
and food security Under the sector programme for industrial development, the same 
categories are mentioned as in the 1986 paper (e g , mixed credit scheme, FMO) 
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81 DGIS 1992 
82 Taking an average annual cash ceiling of Dfl 200 million as the point of 
departure (with about 50% loans and 50% grants) and a conversion rate of 1 0 6, this 
meant that the cash ceiling for India was reduced to Dfl 160 million 
83 In the daily practice of development programmes, this general point is usually 
operationahsed via the creation of 'water-user committees' within irrigation projects, 
for instance (also see Chapter 5) 
84 In effect, Dutch aid to NABARD had already stopped in 1989 The 1992 paper 
therefore only confirms an already existing situation 
85 IOV 1994a 1 
86 Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal 1983 6-7 
87 IOV 1994a 79 
88 Balance-of-payments support refers mainly to the so called dollar-clause which 
was included in the agreements on development loans from 1977 to 1988 This 
means that the Netherlands was 'prepared partially to cover the foreign exchange 
risks entailed for India in paying back the principal and interest on the loans ' As the 
agreements were set in Dutch florins, an appreciation of the florin against India's 
major export earnings exchange (i e, the US dollar) would mean a growth of 
repayments of principal and interest In order to prevent such growth, the Nether­
lands agreed to deduct the appreciation so that India would not have to pay more 
dollars (Internal Communication, 22-8-1977) 'During the last few years in particu­
lar, the cost of the arrangement has increased quite rapidly from Dfl 0 8 million in 
1986, via Dfl 12 4 million in 1990, to Dfl 17 6 million in 1992' (IOV 1994a 95) 
89 Industrial development mainly concerns the programme for Development-Related 
Export Transactions This programme started in 1979 and has carried many different 
names Hundred Million Programme, Mixed Credit Programme, Low Concessional 
Loans Programme and Development-Related Export Transactions Programme 
(abbreviated in Dutch to ORET) The programme 'enables Dutch exporters to offer 
soft financing to developing countries for the supply of capital equipment and the 
execution of projects, whether or not in combination with the provision of services ' 
The programme has also been subject to the entena of development relevance and 
relevance to the Dutch economy (see discussion of the problems accompanying 
projects in the broadening exercise in 2 2 2 above) (ΝΙΟ 1992 2) The funds under 
this programme have (in combination with funds from the regular programme) been 
used for, among other things, the supply of three suction hopper dredgers and the 
dredging project Nhava Sheva 
90 Own calculation based on IOV 1994a 86, 88 
91 Pnor to 1985, the regular programme for concentration countries was placed 
under Category I of the budget ('Bilateral project- and programme aid') Under 
Schoo, the budget was changed and the regular programme became Category II 
('Country and regional programmes'), Category I then became the category for 
'sector programmes, emergency aid and programme support' and for the spearhead 
programme in 1991 
302 The same difference 
92 Technical aid was not thought to be necessary dunng the 1970s, although in 
1976 technical aid (Dfl 10 million) was allocated out of non-regular funds (Cat­
egory I-f) With the growth of project aid, the Netherlands decided to also offer 
technical assistance to India, mainly to be used for monitoring purposes 
93 The then Secretary of the Department of Economic Affairs from the Indian 
Ministry of Finance expressed 'the disappointment of India' in June 1983 (Internal 
Communication, 7-6-1983) The introduction of a cash ceiling as a means of 
controlling disbursements, on the one hand, and a disbursement obligation for 25 
million broadening funds, on the other hand, 'has led to a noticeable disturbance of 
the relationship [ ] The fame of the Netherlands as a serious donor is in this way 
undermined' (Internal Communication, 26-11-1982) 
94 Internal Communication, 12-5-1982 This was a consequence of the fact that 
commitments made in previous years look in the largest part of the cash ceiling The 
India desk of DG1S (DAL/ZZ) regarded this as 'hardly acceptable' to India, 'as for 
this country in the past couple of years disbursements were equal or higher than the 
allocation and the pipeline was intensively used ' That the increasing disbursements 
were the direct reason for introducing a system of cash ceilings and decreasing the 
allocation for concentration countries seems to have passed by DAL/ZZ The 
Embassy seemed to understand the situation better and complained dunng the annual 
consultations in 1982 that 'the internal Dutch problems had an overwhelming impact 
on the content of the development policy Of much less importance was at that time 
India's need for aid ' Nevertheless, India seemed to understand these problems 
(Internal Communication, 26-11-1982) The introduction of a limit to using the funds 
in the reservoir was a general policy and had nothing to do with the circumstances 
in specific countries 
95 Internal Communication, 18-5-1990 This conversion meant that the original 
allocation of 105 loans and 95 grants became 85 loans (105 minus 20) and 107 
grants (95 plus 60% of 20) 'The concessionality of the overall package [increased] 
to 82% from 79% according to this procedure ' The reduction of the cash ceiling 
from 200 to 192 million was acceptable for the Indian delegation to the annual 
consultations, but they nevertheless preferred to keep this acceptance quiet DGIS 
was asked to treat the reduction with confidentially 'in order to avoid repercussions 
within the Indian government [or] comments from concerned Ministries, which 
received the Agreed Minutes of the annual consultations' (Internal Communication, 
5-6-1990) DGIS kept its promise In the annual report of the Ministry for Develop­
ment Cooperation, nothing was mentioned in this regard Not even the amount of the 
cash ceiling for India was mentioned while this was clearly done for all of the other 
concentration countries (DGIS 1990a) 
96 In the 1980s, India remained among the top three receiving countries for overall 
aid (multilateral plus bilateral) India was only surpassed in certain years by Egypt, 
Israel and/or China With respect to the so-called DAC countries, India is not the 
major receiving country but can be found among the first six countries Egypt, 
Israel, Indonesia, China and Sudan When all net disbursements are counted (ι e 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) plus Other Official Flows (OOF) plus 
private net investments), India is among the five major receiving countries, together 
with China, Brazil, Israel and Indonesia (OECD 1991) India distinguishes between 
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three different sources of official external assistance from Aid India Consortium 
members, from the USSR (and East European countries) and from other donors The 
latter mainly consists of Arab countries and OPEC funds Assistance from the 
former USSR (and East European countries) for the period 1980-1991 was only 
4 3% of the total aid utilised by India in that period, while this percentage was 6 5% 
for the other donors The bulk of development assistance (ι e , 89 2%) has been 
provided by members of the Aid India Consortium (AIC) (Government of India 
1993 S-96/97 - own calculations) 
97 For many developing countries, aid as a percentage of GNP is (much) higher 
For all of the Sub-Saharan countries together, however, official development 
assistance amounted to 7 5% of the GNP in 1987-1988 while it was many times 
higher for individual countries ( e g , Somalia - 32%, Mozambique - 31 1%) For EI 
Salvador aid was higher as a percentage of the GNP with 10% In Asia, only China 
scores lower than India with aid amounting to 0 6% of the GNP Official develop­
ment assistance can also be expressed in relation to the total expenditures (budget) 
of the receiving country Net ODA for India in 1975 was 17 9% of total government 
expenditures and dropped to 8 4% in 1978 and further to 7 6% in 1981 
98 Sources for these figures OECD 1986a, 1987, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1995 
99 Nearly 79% of all multilateral aid to India between 1969 and 1992 consisted of 
loans, 21% consisted of grants Loans became less important from 1975 onwards 
Across the entire period, 61 5% of the bilateral aid from the OECD countries was in 
the form of grants and 38 5% in the form of loans There are remarkable differences 
between bilateral donors as far as the loan/grant composition of the aid is concerned 
From 1978 onwards, Sweden only provided grants to India while Japan mainly 
provided loans From 1983 onwards, grants from the Netherlands have been 
consistently higher than net loans while France has always provided more loans than 
grants Net loans from the United Kingdom (since 1976), the United States (since 
1977, with the exception of 1981) and Canada (since 1987) are negative (l e , 
repayments on previous development loans are higher than new loans) This also 
accounts for specific years for other donors Japan in 1981, Sweden in 1978, and the 
Netherlands in 1992 The negative net development loans from the United States, the 
United Kingdom and Canada show development aid to contribute significantly to the 
Indian foreign debt Over the period 1969-1992, India has repaid US$ 9,252 9 
million on development loans This is some 25% of the total net aid (grants and 
loans) received over the same period Of the total outstanding foreign debt for India 
in 1989 of nearly 55 billion, some 23% came from concessional bilateral loans, 24% 
from concessional multilateral loans and 12% from IBRD loans Although debt to 
commercial banks has increased in the second half of the 1980s, the largest part of 
the 'government guaranteed foreign debt' still consists of concessional loans (ι e , 
development loans or aid) 
100 IOV 1994a 88 
101 The IOV reaches a higher amount in the pipeline as they took as aid allocation 
for 1973 an amount of Dfl 113 million This is, however, not correct In 1973, the 
ΝΙΟ provides two loans to India, one of 68 million (being the regular allocation for 
that year) and one of 45 million The latter loan was basically an advance for the 
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purchase of dredgers lo be subtracted in later years In 1974, contracts are signed 
between India and the Netherlands for a sum of Dfl 99 million, consisting of two 
separate loans of Dfl 54 and 45 million respectively The 54 million loan includes 
subtraction of the 28 million pre-financed in 1973 Of the 45 million pre-financed in 
1973, a total of 17 million thus remains as an independent loan Effectively, India 
received loans for a total of 68 + 54 + 45 + 17 + 28 = 212 million guilders This 
amount is presented as two loans in Table 2 1 Dfl 85 (68 + 17) for 1973 and Dfl 
127 ( 54 + 28 + 45) million for 1974 
102 The pipeline funds at the end of 1984 were nearly 350 million guilders If the 
funds disbursed over and beyond the cash ceiling in the period 1985-1992 (a total of 
118 6 million) are subtracted from this, 231 million in aid (for which agreements 
were signed) were lost for India This represents nearly 9% of the total aid allocated 
prior to 1985 In reality, this figure is probably higher as the extra disbursements 
above the cash ceiling after 1984 were not only financed from funds out of the 
pipeline but also from 'non-disbursed funds from elsewhere in DGIS' (IOV 1994a 
88) Mysteriously, no correspondence about this disappearing reservoir could be 
found in the files at DGIS, indicating that India has officially never been informed 
103 Although the IOV (1994a 77) states that the disbursement problems started in 
1985 as a consequence of the withdrawal of the reservoir, it is clear that such 
disbursement problems existed prior to 1985 and were dealt with in a similar 
manner Disbursements problems became manifest from the mid-1970s onwards 
when development aid to India increased significantly While at the end of 1973 
DGIS could still proclaim that disbursements were 'very satisfactory' (Internal 
Communication, 27-8-1973), this was certainly not the case one year later In 
November 1974, Pronk agreed to afterwards financing of transactions under the aid, 
where this was earlier already done for fertiliser (Internal Communication, 29-11-
1974) One could argue that the practise of 'afterwards' financing was already 
introduced in 1972 with the concept of reimbursement, in which India pre-financed 
expenditures out of its own budget and the Netherlands later reimbursed these funds 
out of the aid A problem with this reimbursement-concept was that, as the develop­
ment loans to India were tied to procurement in the Netherlands, a 'certificate of 
origin' was required in order to determine whether the goods were indeed of Dutch 
origin and supplied by Dutch firms In some cases the 'certificate of origin' was 
sidestepped, like in the case of the supply of spare parts by IHC in 1976 (Internal 
Communication, 14-6-1976), or the Dutch corporate sector 'disregarded' this 
regulation (Internal Communication, 13-11-1978) It is, however, true that the 
introduction in the 1980s of the cash ceiling on spending to prohibit the transfer of 
non-disbursed funds to the next year (ι e, all funds allocated in one year had to be 
spent by the end of the year) caused severe disbursement problems This was 
particularly the case in light of the Dutch strategy to reach a more equal balance 
between project and programme aid 
104 The signing of the aid agreements sometimes took an exceedingly long time, 
mainly because India either wanted changes in the agreements or was opposed to the 
changes made by DGIS In 1975, for instance, the signing of the loan agreement was 
delayed by more than one year because of the changes which India wanted in the 
guidelines for procurement The signing of the aid agreement was delayed in 1988 
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because India initially rejected the cancellation of the so-called dollar clause in that 
agreement 
105 Internal Communication, 18-8-1978 Three factors are generally cited as reason 
for the frequent reallocations (1) the strong position of the Dutch guilder in relation 
to a number of foreign currencies including the Yen and the German Mark, (2) cost-
inflation which had been very high in the Netherlands, and (3) the decreasing 
efficiency of Dutch firms 
106 This list included a pipe-laying barge (for Dfl 68 million), fire fighting equip­
ment (6 7 million), a floating crane (9 million), tugboats (13 million), floating dry 
dock (6 million), equipment for the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (40 million), 
compressors for gas fractiomng (6 million), dredger and port equipment (5 million), 
equipment for railways (9 million), steel (20 million) and a multi purpose vessel (45 
million) (Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal 1980 45) 
107 Internal Communication, 17-9-1984 The actual disbursement stayed at 198 
million, which is just under the cash ceiling of 202 million and mainly due to large 
supplies of fertiliser 
108 Internal Communication, 25-4-1990 
109 Agreed Minutes Annual Consultations, April 1976 
110 Internal Communication, 6-2-1979 The Indian decision was a blow to the 
Netherlands which reacted by stating that financing of Indian wharfs out of Dutch 
aid was impossible, if only because suppliers from the Netherlands and so-called 
'eligible countries' were not allowed to participate in the tendering (Internal 
Communication, 20-3-1979) 
111 This trawlers story returns in an article in India Today from 15-11-1982 in 
which it is stated that the Netherlands has slopped aid due to the human rights 
situation The Embassy proposes writing a letter to the periodical and mentioning the 
trawlers DGIS does not agree to mention of the trawlers (although it agrees to the 
rest of the letter) 'The fact that Indian organisations have complained is true, but 
need not be affirmed It would be better not to go into the matter as this could 
reopen the discussion about the policy and the implementation thereof by India, 
while this is a sensitive matter for India On the other hand, we [ι e , DGIS - LS] 
have indeed stopped the delivery of trawlers under the aid India Today could take 
this up and criticise the letter of the Embassy as incomplete' (Internal Communica­
tion, 8-11-1982) 
112 The present leader of the liberal party in parliament was, before his departure to 
India in 1983, briefed about the trawler controversy by DGIS He was informed that 
'the Indian government seems determined to expand deep-sea fishing, despite the 
continuing problems with traditional fishers and doubts about the economic feasibili­
ty' (Internal Communication, 1983 (no date)) 
113 Internal Communication, 5-7-1984 
114 In February 1982, a drinking-water coordinator was appointed at the Dutch 
Embassy in New Delhi The appointment was initially for one year only (despite the 
four years thought essential by DGIS) because of 'the unclear status' of this 
coordinator (DGIS 1982 Chapter 6) (see also Chapter 4) 
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115 Internal Communication, 22-4-1989 
116 Internal Communication, 21-5-1989 Over the period 1980-1992, import support 
accounted for nearly 50% of total disbursements This was despite the Dutch desire 
to lower import support in favour of project aid as discussed with India on several 
occasions The fact that India frequently insisted on import support was well 
documented in 1989 and 1990 Threatening under-utihsation in 1989 prompted a 
request for greater import support It was agreed to regard extra import support as an 
advance and thus subtract it from the amount reserved for import support in 1990 In 
1990, however, there was again a fear of under-utilisation, and India simply declared 
the claims in project sectors a non-priority in the hope that still more funds would 
be reallocated to import support (Internal Communication, 30-10-1990) 
117 IOV 1994a 26 
118 The IOV (1994a 28) notes that 'this was not consistently utilised in all sectors, 
so a coherent database for the management of project implementation was not 
available at the Embassy ' 
119 Internal Communication, 16-9-1987, in which the ΝΙΟ is ordered to pre-finance 
a sum of 57 million It is interesting that DG1S decided on the mechanism of pre­
financing when a negative recommendation had been made to the Embassy The 
Embassy based its opinion with regard to pre-financing on the experiences of the 
Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) This organisation had 
stopped pre-financing projects in India because (1) the Ministry of Finance in India 
held the funds until an acceptable request was received while what was meant by an 
acceptable request was totally unclear, (2) funds frequently did not reach the 
projects, (3) it was difficult to get reimbursement statements with regard to the pre-
financed funds, and (4) control over the project by the donor was even less than 
normal (which was confirmed by Sweden, Norway and Canada) (Internal Com­
munication, 30-6-1987) DGIS insisted on an evaluation of the pre-financing 
mechanism two years later In 1989, India presented such an evaluation in which 
they concluded that the mechanism of pre-financing had contributed to the elimin­
ation of the problem of the timely availability of funds for project implementation 
(Agreed Minutes Mid-Term Review May 1990) The recommendation made by India 
to increase the amounts made available under pre-financing, however, was not 
accepted by DGIS The fact that additionality was simply not questioned also 
contributed to the Dutch viewpoint The state's own contribution therefore remained 
at 40 5% of the project costs, while a total additionality would solve the problems of 
the states, simply because then these states would only have to pay the 15% 
deducted by DGIS as tax component out of their own pocket (Internal Communi­
cation, 27-4-1989) The system of pre-financing introduced in 1987 allowed for a 
pre-financing of 20% with additional funds made available after 65% of the pre-
financed funds were exhausted and was regarded as sufficient by DGIS 
120 Taking all of the above together, 96 4% of the Dutch aid disbursements under 
the regular programme from 1974 to 1992 has been accounted for The remaining 
3 6% falls under miscellaneous and includes such items as debt relief (15 9 million 
over 1974 and 1975), aid to the fertiliser industry (24 7 million between 1974 and 
1977) and the Karnataka Industrial Sheds programme (50 million since 1981) 
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121 When India made clear in 1982 that it wanted to buy less fertiliser from the 
Netherlands under aid, the agreement with BEB was cited by DGIS as one of the 
'disadvantages' of replacing fertilisers with greater budget support (ARDC/NABAR-
D) A higher amount for budget support would automatically raise the percentage of 
funds used for local cost financing above the acceptable 30% of the allocation 
122 Internal Communication, 2-10-1981 Indeed, India did not agree to the use of 
counter-value funds for the financing of local costs, as this would mean the double 
tying of Dutch aid If 'counter value funds are used for financing local costs, the 
Netherlands would, for every guilder of aid, have a voice for two guilders' (Internal 
Communication, 27-11 -1981 ) 
123 IOV 1994a 116 
124 My own calculations from disbursement figures provided by the IOV (1994a 
86, 89), using as yardsticks for the local cost financing component 100% of 
disbursements under budget support, 90% under rural water supply, land and water, 
80% under environment and miscellaneous project aid, and 10% under water 
transport Import support, by definition, has no LCF The 10% taken for the sector 
water transport is possibly on the high side considering the fact that the larger part 
of the activities under this sector concern the supply of dredgers and dredging work 
executed by Dutch firms and experts In the case of rural drinking-water supply and 
also land and water, 90% is taken for LCF, leaving 10% of the disbursement 
amounts for mission, Dutch experts and consultancy firms It should be mentioned 
that this 10% is possibly lower in reality Exact figures, however, are not available 
Funds provided under the technical aid procedure, for instance, cannot be taken as 
the point of departure for the simple reason that they have not been used to finance 
only technical components The 80% for environment and miscellaneous projects is 
mainly based, with regard to the latter, on the largest project (Kamataka Industrial 
Sheds) and the fact that many of the smaller projects concern studies and missions 
Finally, for budget support, a 100% LCF component is taken Although this is 
possibly true for IREDA (energy) and EWE (non-formal education to women), it is 
doubtful for NABARD (considering 'NABARD's involvement in other agricultural 
activities [which] sometimes required more capital goods from abroad than the 
donor's budget support allowed' (IOV 1994a 181)) According to the coordinator of 
the IOV evaluation of the Netherlands development programme with India, the 
percentages utilised above are fairly accurate (interview IOV, 27-8-1996) It should 
be stressed that these figures and percentages are only estimates 
125 Other items important to the distinction between poverty alleviation and 
economic self-reliance are funds provided under the technical aid procedure in 
relation to those provided under the financial aid procedure and the division between 
grants and loans With regard to the latter, the IOV (1994a 93 94) concludes that 
during the period 1980-1992, there has been a 'regular shuffling between loans and 
grants [ ] in order to deplete available annual budgets as much as possible ' 
Whereas grants were normally offered for activities aimed at direct poverty allevi-
ation, it is interesting to note that 66% of the total disbursements for water transport 
(aimed at economic self-reliance) were in the form of grants This accounted for 
25% of all disbursements over 1980-1992 in the field of import support The 
financial aid procedure ('which holds the recipient country responsible for the 
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implementation of activities, including tendering, awarding of contracts and supervi­
sion') was followed for nearly all disbursements under programme support In the 
case of project aid, only the sector environment shows a higher percentage of 
disbursements falling under the technical aid procedure (IOV 1994a 91-92) 
126 E Frank and G vd Molen 1986 181 
127 The 1984 India policy paper stated in this regard that 'the Indian government 
has an ambivalent attitude towards the involvement of NGOs in the implementation 
of government programmes, although the effectiveness of the implementation will 
fare well' with such an involvement (DGIS (DAL/ZZ) 1984) 
128 Internal Communication, 17-6-1984 
129 Internal Communication, 7-5-1984 
130 Internal Communication, 16-4-1984, in which the Indian reaction to the Dutch 
wish for 'possible involvement of private Indian organisations for the implementa­
tion of complementary activities (health education, drainage, sanitary provisions, 
household industries, milk production, etc )' is discussed (see also Chapter 4) When 
Schoo also expressed her wish in the same year to meet with NGDOs active in the 
field of human rights, the Indian government was not very appreciative which 
probably had less to do with the NGDOs than with human rights 'The possibilities 
of discussing human rights with India in general arc "extremely small ' (Internal 
Communication, 5-7-1984) 
131 Internal Communication, 24-1-1986 
132 Internal Communication, 29-10-1986 'It has been tried for years to involve 
NGOs in the implementation of the bilateral programme ' 
133 Internal Communication, 16-11-1987 
134 The focus on basic needs and poverty alleviation under Pronk did not, however, 
mean that the interests of the Dutch corporate sector were forgotten In light of 
disbursement pressure (and pressure from the Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
from India), for instance, Pronk agreed in 1976 to use so-called employment funds 
together with development aid to secure the supply of a pipe-laying barge by IHC 
These 'employment funds' were the predecessor to the mixed credits facility in the 
late 1970s 'Aid out of the employment funds is meant for additional exports which 
create employment in the Netherlands' (Internal Communication, 12-2-1976) It was 
agreed that no link would be made between 'normal aid' and 'employment funds' as 
normal Dutch bilateral loans were already tied to procurement in the Netherlands 
Pronk not only stated in his agreement for a link of these two funds for the IHC 
order that this 'should not be regarded as a precedent', but also that he would 
appreciate it 'if [DGIS] in its information to the [Dutch] corporate sector would 
announce that it is improper for the sector in its commercial contacts with develop­
ing countries to create expectations with regard to the receipt of Dutch aid without 
first contacting [DGIS]' (Internal Communication, 9-6-1976) Although Pronk 
certainly used different terms and ideas than his predecessors, the fact remains that a 
declining but nevertheless large part of the Dutch aid in general and that to India in 
particular was used for import support (ι e , for supplies by the Dutch corporate 
sector) From the development funds administered by the ΝΙΟ, for instance, at least 
Notes 309 
86% was spent in the Netherlands in 1974 and 76% in 1977, which was the last year 
of Pronk's first ministerial period (N10 1975 and N10 1978) Α ν d De Graaf and 
Η Holthuizen (1990) calculated the percentage of financial aid to India spent in the 
Netherlands to have dropped from 88% in 1973 to 66% in 1977 
135 In contrast to what Ρ Hoebink (1988 237) states, the broadening exercise was 
not the outcome of changes in the policy under Schoo Actually, the role of develop­
ment aid in broadening came to an end under Schoo 
136 According to DGIS (1982), India wanted 'to spread foreign aid throughout the 
country Using a large part of the aid for one region for a longer period is unaccept­
able to the Indian government ' 
137 'The feeling of self-reliance in India has developed in such a manner that the 
intensive interference of donors with Indian policy aimed at poverty alleviation will 
[ ] not be accepted' (DGIS 1982) 
138 Although there was no official state concentration until about 1985, disburse­
ments since 1980 show Dutch aid to have been very much concentrated before then 
This holds more for the social projects than for projects falling under the objective 
of (economic) self-reliance Of the total of Dfl 726 million disbursed under project 
aid restricted to specific states between 1980 and 1992, slightly more than 57% went 
to those five states which officially became concentration states for project assist­
ance to India in 1986, for the two most important project sectors in the field of 
poverty alleviation (l e, drinking water, land and water) this was 92 7% and 69 8% 
respectively 
139 DGIS 1988 20 
140 IOV 1994a 9 
141 This means, in effect, that the introduction of the two main programmes for 
rural and industrial development under Schoo had hardly any consequences for the 
already established division of sectors Already existing sectors such as drinking-
water supply and fertiliser import were simply placed under these programmes, and 
the rural and industrial programmes were abandoned a few years later In the 1986-
1989 policy paper, 45% of the allocation was planned for industrial development and 
55% for rural development In reality, the disbursements were exactly the other way 
around The new sectors mentioned in the policy paper for 1986-1989 (e g , agro-
industry and fertiliser infrastructure) met with the same fate as, for instance, 
telecommunication a few years earlier they simply did not materialise By the time 
the policy paper for 1989-1992 was made public, moreover, this alternative sector 
distribution had already established itself 
142 In 1979, for instance, fertilisers took up 89% of all disbursements under the 
regular programme with an additional 6% going to miscellaneous imports 
143 IOV 1994a 164 
144 The Country Desk of DGIS, for instance, regarded the division between project 
and programme aid as undesirable in 1984 but added that 'it is good for reaching the 
cash ceiling' (Internal Communication, 17-6-1984) Import support has indeed been 
used by DGIS more than once to reach the cash ceiling Project aid (i e , social 
projects) was initiated in the second half of the 1970s as a consequence of the 
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changing development policy under Minister Pronk and India's improving balance-
of-payments (BoP) When India's BoP deteriorated at the end of the 1970s, a request 
for greater import support was thus made This argument has been used by India on 
several occasions since then (e g , at the beginning of the 1990s when the Gulf War 
played dirty tricks on India's BoP) DGIS has also used the BoP argument to argue 
for increased import support at the expense of project aid This was done in 1990, 
for instance, when increased import support was called for to prevent under-
utilisation of the cash ceiling In order to increase the amount of import support, 
DGIS would have to go back on the agreement made in 1989, however, the 
'argument could be made that reconsideration is needed in light of the deteriorating 
Balance-of-Payments position' (Internal Communication, 5-6-1990, emphasis added, 
LS) 
145 DGIS 1982 
146 Internal Communication, 16-4-1984 The following is also noted 'It is not 
surprising that this problem particularly occurs in the water transport sector, where 
the Netherlands tries to conquer first place ' 
147 Internal Communication, 27-6-1984 
148 Internal Communication, 18-4-1989 
149 Interview IOV, February 1996 
150 IOV 1994a 173 (note 12) DGIS is basically accused of uncritically following 
the World Bank, which only in 1991 concluded that 'India is in the midst of an 
economic crisis [which] has been a long time in the making ' 
151 В A ten Tuinder 1992 113 
Notes Chapter 3 
1 Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal 1964 С 731 
2 The government made clear that this technical transfer criterion did not mean that, 
for instance, hospital projects were unacceptable under the co-financing programme 
'All aid is aimed at the point that the donor can withdraw and the project will be 
carried further by the people of the concerned country This means, therefore, that 
development projects (indeed) have to carry some transfer of knowledge With the 
decision of the government to start co-financing development projects, then, it is 
logical that the transfer of knowledge be part of the pre-conditions for projects to be 
financed under this programme' (response of the then Undersecretary to questions 
from a Member of Parliament (Catholic People's Party)) (Tweede Kamer der Staten 
Generaal 1964) 
3 A point also taken up in the letter of the CMC and the Dutch Mission Council m 
September 1963 'Activities of the Mission in the restricted sense of the word, ι e 
those aimed at direct spread of the gospel, are, in the given circumstances, not 
eligible for subsidy by the government' (cited in Ρ ν Paaschen 1988 76) A 
Member of Parliament from the ARP (Anti-Revolutionary Party) stated with regard 
to this 'It is an honour and duty for Christianity to take care of this [ι e , spread of 
the gospel, LS] themselves, as they have always done up to now' (Tweede Kamer 
der Staten Generaal 1964 967) 
4 Policy paper 1966 66 
5 Minister Bot in response to requests from, among others, the Christian political 
parties to increase the amount made available for the co-financing of private 
development projects during the parliamentary discussion of the Foreign Affairs 
budget, 28-12-1966 (Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal 1966 652) In 1966, a total 
of Dfl 15 million was made available for private development projects This was a 
300% increase over 1965 In 1967, the budget remained at 15 million, thereafter the 
budget increased annually from Dfl 19 5 million in 1969 to 30 million in 1971 
(Werkgroep Evaluatie Ontwikkelingshulp 1969 236) 
6 This division is said to originate from the so-called 'Zoetermeer-crilerion' based 
on a city in the Netherlands that according to the population census of 1961 
reflected exactly the religious distribution within Dutch society (See S ν Wichelen 
1978 554 and note 6) According to the then Director of ICCO, it was initially 
decided to split the funds between ICCO and CEBEMO, the chairman of CEBEMO 
then proposed reservation of 10% and later 20% for the other organisation (See Ρ ν 
Paaschen 1988 110 (note 197)) The then Minister adopted the 40%/40%/20% 
division for reference The actual division was dependent on the non-committed 
funds at the end of the year (Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal 1969 3255) 
7 Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal 1967 581 
8 Werkgroep Evaluatie Ontwikkelingshulp 1969 19, 235-245, and Bijlage VI This 
first comprehensive evaluation report on Dutch development aid could not reach any 
conclusions with regard to the impact of the co-financing programme for the simple 
reason that 'only a few projects have reached the implementation phase' (p 242) 
'Although it is unclear to what extent requests from the concerned organisations 
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cover the real development needs', the evaluators considered this to be largely 
guaranteed and therefore called for a substantial increase of the programme (p 19) 
9 Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal 1969 3234 
10 Werkgroep Evaluatie Ontwikkelingshulp 1969 236 
11 ICCO 1977 15 
12 This more important role for the MFOs in project assessment was in line with 
the recommendations of the 1969 evaluation (Werkgroep Evaluatie Ontwikke­
lingshulp 1969 20) which stated that 'the primary responsibility for appraisal, 
selection, and implementation should be in the hands of the initiator ' 
13 Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal 1973 1370 Pronk was initially sceptical 
towards the MFP which he had regarded as simply confirming the existing system 
(see Ρ ν Paaschen 1988 83 84) 
14 Figures presented in this box are based on Annual reports of CEBEMO, 
HIVOS, ICCO and NOVIB up to 1992, Annual reports of DGIS 1985, 1986, 1987, 
1988a, 1989, 1990a, 1991a, 1992a and 1993, Stuurgroep Impactstudie 
Medefinancieringsprogramme 1991, and GOM 1995 
15 In 1995 the division of MFP funds had changed to 33 33% each for ICCO and 
CEBEMO, 22 22% for NOVIB and 11 11% for HIVOS 
16 DGIS 1984 Annex С (ρ 2) 
17 This point was already acknowledged in the 1969 evaluation which stated that 
the co-financing programme 'is handicapped by the strict criterion of transfer of 
knowledge' (Werkgroep Evaluatie Ontwikkelingshulp 1969 19) 
18 DGIS 1984 16 
19 L Schulpen and F ν d Velden 1992 The MFP funds grew from Dfl 53 million 
in 1973 to 100 million in 1976 Prior to Zandvoort I, each project had to have the 
approval of the government in the relevant country Starting in 1974, this was no 
longer necessary (except in some cases) 
20 A 'complex of development activities, without the necessity of knowing in 
advance the details concerning the eventual spending' was understood under 
'programmes' (Conclusions of the Zandvoort I consultation 15, cited in Ρ ν 
Paaschen 86) Basically, the foundation was laid for a more integrated approach 
21 L Schulpen and F vd Velden 1992 
22 DGIS 1984 16 Important in this regard is that the relationship between the 
MFOs and Minister Pronk was far from optimal For Pronk, the MFOs remained part 
of bilateral development cooperation and were not seen as a separate channel This 
meant involvement of the Embassies in the assessment and implementation of 
projects which was a thorn in the side of the MFOs The evaluation of projects by 
the recently installed IOV (Inspection Department of DGIS) also caused irritations 
along with the desire of Pronk to not restrict the MFP to ICCO, CEBEMO and 
NOVIB 
23 DGIS 1984 17-18 
24 L Schulpen and F vd Velden 1992 It is important to note here that the PFM 
agreement was largely based on the recommendations of the MFOs themselves Such 
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points as the target-group approach and the 'doubt paragraph' had already been 
brought forth in the 1970s ( e g , in the Chairmen's Statement from 1974) This 
'doubt paragraph' was included in the agreement between the Dutch government and 
the MFOs in order to prevent the use of public funds by the MFOs for (politically) 
unwanted projects The MFOs originally had to check with the Ministry in case of 
doubts about the PFM or possible negative consequences of project funding for 
Dutch development policy On the basis of the 1983 evaluation, the then Minister for 
Development Cooperation decided that this initiative could also come from the 
Dutch government itself In addition to the 'doubt paragraph,' there was also the so-
called 'international law paragraph' which stated that MFOs should withhold support 
for activities aimed at undermining the political independence of a state or the 
overthrow of a legal government using illegal means The last time that the 'doubt 
paragraph' was publicly used to criticise an MFO was in 1990 ICCO was financing 
the Philippine trade union umbrella organisation Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) and 
accused of knowledge concerning the channelling of funds from the co financing 
programme to the Philippine armed resistance via the KMU Although the mission 
which investigated these accusations concluded that there was no proof and that the 
accusations were thus 'without ground,' the Dutch Minister for Development 
Cooperation suggested that ICCO should have appealed to the 'doubt paragraph' 
much earlier, the accusations had already surfaced in 1987 and 1988 (Tweede Kamer 
der Staten Generaal 1990 See also E de Boer 1989 18-23) 
25 Ο ν Cranenburgh 1992 263-284 Quarles van Ufford (1991 29-57) qualified 
the PFM evaluation in 1988 as having little substance the report lacked insight into 
the programmes implemented under the MFP, an overview of activities undertaken 
and any indication of possible results and disappointments 
26 Stuurgroep Impactstudie Medefinancieringsprogramma 1991 10 
27 Ο ν Cranenburg 1992 267 
28 In the 1989 agreement, one of the priorities for the MFOs is omitted ( ie 'in 
case the development process in a society is at an impasse or existing activities have 
a closed character, priority should be given to new initiatives') 
29 A more negative conclusion could also be reached Quarles van Ufford argues, 
for example, that the political support for the PFM no longer reflected an interest in 
the value of the work of the MFOs (P Quarles van Ufford 1991 41) 
30 DGIS 1991b 3 The central theme for the programme evaluations for the period 
1980-1985 was 'participation of the target groups ' For the period 1985-1990, three 
themes were made central the role and impact of NGDOs in development processes, 
income-generating activities, and integrated rural development (including rural 
health) For the period 1990-1993, the central themes were income-generating 
activities, human rights and démocratisation, and sustainable agriculture/environment 
31 DGIS 1991b 5 Of the 43 Programme Evaluations (PEs), 13 were carried out in 
Africa, 15 m Latin America and the remaining 14 in Asia In two of the PEs, more 
than one MFO was part of the evaluation, while the remaining 41 were divided as 
follows across the four MFOs ICCO 10, CEBEMO 11, NOVIB 12 and HIVOS 8 
32 DGIS 1991b 5 
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33 See, for example, Ρ Hoebink 1988 and IOV 1988 
34 Compare, for example, Μ Ρ ν Dijk 1989, M Vellinga 1990, D Kruijt and К 
Koonings 1988, and J Breman 1986 
35 Letter of Minister Bukman concerning the MFP 18-7-1989 
36 M de Graaf 1989 744 
37 Stuurgroep Impactstudie Medefinancieringsprogramma 1991 5 
38 Stuurgroep Impactstudie Medefinancieringsprogramma 1991 45 
39 See, for example, E Oldenboom 1991 and L Schout 1991 
40 See, for example, M Nypels 1991 and Τ Nijzink 1991, who criticised the 
impact study for 'containing contradictions and providing empty recommendations ' 
41 GOM 1992 
42 DGIS 1990 310-311 Up to then, the MFOs had received 6% оГ the budget for 
Development Cooperation as an annual block grant Together with about 2% via 
additional funds, the MFOs could count on about 8% of the total budget With the 
increase of the block grant to 7% in 1994, however, the total allocation for the 
MFOs would not exceed the 8% mark as the additional funds made available to the 
MFOs would be reduced from 2 to 1 % 
43 The MFOs were free to set their own policy within the limits established by the 
agreement with the government but still seen as part of (bilateral) Dutch develop­
ment assistance This was clear in the 1970s under Pronk and in the 1980s under 
Schoo, who predominantly regarded the MFOs as a channel for one track of Dutch 
development policy (ι e , poverty alleviation) Under Schoo, the possibilities for the 
MFOs to make use of funds from other bilateral programmes were also enlarged 
The complementarity between assistance from the Dutch government and assistance 
via the MFOs was stressed by the Schoo's successor, Bukman, who observed in 
reaction to the annual reports from the four MFOs that just as self-reliance and the 
rehabilitation of national economies should not be for the government alone, poverty 
alleviation should not be for the MFOs alone Bukman also stressed the importance 
of the so-called additional programmes for the MFOs According to M Vellinga 
(1990 54), the 'private development cooperation sector' in the Netherlands, which is 
largely financed by the government, has 'increasingly become responsible for the 
implementation of important parts of the bilateral development policy (by which the 
government itself was released of the political responsibility for that part of the 
policy) ' 
44 In April 1995, the four MFOs brought out, what could be called a second 
Chairmen's statement The 'future contours of the co-financing programme' are laid 
out in this statement (GOM 1995a 1), which can also be regarded as closing off the 
discussion of the impact study in 1991 Based on 'national and international appreci­
ation of the work of private development organisations,' 'increased professionahsati-
on' of the organisations 'coupled with more openness and willingness to cooperate 
with other sectors in society' and an 'effectiveness and impact which can well 
withstand comparison with the bilateral and multilateral aid channel,' the four MFOs 
think that greater financial space should be made for themselves in the Dutch budget 
for development cooperation The MFOs basically repeat what they said in 1989 
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when they presented themselves as a better channel for aid m order to obtain more 
government funds and initiated an impact study to prove this claim 
45 ICCO staff members are among the first to acknowledge the general lack of 
policy- making within the organisation In this regard, the India desk is seen as a 
positive exception, the main reason of which is that over the years 'there were 
people in the India desk who wanted to be active in the field of policy development' 
(Interview staff member ICCO, January 1995) The more lively policy discussion 
among the staff of the India desk (as well as within ICCO in general) at the end of 
the 1980s was also a reflection of a more general debate in the Netherlands on the 
quality of development cooperation 
46 It should be obvious that ICCO India policy is not only shaped by internal 
considerations but also by the counterparts of ICCO A survey of ICCO counterparts 
across the period 1971-1992 shows a small number of the NGDOs to consider the 
financing of development activities to be the only role for ICCO The majority of 
the NGDOs, however, were found to be of the opinion that ICCO also has a role to 
play in the fields of advocacy, NGDO capacity-building, NGDO networking and the 
provision of information (also see L Schulpen 1994) Also see the discussion on 
'decentralisation' in the following section 
47 India was still part of the South Asia desk at the time Contacts were laid with a 
number of NGDOs, and a few are still supported by ICCO today 
48 ICCO 1980 1 The 'changing vision on development' mainly referred to the 
target- group approach and the concept of participation brought forward by the 
MFOs in the so-called Chairmen's Statement in 1974 and officially laid down during 
the Zandvoort-I conference m the same year (see 3 1 above) 
49 In a recent publication of the combined Dutch MFOs, their 'partner 
organisations' are divided into five groups The first consists of target-group 
organisations (i e, organisations set up by members of the target group themselves) 
The second consists of societal organisations, including labour unions, cooperations, 
and churches The third consists of intermediate organisations (NGOs or NGDOs in 
the narrow sense), which constitute the majority of the counterpart organisations for 
the MFOs Service-delivery organisations and network organisations constitute the 
fourth and fifth groups respectively (GOM 1995 Annex 3) 
50 This was the first time that ICCO officially accepted secular organisations as 
possible counterparts This does not mean that secular NGDOs in Third World 
countries had been excluded from ICCO support prior to this (Interview staff 
member ICCO, January 1995) In the first year of the India experiment (ι e , in 
1976), for example, a project from a non-Chnstian organisation was supported 
51 The lack of coherent policy stemmed from the experimental character of the new 
desk the target-group approach, the possibilities of funding grass-roots organisations, 
longer and more frequent travelling in a time when visitations were not yet regarded 
as a normal part of ICCO's work, the restriction to one country, and new/young staff 
all played a role (Interview staff member ICCO, February 1995) 
52 ICCO 1980 While the report is presented as a self-evaluation, the India desk 
remarks that it is not up to the desk to determine whether the policy intentions and 
priorities at the base of the experiment were realised or not 
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53 ICCO 1980 14 
54 ICCO/DGIS 1982 16 
55 Visits were very important in these first years of ICCO's involvement in India 
The then secretary of the India desk travelled frequently to India (eight times 
between 1976 and 1979 with a total stay of twelve months) The main goal of these 
visits was to establish a network of relations and prepare projects 
56 ICCO 1984 
57 'Transfer' and 'decentralisation' mainly refer to programme and organisation 
financing (where ICCO did not know all the details of the activities and budget) and 
to advisory services of Indian consultancy organisations Considering the fact that a 
number of different transfer initiatives had already been developed (ranging from 
rotating funds, guarantees of long term project or programme support and institu­
tional support for policy consultations, seminars and advice with regard to funding) 
and the fact that the Indian NGDOs were generally not very charmed by the idea of 
formal project approval in the hands of Indian organisations, the India desk did not 
see reason for further decentralisation An additional argument was that ICCO had to 
account for the projects funded and direct lines with the implementing organisations 
were therefore required (ICCO 1984 30-32) 
58 The India desk mainly criticised the churches in India for not using their wealth 
for programmes for the poor According to ICCO, the main Protestant churches in 
India reflect 'the political spectrum which is dominated by well-educated middle and 
higher class people', representatives of the poor are hardly incorporated into the 
decision-making structures of the churches Church-related organisations and 
communities also, however, existed with a large number of activities aimed at 
'societal justice ' ICCO did not play a role in the tensions between these 
organisations and communities and the official churches The political perspective of 
the India desk became clear at the beginning of the 1980s and contributed to 
growing attention to 'action groups' and 'implicit dissociation' from the official 
churches in India This is not to say that the programmes of official churches were 
no longer supported or that this 'dissociation' was made policy After 1987, this 
'distant relationship' to the official churches in India was reversed 'ICCO, as a 
Protestant Christian organisation, could no longer refrain from noting developments 
in the Christian churches' (Interview ICCO February 1995) 
59 The strong political orientation of the India desk (as expressed, for instance, in 
the 1984 report) did not find much response in the actual financing of projects and 
activities This was partly due to a general Western and Christian reluctance to 
support (violent) political struggles and to the insight that an outside agency should 
not become involved in the political struggles ш foreign countries The agreement 
between the Dutch government and the MFOs, which was heavily dominated by the 
thoughts of the MFOs themselves, also carried the so-called 'doubt paragraph' and 
the 'international law paragraph' which prohibited MFO support for political parties 
and political struggle 'MFOs were very reluctant to directly support political-
development activities' which led to an emphasis on material development and the 
creation of 'pre political awareness' through education, organisation and 
conscientisation (Interview ICCO January 1995) 
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60. ICCO 1984: 11. 
61. As for many of the other priorities, no reasons or criteria for the choice of these 
states are presented. The number of activities previously supported in the relevant 
state can hardly be one of the reasons as the list includes states with 51 projects over 
the period 1971-1983 (Andhra Pradesh) but also a state (Orissa) with no previous 
projects. Of the 272 projects sanctioned between 1971 and 1983, 43% involved one 
of the states now receiving priority. 
62. ICCO 1984: 10-11. 
63. Reference is mainly made here to those cases where the funding exceeds the 
level of projects (i.e., in the case of programme-financing and organisation-
financing). This distinction between projects (limited, one-time activities), 
programmes (a set of clearly designated, longer-term activities) and organisations 
(unearmarked contribution to an organisation's entire programme), was officially 
adopted in 1992 although previously adhered to in practice (see: ICCO 1993a: 11). 
64. The general climate at the India desk left little room for discussion; it was 
difficult to criticise the decisions taken with regard to projects and organisations as 
this was quickly seen as 'abandoning the target group' (Interview ICCO February 
1995). In this regard it is important to note that two separate departments were 
involved in the projects at the time: the preparatory department and the monitoring 
department. The former actually formed the India desk and set priorities; the latter 
was hardly involved in such activities. 
65. Interview ICCO February 1995. 
66. Interview ICCO February 1995. 
67. L. Schulpen and F. v.d. Velden 1992. 
68. Interview ICCO February 1995. 
69. ICCO 1986. The only NGDO regarded more sceptically was the Action for Inte­
grated Rural Development Society (AIRDS) which will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
NOVIB also held a discussion of the BINGOs. In 1988, a report entitled 'Big and 
still beautiful' (N. Beets, J. Neggers and F. Wills 1988) came to a very positive 
conclusion with regard to the involvement of the target group in the programmes of 
the BINGOs. These large NGDOs have 'kept their flexibility, participation and 
closeness to the poor while having wider impact and being considerably less 
bureaucratic and corrupt than government services' (Internal Communication, 1 ΝΙΟ­
Ι 990). 
70. The discussion within ICCO with regard to BINGOs concentrated on the 
organisational consequences for ICCO itself. The ICCO Asia desk, in a reaction to 
the proposal for financing of BINGOs stated that the 'financial need of these 
[BINGOs] has increased over the years' and that 'in general, this growing demand is 
justified, considering the expertise of these organisations, the management qualities, 
the degree of poverty of the target group, and the development approach.' In the 
policy paper entitled 'ICCO op weg naar het jaar 2000' (ICCO on its way to 2000) 
BINGOs were an issue. In this paper ICCO announced the proposal to strive towards 
a network of some 50 organisations in the Third World, which eventually would 
receive a minimum of 50% of the ICCO budget (Internal Message, 11-10-1990). 
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71 In the 1986 ICCO Annual Report (ICCO 1987a), it was mentioned that 
'counterparts which have been active since the mid-1970s in rural development are 
successful and working on a large scale [ ] It has become clear that ICCO should 
not work any longer on the basis of project-financing with organisations with an 
(area-wise) extended approach ' Instead of funding per project, programme financing 
and organisation financing were seen as more appropriate in these cases The remark 
that rural development BINGOs should be supported over a longer period with 
funding secured for up to three years was lagging behind the actual practice of 
ICCO in India 
72 ICCO 1988 By combining responsibility for project/programme application to 
evaluation in one staff member it was hoped that less time would be taken up by 
financial matters and more time could therefore be spent on the programme itself 
during visits 
73 ICCO 1987 The concept of empowerment is here described as a contribution to 
strengthen the limited power of the poor masses to control and influence 
government, which is due to 'various, interdependent factors low level of literacy 
and awareness, inability to organise themselves into effective pressure groups, lack 
of sustenance power due to poor health conditions, low income, uncertainty of 
income and large scale unemployment ' What is basically captured here under the 
term 'empowerment' is the same as what was captured in previous reports and 
papers under terms of 'participation,' 'structural change' or 'political development ' 
74 The discussion of the BINGOs initiated by the director of ICCO in 1986 
sometimes led to intense debates This was not only because of a fear of pressure on 
the small(er) projects and greater bureaucratisation but also because of the 
assumptions underlying the BINGO proposal (ι e, 'big agencies can perhaps better 
organise masses on a larger scale and thus influence power-relationships on a higher 
political level than smaller organisations, some economic problems require a 
coordinated approach on a larger scale') In the later withdrawn ICCO policy paper 
'ICCO op weg naar het jaar 2000' (ICCO 1989), the discussion was brought to a 
more general ICCO level, when it was proposed to work towards the building of a 
worldwide network of 50 so-called key-partners to receive at least 50% of the 
regular ICCO funds The financing of the BINGOs and particularly the demands 
with regard to the large NGDOs were further discussed at the India desk in 
1990/1991 
75 ICCO 1990 
76 A sharp decrease in the number of projects was only possible by reducing the 
number of counterparts Over the period 1990-1992, a large number of relationships 
have indeed been terminated in 'view of the present and future staff capacity of the 
India team' (ICCO 1993a 12) Of course, relationships with counterparts in India 
have been terminated ever since the start of ICCO's involvement in 1971 Only a 
few of the organisations supported in the 1970s have survived the 1980s as ICCO 
counterparts Nevertheless, more and more of the funds available for India each year 
have been absorbed by already existing counterparts It is for this reason that new 
applicants for an ICCO grant over the last couple of years have received a standard 
letter in which it is indicated that 'almost the total annual budget of ICCO for the 
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Indian subcontinent is being utilised for the financing of follow-up proposals' from 
existing counterparts and that 'there is in general only a relatively very small amount 
[ ] available to enter into collaboration with new projects' (ICCO, standard letter to 
tum down new applications) 
77 ICCO 1990 7 The principle of tight financing was already being adhered to by 
the India desk This was not so much the result of policy considerations but the 
more general financial problems encountered by ICCO during 1989/1990 
78 More concrete policy proposals were to be written in the years to follow on 
issues like human rights, land reform, communahsm/fundamentalism, ecology and 
sustainable agriculture, income-generating projects, and the ecumenical network in 
India Separate papers were indeed prepared on some of these topics, including 
urban poverty in 1990 
79 This 1993 policy profile (ICCO 1993a) was sent to ICCO counterparts in India 
for comments In general, the NGDOs in India agreed to the priorities set out by the 
desk, although some, and particularly those with a clear thematic specialisation, 
wanted to add specific 'priorities ' Questions were raised mainly with regard to the 
operationahsation of the list of pnonties/policies (Interview ICCO January 1995) 
80 The data presented in this section have largely been derived from the internal 
administration of the ICCO India desk (see also L Schulpen and F ν d Velden 
1992) Where applicable, data from a survey of the NGDOs supported by ICCO by 
the period 1971-1992 were also used to complete this picture With a coverage of 
42 3% of the ICCO counterparts in India, 49 5% of all projects sanctioned by ICCO 
over the period 1971-1992 and 40 9% of the total ICCO contribution for the same 
period, the response to the survey can be regarded as representative for the total 
number of activities and NGDOs supported in India (L Schulpen 1994) 
81 Of these projects, 926 were executed in India Only one project, an India 
consultation in 1988, was implemented in the Netherlands 
82 With the exception of the first six years (1971-1976) of ICCO's involvement in 
India when Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, Maharashtra and the All 
India projects together accounted for 43% of the projects, these five states have 
always had the majority of projects Only 28% of the projects were not in these 
states between 1977 and 1983, this was up to 31% in the years 1984-1990 The slow 
but steady decline of a state concentration continued over the years 1991 and 1992 
when 36% of the projects were situated in states other than the five major ones This 
decline is mainly due to the decrease of projects sanctioned in West Bengal and, to a 
lesser extent, in Andhra Pradesh between 1991 and 1992 Whereas 22% of all 
projects was implemented in West Bengal between 1977 and 1983, this percentage 
was down to 12% in 1991-1992 
83 In 1991-1992, the majority of ICCO funds ( i e , 51%) were sanctioned for 
projects in the states of Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, Maharashtra and 
All India The decline in funds to these particular slates means that other states have 
taken their place 
84 Other states receiving relatively large amounts of SP funds (and sometimes more 
than West Bengal, Tamil Nadu and/or Maharashtra) are Bihar (45 5% of SP funds 
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over the years 1991-1992), Kerala (5 7% over 1977-1990) and Kamataka (6 2% over 
1984-1990) 
85 This concentration of ICCO's activities in a few states should obviously relate to 
the characteristics of these states One can examine the size of the population and 
combine this information with such indicators of the level of development as literacy 
and the sectoral division of the labour force, possibly supplemented by the 
percentage of the population belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes 
Such a comparison between the different states does not provide a satisfying answer 
to the question of why certain states are more favoured by ICCO than others 
Andhra Pradesh which is the most important state for ICCO as far as number of 
projects and ICCO contribution, is neither the largest nor the 'poorest' state in the 
country The same accounts for Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra It is, therefore, 
necessary to look for other explanations The most obvious one is the number of 
NGDOs active in a specific state and the number of project proposals submitted to 
ICCO for co-financing originating from that state In section 3 4 of this chapter, it 
will be shown that the majority of project proposals originates in those states which 
score high on the ICCO 'hit parade ' A strong concentration of non-govemmental 
(development) organisations exists in the Southern states, and this concentration is 
directly related to a strong history of Christianity in these states (see also F Stephen 
1990) 
86 The figures differ greatly from state to state Whereas ICCO used its own 
sources (i e , Category IV) to finance more than 75% of the total costs in four states 
(i e , Goa, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh and Punjab), this percentage was between 50% 
and 75% in the states of Bihar, Kamataka, Kerala, Maharashtra, North East India, 
Tamil Nadu and West Bengal Whereas more than 50% of the total costs of the 
projects in Himachal Pradesh came from SP funds, whereas the states of Goa, 
Haryana and Punjab did not receive any SP funds The NGDOs in Goa also 
contributed no funds of their own and received no funds from other donors (making 
them financially fully dependent on ICCO funds) The costs of the All India projects 
and the projects in Orissa were carried for more than 50% by other donors, while 
there was no contribution at all from this source for the NGDOs/ projects in Goa, 
Haryana, Himachal Pradesh and Punjab On average the ICCO contribution was 
nearly Dfl 197,000 per project This also varied greatly across the states, ranging 
from Dfl 467,000 per project in Bihar to Dfl 29,000 per project in Goa 
87 SeeL Schulpen 1994 11-12 
88 Of these 56 projects, a total of 51 were sanctioned by the European Union in the 
period 1984-1990 As in the case of the additional funds from DGIS, the funds from 
the EU nearly disappeared in the early 1990s 
89 Block grants from the European Union are projects with a maximum duration of 
one year, an average contribution of some Dfl 17,000, and particularly intended for 
the purchase of materials These block-grant projects have often been used by the 
ICCO India desk for the initial funding of new counterparts L Schulpen and F ν d 
Velden (1992) concluded that 'this facility has been used for many years by the 
India desk of ICCO to finance the operating costs of new, beginning counterparts 
As these project applications could be approved simply and quickly, several projects 
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have been included in the ICCO India programme which, although insufficient 
information was available and/or insufficient quality was produced, grew by means 
of follow-up financing into regular ICCO counterpart organisations ' 
90 L Schulpen and F ν d Velden 1992 
91 The following picture emerges with regard to the average ICCO contribution 
Over the period 1971-1976, each project had an average ICCO contribution of 
slightly more than Dfl 380,000 The years of the India experiment (1976-1983) 
showed a decline to an average contribution of Dfl 222,000 Over the period 1984-
1990, the contribution further decreased to Dfl 164,000 Finally, in the years 1991-
1992, the average contribution per project again increased to nearly Dfl 230,000 
The reduction in the number of counterparts in India and the growing focus on 
organisational and programme financing (in contrast to projects) are at the base of 
this increase 
92 The first projects sanctioned at the beginning of the 1970s were 'completely in 
line with the then transfer of knowledge criterion and the restriction that the so-
called 'running costs' were not allowed as part of the projects The projects therefore 
concerned 'support for (re)building or for equipment Less well-off people certainly 
formed part of the target group for the institutions supported, but the 'poverty-
criterion' was not yet central in the assessment process of the projects ' (cited in 
ICCO 1980 4) 
93 Since 1993, following a revision of the sectoral classification of projects, ten 
different sectors are distinguished (1) The primary productive sector concerns all 
projects with activities m the field of the primary sector (e g , agriculture, husbandry, 
forestry, fishery) (2) Other economic activities refer to activities in the secondary 
and tertiary sectors, while (3) the habitat covers all projects aimed at improving the 
living environment and includes housing and public utilities (e g , drinking water, 
electricity, sanitation) (4) Health care projects cover all activities aimed at 
improving the health situation of the target groups (be it of a preventive or curative 
nature, training, construction of hospitals, provision of information to the target 
group) (5) Projects in which violations of human rights are challenged fall under the 
sector human rights and legal aid (6) Social development work (previously the 
community development sector) refers to all projects aimed at increasing societal 
'empowerment' in terms of conscientisation, training, organisation and/or 
mobilisation, this sector includes integrated programmes and community develop­
ment programmes (7) Those projects concerned with audio-visuals, written and 
social communication, as long as these are a target in and of themselves and not 
used as a means to reach another objective fall under the sector communication (8) 
Education refers to general education and not those types of education instrumental 
to a specific target (9) The sector counterpart building refers to 
projects/programmes aimed at strengthening the NGDO through institutional and 
sectoral support, training, guidance, networking and research Finally, (10) emerg­
ency assistance covers all activities undertaken m emergency situations, including 
rehabilitation and reconstruction (ICCO (199^) 145 (Annex 2) 
94 More specific data on the target groups of the projects are not available from the 
ICCO administration for the years 1991 and 1992 
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95 A total of 35 respondents (31% of the survey) stated that their target group 
(also) consists of NGDOs Of these, only three worked solely with/for NGDOs (L 
Schulpen 1994) 
96 This figure includes ICCO itself ICCO is mentioned as the implementing agency 
for one project in 1988 Of the other 275 organisations, a total of 274 can be 
regarded as Indian organisations The remaining organisation is not a NGDO in the 
strict sense of the word as it is the World Council of Churches registered as the 
implementing organisation for two projects 
97 Although not completely comparable, this implies that the number of new 
projects also declined considerably as a percentage of the total number of projects 
sanctioned From 1987 to 1990, the percentage of annually sanctioned projects which 
can be considered new dropped from 34 5% to 6 9% (see also L Schulpen and F 
ν d Velden 1992) 
98 L Schulpen and F ν d Velden 1992 In this context, project financing is 
understood to mean the financing of an, in principle, one-time activity, programme 
financing is understood to mean the financing of a continuous, not specifically time-
related programme 
99 It should be mentioned that of the 26 NGDOs working at the All India level, 10 
(or 39%) fall within the category of major ICCO counterparts (defined here as those 
NGDOs with an ICCO contribution of over Dfl 1 million for the period 1971-1993) 
It is also interesting to note that 50% of the NGDOs active in the state of Maharas­
htra fall within this category, 26% of the NGDOs in Kerala, 50% of the NGDOs 
active in the North East India region, and 44% of the Delhi organisations Much 
smaller percentages of NGDOs from the states of Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal and 
Tamil Nadu fall within the category of major ICCO counterparts 
100 Data from the survey showed the number of people reached by the ICCO 
counterparts in India to range from 200 to more than 8 million The majority of the 
counterparts (45%) covers between 10,000 and 100,000 people with their activities 
(L Schulpen 1994) 
101 Over the period 1971-1976, more than 93% of all projects was classified as 
local projects This figure dropped to 72% for the years 1977 to 1983 at the expense 
of regional (17%) and national (11%) projects From 1984 to 1990, local projects 
further declined to 59% while mainly regional projects saw a sharp increase to 
nearly 32% This trend of declining local projects and increasing regional projects 
(with some national and international projects) continued over the years 1991 and 
1992 
102 Although Christian NGDOs are the highest in number and in ICCO 
contribution, they come only third (after the Christian secular and secular 
organisations) in number of projects This shows the Christian counterparts to have a 
higher average ICCO contribution per project 
103 L Schulpen 1994 5-9 Note that this is only a general trend While part of the 
NGDOs experienced growth in all three areas (ι e , target population, communities, 
expenditures and staff), others saw their target group, funds and staff decline Still 
others experienced growth in one area and decreases in another 
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104 'In the daily practice there is always the establishment of priorities, what in 
essence is nothing else than a concentration policy' (ICCO 1989 13) 
105 ICCO 1993a 13 (note 11) 
106 Stuurgroep Impactstudie Medefinancieringsprogramma 1991 12 It is 'striking 
that in the MFP relatively late attention was given to certain themes [ ] like the 
population issue, the environment issue and the theme women in development ' With 
regard to women, it is specifically mentioned that 'policy formulation and 
implementation were far behind international developments and behind the policy of 
the Dutch government ' 
107 See ICCO 1993a 12, where it is stated that 'the policy of, in principle, not 
imposing a lower and/or upper limit on the size of the financing by ICCO will be 
continued This means that financing of both large and small organizations will be 
maintained as no significant relationship was noted between the level of financing 
and the effectiveness and efficiency of a counterpart organization ' The latter point is 
of specific interest in relation to the so-called BINGO discussion (see 3 2 2) 
108 ICCO 1990a 43 
109 All of the organisations characterised within the ICCO administration as 
'Christian' are not necessarily organisations belonging to a Church or clearly linked 
to a Church Exact data are, however, not available Within the India desk a 
distinction is initially made between 'Christian' and 'Christian secular organisations ' 
The latter type of NGDOs are officially not related to a Church but do work from a 
Christian perspective In an internal paper of the India desk (ICCO 1991), a 
distinction is made between (1) Protestant Churches and the (development) 
organisation set up by them (e g, the Synodical Board of Social Services within the 
Church of North India), (2) Christian organisations whether or not having an 
institutional relationship with a church, (3) Christian social activists, being 
organisations which are not (or no longer) connected with traditional Church 
institutions, and (4) Christian-inspired secular organisations (ι e , the so-called 
Christian secular organisations) 
110 ICCO 1980 17 
111 Support organisations are those NGDOs which, at a national or regional level, 
provide backing services to implementing organisations in India The activities of 
these NGDOs are not necessarily restricted to support, they may also have their own 
project activities 
112 Over the years, a clear increase in 'support' projects has occurred To classify 
all NGDOs connected to these projects as support organisations is, however, not 
correct There are only some 13 organisations which fall under the support NGDOs 
for the period 1971-1992 (Interview ICCO, 5-9-1996) In addition to the gradual 
increase in the number of projects and organisations since 1983, data on these 13 
NGDOs also show that (1) the first support organisation was co-financed in 1976, 
and (2) a total of 76 projects (8% of all projects over 1971-1992) has been 
sanctioned with a total ICCO commitment of Dfl 14 6 million (8% of all 
commitments) 
Notes Chapter 4 
1 The water/sanitation - health nexus is brought forward as the prime objective of 
improvements in water supply and sanitation It is estimated that some 80% of child 
mortality in India is due to the lack of safe (drinking) water and proper sanitary 
conditions It therefore seems logical that improvements should contribute to better 
health, but this link is scientifically difficult to demonstrate Improved facilities do 
not automatically mean that people use these facilities, that they use them properly, 
that they are maintained properly and/or that the water does not get contaminated 
after it has been drawn from these improved facilities 
2 At the beginning of the decade, the targets set for rural water supply and rural 
sanitation were 100% and 25% respectively In 1985, these targets were revised 'to 
more reasonable levels ' Also in the field of urban water supply and sanitation, the 
targets were revised in 1985 from 100% to 90% in the case of water supply and 
from 80% to 50% in the case of urban sanitation (WHO 1991 19) 
3 At the end of the 1980s, 32% of the population in developing countries had no 
access to safe drinking water, 45% had no access to sanitation (UNDP 1993 138-
139) In rural areas, the situation was even worse with 40% and 60% of the 
population without access respectively The situation differed substantially across 
countries and groups of countries The Decade definitely contributed to an 
improvement in the situation in the 1980s, nearly 770 million people in developing 
countries gained access to sanitation and 1 2 billion to safe drinking water (WHO 
1992 4-5) At the end of the Decade, however, some 1 3 billion people remained 
without two of the most important elements for a healthy life 
4 WHO 1984 7 
5 The World Bank concluded in 1976 that 'the major problems in rural water 
supply programs are those of financing, securing suitable personnel, and developing 
adequate institutions ' Specific problems were also mentioned institutional 
weakness, lack of government rural-water policies, failure of collecting water 
charges, lack of public health education, poor operation and maintenance procedures 
(World Bank 1976 7-8) 
6 Technological issues ('appropriate technologies, improved designs, reformulation 
of design criteria to emphasize easy maintenance, research and development (R&D), 
local manufacture and technology transfer') were central in the first half of the 
Decade and followed by management issues ('human resource development, village-
level operation and maintenance (VLOM), the involvement of women, cost 
recovery') The management issues received 'the lion's share of attention in the 
middle years' and health impact issues ('eradication of dracuncuhasis (Guinea 
worm), reduction of diarrhoeal diseases, health education campaigns, built-in 
linkages between water supply provision and latrine construction') received greater 
attention at the end of the Decade (M Black 1990 11) 
7 In the Second Five Year Plan (Government of India 1956), the water/sanitation-
health link was put central In later Plans, other advantages of improved water 
supply and sanitation were brought forward as in the Fifth Plan where it was stated 
that in 'recognising the importance of [improved water supply and sanitation] for the 
general health and the working capacity of the people increased provisions have 
been made' (Government of India 1974 263) In 1980, the 'importance of safe 
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drinking-water supply in sustaining the processes of economic and human 
development and improving the quality of [the] environment' is highlighted 
(Government of India 1980: 397-398). Also see World Bank 1976: 53-60. 
8. The 1980s produced growing insight into the significance of what is sometimes 
referred to as the software aspects of rural drinking-water supply and sanitation. 
These aspects not only include activities and changes in the organisational sphere but 
also (and mainly) activities in the field of involvement (or as some would say: 
participation) of the target groups in the setting up, implementation and maintenance 
of schemes and also health education activities. See, for instance. Directorate of 
Family Welfare 1991: 10-11. 
9. Together with the introduction of the MNP in the period of the Fifth Plan, the 
term 'problem village' became a central concept within rural water supply and 
sanitation. Villages were regarded as problem villages (PVs) if (1) they did not have 
an assured source of drinking water within a reasonable distance; (2) the available 
water sources were endemic to water-borne diseases like cholera and guinea worms; 
or (3) the water sources suffered from excesses of salinity, iron or fluoride. The 
'reasonable distance' was set at 1.6 kilometres at the beginning of the Fifth Plan but 
later changed to 0.5 kilometres. At the same time, it was noted that a preference 
should be given to 'villages inhabited by weaker sections of society such as tribals, 
scheduled castes and other backward classes' (Government of India 1974: 89). This 
point was also raised in the Accelerated Rural Water Supply Programme (see 4.1.2). 
10. Programme Evaluation Organisation Planning Commission 1980: ii. The poor 
were defined here as those belonging to scheduled castes, scheduled tribes and/or 
landless labourers. Major reasons for the poor not benefitting from the drinking-
water points were (1) points at a distance/alternative sources at hand; (2) frequent 
breakdown/out of order; (3) inadequate duration of water supply; and (4) intended 
for higher-caste groups. This study therefore showed not only the non-poor to 
benefit more from the provision of water supply than the poor but also distance to 
the source to be a major determinant of whether people actually make use of such 
facilities, which is also frequently found in my own research. The proposal to lower 
the reasonable distance criterion from 1.6 to 0.5 kilometres should thus be 
considered in this light. 
11. These characteristics are based upon a study conducted for UNICEF in 1988-
1989. This study covered more than 7,900 individuals, 22 districts and eight major 
states in India (National Drinking Water Mission 1990). 
12. See, for instance, H.U. Bijlani and P.S.N. Rao 1990: 4 and Government of India 
1956: 550. 
13. P.K. Chatterjee and M.M. Datta 1981: 21. 'The programme gives priority to 
areas of great water scarcity and salinity and those in which water borne diseases are 
endemic' (Government of India 1961: 654). 
14. Government of India 1961: 654. 
15. Taking drinking-water supply and sanitation to be state activities, the 
introduction of the MNP made a central scheme for this sector more or less 
redundant. However, 'experience showed that left to the state governments 
themselves, the provision of drinking water got stuck up in the conflict of priorities.' 
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A re-introduction of the ARWSP in 1977-78 was therefore thought necessary 
(Programme Evaluation Organisation Planning Commission 1980 ι) Prior to the 
introduction of the MNP (ι e , up to 1974 or the Fourth Plan period), water-supply 
and sanitation activities at the state level fell under the Community Development 
Programme and programmes for backward classes supplemented by central schemes 
as the Village Water Supply Programme and the National Water Supply and 
Sanitation Programme Of the Rs 670 million originally earmarked for rural water 
supply and sanitation in the Third Plan, 350 were to be provided under the Village 
Water Supply Programme, 120-130 million under community development 
programmes, 160 under the plans of the state under health and 30-40 under the pro­
gramme for the welfare of backward classes (Government of India 1961 655) 
16 The funds made available for the sector via the Minimum Needs Programme 
(MNP) and Accelerated Rural Water Supply Programme (ARWSP) increased 
considerably in the 1980s The outlay for water supply and sanitation m the Sixth 
Plan amounted to Rs 39,220 million, which was 260% above the total outlay for the 
Fifth Plan For the Seventh Plan period, the total outlay was set at Rs 65,225 
million (66% above the budget for the Sixth Plan) and actual expenditure amounted 
to Rs 70,931 million The majority of the funds needed for the construction of 
drinking-water supply and sanitation facilities have in the past been provided by the 
Indian government from its own budget These government funds, then, include the 
funds made available to NGDOs via CAPART CAPART has sanctioned a total of 
1,361 projects under ARWSP for a total amount of Rs 241 4 million and 756 
projects under the Central Rural Sanitation Programme for a total of Rs 170 9 
million between 1987/88 and 1991/92 (CAPART 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, and 
1992) In addition, foreign donors and Indian NGDOs have also contributed Foreign 
donors include such multilateral organisations as the World Bank, UNICEF, UNDP 
and the European Union and such bilateral donors as the Netherlands, Great Britain, 
Denmark, Sweden and Germany The total financial contribution of foreign bilateral 
and multilateral donors 'towards the sector is estimated at roughly 10-15%' (A 
Jansen, M Nageswara Rao and Ρ Vincent 1992 9) UNICEF is the only foreign 
donor working on a national scale in India Other donors concentrate their efforts in 
a number of slates Data with regard to the contribution of (indigenous) NGDOs to 
drinking-water supply and sanitation are hard to come by In light of the fact that a 
large part of the NGDOs follow an integrated (or at least multi-component) approach 
to development, it can be assumed that drinking-water supply and sanitation are 
likely to form part of their activities As part of its search for alternative sources of 
financing, India presently puts even greater emphasis on the involvement of NGDOs 
in drinking-water and sanitation activities In the Eighth Five Year Plan, for 
example, emphasis is placed on mobilising to the extent possible 'private sector 
efforts for construction and maintenance of drinking-water projects', while 'NGOs 
will [wherever feasible] be involved in the implementation of the [sanitation] 
programme' (E Chandran 1992 180-181) 
17 Until 1973, 'expenditure on drinking water and sanitation was under the Ministry 
of Health ' Subsequently, this was transferred to the Ministry of Works and Housing 
In the 1980s, urban water supply 'is under the charge of the Ministry of Urban 
Development, while rural water supply is the responsibility of the Department of 
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Rural Development' (World Bank 1989 130) Presently, therefore, the 'national 
coordinator and focal point' for the rural water supply and sanitation activities is the 
Department for Rural Development of the Ministry of Agriculture The new 
programmes included the Central Rural Sanitation Programme initiated in 1986 and 
an Incentive Bonus Scheme 'in order to further accelerate the programme of water 
supply to problem villages' (Government of India 1985 300) In addition, rural 
sanitation was added to the state MNP in 1987, funds under the rural employment 
programmes and Indira Awas Yojana (housing) were earmarked for sanitation in 
1986, and the Technology Mission was initiated in 1986 This Technology Mission 
(officially named the National Drinking Water Mission (NDWM and renamed the 
Rajiv Gandhi Drinking Water Mission or Technology Mission after the death of 
Rajiv Gandhi) was initiated 'in order to provide scientific and cost effective content 
to the ARWSP' (E Chandran 1992 176) Also see National Drinking Water Mission 
1989 
18 Government of India 1980 397-398 
19 H U Bijlani and Ρ S N Rao 1990 7 
20 Fragmentation in this regard refers to (1) a multitude of agencies and 
departments involved in providing water supply and sanitation and (2) a multitude of 
programmes specifically designed for water supply and sanitation while both sectors 
were also part of such schemes as the Integrated Urban Development Programme 
21 WHO 1992 
22 See, for instance, Government of India 1985 51, which states that 'the total 
impact of the [rural development] programme depends on the degree to which the 
different poverty alleviation programmes, including the Minimum Needs Programme, 
are integrated with one another and with the overall development of the area ' The 
Eighth Plan portrayed rural water supply and rural sanitation as 'essential ingredients 
in the total programme for rural development' with many 'allied elements' including 
'infrastmctural aspects like land management, soil conservation, and afforestation 
and social aspects like primary health care, removal of illiteracy, women's welfare, 
child nutrition, and immunisation (E Chandran 1992 181) 
23 IOV 1983 16, 61 
24 DGIS 1989a 18 Sanitation includes latnnes, hygienic disposal of (household 
and industrial) waste water and solid waste, and drainage 
25 These bottlenecks which are considered to be non specific to the sector include 
such issues as optimal participation of users, institutional development and cost 
recovery 
26 DGIS 1989a 20 
27 IOV 1983 62 In this report, it is observed that the possibilities of DGIS to 
influence the impact of projects in the field of drinking water are severely limited if 
only because 'target countries [ ] make their own plans and lay down their own 
priorities [which] are seldom in accordance with the policies of the Netherlands, to 
the extent that the latter tend to concentrate on the poorest sections of the 
community ' This is not only because 'there were always enough towns or villages 
with more pressing needs' and 'it occurred more than once that projects that were 
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expressly intended for the neediest soon shifted towards providing services for the 
relatively better off,' but also because of the 'limited desire or capacity of 
counterpart organisations to provide staff' and the 'lack of local funds for running 
costs ' Basically, the IOV points to the problems later referred to under the banners 
of institutional development and O&M costs 
28 IOV 1983 74 
29 The country policy papers from the different concentration countries for Dutch 
bilateral aid since 1985 also show the central issues officially presented in 1989 
(e g , user participation, health education, organisation, institutional aid) to have been 
taken up much earlier (see Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal 1986) On the basis 
of the white paper entitled 'A World of Difference,' the country policy plans 
nowadays include a separate section on drinking water and sanitation with 
elaboration of the following central issues participation, institutional improvement, 
improvement in O&M, hygiene education, sanitation and waste-water facilities 
30 IOV 1994a 209 
31 A Janssen, M Nageswara Rao and Ρ Vincent 1992 12 
32 IOV 1994a 209 The Dutch delegation to the Annual Consultation with India in 
1981 also proclaimed that the Netherlands wanted to broaden its projects in the field 
of drinking water to include other activities in the field of preventive health (e g, 
health education) In addition, it was stated that the possibilities for other projects or 
activities would be held open (Agreed Minutes Annual Consultation 1981) 
33 Internal Communications, 27-11-1983 and January 1984 
34 Agreed Minutes Annual Consultation 1984 (Dutch summary) 
35 Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal 1986 82 'In the areas in which drinking 
water projects are being implemented or have been finalised, it will be attempted to 
set up activities aimed at a sustainable improvement of the position of small farmers, 
landless and women Increasing permanent employment is an important objective in 
this It not only concerns projects in the field of agriculture, but also activities aimed 
at off-farm employment, energy supply, improvements in health and environment ' 
36 This is partly explained by the fact that rural and industrial development ceased 
to exist as central programmes with the new policy document of DGIS in 1991 The 
introduction of community participation as an integral part of rural drinking-water 
projects nevertheless implies the necessity of attention to other activities connected 
with the sector and thus a broader approach (interview IRC, 12-7-1995) 
37 Stuurgroep Impactstudie Medefinancieringsprogramma 1991 33-34 Also see, 
ICCO 1995 32 
38 GOM 1995 2 
39 GOM 1995a 2-3 The 'pioneering' first phase (up to around 1974-1975) is 
characterised by an emphasis on 'brick and mortar' instead of people and by once-
only activities of a largely social en economic character The second phase (from the 
mid 1970s up to the beginning of the 1990s) is characterised by what has been 
called the political phase in which NGOs come to be seen as organisations 
facilitating the creation of societal and political pre-conditions for the poor The third 
phase can be characterised as a synthesis of the First and second phases and focused 
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on basic needs, economic programmes and strengthening civil society by 
cooperation, democratic societal organisations forming the countervailing power to 
state and market, self-organisation and own initiative 
40 See, for instance, ICCO 1987b 15-16 
41 GOM 1995a 3 
42 ICCO 1993 In this general policy paper, ICCO distinguishes four concentration 
sectors (ι e , awareness- and organisation-building, primary social facilities, income 
generation and rural development with an emphasis on agriculture) 
43 The decision to take up social facilities as a concentration sector was stipulated 
by, among other things, the outcome of the impact study where these facilities are 
presented as a separate sector Particularly within ICCO and CEBEMO, the 
discussions following the Impact Study showed that 'social facilities were not such a 
bad idea ' Discussions within ICCO on how to incorporate social facilities within the 
separate country policies are still to be held (interview policy desk ICCO, 18-8-
1995) 
44 No evidence could be found of discussions between ICCO and its counterparts in 
India with regard to additional activities relating to drinking water and sanitation 
(e g , health education, participation) Even in case of Kassar Trust (see section 
4 3 2 1 below), the discussions with ICCO centred around organisation, participation 
and awareness-building as part of the development process in general and not within 
the specific context of drinking-water supply and/or sanitation 
45 L Schulpen 1994 
46 One can nevertheless wonder about the accuracy of the number of facilities 
reported 'out of order' if only because (as one of the NGDOs remarked) no records 
are kept 
47 According to the NGDOs, this traditional system not only provides women with 
an 'opportunity for socializing with other women' but also leads to 'ndiculisation' of 
people with latnncs and a general lack of interest among the target group 
48 In the case of drinking water, ICCO funds were reportedly used by 11 of the 29 
NGDOs responding to this question In the case of sanitation, ICCO funds were 
reportedly used by 50% (N=32) of the NGDOs 
49 In the 1995 Chairman's Statement (GOM 1995a), the responsibility of the 
national governments in Third World countries for, among other things, drinking 
water and sanitation is emphasised Despite this agreement between the MFOs and 
NGDOs in India, both continue to be quite active in this sector (or, as in the case of 
the MFOs, intend to become (even) more active) 
50 А К Susheela and G Ghosh 1990 48-52 
51 In excess fluoride areas, all ground-water dependent sources (ι e , open wells and 
hand pumps) are at nsk of being contaminated In Andhra Pradesh, hand pumps and 
open wells are the source of drinking water for 79% of the population Only 12 7% 
of the population uses tap water (ι e , a piped water supply) The remaining 8 3% 
make use of a tank/pond, a nver/lake/canal or a spring (Data derived from National 
Sample Survey Organisation 1990 18) 
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52 IOV 1983 107 By providing safe domestic water, the project was intended to 
contribute to public health and to the social and economic circumstances of the 
population and thereby establish the major prerequisites for rural development 
53 The main reason put forth for adding 30 villages to АР-I (ι e , the Darsi-scheme) 
during the negotiations for AP-II was the absence of a worst-first policy for the 
original selection of the villages This meant the inclusion of villages not suffering 
from excess fluoride and exclusion of many villages with unacceptable fluoride 
levels This occurrence can also be explained by insufficient information with regard 
to fluoride levels at the time of the village selection According to the baseline 
health survey of the Institute of Preventive Medicine (IPM 1988), at least 14 of the 
originally selected villages had fluoride levels below the maximum permissible level 
of 1 5 mg/litre 
54 The majority of these schemes were intended for individual villages The project 
involved 52 individual schemes with the remaining four schemes directed at more 
than one village The scheme for Krishna district was to cover six villages One of 
the schemes for Prakasam district was also meant to cover six villages while another 
scheme there was meant to cover 26 villages 
55 Data calculated from PRED 1992 Based on a growth in population of 32 8% 
for the period 1981-1991, the ultimate population of 243,000 people is expected in 
the year 2002/2003 
56 The only non-technical part of АР-I in the first half of the 1980s was a baseline 
health survey conducted by IPM Although the survey started in 1980, the final 
report was only submitted in 1988 (IPM 1988) 
57 The discussion between the Netherlands and Andhra Pradesh was basically part 
of the negotiations on AP-II although the proposed activities would also fall under 
the АР-I schemes which had not yet been finalised Health education and community 
participation as integral parts of rural drinking-water projects were already part of 
the discussions in the early 1980s In the report of the Fourth Review and Support 
Mission in April 1981, attention was clearly paid to these issues Attention was 
mainly paid to the involvement of the Health Department from the GoAP in the 
project, and a specific proposal for such integration was prepared When mission 
AP-9 concluded in March 1985 that nothing had happened in this field, a change of 
strategy was proposed involving the inclusion of NGDOs instead of Government 
Departments 
58 The main points referred to (1) generally poor operation and maintenance, (2) 
delays in implementation, (3) partial or complete non-compliance with agreed upon 
activities, and (4) non-coverage of weaker sections (Internal Communication, 1-8-
1985) Poor and in some cases non-existent operation and maintenance were later 
brought forth as the main outcome of the 1985 evaluation (Internal Communication, 
24-4-1986) 
59 These recommendations mainly involved the otherwise non-existent participation 
of the user communities in deciding on the location of public taps and the 
integration of health education into the water supply projects 
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60 The poor O&M of the already commissioned schemes became one of the major 
break-points (next to the supplementary activities) for the sanctioning of three 
projects proposed under АР-П (1 e , Mahabubnagar, Kumool and Medak) In a letter 
to the Government of Andhra Pradesh (Internal Communication, April 1986), 
WACO made clear that 'commencement of the remaining projects was made 
dependent on positive developments in the O&M, administratively as well as on 
fieldlevel ' As 'nothing has been accomplished so far regarding sufficient funds for 
O&M [ ] the remaining three new projects cannot be considered for implementa­
tion ' 
61 Internal Communication, 24-4-1986 Normally the maintenance of water projects 
is transferred to the Gram Panchayats This was attempted in a АР-I village near 
Ongole but, according to a executive engineer from PRED, did not work out when 
the Summer Storage Tank was used by the villagers as a fish pond and they 
continued to use the existing wells for drinking water In Darsi, it was not even 
attempted to transfer responsibility to the Gram Panchayats Proper maintenance of a 
scheme like the one in Darsi where 111 villages depend on a single source demands 
not only good coordination at the village level but also across villages The mainten­
ance of the NAP scheme by PRED was made 'one of the conditions of the bilateral 
programme' (Interview Executive Engineer Darsi, February 1994) This means that 
the state is essentially paying for all maintenance while it usually, under 'normal' 
projects, contributes only partly to maintenance The Dutch have contributed to 
maintenance in the years 1985 and 1986 only 
62 This is not to say that complete agreement had been attained on the Dutch side 
In February 1987, for instance, it became clear that the assessment memoranda for 
NAPO and the dairy scheme had not yet been finalised at DGIS and that the 
contracts could not as yet be signed (Internal Communication, 5-2-1987) The 
additional activities agreed upon during the discussions for AP-II also covered water 
quality control (executing agency IPM) with the establishment of laboratories and a 
system for water quality analysis and monitoring along with the construction of 
latrines by Sulabh International 
63 The projects under АР-П started in mid-1987 and were supposed to be finalised, 
with regard to the hardware part, in 1993 In the meantime, a third NAP is being 
prepared for the districts of Nalgonda, Prakasam, Anantapur and Krishna The major 
components envisaged for AP-III are (1) hardware (construction of water supply 
schemes), (2) community-based support activities (community participation, health 
education, income generating activities, mother and child welfare, sanitation), and 
(3) institutional development (Human Resource Development, management info 
system, strengthening planning/ monitoring/design cell, support in developing 
suitable and community-based operation and maintenance systems) 
64 Internal Communication, 1987 (assessment memorandum on the Sanitation 
project) 
65 Internal Communication, 31-7-1987 
66 NAPO 1991 6 Sulabh International (SI) has been accused of not living up to 
the contract with the Dutch Embassy in that the organisation only constructed the 
latrines (15 school latrines and some 500 individual latrines) without involvement of 
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the intended beneficiaries and further health education (interview NAPO, 26-6-1992) 
SI itself states that they were only contracted for the construction part and as such 
are not to blame for the non-use of the latrines (interview Sulabh International, 28-6-
1992), a vision confirmed by Mission AP-15 which concluded that the contract with 
SI 'does not provide for health education of teachers and Village Health Guides ' 
Virtually none of the hundreds of individual latrines built without a superstructure 
were actually used The same held for the school latrines Of the four school latrines 
considered in this research, none were in use The latnnes were stripped of their 
doors, the urinoirs and toilets were full of stones and garbage and on some the 
soakpits were broken In some of the villages, moreover, the area around these 
latrines was still used as an open latrine 
67 The NGDO itself had remained in the field until September 1991 when the 
community-participation and health-education activities were continued under direct 
(but temporary) authority of the NAP Office This particular NGDO (CHAAP -
Catholic Health Association of Andhra Pradesh) was actually the second organisation 
contracted for the community-organisation and health-education activities The first 
NGDO (Andhra Pradesh Voluntary Health Association - APVHA) had been replaced 
by CHAAP in October 1988 when APVHA showed itself to be unequipped to 
perform its duties Staff members from this NGDO had rarely visited any of the 
villages under the project as of October 1988 At the end of 1992, responsibility for 
the community-participation and health-education part was taken over from the NAP 
Office by a third NGDO This NGDO (Andhra Pradesh Productivity Council -
APPC) had previously been responsible for the financial side of community 
organisation and health education APPC is basically a parastate!, which was later 
registered as an NGDO 
68 From this it becomes clear that many different agencies and organisations have 
been involved in АР-I over the years On the Dutch side, these include DGIS in The 
Hague, the Dutch Embassy in New Delhi (and especially the Water Coordinator 
stationed there), the International Water and Sanitation Centre (IRC) and the 
consultancy firm ETC On the Indian side, we first encounter the Panchayati Raj 
Engineering Department (PRED) as the executing agency for the technical part of 
the project We next encounter the Ministry of Health, the Andhra Pradesh Dairy 
Development Cooperation (APDDC) for the income generation part of the project, 
the Andhra Pradesh Productivity Council (APPC) as nodal agency for NAPO and 
later as implementing agency for the software activities in Prakasam district, the 
Institute for Preventive Medicine (IPM), Sulabh International, and a number of 
NGDOs (e g , APVHA, CHAAP, AIRDS) Since the start of Project Clean Village, a 
large number of other government departments were also supposed to get involved 
In addition to these agencies and organisations, a Netherlands Assisted Project 
Office was established in 1987 in order to 'function as a small coordinating and 
monitoring office for the Embassy' (IOV 1994a 211) NAPSO (or NAPSU 
'Netherlands Assisted Project Support Unit) is thus financed by the Netherlands In 
contrast to, for instance, the Programme Support Unit in Uttar Pradesh and the 
Socio-Economie Units in Kerala, NAPSO is not itself involved in the implementa­
tion of activities in the field 
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69 PRED/NAPO/NAP-CEP 1992 5-6 In January 1990, some three years after the 
latrine construction activities, the NGDO contracted for community-participation and 
health-education activities and announced a 'latrine-revival programme' for Darsi 
town In their opinion, not only a superstructure but also (more importantly) 
education and awareness-building were needed to stimulate people to actually use 
the latrines Their activities in this field were, however, not very successful 
considering the fact that only a handful of the latrines were being used after a 
considerable amount of time 
70 PRED/NAPO/CEP-NAP 1992 9-10 This objective was divided into seven parts 
(1) protecting drinking-water sources/supply outlets from contamination, (2) 
promoting hygienic practices for water collection, storage and use, (3) promoting 
domestic and environmental sanitation in the community, (4) breaking the faecal-oral 
cycle and thereby safeguarding people's health by preventing water-borne diseases, 
(5) creating community awareness and action to promote village health/hygienic 
conditions, (6) inculcating civic sense and social responsibilities in the community, 
and (7) integrating health/hygiene/sanitation into the village development 
planning/resource allocation by the Gram Panchayat The intention was to dovetail 
the sanitation project with a range of development activities (ranging from 
immunisation to kitchen gardening and non-conventional energy programmes to 
social forestry), and these activities were to involve various governmental and non­
governmental agencies and organisations Using sanitation as its entry point, thus, 
the project was directed at generating more general rural development with participa­
tion, organisation and education as central issues 
71 The selection of these villages was based on 'the positive response received from 
the people and the Gram Panchayat' in these villages DGIS and IRC had also 
suggested that 'in order to make an impact with the sanitation programme, it [would 
be] better to start in these 18 villages where much of the ground-work has already 
been made by the NAP Office's CEP-team' (Internal Communication, 30-5-1992) 
Of the 18 selected villages, 11 were part of АР-I and the remaining seven part of 
AP-II The initiation of Project Clean Village activities gave community 
participation, health education and organisation a push although the number of 
villages involved was even further reduced 
72 IOV 1994a 272 For the Health Education Programme, an allocation of 1 18 
million was made under category I-a in 1985 
73 It should be kept in mind that all of the villages also have their own old water 
points open wells, streams and/or hand pumps The exact number of open wells and 
hand pumps is not easy to determine because many of them are private property 
There are at least 3 open wells and an average of 2 5 hand pumps per village Some 
of these are reportedly not in use (because of contamination or breakdown (in the 
case of hand pumps) or only in use in times of emergency (fires, summers, and/or 
when the piped water scheme is not functioning) 
74 Interview animator Vempadu VAC, February 1994 
75 Minutes of VAC meeting Vempadu, 4-5-1993 
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76 These latnnes are not all in use All of them also seem to suffer from a 'lack of 
cement' as the slabs on the pits are not closed, doors do not fit and an excellent 
view of the person inside the latrine is thereby provided 
77 In 1972, a total of 35,506 villages in Uttar Pradesh were identified as Problem 
Villages In March 1980, there were still 28,505 of these villages Some 27,143 
(95 2%) were covered during the Sixth Plan period, leaving 1,362 to be covered in 
the second half of the 1980s A survey in 1985 identified 42,544 new Problem 
Villages It should be emphasised that although 679 PVs were reportedly left at the 
end of 1993, this does not mean that all of the other villages were fully covered In 
reality, some 58% of the villages are only partially covered 
78 Data derived from internal administration of Uttar Pradesh Jal Nigam, Lucknow 
79 Internal Communication, December 1987 
80 Internal Communication, 12-5-1988 A total of 1,000 extra hand pumps to be 
equally divided across the two distncts was proposed No extra funds were requested 
from the Netherlands as these could either be generated from (1) the provisions in 
the project for the construction of district and mobile laboratories and inspection 
bungalows or (2) the savings due to the use of PVC pipes in previously installed 
India Mark-II hand pumps The first point would mean that the construction of 
laboratories and bungalows would have to be deferred to a future Sub-Project 
81 This seems to be due m part to the experimental character of SP-III, m which a 
too strict formulation of activities was regarded as impossible and possible 
readjustments would be made during implementation (Internal Communication, 1-11-
1988) 
82 Internal Communication, 27-8-1985 The need for such a unit was dictated by 
the doubts expressed by the Netherlands as well as by India that the government of 
Uttar Pradesh would be in a position to manage the health-education, sanitation and 
community-participation activities 
83 'The involvement of local community especially women in rural water supply 
programme is envisaged to accomplish the following major objectives (1) assisting 
in selection of socially appropriate water points, (2) ensure preventive maintenance, 
(3) closer rapport/communication with the concerned Jal Nigam staff for undertaking 
major repairs, (4) effective social monitoring of water quality, (5) waste water 
management and maintaining cleanliness around water point surroundings, (6) social 
awareness/vigilance on water quality control, and (7) formation of hand-pump based 
Jal S amiti or water committees for better management and utilisation of water' 
(Internal Communication, no date) The Terms of Reference for UP-11 (which was 
to find a practical and functional interpretation of the concept of community 
participation in the socio-economic and cultural context of Uttar Pradesh) it was 
stated that community participation had to be seen as a means to an end (ι e , project 
activities leading to healthy people living in a healthy environment) and not as an 
end in itself 
84 The history of the PSU dates back to December 1986, when the later director of 
the PSU was contracted for an 8 week study In August 1987, DGIS thought the 
time was npe for a proposal to add this person as an external consultant to the Jal 
Nigam At the same time, this person was to be regarded as a future member of the 
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Direction and Monitoring Unit (the original name for the PSU) In 1988, the PSU 
was placed under the Uttar Pradesh Development Systems Corporation (UPDESCO) 
'The choice for UPDESCO was mainly governed by the fact that no governmental 
body is entitled to absorb such a (bilateral financed) unit, plus the expectation that a 
serru-govemmental body such as UPDESCO (as State Consultants) could materialize 
the required flexibility' (Internal Communication, 25-10-1989) The Review and 
Support Mission UP-18 (December 1987) recommended acceptance of the 
UPDESCO proposal to set up a PSU under its own wings 'in order that the Sub-
Project can be effectively started at the shortest possible notice ' UPDESCO was to 
take care of all the administrative, logistic and personnel matters for the PSU At the 
end of 1989, it turned out that the involvement of UPDESCO 'does not allow the 
PSU sufficient alertness and flexibility in disposing of the project funds as required 
under the various sub-projects, as well as in hiring staff required for both its 
establishment in Lucknow and for the fieldwork to be carried out' (Internal 
Communication, 25-10-1989) The contract with UPDESCO was subsequently 
terminated at the beginning of 1990 The performance of UPDESCO had already 
been an earlier subject of discussion at DGIS In June 1988, for example, it was 
already concluded that the functioning of UPDESCO as support agency for PSU is 
not completely satisfactory In December 1988, UP-21 makes clear that UPDESCO 
is acting 'unnecessarily difficult' and that there is a growing fear of personal clashes 
between the official manager of the PSU (an executive engineer from Jal Nigam on 
deputation with UPDESCO) and the social-planning advisor from the PSU (who 
later became director of the PSU) (Internal Communication, 16-12-1988) The Dutch 
consultancy firm DHV therefore proposes in December 1988 that the social-planning 
advisor leave ('if only in name') the management of the PSU to the engineer 
85 PSU 1990 
86 PSU 1990a 1 
87 The most important lessons from the pilot project were (1) an effective 
communication network between the local communities and the implementing 
agency improves rapport and makes the delivery system more effective and 
accountable, (2) mobilisation of existing village-level institutions as well as 
formation of need-based participatory structures are helpful to ensure the 
participation of local communities and especially women for better management and 
sustainability of the programme, (3) communication techniques based on village 
culture can leave an everlasting impression on the local people and ensure their 
concerned participation in the programme, and (4) a decentralised system of hand-
pump maintenance is found to be more cost- and time-effective particularly when 
responsibility for preventive maintenance is shared with the caretakers (PSU 1990) 
88 This does not include the in 1993 agreed upon 'addendum phase' within SP-III 
which was made possible by changes in the exchange rate for the Dutch guilder and 
Indian rupee In this addendum phase, seven villages and one Town Area Committee 
were taken up for a total of Rs 127 million with 85% to be reimbursed by DGIS 
The project total still fell within the original allocation made for this Sub-Project 
89 Internal Communication, 27-8-1985 Total costs at the start of the project were 
estimated at Dfl 19 65 million or Rs 65 3 million 
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90 The costs of the pilot project on Community Participation and Hygiene 
Education were to be carried by funds made available under SP-V 
91 In the pilot project two types of 'water committees' were formed village-based 
and hand pump-based water committees According to the PSU, the latter type of 
committee proved to be more 'effective in achieving the objectives of the 
programme as [1] people were found to be more interested in maintaining the hand 
pumps, by which they are directly benefitted, [2] the participation of women m the 
hand pump level water committee can easily be ensured, [and 3] a better 
maintenance system can be developed through the hand pump level water 
committees' (PSU 1990 2) In addition to the direct activities related to the 
formation of water committees and training of caretakers, there were supporting 
activities undertaken as well These included the formation of cultural groups to dis­
perse the message of community participation, maintenance of water points, water 
management, environmental sanitation, folk songs and puppet shows - all falling 
under activities clustered in the term 'village contact drive' (see also С van Wijk 
and PSU 1995) Lastly, but basically one of the first activities undertaken was a 
review of the hand pumps installed in the three villages This showed that of the 33 
hand pumps constructed in the villages of Mandan, Kadirpur, and Bhagwatpur, five 
were constructed without a platform, six others showed waterlogging at the platform, 
three were out of order since installation, twelve provided muddy and/or sandy 
water, five had insufficient water discharge and twelve had broken down once or 
more since installation (PSU 1989 Annex 5) 
92 The tasks of the Water Committees were '[1] to record faults of the hand pumps 
and decide the line of action for repairs, [2] to keep close rapport with Jal Nigam to 
get major defects repaired, [3] to ensure general cleanliness near the hand pumps, 
[4] to settle complaints of beneficiaries of hand pumps reported by hand pump 
caretaker, [5] to monitor quality of water and proper use of hand pumps, [6] to help 
Jal Nigam in selection of socially best suited locations for hand pump installation, 
[7] to identify and recommend young educated men and women for training 
programmes on hand pump maintenance, and [8] to select village mistri among the 
trained young persons with the consent of hand pump [caretakers] and beneficiaries 
of hand pumps' (PSU 1989 14) 
93 One of the hand pumps had a leaking pipe for about one year Complaints to Jal 
Nigam were of little use The second hand pump had not been in use for some eight 
years mainly because of a dispute between the users After a breakdown of the pump 
years ago, Jal Nigam decided to rebore and situate the hand pump at another site 
However, five families objected to the newly selected site and observed that the old 
hand pump simply needed to be repaired This dispute continues, and the families in 
the area surrounding the hand pump all use an open well now 
94 PSU 1990b and 1990c First an accident with the Community Organiser and the 
'excessive workload of Jal Nigam due to severe drought conditions' were at the base 
of postponing the training 'Various problems in the field [sic]' and the realisation 
that the originally planned training of 15 days would be too short for 'especially 
women' were later at the base of postponing the training The training period was 
extended to 40 days, and greater traimng-on-the-job was to be added 
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95 PSU 1990d 
96 PSU 1991 
97 Interview PSU, 6-11-1993 
98 PSU 1992 
99 Interview Jal Nigam Allahabad district, 10-1-1994 The main reason mentioned 
by Jal Nigam for the change in the maintenance structure (and not incorporating the 
trained caretakers into the SP-III pilot project) was the lack of funds 
100 This rural sanitation project was the direct outcome of the Dutch condition with 
regard to SP-Г stating that an 'additional project for sanitation, hygiene education 
and participation would be earned out' (Internal Communication, 14-1-1992) 
101 PSU 1990 
102 SEARCH India/Operations Research Group 1992 2 
103 Internal Communication, Apnl 1986 Unconditional, here, means no alteration 
of the findings and recommendations made so far and modification of the project 
during implementation instead This procedure shows the eagerness of the Dutch as 
well as the Indian sides to start SP-V In February 1986, the Government of India 
had already issued a statement calling for the sanctioning of SP-V 'as soon as 
possible, especially considering the fact that this project is essentially an integral part 
of UP-IV (and UP-IH) which are both in a very advanced stage of preparation and 
for which implementation will start soon' (Internal Communication, 5-2-1986) 
Judging from the statement of the Embassy in September 1987, the central govern­
ment seemed to need more time 'Awaiting the Gol-approval, neither of these two 
projects [ι e , UP-IV and Up-V] could make any substantial progress so far' (Internal 
Communication, 14-9-1987) 
104 Internal Communication, 8-12-1986 
105 SEARCH India/Operation Research Group 1992 2 
106 This RD&PR department was the state-level agency responsible for the 
implementation of the rural-sanitation programme It had a 'well-defined 
organisational set up right down till the village level and hence it was felt that this 
department was the most competent to coordinate resources and inputs of some of 
the relevant agencies at district and block level' (SEARCH India/Operations 
Research Group 1992 3) 
107 The official Indian poverty line was taken as an indicator for determination of 
the contribution of the beneficiaries Those households above the poverty line had to 
contribute in cash while those under the poverty line had to contribute in labour 
Over the years, the required contribution has increased 
108 In a period of 18 months, this department only managed to install four 
demonstration household latrines Non-availability of staff for supervising the 
construction work, lack of technical expertise, inadequate monitoring and poor 
quality control were among the reasons for the PR Department not being up to the 
task (Internal Communication, 12-3-1990) These delays were also due to, among 
other things, slow disbursements of the funds from the Government of Uttar Pradesh 
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109. This number was later reduced to 12 villages when one of the villages in Rae 
Barelli district was dropped. In this village, the 'non-availability of technically 
suitable sites' made construction of latrines impossible (the entire village is a water 
prone zone with a high level of sub-soil water) (PSU 1991a). 
110. The reasons for dismissing the BHU were 'delays in making decisions,' 
'procedural complications' and only 'partial involvement of project co-ordinators 
leading to an ineffective team working in isolation.' 
111. Internal Communication, 22-1-1992. 
112. Internal Communication, April 1986. 
113. Internal Communication, 28-8-1987. 
114. This was done in June 1988, for instance, when DGIS agreed to Finance the 
training of three 'fellows' via a sanitary-engineering course at the IHC in Delft for 
an amount of Dfl. 81,450 (Internal Communication, 28-6-1988). 
115. The tasks of these Water Committees are basically the same as the ones 
previously mentioned for the Water Committees in the pilot project in Allahabad 
district under SP-III. 
116. Up to June 1992, a total of 44 soakpits were constructed in Varanasi district 
and 50 drains while 88 wells were repaired and 132 wells were bleached. 
117. Two of these villages (Napura Kalan and Tikiri) were included in Phase A, one 
(Tarapur) in the Interim Phase and the fourth (Chattauri Kot) was part of Phase B. 
The research was carried out in January 1994. 
118. Usage of the latrines in the project area is regularly monitored by the PSU. A 
survey covering 1,370 HSLs conducted in February 1992 showed a large majority of 
the household members to use the latrines and also maintain them (PSU 1992a). The 
usage of the latrines in Varanasi district was found to be highest among the women 
(92%) followed by men (86%) and children (64%). In the project villages in district 
Rae Barelli, 93% of the males used the latrines regularly while 91% of the women 
and 70% of the children used them regularly. In general, 95% (Rae Barelli) and 87% 
(Varanasi) of the surveyed latrines were regularly used. Good maintenance was 
found for 76% of the latrines in Rae Barelli and 70% in Varanasi while satisfactory 
maintenance was found for 17% and 26% of the latrines respectively. These general 
findings have been confirmed by the regular monitoring of use and maintenance by 
the PSU team (PSU 1992b). 
119. In addition, there were several individual reasons for not having a latrine 
constructed. In Napura Kalan, for instance, one household wanted two latrines and 
refused to cooperate any further when they were told that they could only have one. 
In another house inhabited by two brothers and their respective households, one of 
the brothers constructed a latrine but refused to let the other use it. There was no 
other space for an additional latrine, so the latter household was left to go outside. 
Another household had recently moved to the village, while a fourth household 
wanted a latrine but could not afford to miss a day's work and make the labour 
contribution required of households below the poverty line. 
120. Discussion PSU staff, Varanasi district (SP-V), 18-1-1994. 
121. Interview Jal Nigam, January 1994. 
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122 Шаг Pradesh Jal Nigam 1987 This project was planned to be a saturation 
project because the villages had been previously provided with an average of two 
hand pumps or a total of 2,744 hand pumps under the MNP and other schemes Of 
the originally proposed 10,000 hand pumps, 1,782 were specifically intended for the 
weaker sections of the population The existing water sources m these villages are in 
many cases so contaminated that they are 'not fit for human consumption, 
aesthetically and hygienically ' In the original proposal, only five districts are 
mentioned In November 1989, however, a new district (Siddhamagar) was created 
by dividing the district of Basti in two In November 1986, the Netherlands had 
already received pre-notification of what would later be labelled SP-VI 
123 Internal Communication, 19-5-1988 According to the Department of Rural 
Development in its letter to the Royal Netherlands Embassy (RNE), the community 
will be involved in (a) site selection of hand pump installation points and (b) 
preventive maintenance and promotion of hygiene for hand pumps PSU would be 
involved in drawing up a programme to this effect The fact that the proposal for 
SP-VI was still pending at the level of the RNE one-and-a-half years after 
submission by the Government of Uttar Pradesh shows the delay to have been 
deliberately caused by the Netherlands in order to pressure the GoUP into accepting 
software activities as an integral part of SP-VI After the Indian authorities showed 
themselves prepared to include a 'social paragraph,' DGIS adopted a shortened 
procedure for the sanctioning of SP-VI 
124 Internal Communication, September 1988 
125 Internal Communication, September 1988 The consent of IRC is mainly based 
on the fact that the integration of a social paragraph in the project proposal for SP-
VI indicates that the GoUP is slowly being convinced of the necessity of community 
participation for sustainable dnnking-water supply On 20-7-1988 (Internal 
Communication), the DHV consultant already advised DGIS to sanction SP-VI as 
the Community Participation component had now been incorporated They 
simultaneously acknowledge that the 'actual filling-in of the community development 
activities still has to be worked out' on the basis of the pilot project under SP-III 
126 The DGIS project commission seems to have been struggling with the 
following points (1) assurance that DGIS will not have to carry the O&M costs and 
(2) assurance that the training (of Jal Nigam engineers in community-participation 
activities) and community-participation aspects of the project will succeed (Internal 
Communication, 1-12-1989) 
127 Internal Communication, December 1989 
128 During the period that the project proposal was pending at the RNE, Jal Nigam 
started the construction of the hand pumps with its own funds These activities were 
later interrupted 'to allow a proposal for Community Participation by PSU to be 
processed' In September 1989, while the sanctioning of the project proposal (now 
including the participation component) was still awaited, Jal Nigam resumed 
construction In November 1989, the first so-called social scientist was stationed in a 
district (and it took until March 1990 for a social scientist to be stationed in all of 
the six SP-VI districts) and the Community Participation aspect of the project to be 
initiated 
340 The same difference 
129 This ranges from sites favouring the higher castes to inside a house boundary 
or outside the village In general, the problems with the already installed hand 
pumps were found to be of a technical and/or social nature 
130 PSU 1990a 1 
131 At that time, the installation of hand pumps was almost completed The district 
of Lakhtmpur-Khen constituted an exception, and a so-called saturation phase 
(officially named an addendum phase) was announced for this district in 1993 
Thanks to changes in the exchange rate another 3,704 hand pumps to be installed in 
694 new villages could be Financed (interview Jal Nigam/Lakhimpur Khen district, 
27-10-1993) For the social scientists in Lakhimpur-Khen district, this meant that 
site selection would continue to take priority The fact that review and site selection 
were of major importance at the beginning of the work of the PSU does not mean 
that other activities were not undertaken In light of the fact that a large part of 
villagers was not using the hand pumps (and stuck to the traditional sources of water 
instead) meant that attention was paid to health education and improvements of the 
open wells right from the beginning Attention also had to be paid to the 
coordination of the implementing government agencies for which the concept of 
community participation was (also) something completely new (group discussion 
PSU-staff, 21-10-1993) 
132 PSU 1992c 
133 PSU 1993 2-4 
134 In November 1992 (Internal Communication), the PSU describes its own 
activities at this level by stating that 'physical assets have to be supported by [1] 
awareness creation about health and hygiene, [2] strengthening the future health base 
of the community by focusing on children and school sanitation, [3] facilitating 
waste water disposal through innovative ways for social forestry, [4] ensuring 
women's participation in selection of water sites, [and 5] establishing a system of 
decentralized maintenance and ensuring the ready availability of local mechanics ' 
135 'The main objective of the programme [is] to improve the living conditions and 
the health of the people with special reference to the fulfilment of one of the basic 
needs of the disadvantaged sections of the population' (Internal Communication, 22-
5-1992) In the side-letter (Internal Communication, October 1990) for SP-VI, the 
health aspect is not (directly) mentioned when it is stated that the 'overall objective 
is to provide the population located in the problem villages in the project area with 
safe, reliable and sufficient drinking water at a reasonable distance from their 
housing units, so that the population in the project area will have full access to the 
sources throughout the year to meet their drinking water needs ' In general, the side-
letter is restricted to the drinking-water facilities (to be) installed The activities of 
the PSU in the field of socio-economic activities are seen as a contribution to the 
'acceptance and sustainabihty of the project' with the active enrollment of especially 
women 'in the operation and use of the facilities' and through the involvement of 
users in 'site selection, health promotion, hygiene education and training of village 
based caretakers ' According to the UP drinking-water and sanitation evaluation 
report of May 1992, the long term objectives of the Dutch-assisted projects in the 
field of drinking water in Uttar Pradesh were (1) to facilitate the start of economic 
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activities, (2) to increase the social status of the population with special reference to 
the improvement of the position of women and of the poorest groups, and (3) to 
stimulate the local capacity for active participation of the different population groups 
in planning and implementation of a sustainable improvement of the environment 
(DGIS 1992b 8) 
136 Water is regarded as an entry-point for the PSU which is part of a bilateral 
project in this sector The villagers confront many more problems, however 
Therefore other activities (e g, literacy) are also undertaken In order to solve the 
problems of the villagers, it was found necessary to formalise the coordination with 
the government machinery In light of the latter, the concept of District Coordination 
Committees and Block Coordination Committees came up The major objectives of 
the Expanded Base of Community Participation are, according to the field staff of 
the PSU to cover a maximum area within the limited time given, to use, for 
instance, health and education resources to maximise the reach, to assist the target 
group in reaching their expectations which are the result of awareness-building, and 
to facilitate changes in the government machinery (group discussion PSU staff, 21-
10-1993) 
137 The participation part was considered essential The involvement of the local 
community (and women in particular) in the rural drinking-water projects was aimed 
at (1) assisting in the selection of socially appropriate water points, (2) assuring 
preventive maintenance, (3) a closer rapport/communication with Jal Nigam for 
major repairs, (4) effective social monitoring of water quality, (5) waste-water 
management and maintaining of cleanliness, and (6) formation of hand-pump-based 
Jal Samitis or Water Committees for better management and utilisation of water 
(PSU η d ) It should be noted that the Jal Samitis can be seen as complementary to 
the Gram Panchayats which are the main representative democratic bodies at the 
village level It is therefore important that the Jal Samitis 'will assume no conflicting 
functions with the Gram Panchayats and will not pose any threat to the existing 
Village Panchayat system ' As such, the tasks of the Samitis are restricted to site 
selection, proper maintenance and adequate cleanliness around the hand pumps In 
contrast to many NGDOs, the organisational activities within SP-VI were not seen as 
the establishment of independent village-level committees capable of taking up their 
own development From this, it might be concluded that the objectives for the 
drinking-water projects in Uttar Pradesh are restricted to drinking water This is, 
however, not correct As in Uttar Pradesh (cf АР-I), the integrated approach is 
intended to contribute to a more general development of the rural areas The 
evaluation mission which visited Uttar Pradesh in 1992, for instance, was 'to 
concentrate on assessing the results of and the extent to which the integrated 
approach already had been operationalized and whether these developments already 
contribute to the Dutch policy objectives (reliable and accessible services and 
general use of safe water/sanitation, also for the poor, improved living conditions, 
enhanced organizational and development capacities of villages and implementing 
organizations, improved position of women)' (Internal Communication, 10-1-1992) 
138 PSUnd 
342 The same difference 
139 Jal Nigam counts 20% centage charges on the implementation of projects 
consisting of 4% design, 1% research and development and 15% construction 
supervision Actual implementation is carried out by contractors 
140 DGIS 1992b The 15% reduction as local tax component does not apply for the 
activities of PSU in the field of Community Participation 
141 Site selection was initially in the hands of the Member of the Legislative 
Assembly (MLA) for the area This selection was later done by the PSU and Jal 
Nigam in consultation with the Gram Panchayat and the major beneficiaries of a 
particular hand pump in the village In July 1990, the Department of Urban 
Development in Uttar Pradesh issued a statement which 'categorically mentions that 
the consent of the concerned Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA), not of 
the village Pradhans, should be obtained in writing for the location of hand pumps in 
all water supply programmes ' The PSU correctly remarked that this 'decision m 
itself negates the very spirit of community participation and puts a question mark on 
the efforts to develop a more decentralised system of operation and maintenance' 
(PSU 1990 14-15) 
142 PSU 1990 7 
143 PSU 1989 9 
144 The villages described here constitute only the top of the iceberg Problems 
with the hand pumps in the area of SP-VI are still relatively frequent A review of 
3,848 hand pumps in 860 villages spread across the six districts in SP-VI over a 
one-year period (July 1992 - July 1993) shows 15 4% of the hand pumps to require 
corrective measures While only 0 8% of the reviewed hand pumps were found to be 
at a socially unacceptable site, nearly 4% had no platform, 10% showed defects in 
the platforms and drains, 8 2% had no drain or an inadequate drain, 1 7% had a 
muddy/sandy water discharge and 2 7% were out of order Of the 591 hand pumps 
requiring corrective measures, a total of 177 (30%) were indeed repaired during the 
year by Jal Nigam (data derived from internal administration Jal Nigam, Lucknow) 
145 Dharsawan clearly showed some of the positive outcomes anticipated for the 
ECP activities A District Coordination Committee meeting held in (he village at the 
beginning of 1993 not only resulted in assistance from the government for a cash-
crop pilot project but also in assistance for the establishment of a milk cooperative 
in the village The idea of the milk cooperative was prepared by some of the more 
active members of the community (the youth organisation) The fact that people 
were willing to work together was, according to them, also due in part to the 
organisational activities of the PSU in the village 
146 Also see, PSU 1992d, which regards this lack of a feeling of ownership among 
the people as 'the most serious hurdle, which impairs cost-shanng In fact the 
problem fundamentally lies with the whole Dutch assisted water supply programme, 
which does not have any component of cost-sharing, thus leaving the entire 
programme to be nothing more than chanty ' 
147 Calculated from PSU 1990b, 1990c, 1990d, 1991, 1991a, 1991b, 1992a, 1992d 
In contrast to the other districts under SP-VI, more than one social scientist was 
stationed in Lakhimpur-Khen This probably explains the relatively greater number 
of water committees formed in this district when compared to others 
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148 According to available information, the training of local-level mechanics under 
SP VI was only due to start in December 1993 It is therefore not possible to draw 
conclusions with regard to the impact of such training on the maintenance objective 
of the Community Participation part of SP-VI Furthermore, experiences with SP-III 
have shown the training of villagers (whether women or men) in preventive and/or 
breakdown maintenance to be of little use when these trained mechanics are not 
incorporated into the existing structure for the maintenance of the hand pumps in the 
districts 
149 Interview Jal Nigam, Lakhimpur Khen district, 27-10-1993 
150 According to the social scientist for Gonda district, the battle with the open 
wells was almost won but not with the private shallow hand pumps (personal 
communication) 
151 This essentially means that a preference was given to people who already 
perform certain roles in the community and/or belong to the more educated part of 
the village (e g , members of the Gram Panchayat, members of youth clubs, teachers, 
health workers) It also means that people from other social strata (and particularly 
those with no formal education or illiterates) may simply not be qualified for a more 
active part in the community participation activities as implemented by the PSU 
152 This observation is in accordance with a statement by the representatives of the 
Jal Nigam in Bahraich district According to them, no difference exists between the 
NAP and non-NAP villages with regard to cleanliness ('only in a negligible number 
of villages has anything been done in this field') There are also no differences with 
respect to breakdowns The difference thus lies in the fact that there are more 
platforms and drainages in NAP villages than in non-NAP villages and the fact that 
the construction was called 'better' because of greater community involvement and a 
minimum level of awareness with regard to water and hand pumps A difference in 
the selection of sites could also be observed In non-NAP villages, selection is 
mainly the task of the MLA/MP, in NAP, it is the combined task of the PSU, Jal 
Nigam and the Gram Pradhan (Interview Jal Nigam Bahraich district, 29-10-1993) 
153 Over the period April 1992 - July 1993, the social scientists stationed in the six 
districts visited a total of 1,053 villages The number of 'visited villages' was 
highest for the district of Lakhimpur Khen and lowest for the district of Basti In 
Lakhimpur Khen, a team of social scientists (in 1993 three) is at work while in the 
other districts only one social scientist has been stationed Even when it is assumed 
that a social scientist can visit one village a day and work seven days per week, it 
will take ten months in Bahraich, nine in Gonda, five in Siddhartnagar, six in Basti, 
eight in Ballia and five months in Lakhimpur Khen before each of the villages has 
been visited once With regard to Lakhimpur Khen, it is often noted that three social 
scientists were stationed here but not that 694 villages were added to the original 
487 in an addendum phase 
154 There are, of course, other incentives for better use, operation and maintenance 
and greater involvement and interest among the villagers One of the most important 
incentives in this regard concerns the possibilities created under the ECP for other 
such developmental activities as income-generating activities The District Magistrate 
(DM) in Bahraich district, for instance, sees community participation as not only 
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important in the field of drinking water and sanitation but also more generally (ι e, 
for more general rural development) The educational and participatory activities 
implemented under SP-VI create possibilities for better interaction between the 
government machinery and the people in the villages 'People are coming more 
forward' as they leam about different government programmes and become more 
aware and confident of their own role in development Many government 
programmes, according to the DM, have only been implemented on paper In the 
Intensive Mobilisation Villages, the people are now coming more forward with their 
own demands and ideas There is also a closer interaction between the departments 
and agencies responsible for the implementation of, for instance, poverty alleviation 
programmes The PSU is regarded as an important facilitating and implementing 
agency, but the DM also feels that such development should be possible without the 
PSU, there are many agencies and departments working at village level and they 
also see the positive effects of a more participatory strategy (interview District 
Magistrate Bahraich district, 28-10-1993) 
155 Not all of the villages in the area to be reached by Kassar Trust suffer from the 
same water problems For some villages, it is a question of quantity (as in Mankote 
village) That is, the supply of water in and around the village is simply insufficient 
to provide every family with the quantity of water needed over the year In other 
villages, the quality of the water can be and is a problem This does not necessarily 
mean that the villagers also perceive the quality of the water as a problem, however 
156 According to one of the medical doctors at the Bageshwar Hospital (covering 
the area stretching into Kapkote block of Almora district), the most prevalent 
diseases in the area are, besides tuberculosis and malnounshment, water-borne 
diseases Worm-infection (though related to malnounshment) scores highest within 
this category, infecting circa 50-60% of the people An additional one-third of the 
people are infected with amoeba while the figure for hepatitis is, according to the 
Bageshwar hospital, increasing Particularly in the summer the people in the area 
around the Bageshwar hospital also suffer from diarrhoea Between 70-80% of all 
daily outpatient cases at the hospital could be traced to water-borne infection, with 
most of these being preventable It remains difficult to say whether the number of 
people suffering from these water-bome diseases, let alone the people within the 
area of the NGDO under discussion here, is increasing or decreasing This is not 
only because the population is growing (and thus the number of patients), but also 
because records are not available in the hospital 
157 Kassar Trust basically consists of two staff members who are the technical 
director and director for social activities respectively Both are from the ashram of 
Sri Aurobindo in Pondicherry, where one has been involved in a pottery project The 
technical director, who originates from Great Britain, is the driving force behind not 
only the introduction of hand pumps in the Himalayan region of Uttar Pradesh but 
also many of the other technical (and sometimes innovative) activities of the Trust 
Recently, in 1992, the staff has (temporarily) been enlarged with two people from 
Mankote village These people are not only active in assisting other samitis and 
outside organisations in the installation of hand pumps but also act as intermediaries 
for Kassar Trust and as teachers in the field of health education, personal hygiene 
and environmental hygiene 
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158 Within this district, activities are concentrated in two blocks Bageshwar and 
Kapkote Almora, one of the 63 districts in the state, is part of the Kumaon 
Himalaya Region in the North-West of Uttar Pradesh and is characterised by 
depleting natural resources, not only because of the growth in population and the 
concomitant need for food, fodder, fuel and water but also because of 'excessive 
commercial exploitation of forests, outdated land management practises such as the 
uncontrolled grazing of livestock, and anachronistic land laws which deprive rural 
communities of the power to manage the uncultivated land which supports their 
agriculture' (Uttarakhand Seva Nidhi 1990) Only in 1991 Kassar Trust (through the 
Mankote samm) was involved in the construction of a hand pump and latrine in a 
village in the neighbouring district of Pithauragarh 
159 The hand pumps installed under the Kassar Trust programme intercept small 
underground seepages In order to collect the water for pumping, underground 
infiltration tanks were built The amount of water which can be pumped daily 
depends on the speed with which this infiltration chamber collects the water from 
the small seepages In other words The quantity of available water depends on (1) 
the capacity of the seepage intercepted and (2) the number of families using the 
source In the dry season, when more people are likely to use the hand pump 
because of other sources temporarily drying up, a hand pump may not provide 
sufficient water for all 
160 Interview Executive Engineer Jal Nigam, Bageshwar, October 1993 According 
to the Executive Engineer, such chlonnation is not always done in piped-water 
schemes due to the 'paucity of staff and funds ' This means that even the water in 
the piped-water schemes cannot be guaranteed safe for human drinking purposes 
161 Incomplete coverage may be due to (1) population growth and (2) delays in the 
implementation of the schemes (interview Executive Engineer Jal Nigam, 
Bageshwar, October 1993) The piped-water schemes of the government subtract 
water from groundwater of surface water, which is first led to slow sand filters and 
after chlorimsation distributed to the connected villages through public standposts 
(compare to AP-I) 
162 Kassar Trust 1993 2 
163 The Executive Engineer of Jal Nigam in Bageshwar stated in this regard 'If we 
can go by jeep to the site, then supervision is not a problem, but if we can't get 
there by jeep, then supervision is a problem' (Interview Executive Engineer Jal 
Nigam, Bageshwar, October 1993) Visits to some of the government schemes and 
discussions with Kassar Trust and Mankote samiti revealed that many of the 
schemes were poorly constructed The fact that pipes were laid on the surface and 
thereby more vulnerable to (intended or non-intended) breakages is the cause of the 
non-functioning of many schemes According to Kassar Trust, the main problems 
with the government piped-water schemes are (1) problems at the sources and 
collection chambers, (2) sources tending to dry up as a result of environmental 
factors, (3) pipelines are inadequately protected in areas prone to erosion and in 
gully crossings, leading to failure in monsoons, (4) possible tampering with distant 
pipelines passing through villages with water problems, (5) inadequate maintenance, 
compounded by the indifference of the villagers to what is considered government 
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property, and (6) tampering with the distribution systems in multi-distnbution 
schemes 
164 The dnnking-water programme, which was officially started in 1987, has thus 
developed into a multi-component programme There is also a clear tendency 
towards greater non-technical and non-construction activities within the KT 
programme In later years, more attention has also been paid to training and 
awareness-building Consideration of the technical or construction activities shows a 
total of 95 drinking-water supply facilities, 321 latrines, 5 polyhouses, 5 polyhned 
tanks, 16 nurseries, 350 fuel-efficient stoves, 109 solar lights and 1 power water 
wheel to have been provided along with 61 5 hectares brought under fodder 
cultivation In the non-technical field of awareness and organisation, activities have 
been undertaken with regard to training, health and literacy Training refers firstly 
and foremostly to the training of Jal Karmis or water workers, who not only receive 
a technical but also a non-technical training (in community development work, 
organisation, participatory rural appraisal) Over the period 1988-1993, construction 
activities have been undertaken in approximately 53 Gram Sabhas spread across 
seven different blocks in Almora district This distribution of activities is due to 
Kassar Trust's strategy of broadening the scope of its programme by training people 
from other organisations outside their direct working area and not expanding the 
number of villages covered by Kassar Trust itself The number of activities per 
Gram Sabha ranges from one to 11 
165 Kassar Trust 1993 9 See also Kassar Trust 1991 1, in which it is stated that 
'the primary objective of the Trust lies not in the construction of this or that number 
of hand pumps, nor even in drinking water itself, the primary objective is to create 
local capability That is to say local capability to organise and implement 
environmental programmes ' 
166 ICCO 1988a 2 
167 See also L Schulpen 1993 27-30 
168 It should be noted that the rainwater harvesting programme of Kassar Trust is 
not directed at providing drinking water, as this water is not considered safe for 
drinking water purposes The rainwater harvesting programme (in which rainwater 
from roofs is collected in tanks) is aimed at the provision of water for purposes 
other than drinking near the habitations (and thereby reducing the work load of 
women considerably) The pressure on the safe drinking-water spots is also reduced 
in such a manner According to Kassar Trust, only 10% of the water collected daily 
is used for drinking purposes 
169 With the exception of a hand pump installed near one of the naulas, all of the 
other drinking-water facilities have been installed near the houses of the users This 
means 5-10 minutes walk from the habitations in the case of hand pumps and 
possibly even less in the case of gravity schemes 
170 Discharge per facility, thus, differs sharply One of the hand pumps used by 
some 35 households in the dry season, for instance, provides between 2,000 and 
2,500 litres daily The other hand pump used by only two households provides 400 
litres daily It should be noted that a total of three hand pumps has been installed m 
Mankote village under the programme of Kassar Trust but that one of these is only 
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used for religious purposes The lift scheme is only used by one household as none 
of the others in the surroundings wanted to participate financially in the scheme 
171 Kassar Trust 1993a In January 1994, the first water samples from the working 
area for Kassar Trust were collected Over the coming two years, water samples will 
be periodically collected in order to determine the quality of the water provided 
through different means (e g, hand pumps, lift pumps) The intention is that Kassar 
Trust and Jal Karmis leam to take and analyse water samples in order to be able to 
regularly check the quality of the water in the future 
172 This is especially true when one considers the fact that even in villages where a 
lot of attention has been paid to health education, the distance to the source remains 
one of the most important determinants of use (whether standposts or hand pumps) 
Compare in this regard the findings on the DGIS-projects in Andhra and Uttar 
Pradesh 
173 Interview Kassar Trust This amount covers the cost of the materials and the Jal 
Karmis who supervise the construction One Jal Karmi earns Rs 50 per day plus 
expenses for travel, shelter and food The beneficiaries themselves contribute 
(unskilled) labour and local transport for a distance up to 500 metres from the road 
In cases where the distance is more than 500 metres from the road, Kassar Trust 
bears the costs Up to April 1993, the beneficiaries also contributed 10% of the total 
costs to the samitis This practice has been abandoned as the samitis are no longer 
functioning With regard to the unskilled labour provided by the beneficiaries it 
should be noted that many of the families hire labour for the digging of the well 
One labourer costs circa Rs 35 per day The total costs can thus be increased by 
some Rs 4,000 (6 labourers for 15-20 days) According to the Trust, approximately 
50% of the beneficiaries indeed hire labourers The time needed for the complete 
installation of a hand pump is in Kassar Trust's experience between one and one-
and-a-half months Domestic pumps which are meant for only one to two households 
are much cheaper than India Mark-II pumps While the domestic pump costs around 
Rs 1,000, the Mark-II pump costs Rs 5,000-5,500 In the case of a domestic pump, 
the depth needed is also much less than in the case of Mark-II The Mark-II pump, 
however, is much stronger, easier to handle and therefore preferred by the Trust 
174 Uttar Pradesh Jal Nigam 1992 The cost of one hand pump is Rs 7,292 for 
materials, Rs 3,960 for labour and around Rs 200 for provision of an unsuccessful 
bore, construction of a 1 85 diameter platform and a 3 metre drain 
175 No official system for breakdown repair has as yet been set up by the Trust 
According to plans, this will be done in the Sorag area when this becomes the main 
working area of the Trust after April 1994 The intention is to request a contribution 
of Rs 2 per beneficiary-household per hand pump and to use the money collected 
for repairs 
176 Kassar Trust 1993b 5 
177 For comparison The unit cost for a household latrine under the SP-V project 
financed by DGIS was set at Rs 3,575 in 1990 This is generally considered 
expensive and, therefore, difficult to incorporate into government schemes (also see 
section 4 3 2 2) In the case of Kassar Trust it should be noted that most of the 
beneficiaries construct an entire bathroom while building a latrine Kassar Trust only 
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provides assistance to Rs 850 for materials All other costs are to be earned by the 
beneficiaries 
178 Note that the working area for Mankote samiti is not restricted to the village of 
Mankote or the surrounding area, the two members (who have been temporarily 
employed by Kassar Trust) may also be active in other blocks and for other sarrutis 
179 The survey conducted in the course of my research on YCO covering 194 
households in eight villages showed women to collect the water in nearly 90% of the 
families (sometimes together with children) On average, women collect 15 pots (of 
9-10 litres) daily for drinking, cooking, cleaning, bathing, washing and animal 
purposes The number of pots collected daily per family largely depends on the 
number of animals (ι e , bullocks, cows and buffalos) On average, only 18% of the 
water collected is used for drinking and cooking purposes 
180 ICCO 1991a 
181 In reality at least one village (Dharmavaram) has been added since 1991 while 
YCO has also started a few activities in one of the wards of the town Yellamanchili 
182 The literacy rate in this area is with 34 4% higher than in the rural Vizag 
district but nearly equal to the figure for rural Andhra Pradesh (35 7%) In contrast, 
the target villages for YCO are characterised by a higher than average percentage of 
marginal workers, with more than 51% of the working force falling in the category 
of 'cultivators' and 34 5% in the category of 'agricultural labourers' (the figures for 
rural Visakhapatnam are 50 1% and 30 8% respectively and those for rural Andhra 
Pradesh are 33 5% and 47 5% respectively) The average number of people per 
household is, with slightly more than four, nearly equal to the average figures for 
rural Visakhapatnam and Andhra Pradesh Of the total rural population in 
Visakhapatnam district, nearly 25% belongs to Scheduled Tribes and around 7% to 
Scheduled Castes For rural Andhra Pradesh, these figures are 8% and 18% respect­
ively According to the descriptions of the projects sanctioned by ICCO over the last 
couple of years, nearly 80% of the target population for YCO belongs to Scheduled 
Castes and Backward Castes (derived from Primary Census Data 1991 (floppy)) 
183 In her policy, YCO does not make a distinction - as many of the NGDOs in 
India do — between the different castes in a community For the economic 
programme, a distinction is made between not castes but the different economic 
classes which can cut across the different castes 
184 It should be clear that these different activities were not all incorporated into 
the YCO programme right at the start in 1981 As with many other NGDOs, YCO's 
programme has expanded and diversified over the years Non-formal education 
(including awareness-building and organisation), agro-forestry and training were the 
first activities, followed by income-generating activities in 1983 and animal 
husbandry, community health, rural housing, water resource development and skill 
training in 1985 In 1987, YCO started building training centres and community-
health centres In 1988-1989, agricultural extension is added as a new activity 
Finally, in 1990, the cyclone relief/rehabilitation programme is taken up 
185 R Rajaiah, К Papa, В Reddy and I Ramarao 1991 8-20 
Notes 349 
186 It is nevertheless nearly impossible to assess the impact of these educational 
activities as (1) no baseline data exist and (2) changes in knowledge and behaviour 
cannot simply be attributed only to the activities of YCO Any statement in this field 
should therefore be treated with caution 
187 Over the years, YCO has tapped many different sources for funding of both the 
smaller and larger activities in its programme Over the period 1981-1991, foreign 
funds constituted nearly 57% of the total funds mobilised by YCO The remaining 
43% mainly came from the government, with smaller amounts coming from banks, 
agricultural income, rental of the YCO tractor and the target group itself The 
contribution of the target group m particular (some 3%) is considered too low by 
ICCO The foreign funds came from 18 different sources, including bilateral 
(Netherlands, SIDA) and multilateral (UNICEF, World Bank) donors ICCO 
provided 28 7% and EZE 52 3% of the total foreign funds in this period 
188 R Rajaiah, К Papa, В Reddy and I Ramarao 1991 83 
189 Interestingly, the condition of the water sources created in the village of 
Govindapalem was reported as 'satisfactory' in the 1991 Evaluation Report When 
the village was visited in February 1994, the piped scheme was not functioning and 
had never functioned 
190 The three wells already existed before the intervention of YCO The NGDO, 
however, provided funds for desalting of the wells and for building a wall around 
them The villagers were paid for their labour, and this reflects the importance of the 
economic part of the YCO programme which is aimed at raising income and 
providing employment opportunities 
191 The only exception is the beggar colony known as Ramaknshnapuram In this 
colony, which was built in cooperation between YCO and the Government of 
Andhra Pradesh, 30 beggar families were originally provided with a house, some 
land and a buffalo The intention was to provide them with a means of work/income 
and thereby remove the need to beg This trial project only succeeded to a very 
small extent In 1994, five houses were completely abandoned and the 'villagers' 
returned for a large part to begging as they could make more money doing this than 
farming or working the plantation set up for them Only three people are currently 
employed in the activities set up under the YCO programme, the rest has either 
returned to begging or is involved in petty trade In building the colony, a hand 
pump and household latnnes were also installed Whereas the hand pump is still in 
working order, the latnnes are certainly not Actually, they have never been used by 
the people, the doors are broken or have simply been sold, and the pits are filled 
with dirt Several of the inhabitants explained that the latnnes are not needed 
192 Community latnnes, installed with government funds, are found all over India 
They consist of a square surrounded by a brick wall of approximately two metres, 
with a small entrance on the side The main problem and main reason for the 
general non-use of these structures is the fact that these latnnes are not cleaned 
193 One can wonder whether this actually means that the majonty of the people is 
aware of the water-health nexus Drinking water is simply a problem in the area 
194 The exact nature of this contribution was difficult to assess The impression is 
that many meant cleaning although some clearly stated that they contnbuted cash 
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195 ICCO 1991b 
196 Another point with regard to these saving groups is that it is very difficult for 
new women to join, as most of the groups already exist for quite some time In 
some cases, the members of these groups clearly stated that they were not very eager 
to admit new members The scope of these schemes is thus limited particularly in 
light of the fact that YCO does not regard the establishment of new saving groups as 
a priority In contrast, there are a few Manila Mandais (particularly in those villages 
where women are active in the plantation work supported by YCO) which are active 
on a broader platform These villages are considered prime examples of the YCO 
programme 
197 There is a clear difference between the six villages with regard to the 
percentage of the population which benefitted from any of the YCO activities In 
Gobburupalem, for instance, nearly 93% of the respondents stated that they 
benefitted, while this percentage was only 47% in Rajakoduru There is also a slight 
but unmistakable difference with regard to the economic and social positions of 
those families which benefitted and those which did not Percentage-wise, those who 
benefitted have an education slightly more frequently than those who did not benefit 
while more depend on own agriculture instead of agricultural labour Slightly more 
of those who benefitted have buffalos and chickens than those who did not, and on 
average the former also own more land to cultivate than the latter During the 
survey, it also became clear that the 30 target villages are not only the focus of 
YCO Another NGDO based in Yellamanchih also works in, for instance, 
Goppugondapalem 
198 Many other YCO activities were mentioned by the target group during the 
interviews, ranging from fruit trees and community nurseries to family-planning 
operations, skill training, leadership training and social awareness In the village of 
Koppugondapalem, a few women clearly stated that they no longer had a 'fear of 
talking ' 
199 It is possible that the benefit for these respondents with regard to the water 
activities of YCO was in the form of temporary employment during the construction 
phase and not in the form of water availability 
200 Interview director YCO, February 1994 
201 WHO 1992 
202 National Drinking Water Mission 1990 
203 See, for instance, О Saasa and J Carlsson 1996 86-104 
204 In 1989, the management of ICCO proposed a general sectoral concentration 
with priority for (1) integrated rural development and (2) integrated urban 
development Within these, the focus was to be on education and provision of 
services, organisation and income-generating activities (ICCO 1989 14-15) 
205 DGIS (DAL/ZZ) 1992 10 Total costs per latrine vary from Rs 2,000 in 
Kerala, Rs 3,000 in Gujarat, Rs 3,350 in Andhra Pradesh to Rs 6,000 in Uttar 
Pradesh Total costs include the costs for materials, project coordination, monitoring, 
community participation, hygiene education and overhead 
206 National Drinking Water Mission 1990 Also see Box 4 2 
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1 See, for instance, G Diemer and F Ρ Huibers 1996 1-10, who observe that it has 
only been acknowledged since the late 1970s that 'using an irrigation system means 
collaboration between people ' 
2 Government of India 1969 182 According to Arun Ghosh (1991), the 'increase 
of foodgrains output has come mainly from irrigated areas ' Similarly, the Eighth 
Five Year Plan sees the 'availability of adequate, timely and assured irrigation [as] a 
critical determinant of agricultural productivity' (Government of India 1992 56) 
3 World Bank 1989 88 
4 Government of India 1988 16 
5 Generally speaking, an irrigation scheme using surface water consists of one or 
more nver outlets, a storage reservoir (if possible and necessary), main, branch, 
distributary and minor canals, and field inlets and outlets (also see, FAO 1986 3-
71) 
6 In the words of the Eighth Five Year Plan (Government of India 1992 63) 
'There are complaints of overexploitation of ground water in several parts of the 
country, reflected in a progressive deepening of wells and lowering of the water 
table ' Also see, for instance, B D Dhawan 1991, Τ Shah 1992, M Moench 1992 
and A S К Rao 1993 
7 Government of India 1956 328 
8 Government of India 1974 105 and Government of India 1980 Of this ultimate 
potential of 113 5 million hectares, 73 5 million fell under surface-water irrigation 
and 40 million under ground-water irrigation As ground-water irrigation is by 
definition minor irrigation, this means that 15 million hectares of the 55 million 
under minor irrigation involved surface water 
9 А К Mitra 1996 A-31 
10 While the total costs per hectare under major/medium projects was Rs 1,526 
during the First Plan, this shot up to Rs 73,556 during the Seventh Plan Over a 
period of 30 odd years, the costs per hectare therefore increased by more than 
4,700% In the case of minor irrigation, this increase was high, but far less dramatic 
while the costs for one hectare brought under minor irrigation amounted to Rs 569 
during the First Plan, this was Rs 7,078 under the Seventh Plan in the 1980s, which 
represents an increase of 1,144% It should, however, be mentioned that no attention 
is paid to inflation in these figures According to В D Dhawan (1993), for instance, 
the average costs per hectare under major/medium irrigation have not, taking outlays 
at constant 1970-71 pnces, risen some 40 times but 'probably nearer four times ' 
11 Government of India 1992 57-58 Also see M Lipton and J Toye 1990 69, in 
which it is stated that 'in most of India the inexpensive options in irrigation have 
been used up, and it is increasingly expensive as it spreads to new areas ' 
12 Government of India 1961 383 
13 Government of India 1987 15 
14 In addition to these rising costs, the continued incorporation of new 
major/medium projects hampered the timely completion of irrigation projects 
Understandable as the adoption of new schemes may be in light of, for instance, the 
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major emphasis put on the creation of irrigation since the 1950s and the political 
patron-client system in India, these schemes have led to a very 'thin spreading of 
resources and consequent time and cost overruns Though all the Plans, without 
exception, declared their intentions to give priority to complete the ongoing schemes, 
the addition of new schemes continued unabated' (Government of India 1992 58) 
In discussing the lingering on of projects described in the Eighth Plan, В D Dhawan 
(1993) even stated that 'in the absence of a Planwise frequency distribution of 
projects we have no way of rejecting the much-aired criticism that some of these 
projects (major as well as medium ones) are of the First Plan vintage1' 
15 A К Mitra 1996 
16 Government of India 1956 325 
17 Government of India 1961 387 In discussing direct revenues from 
major/medium projects, the Fourth Five Year Plan noted that 'the irrigation systems 
are presently working at a loss in all States ' Concerning the water rates in the case 
of minor irrigation schemes, the Plan added that 'the present rates seldom cover the 
operation and depreciation charges' (Government of India 1969 192-193) In the 
1990s, this situation remains the same, according to the Eighth Five Year Plan, 'it is 
well known that the water charges collected do not cover even working expenses, 
not to speak of depreciation charges and contributing even a moderate return on the 
investments' (Government of India 1992 67) 
18 A К Mitra 1996 
19 С H Hanumantha Rao and A Gulati 1994 
20 World Bank 1989 89 It is noted that 'groundwater investments are unlikely to 
be remunerative unless a minimum area can be irrigated,' it is also noted that this 
problem of scale 'in principle can be overcome through public or cooperative 
ownership and operation of wells ' 
21 А К Mitra (1996 A-32) provides a clear example of the consequences of 
incorrect use or under-utihsation 'It is well known that an irrigation scheme is 
declared to have been completed for commissioning even when the network of field 
channels and land levelling work to receive water in the entire canal command, 
specially at the tail reaches, have not been completed ' The consequence of this is 
that at the time of releasing water at the head reaches of the system farmers there 
grow crops that require large quantity of water 'Even when most of the canal 
command is ready to receive the water after completing works of land levelling and 
construction of field channels, the users in the head reaches are not ready to give up 
their claims on intensive use of irrigation water for their crops ' 
22 It should be mentioned that up to the Sixth Plan period, the general assumption 
(backed by a lack of available data) was thai utilisation equals potential in the case 
of minor irrigation That this assumption was incorrect was already acknowledged in 
the Third Five Year Plan when a field study on the problems in minor irrigation 
performed by the Programme Evaluation Organisation suggested 'that non-utilisation 
of facilities is a factor of quite serious dimensions even in the case of minor 
irrigation' (Government of India 1961 308) In 1985-86, the Economic Survey again 
acknowledged that the utilisation 'gap may be higher as some of the potential under 
minor irrigation schemes may have remained unharnessed, contrary to the common 
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assumption of full utilisation of the minor irrigation potential' (Government of India 
1986 11) 
23 Government of India 1992 60 
24 А К Mitra 1996 A-32 
25 Also see Government of India 1982 10 The World Bank (1989 88-89) in this 
regard points at what they call the 'tailend' problem 'water reaches only a part of 
the targeted area and results in output and employment gains far below what could 
be achieved.' leading to 'inferior irrigation service, in terms of quantity and 
reliability, for those not well situated in the command ' 
26 ID Carruthers 1983 56-58 cites the 'physical and operational inadequacies in 
canal systems (as cited by Indian officials) ' In this long list of inadequacies many 
of the problems mentioned above in major irrigation schemes are pointed at, while 
adding some others Regarding operation and maintenance, the Indian officials, for 
instance point at the fact that 'head-end farmers got oversupply of water in initial 
years and resist later reduction of supply ' Further inadequacies mentioned refer to 
institutional arrangements ('lack of co-ordination among key agencies especially the 
Irrigation Dept, the Command Area Development Authority (CADA) and the 
Agricultural Dept '), drainage ('drainage systems often omitted or inadequately 
designed'), on-farm practices ('plot-to-plot irrigation as widely practised is 
inefficient'), modernisation procedures ('techniques for introduction of warabandi 
(rotational water supply) often not properly thought or implemented') These 
problems or inadequacies mainly refer to either technical or institutional problems 
and social problems (for instance, caste, large versus small fanners) are simply not 
referred to 
27 Government of India 1980 153-154 
28 Government of India 1992 61, 67 Also see, А К Mitra 1996, R Meinzen-Dick 
and M Mendoza 1996, N Sengupta 1985, and S Satish and A Sundar 1990 
29 Government of India 1984 9 
30 Government of India 1992 60 
31 This also means that the data on the minor irrigation potential created do not 
include that created by individual fanners or groups of farmers which have financed 
the facility completely out of their own pockets According to В D Dhawan (1993 
A-38), a precise estimate is not possible 'but it could be as high as the public sector 
outlay (about Rs 6,000 crores) set aside for minor irrigation' in the Eighth Plan 
32 Government of India 1992 61 
33 M Lipton and J Toye (1990 57) observe that aid-flow data are not presented 
separately for irrigation but nevertheless appear to constitute a large component of 
the aid flow In an OECD publication (1983 28-33), aggregate figures are presented 
with regard to official commitments (ODA + OOF) to irrigation by bilateral and 
multilateral donors for the period 1976-1981 Over this period a total of US$ 8,769 
million was committed to the development of irrigation with nearly 29% coming 
from DAC countries (including the European Union) and the remaining 71% coming 
from multilateral donors The irrigation share of the official commitments to 
agriculture fluctuated over the period While 22% of the donors' commitments to 
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agriculture were dedicated to irrigation in 1976, this figure dropped to 11% in 1981 
The majority of funds for irrigation in this period (for instance, 53% in 1980 and 
43% in 1981) went to South Asian countries 
34 Agriculture here includes 'crop and livestock development, provision of 
production requisites such as farm machinery and fertiliser, irrigation, pest control, 
veterinary services, services to the agricultural sector, Fishing and forestry (including 
tree crops), conservation and extension, land reclamation, land and soil surveys, land 
and water use, agricultural construction, storage and transport facilities, agricultural 
development banks' (OECD 1986a) (emphasis added, LS) 
35 OECD 1986 220 This point is acknowledged in the Seventh Five Year Plan In 
this Plan, it is further remarked that the completion of ongoing projects was also 
hampered by the ear-marking of 'a sizeable outlay under the irrigation sector [ ] for 
extemally-aided projects to honour the commitments made to external financial 
agencies Adequate funds, therefore, could not be provided by the States for other 
projects (not aided externally) which were in advanced stages of completion ' It is 
also observed that although 'external aid has undoubtedly contributed to improved 
technology and more systematic planning,' this has been done 'at a slightly higher 
cost than that of projects being implemented without external aid' (Government of 
India 1985 73) 
36 Ρ Hoebink 1995b 21 
37 While separate programmes and schemes for rural drinking water and for rural 
sanitation have been set up with NGDO participation, this is not the case in the field 
of irrigation and despite the fact that the development of irrigation potential has 
received primary attention since the 1950s and NGDOs have officially been 
recognised as 'partners in development' since the middle of the 1980s 
38 The sector agriculture is, however, a major sector within Dutch aid In the 
1980s, around 20% of the total bilateral ODA commitments were made to 
agriculture It should be recognised that a large part of these commitments was used 
to finance fertilisers 
39 Policy paper 1984 33 
40 Policy paper 1984 34 
41 Policy paper 1990 
42 All evaluations of rural development projects 'stress that the target group was 
not sufficiently involved in project design and implementation, which did nothing to 
promote the sustainabihty of the activities' (Policy paper 1991 165) 
43 At the end of 1984, only a few small research projects were about to be initiated 
(DGIS (DAL/ZZ) 1984) 
44 Within this broadening exercise, agricultural cooperation should focus on long-
term cooperation in the field of agricultural research and education, 'improvements 
of agricultural production, post-harvest technology and animal husbandry' (DGIS 
1980 2) 
45 DGIS 1990b 150 Later, in 1992, it is more specifically observed that 'the 
Dutch objective in integrated rural development in the Land and Water sector is in 
the first instance aimed at sustainable poverty alleviation by bringing about a better 
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distributions of the gains from irrigation systems across a greater number of (small 
and marginal) farmers with special attention to rural women In connection with this, 
the Netherlands also aims at combatting environmental degradation' (DGIS 1993 
191-192) 
46 IOV 1994a 225 
47 DGIS 1988c 
48 DGIS 1989b 
49 Justification for this concentration is sought by pointing at the fact that reversing 
the ill-effects of the problem of waterlogging and salinisation is still in the infancy 
in India, by pointing at the lower average costs for minor irrigation in comparison to 
major irrigation and by bringing forward the 'small donor' reason The latter means 
that 'to arrive at an effective Indo-Netherlands' bilateral cooperation on Land and 
Water Development, this cooperation should be focused on a limited number of 
fields of activities rather than to render assistance to the entire irrigation 
development program' (DGIS 1989b 3-4) Basically this could be regarded as a call 
for project aid above budget aid 
50 Expenditures in this sector started in 1981 and remained below Dfl 1 million per 
year until 1986 In this year, expenditures grew to nearly 5 million, in 1987 expendi­
tures grew further to nearly 25 million In contrast to the rural drinking water and 
sanitation sector, a large part of the disbursements in the sector land and water 
(42%) was made under the Technical Aid procedure which means that the 
Netherlands is in principle responsible for the implementation of activities 
Furthermore, 99% of the disbursements consisted of grants and 1% of loans (for 
drinking water and sanitation, 80% of the disbursements were grants and 20% were 
loans) (See IOV 1994a 89-94) Financial aid was used for those projects m which 
construction of irrigation facilities was an important part of the programme (ι e, in 
the North Bengal Terai project, the UP Tubewells project and the minor irrigation 
projects in Andhra Pradesh and Kerala) (See IOV 1992 Annex 3) 
51 This means that some 33% of the total disbursements over the period 1980-1992 
in the sector land and water were not spent in one of the five concentration states for 
Dutch bilateral aid This is particularly striking in light of the fact that most of the 
irrigation schemes were initiated in the mid-1980s when the state concentration was 
nearly finalised 
52 See, for instance, IOV 1992 Annex 3 A total of Dfl 17 04 million or 14 8% of 
the total disbursements in the sector land and water was spent on these four projects 
over the period 1986-1992 
53 Stuurgroep Impactstudie Medefinancieringsprogramma 1991 32 
54 SEE ICCO 1987b 15 where it is stated that 'economic aspects of development 
may not be separated from such matters as liberation, awareness-building, 
emancipation ' 
55 ICCO 1993 13-14 
56 ICCO/DGIS 1991 64-78 
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57 Based on an evaluation of four NGDOs in India supported by ICCO, this 
programme evaluation distinguishes between two different situation as concerns land 
conditions In the first situation, there is severe land degradation leading to not only 
exceeding production levels, but also to a need for 'major investments [ ] to 
stabilize further degradation and maintain productivity ' These investments include 
such items as introducing appropriate cropping patterns, soil and water conservation 
and regeneration of vegetation It is clear that irrigation projects will contribute to 
further land degradation under such circumstances and should therefore not be 
funded In the second situation, the 'land degradation processes are in a more initial 
phase ' Even in such a situation, however, 'a further increase in production potential 
by additional investments [ ], such as water supply by irrigation, [can] be justified' 
only when accompanied by investments in, for instance, soil and water conservation 
and tree planting in order to 'maintain or improve productivity ' 
58 When irrigation facilities are being provided under a NGDO programme, the 
report concludes that 'these investments could be covered by (soft) loans and/or 
partly being subsidized,' depending on 'both the economical and ecological resource 
base of target communities ' Recurring costs for operation and maintenance of 
irrigation facilities should be the responsibility of the beneficiaries (ICCO/DGIS 
1991 54) 
59 Some of these points were already taken up in a report by one of the staff 
members from the ICCO India desk after a three-week visit to different projects 
falling under the banner of 'agriculture, ecology and NGO's in India' (ICCO 1990b 
15) In this report, attention is asked for several points when irrigation is introduced 
into an area These concern experience of farmers with irrigation, technical 
complexity of the system, organisation of water management, possible changes in the 
eco-system, marketing and the financial contribution of the NGDO versus the own 
contribution of the beneficiaries Regarding the latter, the report states that in the 
case of NGDOs working with the 'poorest farmers,' 'it seems justified when the 
capital investments (in many cases pumps, pumphouses, electrification and pipes) are 
externally financed The target group can contribute in labour to the construction and 
then take care of operation and maintenance costs ' 
60 Under the heading of 'sustainable agriculture and environmental care," which is 
presented as one of the 'thematic/sectoral point of interest' the ICCO India-team 
notes that 'in principle ICCO will not support agricultural projects which result in a 
degeneration of the environment Priority will be given to programmes which are 
aimed at removing the causes and consequences of already degenerated natural 
resources, such as land and water, allowing for a long-term improvement in the 
position of the poor' The policy paper further states that 'if suitable these 
programmes will be based upon an integrated watershed management approach, 
which may require the involvement of other beneficiaries, ι e big farmers, also' 
(ICCO 1993a 13) 
61 In cases of doubts or questions with regard to specific irrigation activities, it has 
always been possible to contact staff members from the ICCO organisation for 
advice and/or specialised organisations from the ICCO network in developing 
countries In the case of the India desk, for instance, one of the staff members has 
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specific expertise in this field, while there are specialised organisations such as 
AFPRO in India that can be consulted 
62 Of the hundreds of projects co-financed by ICCO in India over the period 1971-
1992, 31 projects were grouped under the sector agriculture and land development 
This, however, does not say anything about the number of irrigation activities 
supported by ICCO as there are also projects with the word 'irrigation' in their title 
These projects may be grouped under such diverse categories as community 
development or infrastructure 
63 L Schulpen 1994 4 A total of 35 organisations (N=119) stated that they were 
active in the field of irrigation These NGDOs then received a second questionnaire 
concerning these specific activities A total of 18 (or 51%) ICCO counterparts or 
former counterparts returned this second questionnaire 
64 For at least one of these four organisations, the involvement in canal irrigation 
was restricted to the provision of pumpsets for the target group in order to allow 
them to pump water from a nearby irrigation canal to their fields (also see section 
5 3 2 1 below) 
65 In this regard, it should be mentioned that the majority of the respondents 
considered the provision of irrigation first and foremost the task of the government 
although this does not seem to restrict the activities of the NGDOs 
66 At the end of the 1980s, nearly 56% of the total area under crops in Uttar 
Pradesh was irrigated In only two other states (Punjab and Haryana) was this 
percentage higher (See Government of India 1992a 102-103) 
67 О Coutinho and Τ С Sharma 1987 887-893 
68 This was partly the outcome of the Free Boring Scheme from the state 
government for the creation of irrigation potential with a 100% subsidy of the boring 
costs for tubewells 
69 According to S Satish (1989 31-41), the decision of the Uttar Pradesh 
government in the early 1950s to become involved in the construction of tubewells 
was dictated mainly by the fact that poorer farmers were not in a position to 
'contribute towards the initial capital investment [ ] for harnessing ground water 
The State's role thus becomes inevitable in providing irrigation to poorer farmers ' 
70 See UPDESCO 1985 ni-xiii, N Pant 1992 and ETC 1987 12-30 These 
problems are comparable to those which existed before the World Bank projects By 
1980, the public tubewells had 'run into many difficulties not the least of which 
[was] poor utilisation of the potential due to power cuts, mechanical and electrical 
failures, badly operated and maintained water distribution system and lack of 
cooperation between the irrigation administration and the water users' (S Satish 
1989 31) 
71 Internal Communication, 1-11-1984 
72 Monitoring and Appraisal Cell 1989 12 
73 'Modernization of a tubewell will be undertaken in case of an old state tubewell 
with a dilapidated distribution system or in case of a relatively new tubewell without 
distribution system ' In the case of improvement, the most important activity will be 
connection to a dedicated feeder line for secured electricity The work to be 
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undertaken under modernisation and improvement was basically the same 
Modernisation simply required more work and thus more funds In both cases, the 
most important activity relates to the water distribution system (ETC 1987a 8-9, 
Annex) 
74 ETC 1987a 1 The increase in the number of districts to be covered by the 
project was due to the division of two districts and, thus, the creation of two new 
districts The district of Basti was first divided to create the new district of 
Sidhartanagar The district of Maharanjganj was later formed by dividing the district 
of Gorakhpur Together these districts were inhabited by nearly 28 million people or 
20% of the total population in the state m 1991 while the districts occupy some 15% 
of the total area of Uttar Pradesh A less than average percentage of the rural 
population m the project area belongs to Scheduled Castes and, like in Uttar Pradesh 
as a whole, a large majority of the population depends directly on agriculture for 
their livelihood There are relatively more agricultural labourers than in other areas 
(Own calculations based on A Bose 1991 361-366) 
75 ETC 1987 4 
76 Internal Communication, 24-4-1987 
77 MAC was headed by the parastatal Uttar Pradesh Development System 
Corporation (UPDESCO) The Netherlands though it necessary to have its own 
experts in the core UPDESCO team, as 'experiences with other projects, such as 
North Bengal Terai, leam that regularly returning review missions can only actively 
support project activities to a certain extent' (Internal Communication, 9-4-1987) In 
addition to technical support for the Department of Irrigation in the field of tubewell 
construction and improvement, the responsibilities of the MAC also included such 
activities as review of programmes, recommendations, identifying additional 
activities, liaison function with other organisations and checking of financial claims 
(IOV 1992 18) After India agreed to the revised project proposal and to the 
stationing of two Dutch experts within MAC in October 1987, several Dutch 
consultancy firms applied for the job of providing these experts The firms 
Oranjewoud, Haskoning, Euroconsult and DHV received an invitation to prepare a 
proposal In March 1988, after Oranjewoud withdrew, Euroconsult was selected In 
June 1991, DHV succeeded Euroconsult because the latter could not guarantee 
continuation of the team in the field (Internal Communication, 17-6-1991) 
78 For the training of women agricultural extension workers, the NGDO Knshi 
Vigyan Rendra (later replaced by the Kamla Nehru Memorial Trust) was 
responsible The Narendra Deva University of Agriculture and Technology Faizabad 
was to be the implementing organisation for 'advise to the Irrigation Department 
about the adaptation of the lay-out of tubewell command areas to agro-ecological 
conditions, farm household surveys, and on-site research regarding the relation plant, 
soil and water ' The Department of Agriculture was to set up demonstration plots 
and secure extension services for the farmers within the project, and the Department 
of Irrigation was the executing agency for the 1,075 tubewells to be constructed, 
improved or modernised 
79 Internal Communication, 17-5-1991 Sufficient funds also remained under the aid 
allocation for such extension 
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80 Monitonng and Appraisal Cell 1990a 22 With these conditions, the mission 
was reacting to not only the fact that they had not received 'proper information 
about incurred expenditure' but also (and mainly) to the fact that rehabilitation of 
old tubewells had up to then received hardly any attention 
81 Monitoring and Appraisal Cell 1993 Some technical advantages were also 
mentioned The power supply for the new design tubewells would come from rural 
feeder lines and therefore be possibly less erratic than from the dedicated feeder 
lines in the first phase The advantages mentioned with regard to the pilot phase 
starting in July 1993 can also be seen as part of the critique of the first phase 
82 Interview Monitoring and Appraisal Cell, Lucknow, October 1993 
83 Interview DAL/ZZ (DGIS), 26-10-1995 In August 1994, DGIS withdrew the 
side-letter for the pilot project because India had refused to sign it (Internal 
Communication, 10-8-1994) This basically meant that the project was being 
implemented and DHV was working on the project while the project was not 
officially agreed upon According to DGIS, the Department of Irrigation resisted the 
new pilot project as (a) Ή brings in too little A project of 2 3 million is not 
important for the Department of Irrigation, especially not in comparison with the 80 
million of the previous phase' and (b) 'the consultant tries to prove that small-scale 
irrigation projects can be managed and maintained by the farmers themselves This 
is a threat to an agency whose existence is based on the operation and maintenance 
of irrigation systems ' DGIS, therefore, felt it was left with no other option than to 
terminate its involvement 
84 Internal Communications, 13-11-1992 and 27-8-1987 The Dfl 85 5 million were 
meant for 'construction, modernization and improvement of tubewells' while the 
technical aid grants were allocated for 'agricultural extension and research, training 
and monitoring ' Of the total technical aid allocation of Dfl 4 5 million, an amount 
of Dfl I 5 million was for the two Dutch experts to be stationed at the project In 
the Agreed Minutes of the 1987 Annual Consultations, this latter amount is not 
mentioned The total costs of the project were 'estimated at Dfl 92 million' (IOV 
1994a 227), and the Dutch allocation would cover over 96% of the project costs 
85 Internal Communication, 16-9-1987 This pre-finance was part of a total package 
of Dfl 57 million out of financial aid grants for projects in the sectors drinking 
water and irrigation (land and water) 
86 Internal Communication, 4-4-1991 The total financial requirements for this two 
year extension (June 1991-June 1993) of the technical aid component amounted to 
Dfl 2,973,150 An amount of Dfl 908,400 still remained from the first phase so that 
an extra allocation of Dfl 2,064,750 was required This amount was divided as 
follows across the different items and activities Dfl 1 5 million (or 50 5% of the 
total amount) for the contract with the Dutch consultancy firm DHV which provided 
the experts connected to the Monitoring and Appraisal Cell plus an additional 16 2% 
for this Cell The Farmers Participation Unit and the Women Extension Programme, 
both implemented by the NGDO Krishi Vigyan Kendra, were to receive 7 6% and 
25 7% respectively 
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87 Internal Communication, 21-4-1988 The latter point was not entirely correct, in 
the Plan of Operations set up by the Dutch consultancy firm ETC in March 1987, 
criteria for the selection of 'cluster areas and tubewell sites' were already elaborated 
(ETC 1987 7) A total of eight entena which were either technical or social were 
mentioned With the exception of further specification for a few of the criteria, they 
remained largely the same and were used as such by the Monitoring and Appraisal 
Cell to accept or reject cluster and site proposals by the Department of Irrigation 
Even when the review/support mission recommended adjustment of the cluster-
selection criteria in December 1990 in order to increase attention to the rehabilitation 
of old tubewells, the Netherlands rejected this on the ground that they wanted to 
'avoid a drift towards complete confusion' (J Vos and J G van Alphen 1990 7-10) 
88 Internal Communication, 17-7-1989 Originally this percentage was set at 20%, 
but the existing irrigation situation in the project area made an adjustment necessary 
89 The 0 65 hectare criterion was aimed at insuring the reach of small and marginal 
farmers The other 12 tubewell sites before June 1992 did not meet technical criteria 
and the Monitoring and Appraisal Cell had already in 1989 proposed the inclusion of 
other districts and/or adjustment of the targets for construction in the ten distnets 
and/or greater attention to modernisation and improvement of old tubewells 
90 Monitonng and Appraisal Cell 1990 8 
91 J Vos and J G van Alphen 1990 7 
92 Monitoring and Appraisal Cell 1990a 22-23 (Annexure II) 
93 Interview Monitoring and Appraisal Cell, Lucknow, January 1994 
94 Internal Communication, 20-4-1990 
95 Monitoring and Appraisal Cell 1990b 14-15 It is noted that 'many tubewells 
indicated as energised are not properly connected by independent feeder lines' and 
that (technical) monitoring within the project is needed That tubewells are declared 
operational without all field channels being constructed is particularly troublesome in 
light of the fact that this was already recognised by the Indian government as one of 
the major problems in utilisation of the created irrigation potential (also see section 
5 1 above) 
96 Euroconsult 1991 4 
97 Interview Monitoring and Appraisal Cell, Lucknow, January 1994 The original 
target of 750 new tubewells was adjusted to 547 in the course of implementation 
98 According to the DHV consultant responsible for the Uttar Pradesh Tubewell 
Project, only 20% of the systems functioned well (Interview DHV, Amersfoort, 26-
8-1993) 
99 Some of the farmers within the Indo-Dutch Tubewell Project also restrict 
themselves to subsistence farming (Interview Monitonng and Appraisal Cell, 
Lucknow, January 1994) 
100 Internal Communication, 4-12-1992 
101 Each tubewell cluster includes an average of nearly 20 tubewells while the 
target was set at 20-30 tubewells per cluster In practice, the number of tubewells 
per cluster ranges between 5 and 32 
Notes 361 
102 Ю 1992 33 
103 ETC 1987 18 
104 In the cluster Lambhua, all 25 of the tubewells had more than 1,000 running 
hours In the cluster Urwa II, all six of the tubewells fell within the 100-500 hour 
range In the cluster Akhandnagar in district Sultanpur which served as the trial area 
for the activities of the Farmers Participation Unit from the end of 1991 onwards, 
the 18 tubewells are situated in the middle range with 13 of the tubewells in this 
cluster having between 500 and 1,500 running hours during the winter of 1992-1993 
105 Euroconsult 1991 4 
106 ETC 1987 17 Taking a 'switching value' or 'break-even-point' of 1,610 hours, 
it can be observed that less than 25% of the tubewells constructed under the Dutch 
projects surpass this point 
107 Completed was, for instance, a benchmark survey which was to provide an 
overview of the present farming practices A water-market study was also completed 
by the Monitoring and Appraisal Cell while the constraint analysis (which had 
replaced the initially anticipated agro-economic survey) was nearing completion A 
water management study by the Narendra Deva University of Agriculture and 
Technology, Faizabad, was still under way 
108 'No need is envisaged to provide for additional support in terms of agricultural 
extension services to the programme' (ETC 1987a 16) 
109 Monitoring and Appraisal Cell 1992 10-15 
110 This follow-up proposal consisted of a consolidation phase for the Women 
Extension Workers programme This programme was presented as a pilot activity 'as 
it [was] the first time in Uttar Pradesh that women are active in the field of 
agricultural extension and live in villages other than their own' and was considered 
not only of major importance but also effective The Women Extension Workers 
were fully accepted and well-respected by the village communities, and they were 
also considered dedicated and well-performing Nevertheless, they still needed 
further guidance and upgrading, especially in the field of group formation and 
management, gender issues, extension technics, and income generating activities' 
(Monitoring and Appraisal Cell 1991) 
111 Momtonng and Appraisal Cell 1990c Basically the task of the Women 
Extension Workers within the project is twofold 'on the one hand they will act as 
implementors of agricultural activities as this component is their formal task On the 
other hand, they will play the role of facilitators for women welfare activities 
bringing the women farmers into contact with the relevant development agencies 
and/or specialists needed' (Monitoring and Appraisal Cell 1991a) 
112 Networking with other development agencies/projects was considered essential, 
particularly at the block and district levels The role of the extension workers is 
comparable to the role of the PSU in the dnnking-water projects in Uttar Pradesh 
(see Chapter 4) 
113 ETC 1987a 6, 11 
114. J Vos and J G van Alphen 1990 10 
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115 ETC 1987a 26 The Plan of Operations set out by the Dutch consultancy firm 
ETC in March 1987 goes no further than noting that the farmers will form 
committees with the assistance of the Irrigation Department That these committees 
are dominated by the bigger and more influential farmers and that small farmers 
therefore receive insufficient water is taken into consideration nowhere (cf 
evaluations of World Bank projects on this issue) 
116 Monitoring and Appraisal Cell 1990b 
117 The main tasks of the Tubewell Management Committee as described by the 
Department of Irrigation are '(1) will tell farmers about working of tubewell, (2) 
will meet officials and will watch the ongoing work and inform the officers for right 
situation, (3) consent and cooperation is required in forming of osrabandi and 
cooperating to each other, (4) if hindrance is created by any farmer regarding the 
construction of tubewell then committee will also cooperate in finding solution so 
that progress of work will not be suffered, (5) the period of tubewell management 
committee will be for 3 years After that it will be reelected' (Monitoring and 
Appraisal Mission 1990b Annexure 4) 
118 Monitoring and Appraisal Cell 1990b Annexure 4 After acknowledging that 
'presently the work of the state tubewells and their distribution system is being 
implemented on mostly technical grounds' and that 'some difficulties were 
experienced in implementation,' it is concluded that 'it is important to have farmers 
co-operation who are going to be benefitted, so that shortcomings, which may arise 
after completion, can be eradicated and to make the work more useful ' 
119 On the same day that the tubewell discharge is tested, the relevant Executive 
Engineer will visit the tubewell and elections will be held for the TMC Explanation 
concerning the tasks of this TMC is provided on exactly the same day This fact 
alone can be seen as a major contribution to TMCs being dominated by influential 
large farmers This is also despite the fact that the general guidelines prescribe that 
'at the time of election [ ] it should be ensured that members should belong to 
different economic community and classes' and 'special attention should be given to 
representation of farmers belonging to backward class and lower caste, from which it 
will be convenient to solve their problems ' One can, therefore, wonder whether it is 
appropriate to speak of "elections" or whether the term "selection" is more in place 
With regard to the fixation of the outlets (which is seen as the second stage of 
participation), it is the intention that the officials from the Department of Irrigation 
visit the tubewell area and, m discussion with concerned farmers, select the places 
for outlets These outlets will then be constructed by a contractor hired by the 
department The outlets form an important part of the distribution system for each 
tubewell command area According to the technical design, each outlet valve will 
serve about five hectares (or, with an average holding size of 0 65 hectares, around 
7-8 farmers) 
120 Internal Communication, 4-4-1991 
121 A point already evident from the interpretation of the concept of participation 
by the department itself In its "withdrawal report," the Dutch consultancy firm 
Euroconsult (1991 6-7) remarks that although the Department of Irrigation gradually 
became more willing to involve farmers in the planning of, for instance, outlet 
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locations, 'there is a limit to what can be expected of the mechanical engineer.' This 
picture is confirmed by the Monitoring and Appraisal Cell (interview, Lucknow, 
January 1994) when they state that it took ten years for the relevant Indian 
authorities to be partially convinced of the necessity of participation. It was 
immediately added that this opinion is still not shared at all levels within these 
authorities and particularly at the Field level. 
122. This specific cluster was selected because most of the tubewells were still 
under construction and 'the Department of Irrigation had only (s)elected a few 
Tubewell Management Committees' (Monitoring and Appraisal Cell 1992a: 19-20). 
123. Monitoring and Appraisal Cell 1992. 
124. Monitoring and Appraisal Cell 1992a: 19-20. Despite two 'advertisements in 
the main national papers, no suitable candidate applied for the position of Farmers 
Participation Expert.' 
125. Internal Communication, 23-9-1992. The report substantiates the last argument 
by stating that water is provided free of cost and that in such cases the (relatively) 
stronger tend to profit the most. 
126. Interview Monitoring and Appraisal Cell, Lucknow, January 1994. 
127. This is not only because of the comparatively high investment costs, but also 
because it is the only project in which the construction of relatively large irrigation 
facilities formed the major activity. The reasons for the Netherlands to sanction this 
project were primarily political. Not only had India asked for support in 1984 and 
considered the project important, the Dutch also wanted to become more involved in 
agriculture. The relations with the Ministry of Water Resources also offered 
opportunities for cooperation. The problems in building up a project pipeline may 
also have contributed to the decision to sanction this tubewell project, as did the 
observation of the Claus mission in the early 1980s that insufficient activities were 
undertaken in the field of irrigation (Interview P. Dieleman, Heelsum, 23-4-1992). P. 
Dieleman, who was part of the team which evaluated the Dutch aid to India for 
DGIS, added that the 'spending pressure' at DGIS may also be regarded as a reason 
for sanctioning this large project. Finally, the fact that this project would follow-up 
on two World Bank projects was considered important: it 'meets the need for donor 
coordination and is easily accepted in all quarters' (IOV 1992: 17). 
128. The Formulation Mission of 1987, however, found that there was no need to set 
up a special extension programme for the Dutch project, as there was an 'elaborate 
set-up' of the Training and Visit (T&V) system in the area. This was despite the fact 
that the functioning of this system was not known, while the UPDESCO evaluation 
showed extension as one of the "weak spots" in the first World Bank funded 
tubewell project (ETC 1987). 
129. The evaluation of this World Bank project showed, among other things, that the 
actual area irrigated by the new design tubewells was in most cases well below the 
target (see: UPDESCO 1985: 120). The impression of the Monitoring and Appraisal 
Cell (Interview, Lucknow, October 1993) is that yields have increased; there are no 
marketing problems for grains, sugarcane and rice, but marketing problems appear 
for new products. Quantitative data on these and other indicators of the impact of 
the project were not available at the time, however. 
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130. Internal Communication, 10-8-1994. 
131. Over the years, the Monitoring and Appraisal Cell, which was initially intended 
to provide technical support for the Department of Irrigation, assumed a more 
coordinating role with regard to the supporting activities. For DGIS, this Cell 
therefore 'contributed significantly to the quality and financial monitoring of the 
tubewells implementation programme' (Internal Communication, 15-3-1991). 
132. In this regard it should be pointed out that the Monitoring and Appraisal Cell 
had already recommended action to bring the project closer to the target group of 
small and marginal farmers in 1989. The Mid-Term Review Mission seemingly had 
more of an eye for the discrepancy between the construction of new tubewells and 
the rehabilitation of old ones. The lack of attention to these latter areas and the 
associated support/social areas basically continued during the implementation phase. 
Although the introduction of a Farmers Participation Unit during the first phase of 
the project may somewhat soften this critique, the slow and marginal implementation 
of such a unit can nevertheless be regarded as a clear example of the less than 
dynamic initiatives from the Dutch side. All of this does not mean that the 
Netherlands was blind to the problems encountered in the project. In the pilot project 
announced in 1993, the strategy was totally turned around and ultimately resulted in 
the decision to withdraw from the project after the pilot phase. 
133. Although the above shows the Women Extension Programme to have a 
relatively high impact, it is far too early to say anything conclusive. 
134. Internal Communication, 4-12-1992. 
135. DGIS 1993a: 1. More than half of the rural population in this region belongs to 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. With a total cultivable area of 484,000 
hectares, the average acreage per fanner amounts to 0.89 hectares (Primary Census 
Data 1991 (floppy); A. Bose 1991; and Euroconsult 1993). Major differences 
characterise the districts. In the district Darjeeling, the average cultivable area per 
farmer is 0.64 hectares while it is 0.95 hectares for Jalpaiguri and 0.87 for Cooch 
Behar. Marginal (up to 1 hectare) and small (between 1 and 2 hectares) farmers thus 
predominate in the region. In Jalpaiguri, for instance, more than 71% of the 
landholdings can be classified as marginal and nearly 19% as small. Together these 
holdings take up 46% of the total cultivable area. In the Siliguri block of Darjeeling 
district, small and marginal farmers constitute 90% of the fanning households which 
farm 68% of the area. In Cooch Behar, the percentage of marginal and small 
landholdings is 78, while they farm 73% of the cultivable area (Principal 
Agricultural Officer Darjeeling 1986: 6, Principal Agricultural Officer Jalpaiguri 
1991: 10 and Principal Agricultural Officer Cooch Behar 1990: 8. Figures refer to 
1981 census data). 
136. At the beginning of the 1990s, 53% of the irrigation in Jalpaiguri district, for 
instance, was by tubewells, tanks and river lifts. 
137. An agriculture identification mission in 1981 recommended that only a few 
more technically-oriented parts of the agricultural development programme be made 
eligible for financing by the Netherlands (i.e., soil conservation and additional 
irrigation) because the total budget far exceeded the 'possibilities of Dutch 
financing' (DGIS 1982: 32). This choice was consciously made because the 
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Netherlands wanted to enter into a relationship with the Ministry of Agriculture and 
had not previously implemented any programmes with this Ministry (Ρ H Streefland 
and Τ vd Zee 1988 13) 
138 Discussions on the involvement of Dutch experts in the programme, 
identification missions and formulation missions would take until 1984 The project 
was officially opened by the Chief Minister of West Bengal in March 1985 This 
was accompanied by substantial media coverage and the Dutch Embassy in New 
Delhi announced that it was their 'positive impression that the project - which had a 
too long preparation time - is now on the right track, with the necessary political 
backing and with major local interest' (Internal Communication, 29-3-1985) 
139 Agreed Minutes Annual Consultation 1985 The masterplan referred to Phase II 
and should contain detailed proposals for irrigation and soil conservation works 
140 Office of the Joint Director of Agriculture (Jalpaigun range) 1993 1 The 
proposal for Phase Π was drafted by an evaluation mission in March 1987 The side-
letter for the second phase was exchanged in July 1988 
141 Office of the Joint Director of Agriculture (Jalpaigun range) 1993 1 
According to the mid-term evaluation report of 1990 (DGIS/Govemment of West 
Bengal 1990 7), the general objective of the second phase ('to induce a better 
income for and a better income distribution among the marginal and the small 
farmers') is in line with the general objective of the West Bengal Ministry of 
Agriculture ('to increase agricultural productivity and to create social justice') With 
regard to the short-term objectives of the second phase in comparison with the short-
term objectives of the Ministry of Agriculture in West Bengal, it is stated that these 
are 'parallel or supplementary [ ] and [that] both will contribute to the long term 
objectives ' For the sake of completeness the short-term objectives of Phase II as 
mentioned by the mid-term evaluation mission are (1) implementation of irrigation 
facilities, (2) implementation of soil conservation and improvement works, (3) 
community participation and involvement of women, (4) training of beneficiaries and 
extension workers (locally) and of project staff (locally and abroad), (5) monitoring 
and research in order to make adjustments when required, and (6) a marketing study 
The short-term objectives of the West Bengal Ministry of Agriculture are reported to 
be (1) promote the applications of modem crop inputs, (2) increase the use of High 
Yielding Varieties, (3) stimulate multiple cropping, (4) extend the irrigation 
facilities, (5) improve irrigated agricultural practises, (6) improve the soils, and (7) 
stimulate credit and marketing facilities 
142 The mission which evaluated the first phase concluded, among other things, 
that 'community participation during the planning and operation and maintenance of 
irrigation schemes was inadequate during Phase I The publicity to potential 
beneficiaries of irrigation facilities was not sufficient and water users associations 
and committees were not functioning properly ' The mission further concluded that 
'underutihsation of the existing public irrigation schemes was obvious' and that the 
main factors causing these problems were inadequate community participation, 
coordination problems between water users and pump operators, shortage of 
extension workers and significant water losses (DGIS/Govemment of West Bengal 
1987) 
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143 IOV 1994a 231 
144 The Department of Soil Conservation is responsible for the implementation of 
soil-conservation and soil-improvement activities The Department of Agriculture is 
responsible for the installation of hand tubewells and shallow tubewells The 
Department of Minor Irrigation is responsible for river lift irrigation and deep 
tubewells 
145 DGIS 1993a 3 
146 An evaluation mission in 1993 noted delays in the selection of beneficiaries due 
to shortage of staff and delays in the construction of handpumps in particular due to 
price increases (DGIS 1993a 4) In October 1985, it was clear that the target of 
5,000 hand tubewells could not be reached due to price increases The target was 
therefore reduced to 1,850 In Phase I, for instance, hand tubewells turned out to be 
157% more expensive than planned In Phase II, all of the construction parts of the 
project turned out to be more expensive than anticipated, the price increases ranged 
from 3 5% for deep tubewells to nearly 100% for pump dugwells and 4-ha units 
The fact that the targets set for the different units within the project were by and 
large met suggests that increasing unit costs did not affect the financing of the 
project The Dfl-account was apparently large enough to cope with these changes 
together with the depreciation of the Indian rupee 
147 See Office of the Joint Director of Agriculture 1993 1-2, DGIS 1993 8, 
Euroconsult 1993 Bl and V As the 4-ha units were set up to insure the proper 
functioning of the larger facilities, (his calls to mind one of the problems of Indian 
major/medium irrigation for which the Command Area Programme was started in the 
1970s (also see section 5 1 above) 
148 Euroconsult 1986 
149 Nearly 47% of the Dfl 525,000 allocated under technical aid was meant to 
finance the monitoring contract with the Dutch organisation ILRI which is the 
backstopping agency for all irrigation projects financed by DGIS in India 
150 Technical aid originally amounted to Dfl 1,868,667 Certain budget posts were, 
however, cancelled in the years to follow while others were adjusted Together with 
the depreciation of the Indian rupee, this led to a reduced budget for technical aid 
151 It should be noted that the constant depreciation of the Indian rupee 
significantly contributed to more than half of the budget allocated under financial aid 
still being available in June 1993 The budget for the second phase expressed in 
rupees was set at Rs 114,542,508 The total expenditure under financial aid 
amounted to Rs 92,582,046 or nearly 81% of the budget Even after DGIS started 
subtracting a 15% tax component from the reimbursement claims under financial aid 
in July 1990, the total expenditure amounted to 91% The tax component does not 
play a role in the case of technical aid For the first phase, a total expenditure for 
irrigation facilities and 4-ha units was planned at Rs 154 8 million and the actual 
expenditure amounted to Rs 137 4 million or 89% At the beginning of 1985 (ι e at 
the start of Phase I) the rupee stood at Dfl 1 = Rs 4 17 At the end of Phase I, this 
had changed to Dfl 1 = Rs 6 71 
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152 The Findings are primarily derived from a small sample survey conducted in 
two of the hand-tubewell clusters in Haldiban block in the district of Cooch-Behar 
and Sihgun block in Darjeeling district In both blocks, (group) interviews were also 
held with pump-dugwell beneficiaries In the case of a hand tubewell, a total of 36 
individual interviews were conducted with beneficiary households In the case of a 
pump dugwell, group interviews were held with 15 beneficiary households 
153 The 'highest coverage from one H T W in one [agricultural] year is 0 484 ha 
(average),' according to a survey of 1,996 hand tubewells by the Department of 
Agriculture (see Office of the Joint Director of Agriculture (Jalpaigun range) 1993 
10-20) 
154 The total acreage irrigated by a pump dugwell depends first on the number of 
users, second on the proximity of the land to the well and third on the financial 
position of the farmers Irrigating more land also requires more investment, and at 
least one of the groups gave this as a reason for irrigating only 1 8 hectares of their 
total of 6 3 hectares 
155 When the number of farmers using the irrigation facility exceeds five, it seems 
justified to conclude that the remaining users are un-official users in the sense that 
they have usually not contributed to the construction of the facility and are simply 
allowed to utilise the facility (at a price) 
156 According to the 1993 Evaluation Mission, 'community participation has been 
limited to creating beneficiary committees with a (somewhat vague) responsibility 
primarily in respect of water distribution' (DGIS 1993a 20) 
157 Office of the Joint Director of Agriculture (Jalpaigun range) 1993 10-20 
158 DGIS 1993a 9-10 
159 Taking the target number of beneficiaries as the point of departure, the unit cost 
per HTW is Rs 3,544 and a few rupees more per PDW The other facilities 
constructed as part of the North Bengal Terai project are (much) more expensive per 
beneficiary STW - Rs 3,770, DTW - 10,970, and RLI - 10,950 Per hectare (again 
taking the planned Command Areas as point of departure), the investment costs for 
HTWs come to nearly Rs 21,000 while these are less than Rs 6,000 for PDWs, Rs 
4,700 for STWs, Rs 13,711 for DTWs and Rs 13,690 for RLI 
160 DGIS 1993a 10 
161 Euroconsult 1993 С 8 (Table С 2a HTW given to female farmers) 
162 One-third of the farmers still appear to use the old sources which are open 
dugwells in most cases There is also at least one government handpump still in use 
Using the handpump for drinking water and other household requirements is not in 
all cases possible year-round Some of the beneficiaries (14% in the survey) 
dismantle the pump when it is not needed for irrigation (ι e , in the khanf-season) 
There is a simple explanation for this fear that the pump or parts of it will be 
stolen In many cases, the beneficiaries were seen to literally chain their pump down 
These protective measures not only indicate the value attached to the pump by the 
beneficiaries but also the favourable (black) market value of the pump 
163 According to a report on 'the economics of irrigation' by Euroconsult (1993a), 
the annual costs for operation and maintenance are the highest for river lift irrigation 
368 The same difference 
schemes, followed by deep tubewells Expressed per hectare, however, the O&M 
costs for hand tubewells nearly equal those for nver lift irrigation and are even 
higher than those for deep tubewells The shallow tubewell scores the highest which 
is also the case when the O&M costs are expressed per beneficiary From the 
perspective of the government, the river lift irrigation and deep tubewells are clearly 
the most expansive facilities simply because the other three facilities are operated 
and maintained by the beneficiaries themselves Management of the large schemes is 
also difficult because of the large number of farmers involved and the fact that the 
'low cost to the farmers that the present system of fixed water rates imply offer no 
incentive for the beneficiaries to take over the effective responsibilities for the 
schemes' (DGIS 1993a Appendix VII, 12) 
164 DGIS 1993a 10-11 
165 The survey of 1,996 hand tubewells conducted by the Department of 
Agriculture during 1992 shows these irrigation facilities to first be used for 
vegetables and chilles and second for paddy and the raising of paddy seedlings The 
third crop for which a large number of hand tubewells have been used was wheat 
The production of vegetables and paddy (in this case winter or boro rice) has 
increased over the period 1984/85-1992/93 According to information from the 
Department of Agriculture, winter or rabí vegetable production increased by 62%, 
23% and 129% for Jalpaigun, Cooch Behar and Sihgun subdivision of Darjeeling 
district, respectively However, it should be noted that the area brought under these 
winter vegetables increased even more The growing of boro псе shows the greatest 
increase because it is virtually impossible to grow without irrigation The increase of 
823% in Jalpaigun and 5,288% in Cooch Behar can also, therefore, be attributed to 
an increase in the irrigation potential in these areas Nevertheless, the areas brought 
under boro rice in the two districts increased by 748% and 914% over the same 
period which suggests that the increase in production is not only due to an increase 
in the area cultivated (see Office of the Joint Director of Agriculture (Jalpaigun 
range) 1993 16-18,31-45) 
166 Interview Directorate of Marketing, Jalpaigun, 4-1-1994 These facilities 
include cold storages, fruit processing facilities and improvement of 'bullock carts 
and van rickshaw for easy transportation' (Office of the Joint Director of Agriculture 
(Jalpaigun range) 1993 49) 
167 In 1992-93, there were 1,398 sale points for fertiliser within the project area 
and 515 for pesticides Most of these were in the largest district of Cooch Behar 
(718 fertiliser and 300 pesticides sale points) Over the period 1988/89 - 1992/93, 
there was an increase of 58% in the number of sale points for fertiliser in Jalpaigun 
district and 36% for pesticides In Cooch Behar and Sihgun subdivision of 
Darjeeling district, the number of fertiliser sale points increased by 132% and 342% 
respectively over the period 1984/85-1992/93, the figures for pesticides were 200% 
and 312% respectively These figures already indicate a substantial increase m the 
consumption of fertilisers and pesticides From 1984/85-1992/93, the total 
consumption of fertilisers increased by 76% in Jalpaigun district and by 363% in 
neighbouring Cooch Behar The consumption of pesticides increased over the same 
period by more than 300% in Sihgun subdivision and by 721% in Jalpaigun district 
(Office of the Joint Director of Agnculture (Jalpaigun range) 1993 4647) 
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168 The NGDO originally engaged for the training component managed to train a 
total of 1,636 people over the period May 1989 to February 1991 Of these, 77% 
were farmers and the remaining 23% were formed by either government extension 
workers, operators of river lift irrigation and deep tubewells or other public servants 
Of the 1,254 farmers trained by the NGDO, 142 were beneficiaries of either river lift 
irrigation or deep tubewells, 888 were beneficiaries of a hand tubewell and the 
remaining 224 were women beneficiaries Over the period November 1992 to May 
1993, the Department of Agriculture trained a total of 192 farmers with 13% 
women The target was 750 farmers with 20% women (Office of the Joint Director 
of Agriculture (Jalpaigun range) 1993 8) 
169 This means that key cultivators should be identified in the villages to 
disseminate the message to others 
170 Not only because of its emphasis on the poor but also because of the objectives 
of expanding the irrigation potential and improving the organisation of water 
management and water distribution (Internal Communication, 14-9-1988) 
171 DGIS 1993a 11 
172 This in contrast to, for instance, the Tubewell project in Uttar Pradesh or the 
drinking-water project in Andhra Pradesh 
173 These data come primarily from a baseline survey conducted in 1989-90 On 
the basis of this information, 283 families spread over the project area and different 
irrigation facilities were selected for further study (243 direct beneficiaries and 40 
landless labourers) These families were interviewed three times per year over the 
period 1990-91 to 1992-93 The findings of this long-term survey were then 
presented in 1994 
174 The 1993 evaluation mission observes that 'in an area where an estimated 85% 
of all cultivating households are small and marginal farmers it would indeed be 
surprising if they did not dominate the beneficiary statistics as well' (DGIS 1993a 
18) The same holds for beneficiaries belonging to the Scheduled Castes or Tribes 
(to which at least 50% of the beneficiaries should belong) Considering the fact that 
more than half of the population in the project area belongs to one of these two 
groups, it should not come as a surprise either when they dominate the beneficiary 
statistics 
175 For an extensive description of the CRD programme, see L Schulpen 1994a 
176 CRD 1993 4 
177 Over the last 40 years, many so-called Poverty Alleviation Programmes (PAPs) 
have been initiated and developed by the Indian authorities The major premise of 
these programmes and schemes 'is that benefits will flow to the [ ] weaker section 
because of the specificity of the target group and activity chosen' (N Banerjee 1990 
64) In the case of CRD funds for economic activities, these are mainly tapped from 
the following departments or programmes Scheduled Caste corporation (land 
development, community irrigation wells, pump sets/oil engines, fishing equipment 
and fishing tanks), Minor Irrigation Department (community irrigation wells), Social 
Forestry Department (agro-forestry), Sericulture Department (sericulture), District 
Rural Development Agency (land development, community irrigation wells, 
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pumpsets/oil engines, fishing equipment, fishing tanks), the Integrated Rural 
Development Programme (agricultural implements, plough bullocks, bullock carts, 
milch animals, calf rearing, piggery, rams/lambs/goats, poultry, duck farming, sewing 
machines, cycle shop/welding centre, rickshaws/horse carts, mike sets, petty 
business), CAPART (housing, community centres, streetlights, drinking water), Rural 
Permanent Housing scheme (housing), Indira Awas Yojana (housing), District 
Development Office/Panchayati Raj (community centre, streetlights, drinking water, 
primary schools) and TRYSEM (chapel making, weavenng, artisans training) The 
specific activities represent the major economic activities undertaken under the aegis 
of the CRD programme 
178 In 108 communities, the target group consists of a single social class, in 27 
communities, the target group consists of two different classes, and in seven 
communities, all three classes are represented 
179 The Chowdavaram and Rajupalem areas are clearly the most important areas as 
far as the number of communities, number of activities and duration of CRD 
intervention are concerned Pittalavanipalem area only became part of the CRD 
programme in 1990 during the emergency-situation in the coastal areas of Guntur 
district The term 'communities' is used here instead of 'village' as the CRD target 
groups consist of specific segments of the villages Several CRD communities may 
be distinguished within a single village or Gram Sabha In the Gram Sabha 
Kattamuru in Rajupalem, for instance, three such CRD communities exist (ι e, 
Kattamuru I, II and III) The existence of 142 target communities obscures as of 
March 1993 the fact that several more communities have been part of the CRD 
programme in the past These communities have been dropped, mainly because they 
showed insufficient willingness to take up their own development and search for 
solutions to their problems In the period March 1991-March 1993, a total of six 
communities were dropped in Pittalavanipalem area for this reason, two in 
Rajupalem and none in Chowdavaram 
180 There is a clear correlation between the growth in the number of communities 
and the projects sanctioned by ICCO In 1983, when ICCO sanctioned the first CRD 
project, the number of communities increased by eight, in 1986 with the second 
ICCO project, the number of communities increased by twelve, in 1990, three 
different emergency projects were agreed upon with ICCO and the number of 
communities increased by 30 
181 The communities do not necessarily go through all three phases in the CRD 
intervention cycle Particularly in more recent years, some of the communities have 
become active straight away because of previous exposure to the CRD programme 
and its strategy through neighbouring communities already included in the 
programme 
182 The criteria used by CRD to distinguish between the three phases are 
impossible to quantify The ability of the community to 'take up their own 
development' without constant guidance from the organisation is basically the main 
criterion This criterion indicates a change in the thinking of the people (and 
especially the leaders elected by the community) Although many of the CRD 
activities are related to what one could term economic development, the economic 
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development of the people is not a criterion for distinguishing between the three 
phases. The number of economic activities undertaken in the communities in the 
active phase generally does not differ significantly from the number of activities 
undertaken in the autonomous communities. Autonomous communities may still be 
economically backward although they created additional economic possibilities 
during the active phase. The main criterion for distinguishing the three phases (and 
especially between the active and autonomous phases) is 'a change of mind.' This 
makes the use of time as a criterion difficult; nevertheless, it generally takes a 
community 5-6 years from the first contact with the CRD programme to reach the 
autonomous phase. The amount of time clearly varies and has declined considerably 
since 1985-86 which can be seen as a breakpoint. In 1985-86, the CRD programme 
was in its sixth year and obviously started to become more known among the 
communities in the CRD working areas. Communities started to approach CRD for 
inclusion in the programme, and the main reason for their quicker attainment of 
autonomy seems to be exposure to the developments under the programme in 
neighbouring communities. 
183. The animator and the health worker-cum-women guide also play a central role 
(at the village and area level). Both are payed for their services to the community. 
This payment is initially carried by CRD but taken over by the community once that 
community has reached the autonomous phase. The payments are then provided by 
the community fund which has been established. The animator is paid up to Rs. 250 
per month depending on the time spent on the programme. The maximum pay for 
the health worker-cum-women guide is less at around Rs. 150, as she normally 
spends less time to her duties. 
184. In the community committee, at least three of the seven members must be 
women. Up to now, no woman has been elected president of this committee 
although women have been elected vice-president. 
185. Women groups are encouraged to initiate saving schemes which can then be 
used as a revolving fund among the members. The community fund is set up in 
every community, gets its money from a 10% contribution from the beneficiaries of 
the different activities and also a contribution from CRD. The community fund is 
not in principle a revolving fund. The community fund can be used, rather, as 
collateral for securing bank loans for various development activities. In some cases, 
the autonomous communities may use this fund to pay the local animator and 
women worker. 
186. Legal assistance may, for instance, be offered with regard to crop loans which 
are often refused. This frequently happens when the farmland is not the property of 
the farmer although one need not be - according to Indian laws — the rightful owner 
of the land in order to be eligible for crop loans. 
187. A total of 24 communities have received CRD assistance for one well; 21 for 
two wells; three for three wells; five for four wells each; and one community for 
eight wells. 
188. The 'crude education rate' refers to the percentage of women, including those 
below the age of seven with at least two years of education. 
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189 The farming households which have not benefitted from the support of CRD in 
the field of irrigation own on average 1 42 acres as opposed to 1 94 acres for the 
beneficiary households Furthermore, a total of 94 5% of the beneficiary households 
owns land while this percentage is 70 6% for the other farming households 
190 Of the 100 farmers using an irrigation facility, 19% still see the availability of 
water as a problem for agricultural production For those benefitting from the CRD 
programme in the field of irrigation, this percentage is even slightly higher (ι e , 
21%) 
191 Whereas all of the farmers using HYV seeds also use fertilisers and pesticides, 
only 66% of them utilise an irrigation facility (and thus a theoretically assured water 
supply) 
192 Extensive field research was conducted in neither cases The data collected 
during discussions with the staffs of the Rural Development Trust (RDT) and Action 
for Integrated Rural Development Society (AIRDS) and during visits to the target 
villages will therefore be supplemented Both organisations were part of the 
programme evaluation on sustainable land use conducted by ICCO and DGIS in 
1992, for example 
193 Anantapur is a predominantly agricultural district with nearly 85% of the rural 
population depending foremost on their work as farmers (41 6%) or agricultural 
labourers (43 3%) This is not to say that agriculture provides sufficient 'yields to 
survive on ' Not only do the farmers 'earn additional income from casual 
agricultural labour,' but 'men also seasonally migrate to other places' (ICCO/DGIS 
1991a 1) The job opportunities outside agriculture are restricted The 15% of the 
rural working population not directly depending on agriculture is mainly active in 
the fields of 'other services' (4 6%), 'trade and commerce' (2 7%) and 'manufacture 
and production in house hold industry' (2 2%) Almost 20% of the population 
consists of Scheduled Castes and Tribes which form the 'natural target groups' of 
RDT 
194 In the 1980s, the Rural Development Trust got into some troubles with its 
FCRA number which is obligatory for any organisation in India wanting to receive 
foreign assistance Three new organisations were then set up in order to overcome 
these troubles The first is known as the Women Development Trust which is 
officially the implementing organisation for the Community Development 
Programme The second is known as Acción Fraterna which is the official 
implementing NGDO for the Eco-Employment Programme The third is known as 
'Boy's town' which is a 'sleeping' NGDO These organisations are merely other 
names for the Rural Development Trust which is in reality is the implementing 
organisation for the programmes mentioned 
195 E Jordans 1991 45 
196 Data presented on this Community Development Programme were collected 
from the internal administration of RDT, progress reports from the Women 
Development Trust to Aide et Action over the period 1989-1991, progress reports to 
Action Aid over the period July 1990-June 1991 and interviews with RDT staff 
members (area directors, teachers and other cluster staff) 
197 M Robinson and E S Sampalh Kumar 1991 2 
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198 Disputes in the community may also interfere with the functioning of the 
sanghams This is the case in Diguva Thanda where the male sangham officially 
exists but is not in practice due to a quarrel over land between two factions in the 
community According to the RDT coordinator, the people in this community have 
gained individually from the programmes of the NGDO but not as a group 
(Interview RDT, 28-7-1992) During group interviews with staff members from two 
community clusters in two different areas (AA 2 and AeA 1), this picture was 
confirmed Although the staff members are convinced that the awareness level m the 
communities has increased, they do not regard these communities as self-reliant 'To 
a certain extent successful' is probably the best description The interviews also 
showed people to be far more willing to participate in economic programmes than in 
social ones 'This accounts for 90% of the villages,' according to one of the field 
staff members in the Damodar cluster in the AA 2 area (Group interviews, staff 
members RDT, 26-6-1992 and 27-6-1992) 
199 A point confirmed by the ICCO/DGIS programme evaluation (1991a 12-13) It 
is stated that the causes for 'low potential for off-farm employment and no access to 
the more productive lands for target families' (for instance, sangham members who 
do not participate sufficiently in planning of programmes supported by RDT or the 
government, insufficient pressure on government services due to the lack of claim-
making power) 'can be ascribed to still insufficiently strengthened and consolidated 
village sanghams ' Factors contributing to this are '(1) insufficient self-confidence 
among target communities in their own capacity of solving their own problems, (2) 
inadequate leadership at their own level, and (3) insufficient means and skills of 
Acción Fraterna staff at different levels to consolidate sanghams and, in some 
sections (mainly at the lower levels) of Acción Fraterna, low levels of initiative ' 
200 M Robinson and E S Sampath Kumar 1991 2 and 9 
201 All these activities are meant to preserve water and control erosion Contour 
bunds, the main activity under the programme serve as miniature percolation tanks 
in the sense that water running downstream is halted and time thereby provided for 
the water to percolate into the ground This activity should be accompanied by such 
measures as ploughing and sowing across the slope In the experience of RDT, the 
main problem is to convince fanners of the necessity of such agricultural practices 
Awareness-building and education therefore form the central issue This is also the 
case with regard to the planting of trees in order to control erosion and preserve 
water. It takes a long time for the members of the target group to 'reap the fruits' of 
these trees Finally, checkdams and percolation tanks (like contour bunding on a 
small scale) halt the flow of water and thereby provide time for it to percolate into 
the ground and thus raise the ground-water level downstream The farmers 
downstream will benefit from irrigation wells carrying more water or raised ground-
water levels making rainfed agriculture more feasible 
202 With the drought situation confronting Anantapur district in the mid-1980s, 
another dimension was added to the RDT programme and thus to the long-term 
objective of the organisation It was realised that in order to 'assist the poorest 
communities in fighting against the causes of their poverty and to bring about self-
reliance and self-support in their social and economic conditions,' it was imperative 
that 'a high level of awareness [be created] among the people about the continuing 
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and impeding ecological and environmental disaster and to motivate them to 
conserve the nature as much as they utilize it' (ICCO 1991c 3-4) In this document, 
the short-term objectives are divided into (1) ecological objectives (eg, prevention 
of soil erosion, conservation of moisture, promotion of water-harvesting structures 
and farm forestry) and (2) social and process objectives (e g, increasing ecological 
awareness, mobilisation of groups, organisation of mixed-labour groups, promotion 
of savings and credit facilities, active involvement of women, and consolidation and 
strengthening of the bargaining capacity of the sanghams in their relation with the 
middle-class fanners) 
203 Within the Eco-Employment Programme, different groups are currently being 
set up These range from watershed-development groups m which all castes and 
classes are represented to labour groups mainly restricted to the principal target 
group 
204 Rural Development Trust 1986 2 'Each irrigation well on an average provided 
assured irrigation tor about two acres of land ' 
205 This was also prompted by the realisation that 'many poor farmers failed to 
benefit from the irrigation programmes of the early 1970s' (M Robinson and E S 
Sampath Kumar 1991 8-9) The new focus on group organisation and the social 
aspects of poverty nevertheless met with several problems For one, 'It took almost 
one year to convince people that we were no longer in that business [ι e, irrigation -
LS], and all help in that respect should come from the Banks and Government 
assistance In the process the farmers were disappointed and [the newly enlisted 
Community Organisers] frustrated' (RDT 1986 2-5) 
206 Interview RDT, Anantapur, 29-7-1992 This is not to say that the target group 
does not own or utilise irrigation facilities Of the total population of 567 families in 
the eight target communities in Damodar cluster of AA-2 area, for instance, 12% 
own or utilise an irrigation facility (Group interview field staff Damodar cluster, 26-
6-1992) 
207 Rural Development Trust 1986 5 
208 Interview RDT, 28-6-1992 Funds from the government (and banks) are mainly 
used, but RDT also uses its own funds to match these grants or as a collateral for 
bank loans Strengthening and deepening of the wells are still part of the RDT 
activities but certainly not to the extent known previously 
209 Richer farmers who, by definition, do not belong to the principal target group 
can only participate in the watershed development activities and are excluded from 
the other activities undertaken by the organisation The current opinion of RDT — 
namely that the target groups 'by now have become strong enough and are able to 
participate with the rich farmers in a committee and will not be overruled' — can be 
doubted on the basis of the outcome of an ODI evaluation which showed that the 
strength of the target group committees was still below the target (see E Jordans 
1991 46-47) Individual and group interviews held with members of the target group 
in four communities showed all members to have 'benefitted' from at least one of 
the activities implemented under either the Community Development Programme or 
the Eco-Employment Programme Long lists of beneficial activities were mentioned 
in these interviews which further showed that (1) farmers have generally made more 
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use from activities than the landless, and (2) Scheduled Tribes have generally made 
more use of the RDT activities than Scheduled Castes According to the staff of 
RDT, tnbals are more 'enterprising' and have a stronger history of cooperation. 
Scheduled Castes are economically and socially more backward mainly because of 
greater exploitation and oppression This difference can also be seen in the reactions 
of the two groups to the withdrawal of RDT Whereas the majority of the tnbals did 
not really object, the resistance among the hanjans was much greater 
210 Mahbubnagar distnct is, despite the closeness of the state capital Hyderabad, 
one of the more backward districts in the state Slightly more than 85% of the rural 
working population is active primarily as a cultivator (41 8%) or an agricultural 
labourer (43 6%) This indicates that jobs outside agriculture are hard to come by in 
the district (Primary Census Data 1991 (floppy)) 
211 Interview staff members AIRDS, Shadnagar, June 1992 
212 In the Scheduled-Caste and Backward-Caste communities of Thummalapally, 
for instance, adult literacy classes were started after the official withdrawal of 
AIRDS The willingness of the people was previously insufficient for these classes 
213 The provision of drinking-water facilities is included under health which is 
taken as an entry point By providing assistance in the field of health, the 
communities should become more receptive to activities related to education, 
awareness and organisation 
214 Prior to 1984, AIRDS worked through the existing Gram Panchayat structure in 
the villages As these official political structures were dominated by the higher 
castes and AIRDS was put under pressure of providing mamly economic input, the 
NGDO found it necessary to create separate structures for the Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes (Interview director AIRDS, Shadnagar, 22-7-1992) It is interesting 
to note that the existing power structure in the communities is taken as the point of 
departure in the creation of these separate structures This is especially clear in the 
case of Scheduled Tribes which constituted the majority in the 50 communities taken 
up under the programme up to 1991 Under Scheduled Tribes, the traditional 
leadership is m the hands of a so-called пай In the village committee (or male 
committee) set up under the programme, these naiks again became the leaders In a 
1989 evaluation report (D Manti 1989), the use of these traditional leaders was 
warned against 'They are leaders, generally, because they dominate and own the 
majority of the assets They are never neutral and always try to protect their own 
position in the society These leaders have close contact with the leadership of the 
main village and try to involve the target group into the village politics and convert 
them into an extension of the main village ' It can thus be argued that AIRDS does 
not succeed in creating separate organisations and thus increased possibilities for 
participation 
215 Besides the core programme discussed above, AIRDS is also involved in some 
other activities In four other mandais in Mahbubnagar district, the NGDO is 
implementing a biogas programme at the instigation of the government Although 
ideas have been offered to include these areas under the core programme, nothing 
had been done in this regard up to 1992 Since 1992, AIRDS is also involved in a 
drinking-water project financed by DGIS in three mandais in the southern part of the 
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Mahbubnagar district In this project which is part of AP-II, AIRDS is responsible 
for the so-called 'software-part' (1 e , health education and community participation) 
AIRDS further runs a 'ladies training-cum-crafts centre' in which young women are 
educated in the fields of, for instance, needle work, housekeeping, cultural activities, 
gardening, agriculture, dairy and biogas with the aim of acting as an example in 
their respective communities At the same time, the training centre aims at 
enhancing self-employment opportunities for these women Finally, in Guntur 
district, the NGDO was involved in a cyclone relief and rehabilitation project in 
1991 
216 Also see, D Manti 1989 AIRDS strongly objected to this evaluation report by 
stating that the manner in which the evaluation was performed was prejudiced and 
inadequate This evaluation report was the basis for the ICCO decision to grant a 
one-year project to AIRDS in 1989 in order to reflect upon the evaluation In 1990, 
this was followed by a consolidation phase of another six months as 'AIRDS had 
not yet reacted to the evaluation' (Internal Communication, 1990) 
217 The distribution across the various years clearly shows the availability of ICCO 
grants to largely determine the loan possibilities The majority of the AIRDS loans 
were provided in the years 1984, 1986 and 1988 when new projects were sanctioned 
by ICCO 
218 Three repayments on the same loan are taken as three separate repayments 
This means that the beneficiaries have lived up to their obligation of repaying on 
even less than 73 of the outstanding loans Over the given period, a total of Rs 2 9 
million was loaned, repayments had amounted to only Rs 0 8 million by April 1991 
On average, each loan was for almost Rs 11,700 The loans were not equally 
distributed among the 50 target communities In effect, the 247 loans were provided 
to members of the target group in 34 communities The distribution across these 
communities is also unequal While each village received an average of six loans, 
the number of loans per village actually ranged between 1 and 43 Finally, within 
the communities themselves the distribution of the loans raises questions concerning 
the selection criteria for the beneficiaries A total of 253 loans was provided to 220 
beneficiaries The majority of the beneficiaries thus received one loan while some 
members of the target group received two or three consecutive loans and one 
beneficiary even received four loans from AIRDS 
219 The funds provided by ICCO for irrigation purposes are used by AIRDS to 
credit a bank account on behalf of the farmer AIRDS receives 7% interest on this 
account 'The farmer may draw on this account for paying (hired or own) labour 
inputs (which account for 60% of the total cost) and other construction costs The 
total amount drawn from the bank by the farmer is thus a bank loan on which the 
farmer should have paid, without the mediation of AIRDS, an interest rate of 11 % 
over a period of 5 to 10 years However, the 7% interest received from the bank on 
the credit account of AIRDS is used to cover part of the interest to be paid by the 
fanner The farmer, therefore, has to pay only the remaining 4% Basically the only 
financial assistance by AIRDS to the farmer consists of a subsidy on the interest 
payments in the case of a total loan of Rs 30,000 - this amounts to about Rs 
1,200- ' A single well costs an average of Rs 25,000 to Rs 30,000 Besides this 
financial assistance, AIRDS also provides technical assistance in the form of 
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supervision of well construction and the rental of machines (maintained by AIRDS) 
for the digging and deepening of wells to farmers (ICCO/DGIS 1991b: 8-9). 
220. ICCO/DGIS 1991b: 8. 
221. The impression of the 1991 ICCO/DGIS evaluation team was that the irrigation 
programme was 'rather oriented towards joint families than towards communities' 
(ICCO/DGIS 1991b: 9). This impression is in line with the relative weakness of the 
village committees as the principal decision-making structure with regard to, for 
instance, the selection of beneficiaries for the well programme. Furthermore, 47 of 
the wells are owned by members of Scheduled Castes and the remaining 59 by 
Scheduled Tribes. 
222. ICCO/DGIS 1991b: 10. 
223. One can think of activities in the fields of soil and water conservation and tree 
planting but also in the fields of rainfed cultivation and education with regard to 
agricultural and environmental issues. 
224. The case of drinking water is indicative in this regard. AIRDS has assisted in 
the installation of drinking-water borewells in 47 villages. These borewells have 
mainly served as entry points, however (i.e., to make people more receptive of other 
activities). Many of these borewells are no longer in working order as no attention 
has been paid by either AIRDS or the committees to operation and maintenance. 
225. IOV 1992: 33. 
226. No distinction is made here between new, improved or modernised tubewells. 
In reality, the costs differ substantially between the tubewells depending on whether 
they were newly constructed, improved or modernised. 
227. This figure is only an indication. Considering the fact that 15 running hours per 
day are necessary to irrigate an area of 100 hectares, the data available with regard 
to running hours for the 535 new tubewells over a six month period show the 
possible number of irrigated hectares to range from 4 hectares to 80 hectares per 
tubewell, with an average of 45 hectares. 
228. DGIS 1993a: 9-10. 
Notes Conclusions 
1 Ρ Hoebink 1988 225 
2 Rough calculations show total disbursements of slightly more than Dfl 1 billion 
for poverty alleviation over the period 1974 to 1992 and an average of Dfl 1 40 per 
person for the entire period or Dfl 0 07 per Indian per year 
3 DGIS 1990 310-311 
4 R S Snvastava 1997 5 This figure shows the cumulative number of people 
living below the poverty line for the states of Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Maha­
rashtra, West Bengal, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Kamataka, Kerala, 
Madhya Pradesh, Onssa, Punjab, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh 
5 D C Korten 1987 145-149 
6 This centralisation led one of the staff members from the DGIS India desk to state 
in connection with recent policy changes that 'there is only one policy-making 
organ [the Minister for Development Cooperation] Pronk' (Interview DGIS, 8-1-
1997) 
7 R Chambers 1995 30 
8 M Steifel and M Wolfe 1994 225 
9 UNDP 1993 24 
10 See, for example, GOM 1995a 
11 M Stiefel and M Wolfe 1994 206 
Annex 1 
Questionnaires ICCO counterparts India 
1 General questionnaire 
Part A Background of your organisation 
1 Name and address of the organisation 
2 Year of start of your organisation 19 
3 Present area of operation of your organisation (please indicate in which state(s) 
and in which distnct(s) your organisation is presently working) 
State(s) Distnct(s) 
4 Number of people and number of villages-cum-communities covered by your 
organisation over the years 
1988 1990 1992 
Target population 
Target-villages-cum-commumties 
5 Composition of the target group of your organisation (more than one answer is 
possible) 
О Scheduled Castes О Women 
О Scheduled Tnbes O Non-govemmental organisations 
О Economically Backward Classes О Others, namely 
6 Main areas of operation (more than one answer is possible) 
О education О sanitation 
О organisation О legal assistance 
О agriculture О health 
О economic programmes О environmental programmes 
О afforestation О women programmes 
О drinking water О other areas, namely 
О irrigation 
7 Number of staff members of your organisation over the years 
1988 1990 1992 
Office staff Male 
Female 
Field staff Male 
Female 
8 Total financial turnover of your organisation as reflected in the reports to the 
Ministry of Home Affairs over the years 
1988 1990 1992 
Total (in rupees) 
9 Sources of finance as percentage of total expenditure over the years 
Sources of finance 1988 1990 1992 
Foreign assistance 
Government assistance 
Own contribution target group 
Own resources of the organisation 
Bank(loans) 
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10 What was the first year your organisation received foreign assistance: 19.. 
11 Can you name the foreign donors of your organisation over the last ten (10) 
years (more than one answer is possible): 
Non-govemmental donors Bilateral donors (governments) 
О OXFAM О DANIDA 
О Miserior O SIDA 
O ICCO O Netherlands 
О Bread for the World 
O EZE Multilateral donors 
О Christian Aid О UNICEF 
О Action Aid O F.A.O 
О other non-governmental, bilateral and/or multilateral donors, namely 
Part B: Relationship with ICCO 
12 In what year was the first co-financing contract signed between your 
organisation and ICCO: 19.. 
13 How did you come to know about ICCO (more than one answer is possible) 
О personal contact with ICCO-staff member(s) 
О through NGOs 
О directory on funding agencies 
О otherwise, namely 
О don't know 
14 How many projects-cum-programmes of your organisation have been co-
financed by ICCO up to 1992 or up to the end of the (financial) relationship 
15 Do you still have a (financial) relationship with ICCO 
О Yes (go to 18) О No (go to 16) 
16 Please give the reason(s) for ending of the (financial) relationship with ICCO 
(more than one answer is possible) 
О difference of opinion over development vision/approach 
О difference of opinion over implementation capacity/administrative strength 
О change in policy of ICCO 
О other reason(s), namely 
О don't know 
17 Did the ending of the financial relationship between your organisation and ICCO 
cause any problems for your organisation: 
О No (go to 19) O Yes (please indicate type of problems) 
О part(s) of the programme had to be cancel­
led 
О staff of the organisation had to be dis­
missed 
О the organisation had to be dissolved 
О otherwise, namely 
О don't know 
18 Were there in the past any disputes between your organisation and ICCO? 
O No O Yes (please indicate type of dispute) 
О reporting of your organisation О policy of ICCO 
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О growth of your organisation/programme О others, namely 
О staff and/or organisational set-up О don't know 
19 Do you have any cntique on the handling by ICCO of project proposals, 
financing, monitoring and evaluation 
O No O Yes (please indicate your cntique) 
О ICCO takes too long a time to sanction a proposal 
О ICCO reduces the proposed budget unilaterally 
О ICCO takes too long to respond to letters, questions and prob­
lems 
О money of ICCO is not transferred in time 
О ICCO hardly gives follow-up to progress-reports and evaluation-
reports 
О other, namely 
О don't know 
20 Apart from funding does, according to your opinion, ICCO have another role to 
play in 
A) India O No O Yes, namely 
О advocacy О capacity-building 
О information provision О other, namely 
О networking between NGOs 
B) the Netherlands O No O Yes, namely 
О development education 
О lobbying 
О other, namely 
21 Is ICCO, according to you, involved in one or more of the roles mentioned 
under question 20 9 O No O Yes, namely in 
Part С Relationship with Government 
22 Did your organisation ever made use of government schemes 
О No (go to 27) O Yes (please indicate type of schemes) 
О Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) 
О Accelerated Rural Water Supply Programme (ARWSP) 
О Rural Landless Employment Guarantee Programme (RLE-
GPyJawahar Rozgar Yojana 
О Development of Women & Children in Rural Areas 
(DWCRA) 
О Training of Rural Youth for Self Employment (TRYSEM) 
О others, namely 
О don't know 
23 Did your organisations ever apply for a grant with CAPART 
O No O Yes (please indicate the number of applications from your 
organisation approved by CAPART) 
24 Were the funds from the govemment(-programme(s)) directly given to the 
beneficiaries or routed through your organisation 
О routed through the organisation 
О directly to beneficiaries 
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О otherwise, namely 
О don't know 
25 What was/were the task(s) of your organisation in this/these govemment-
scheme(s) 
О selection of beneficiaries О recovery of (bank-)loans 
О awareness-raising О other, namely 
О raising own contribution О don't know 
О contribution from organisation 
26 Were there any problems during the implementation of this/these govemment-
scheme(s) 
O No O Yes (please indicate this/these problem(s)) 
О funds were not released in time/at all О others, namely 
О political interference О don't know 
27 What is the position of your organisation on the issue of government funds 
(more than one answer is possible) 
О government funds are right 
О government funds are welcome only under specific circumstances (please 
indicate what these circumstances are) 
О our organisation would never make use of government funds, because (please 
indicate why your organisation would never make use of government funds) 
О other, namely 
О don't know 
28 Is there, according to you, a difference between the attitude of the central-, 
state- and local government towards the NGO-sector 
O Yes О No 
If Yes, please indicate in which way the attitude of the central-, state- and local 
government differ 
29 How would you describe the attitude of the central-, state- and local government 
towards the NGO-sector (more than one answer is possible) 
The Government Central State Local 
is positive towards the NGO-sector 
tries to control the NGO-sector 
tries to incorporate the sector in 
its own programmes 
otherwise, namely 
don't know 
Part D Relationship with other NGOs 
30 Does your organisation has a regular (working) relationship with other NGOs 
O Yes (go to 31) 
О No (please indicate why not and go to 36) 
О there are no other NGOs in the area О other, namely 
О we never thought about contacting other NGOs О don't know 
О the difference between our organisation and other NGOs 
are too big (please indicate what these differences are) 
31 With how many NGOs does your organisation has this (working) relationship 
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32 The organisational structure of this collaboration between your organisation and 
the other NGOs is (more than one answer is possible) 
О informal О issue based networking, namely on the issue of 
О regional networking О otherwise, namely 
О national networking О don't know 
33 The issue(s) central in the collaboration is/are (more than one answer is poss­
ible) 
О relationship with the government О implementation problems 
О strategies of the organisations involved О other, namely 
О organisational improvements О don't know 
34 The approach(es) followed in this collaboration is/are (more than one answer is 
possible) 
О discussion О training 
О advocacy О other, namely 
О information О don't know 
35 Are there ever any problems in this relationship between your organisation and 
other NGOs 
O No O Yes (please indicate first what these problems are about) 
О differences in vision/ideology О other, namely 
О differences in strategy/programmes О don't know 
О personality problems 
36 Do you think that NGOs should work (more) together O Yes О No 
If No, please indicate why you think NGOs should not work (more) together 
О regional differences are too big 
О differences in vision/strategies are too big 
О working (more) together cost too much time 
О usefulness of cooperation is not clear 
О other, namely 
О don't know 
If Yes, please indicate why you think NGOs should work (more) together 
О in order to increase the bargaining capacity of the NGOs 
О in order to improve the implementation capacity 
О to reduce the costs 
О other, namely 
О don't know 
37 A) Would you support the foundation of a Council or Platform for the 
coordination of the activities of NGOs in India on the 
Regional level O Yes, because 
О No, because 
State level O Yes, because 
О No, because 
National level O Yes, because 
О No, because 
B) Would there be a role to play for the government in this/these councils/plat­
forms 
O No O Yes 
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- Is there anything else you want to remark regarding the relationship between your 
organisation and ICCO/donors, government and/or other NGOs'' 
- Is there anything you would like to remark concerning this questionnaire or items 
raised in this questionnaire7 
- What is your name and function within your organisation'' 
2 Drinking water questionnaire 
1 Is drinking water an important activity of your organisation O Yes О 
No 
2 Please state the percentage of your yearly budget that is being used for activities 
in the field of drinking water 
3 Please state the main objective(s) of your organisation with regard to drinking 
water (more than one answer is possible) 
О potable drinking water is an essential part of the (rural) development process 
О providing potable drinking water contributes to an improvement in the health-
position of the people 
О by providing drinking water to our target group the workload of women is 
reduced 
О other, namely 
О don't know 
4 Why did your organisation decided to get involved in activities in the field of 
drinking water 
О upon request from the target-group 
О water-scarcity in the area 
О other, namely 
О don't know 
5 Do your activities in the field of drinking water (also) include construction of 
drinking water supply facilities O Yes О No 
If YES please continue with question 6, if NO please go to question 12 
6 What kind of facilities have been constructed by/through your organisation 
O borewells (handpumps) 
О piped water supply 
О open wells 
О other, namely 
О don't know 
7 Please state the number of facilities (by type) and the number of villages-cum-
communities from the construction of these facilities by/through your organisation 
Number Number of Number of 
of facilities villages facilities not working 
Borewells 
Piped schemes 
Open wells 
8 Are all drinking water-facilities provided by/through your organisation still 
functioning 
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O Yes, all facilities are still functioning 
О No, part of the facilities are not functioning anymore 
О No, none of the facilities is functioning anymore 
О Other, namely 
О Don't know 
9 Can you name the main reasons why (part of) the facilities are not working 
О Lack of funds by the community 
О Lack of knowledge in the field of maintenance and operation by the community 
О Lack of awareness concerning the proper use and maintenance 
О other, namely 
О don't know 
10 Are the facilities provided through/by your organisation being used by the 
members of the target-group 
О Yes, by all people in the communities О other, namely 
О Yes, by part of the community О don't know 
О No 
11 Why are people in your project-area, in general, not using the sources of drinking 
water provided by/through your organisation 
О distance to the tap 
О source is not functioning 
О they don't like the taste of the water 
О lack of awareness regarding the necessity of using clean water 
О other, namely 
О don't know 
12 Does your organisation, as part of the activities in the field of drinking water, 
also train members of the target group in maintenance and repair of the drinking 
water sources O Yes О No 
13 Besides construction of drinking water facilities is your organisation involved in 
any other activity in this sector O Yes О No 
14 If Yes: In what kind of activities, besides construction, are you involved 
О awareness-building regarding proper use of drinking water 
О education regarding water borne diseases 
О organisation of 'water-committees' for maintenance and repair 
О other, namely 
О don't know 
15 Have ICCO-funds been used (or are they still being used) for activities in the 
field of drinking water O Yes О No 
16 If yes, for what kind of activities in the field of drinking water have ICCO-funds 
been used 
О construction of drinking water facilities 
О education concerning water-borne diseases 
О awareness-building regarding the proper use of drinking water 
О other, namely 
О don't know 
17 What other sources have been used by your organisation to finance your activ­
ities in the field of drinking water 
386 The same difference 
О own sources of your organisation О contribution from the target group 
О Government sources О other, namely 
О Bankloans О don't know 
18 Did/do (members of) the target-group participate in the drinking water activities 
of your organisation O No O Yes О Don't know 
19 In what way did/do (members of) the target-group participate in the activities of 
your organisation in the field of drinking water 
О activities in this field were taken up upon the request of the target-group 
О number and type of facility was decided upon by the target-group 
О the target-group contributed in labour to the programme 
О the target-group contributed in cash to the programme 
О other, namely 
О don't know 
20 What do you consider the biggest problems in the field of drinking water in your 
working area 
О scarcity of water О (lack of) maintenance 
О contamination of drinking water О other, namely 
О improper use of drinking water by the communities О don't know 
21 Are you of the opinion that the objectives (as mentioned in question 2) of the 
drinking water-programme of your organisation have been reached O Yes О 
No 
Please explain your answer to question 21 
22 Are you of the opinion that providing potable water to the population is in first 
instance the task of the government O Yes О No 
3 Sanitation questionnaire 
1 Is sanitation an important activity for your organisation O Yes О No 
2 Can you state what percentage of your yearly budget that is being used for 
activities in the field of sanitation 
3 What is the main objective of your organisation with regard to sanitation 
О proper sanitation is an essential part of the (rural) development process 
О sanitation contributes to an improvement in the health-position of the people 
О other, namely 
О don't know 
4 In what kind of activities m the field of sanitation is your organisation involved 
О construction of latrines 
О construction of soakpits 
О construction of drainage(-systems) 
О awareness-building and education regarding personal and environmental 
hygiene 
О awareness-building and education regarding proper use and maintenance of 
sanitary facilities 
О other, namely 
О don't know 
Questionnaires ICCO counterparts India 387 
5 If your organisation is also involved in the construction of sanitary facilities can 
you state how many of these facilities have been constructed by/through your 
organisation 
Number Number of Number of 
of facilities villages facilities not working 
Latrines 
Soakpits 
Drainage 
6 Are all sanitary-facilities provided by/through your organisation still functioning 
О Yes, all facilities are still functioning О other, namely 
О No, part of the facilities are not functioning anymore О don't know 
О No, none of the facilities is functioning anymore 
7 Can you name the main reasons why (part of) the facilities are not working 
О Lack of funds by the community 
О Lack of knowledge in the field of maintenance and operation by the community 
О Lack of awareness concerning the proper use and maintenance 
О other, namely 
О don't know 
8 Are the facilities provided through/by your organisation being used by the 
members of the target-group 
О Yes, by all people in the communities О other, namely 
О Yes, by part of the community О don't know 
О No 
9 Why are people in your project-area, in general, not using the sanitary facilities 
provided by/through your organisation 
О facilities are not working О other, namely 
О lack of awareness regarding the necessity of sanitation О don't know 
10 Have ICCO-funds been used (or are they still being used) for activities in the 
field of sanitation O Yes О No 
11 If yes, for what kind of activities in the field of sanitation have ICCO-funds been 
used 
О construction of sanitary facilities 
О health and hygiene education 
О awareness-building regarding the proper use of sanitary facilities 
О other, namely 
О don't know 
12 What other sources have been used by your organisation to finance your activ­
ities in the field of sanitation 
О own sources of your organisation О contribution from the target 
group 
О Government sources О other, namely 
О Bankloans О don't know 
13 Did/do (members of) the target-group participate in the sanitation activities of 
your organisation O No O Yes О Don't know 
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14 In what way did/do (members of) the target-group participate in the activities of 
your organisation in the field of sanitation 
О activities in this field were taken up upon the request of the target-group 
О number and type of facility was decided upon by the target-group 
О the target-group contributed in labour to the programme 
О the target-group contributed in cash to the programme 
О other, namely 
О don't know 
15 What do you consider the biggest problems in the field of sanitation in your 
working area 
О scarcity of water 
О (lack of) awareness about the necessity of sanitary and hygienic behaviour 
О (lack of) maintenance of the sanitary facilities 
О other, namely 
О don't know 
16 Are you of the opinion that the objectives (as mentioned in question 2) of the 
sanitation-programme of your organisation have been reached O Yes О 
No 
Please explain your answer to question 16· 
17 Are you of the opinion that providing potable water to the population is in first 
instance the task of the government O Yes О No 
4 Irrigation questionnaire 
1 Is irrigation an important part of your normal programme O Yes О 
No 
2 Can you state what percentage of your yearly budget that is being used for 
activities in the field of irrigation 
3 What is the main objective of your organisation with regard to irrigation (more 
than one answer is possible) 
О irrigation is an essential part of the (rural) development process 
О irrigation leads to better income-position of the target-group 
О through irrigation the production can be raised and thus the food-consumption 
of the target-group can be enhanced 
О other, namely 
О don't know 
4 Can you divide the target-group of your organisation (percentage-wise) according 
to the following categories 
Landless 
Marginal farmers (up to 1 ha) 
Small farmers (between 1 and 2 ha) 
Medium seized farmers 
Others, namely 
5 Do your activities in the field of irrigation (also) include construction of irrigation 
supply facilities O Yes О No 
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6 If yes, what kind of facilities have been constructed by/through your organisation 
О borewells (handpumps) О other, namely 
О tubewells О don't know 
О open wells 
7 Please state how many of each kind of facilities have been constructed by/through 
your organisation and for how many beneficiary households these families were 
meant 
Number Number of Number of 
of facilities beneficiaries facilities not used 
Borewells 
Piped water 
Open wells 
8 Are (he irrigation facilities provided by/through your organisation, in general, 
meant for single households or for groups of households 
О single households О other, namely 
О groups of households О don't know 
О single and groups of households 
9 Are the irrigation facilities provided by/through your organisation still being used 
by the beneficiaries 
O Yes, all facilities are still being used 
О No, part of the facilities are not being used anymore 
О No, none of the facilities are being used anymore 
О Other, namely 
О Don't know 
10 Can you name the main reasons why (part of) the facilities are not being used at 
the moment 
О Depleting groundwater tables 
О Lack of motor to pump water 
О Lack of money and/or knowledge to maintain irrigation-source 
О other, namely 
О don't know 
11 Does your organisation also train members of the target group in maintenance 
and repair of the irrigation sources O Yes О No 
12 Why did your organisation decided to get involved in activities in the field of 
irrigation 
О upon request from (members of) the target-group 
О irrigation was considered by the organisation itself an important activity 
О other, namely 
О don't know 
13 Are you (also) involved in activities related to irrigation (or agriculture in 
general) besides the construction of irrigation facilities О No О 
Yes 
14 If Yes: in what kind of activities, besides construction, are you involved 
О provision of fertilizers/pesticides 
О provision of hybrid seeds 
О provision of credit 
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О assistance in marketing 
О other, namely 
О don't know 
15 Did/do (members of) the target-group participate in the irrigation activities of 
your organisation O No O Yes 
16 In what way did/do (members of) your target-group participate in the activities of 
your organisation in the field of irrigation 
О activities in this field were taken up upon request of the target-group 
О number and type of facility was decided upon by the target-group 
О the target-group (ι e beneficiaries) contributed m labour 
О the target-group (ι e beneficiaries) contributed in cash 
О other, namely 
О don't know 
17 Have ICCO-funds been used (or are they still being used) for activities in the 
field of irrigation O Yes О No 
18 If yes, for what kind of activities in the field of irrigation have ICCO-funds been 
used 
О construction of irrigation facilities 
О deepening of wells 
О other, namely 
О don't know 
19 What other sources have been used by your organisation to finance your activ­
ities in the field of irrigation 
О own sources of your organisation О contribution from the target group 
О Government sources О other, namely 
О Bankloans О don't know 
20 What do you consider the biggest problems in the field of irrigation in you 
working area 
О scarcity of water О maintenance of the irrigation sources 
О insufficient credit О other, namely 
О small landholdings О don't know 
21 Are you of the opinion that the objectives of the irrigation-programme of your 
organisation (as mentioned in question 2) have been reached O Yes О No 
Please explain your answer to question 21 
22 Is irrigation in first instance the task of the government O Yes О No 
Annex 2 
Socio-economic background of states and districts 
The eleven projects covered in this study have been or are being implemented within 
22 districts in the states of Andhra Pradesh (AP), Utlar Pradesh (UP) and West 
Bengal (WB) (see also Table 1). This annex provides some background information 
on these states and districts. It should be mentioned that, although both DGIS and 
ICCO have a regional concentration policy, they do not have institutionalised or 
systematic knowledge of the socio-economic or political background of the areas in 
which they support development interventions. As a rule, this type of information is 
provided by the implementing organisation (i.e., government department or NGDO). 
DGIS or, in this case, the Royal Netherlands Embassy in New Delhi, started 
collecting data on its concentration states in a more structured manner only in the 
mid-1990s. The first report by an Indian consultant on the 'socio-economic develop­
ment status' in Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Kerala and Шаг Pradesh has been issued 
in the meantime. A further study is expected soon. 
Table 1 
States, districts and projects 
District 
Prakasam 
Vizag 
Mahabubnagar 
Guntur 
Anantapur 
Jalpaiguri 
Cooch Behar 
Darjeeling 
Allahabad 
Rae Barelli 
Varanasi 
Project State District 
АР-I UP Lakhimpur Kheri 
YCO 
AIRDS 
CRD 
RDT 
NBTDP 
NBTDP 
NBTDP 
sp-m 
SP-V 
SP-V 
Siddhartnagar 
Bahraich 
Gonda 
Ballia 
Basti 
Gorakhpur 
Deoria 
Sultanpur 
Faizabad 
Almora 
Project 
SP-VI 
SP-VI 
SP-VI / UPSTP 
SP-VI / UPSTP 
SP-VI / UPSTP 
SP-VI / UPSTP 
UPSTP 
UPSTP 
UPSTP 
UPSTP 
Kassar Trust 
Шаг Pradesh is the second largest state in India and, with a total population of 
nearly 139 million in 1991, by far the state with the largest number of people within 
its boundaries. A total of 16.4% of all Indians live in Urtar Pradesh. Simultaneously, 
nearly 42% of the total population in UP (41.1% of the rural and 45.2% of the urban 
population) fell below the poverty line in 1987-88. Andhra Pradesh qualifies as the 
fifth largest state in India with 66.3 million people in 1991. The percentage of 
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people living below the poverty line in AP is 27 2% (20 9% for rural areas and 
44 6% for urban areas) West Bengal is slightly larger than AP with nearly 68 
million people The percentage of people living below the poverty line is substan-
tially higher, however, with 44% (48 3% in rural areas and 32 8% in urban areas) ' 
Among the 16 major states in India,2 UP ranks lowest as far as the Human Devel-
opment Index is concerned With a life-expectancy of 55 8 years, an adult literacy 
rate of 38 7% and a real GDP per capita of $884 (panty purchasing power), the 
index reaches 0 348 for UP For AP, the index is 0 400 (60 3 years, 40 1 % and 
$1,227) and for WB the index is 0 459 (61 2 years, 57 1% and $1,186)3 
Looking at only the rural areas, there are remarkable differences between the 
three states with regard to population characteristics (see Table 2) The average 
number of people per household ranges from 4 7 in AP to 6 2 in UP Female literacy 
is much higher in West Bengal than in Andhra Pradesh while it is even lower in UP 
Only 19% of all women above the age of seven in UP were registered as literate in 
the 1991 census Table 2 also clearly shows marked differences between the 
districts In Almora district, which constitutes the principal working area for Kassar 
Trust, the female literacy rate approaches the average for WB In Bahraich, the 
district where DGIS has supported a drinking water and irrigation project, the 
literacy rate shows only some 8% of all women above the age of seven to be able to 
read and write In AP, the position of Mahabubnagar is noteworthy Only 13 9% of 
the women above the age of seven can read and write in this district 
The two groups which are generally regarded as constituting part of the 'poor' 
form a substantial part of the total population in all three states The Scheduled 
Castes and Scheduled Tribes constitute about 25% of the population in AP and UP 
and are nearly 35% of the population in WB In the districts targeted by the North 
Bengal Terai Development Project from DGIS this percentage is — at least for 
Cooch Behar and Jalpaigun — even higher With regard to the working population, it 
is noteworthy that the majority of the rural population in UP is employed as a 
primary cultivator while this accounts for only 38% and 33% of the rural popula-
tions in WB and AP, respectively In the latter two states, the number of people 
working primarily as agricultural labourers is substantially higher than in UP This 
shows the scarcity of land to be much more severe in AP and WB than in UP In 
AP, the total percentage of the working population primarily involved in agriculture 
is around 80%, in UP, it is nearly 85%, and in WB, it reaches 70% Among the 
alternative occupations in WB are manufacturing other than household industnes 
(6 2% of the working population) along with trade and commerce (6%) In UP, the 
percentages of the working population m these two occupations are 2 8% and 2 5%, 
respectively, and in AP, the percentages are 3% and 3 3%, respectively 
1
 Government of India 1993a 
2
 These states are Kerala, Punjab, Maharashtra, Haryana, Gujarat, West Bengal, 
Himachal Pradesh, Kamataka, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Onssa, 
Rajasthan, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh 
3
 R S Snvastava 1997 9 
Table 2 
Some basic population data on states and districts (rural areas) 
District 
Prakasam 
Vizag 
Mahabubnagar 
Guntur 
Anantapur 
Jalpaiguri 
Cooch Behar 
Darjeeling 
Allahabad 
Rae Barelli 
Varanasi 
Lakhimpur Kheri 
Bahraich 
Gonda 
Ballia 
Basti 
Siddhartnagar 
Almora 
Gorakhpur 
Deoria 
Sultanpur 
Faizabad 
1 
48.6 
2.3 
2.0 
2.7 
2.9 
2.4 
49.4 
2.3 
2.0 
0.9 
Ш . 5 
3.9 
2.1 
3.5 
2.2 
2.5 
3.3 
2.0 
2.6 
1.6 
0.8 
2.5 
4.1 
2.4 
2.6 
2 
23.9 
22.4 
27.9 
13.9 
29.3 
21.1 
38.1 
26.9 
29.7 
37.5 
19.0 
13.9 
18.2 
20.9 
12.5 
7.9 
9.7 
23.8 
15.8 
10.9 
37.3 
17.2 
16.5 
19.4 
19.4 
3 
26.0 
25.5 
30.3 
26.9 
21.0 
19.9 
34.9 
64.1 
55.1 
35.7 
23.4 
27.5 
31.3 
21.4 
30.3 
17.7 
16.8 
15.4 
21.7 
16.9 
22.7 
24.7 
16.1 
22.9 
25.0 
4 
33.4 
29.2 
50.1 
41.8 
25.0 
41.6 
38.0 
33.7 
51.6 
33.3 
63.0 
51.0 
63.7 
42.5 
79.2 
77.0 
75.5 
45.4 
69.3 
72.2 
80.8 
48.2 
61.9 
60.7 
63.8 
5 
47.5 
54.6 
30.8 
43.6 
59.1 
43.3 
32.2 
19.0 
27.8 
15.6 
21.5 
30.2 
22.2 
24.0 
14.0 
15.3 
5.2 
37.9 
19.8 
20.2 
1.0 
34.4 
24.5 
26.3 
23.2 
6 
4.7 
4.7 
4.4 
5.4 
4.3 
5.1 
5.5 
5.2 
5.1 
5.3 
6.2 
6.1 
5.4 
7.4 
6.0 
5.6 
6.0 
7.2 
6.3 
6.0 
5.0 
6.4 
6.5 
5.9 
6.2 
1 = Total rural population in millions 
2 = Female literacy (in % of total female population above the age of six) 
3 = Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (in millions) 
4 = Cultivators as % of total working population 
5 = Agricultural labourers as % of total working population 
6 = Number of people per household 
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The average acreage per farmer m the three districts targeted by the North 
Bengal Terai Development Project is 0 89 hectares This shows marginal (up to 1 
hectare) and small (between 1 and 2 hectares) farmers to predominate in this area In 
Jalpaigun, for instance, more than 71% of the landholdings can be classified as 
marginal and nearly 19% as small Together, these holdings occupy 46% of the total 
cultivable area In Siligun block of Darjeehng district, marginal and small farmers 
constitute 90% of the farming households and farm 68% of the area In Cooch 
Behar, the percentage marginal and small landholdings is 78% and 73% of the 
cultivable area4 Marginal and small farmers also constitute the majority of the 
farming households in AP 73 1% of the holdings in AP are smaller than 2 hectares 
and cover an area of 4 3 million hectares or 30% of the total cultivable area The 2% 
of the holdings of more than 10 hectares each cover 20% of the cultivable area5 In 
UP, the average landholding is 1 OS hectares In the eastern region (ι e , the region 
targeted by the Uttar Pradesh State Tubewell Project) this average is down to 0 78 
hectares In this eastern region '79% of the holdings were below 1 ha, 13% 
between 1-2 ha, 6% between 2-4 ha and 2% had a landholding size of more than 4 
ha ' The marginal and small farmers together occupy a total of 55% of the cultivable 
area
6 
With regard to drinking water and sanitation, the data on the different states 
show the following At the end of the 1980s, the proportion of rural households 
drinking tap water was highest in Andhra Pradesh with 12 7% Only 6 7% of the 
rural households made use of tap water in UP, and this was even lower in West 
Bengal with 3 6% (the average percentage for rural India was 15 5%) The most 
important source of drinking water is by far the open well and the handpump (with 
the latter being slightly more important than the open well in Andhra Pradesh) In 
rural India, nearly 90% of the population does not use a latrine There are substantial 
differences between the states, however In Mampur, for instance, only 8 7% of the 
households do not use a latrine while in Haryana this is 96 1% In the two most 
important states in this study, the proportion of the rural population not using a 
latrine is slightly higher than the average 90 5% in Andhra Pradesh and 92 6% in 
Uttar Pradesh7 
4
 Principal Agricultural Officer Darjeehng 1986 6, Principal Agricultural Officer 
Jalpaigun 1991 10, and Principal Agricultural Officer Cooch Behar 1990 8 Figures 
refer to 1981 census data 
3
 Government of Andhra Pradesh 1986 Figures refer to 1981 census data 
6
 ETC 1987 6 
7
 Government of India 1990a. 
Annex 3 
Irrigation in India 
Table 1 
Irrigated area under different crops (as % of total area under crop) 
Rice 
Jowar 
Bajra 
Maize 
Wheat 
Barley 
Total cereals 
Total pulses 
Total foodgrains 
Oilseeds 
Cotton 
Sugarcane 
1970-71 
38.4 
3.7 
4.0 
15.9 
54.3 
52.0 
27.6 
8.8 
24.1 
7.4 
17.3 
72.4 
1980-81 
40.5 
3.8 
5.4 
19.7 
69.7 
50.4 
33.8 
8.9 
29.4 
14.3 
27.1 
80.8 
1990-91 
45.1 
5.6 
5.7 
18.6 
79.8 
50.0 
40.5 
10.0 
34.6 
20.7 
35.1 
84.2 
Source: Government of India 1994: S-23. 
Table 2 
Distribution of net area irrigated by sources of irrigation (in %) 
Year 
1950-51 
1960-61 
1970-71 
1980-81 
1986-87 
Govt 
34.4 
37.2 
38.5 
37.3 
36.8 
Canals 
Pri-
vate 
5.5 
4.9 
2.8 
2.2 
1.1 
Total 
39.8 
42.1 
41.3 
39.5 
37.9 
Tube-
wells 
neg. 
0.6 
14.3 
24.6 
28.4 
Wells 
Others 
28.7 
29.6 
23.9 
21.1 
20.5 
Total 
28.7 
29.6 
38.2 
45.7 
48.9 
Tanks 
17.3 
18.5 
13.2 
8.2 
6.9 
Others 
14.2 
9.8 
7.3 
6.6 
6.3 
Source: A.N. Agrawal, H.O. Varma & R.C. Gupta 1992: 113 
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Table 3 
Net irrigated area by source in selected states and All India (in % of total net area 
irrigated - 1986-87) 
Andhra Pradesh 
Karnataka 
Kerala 
Uttar Pradesh** 
West Bengal 
All India 
Canals 
50 1 
4 4 0 
34 1 
33 1 
37 5 
37 9 
Tanks 
219 
14 3 
14 7 
14 
13 8 
6 9 
Tube-
wells 
5 4 
4 1 
15 0 
56 9 
36 0 
28 4 
Other 
wells 
194 
24 7 
* 
5 6 
12 
20 5 
Other 
sources 
3 1 
12 9 
36 1 
3 0 
115 
6 3 
Total 
in % 
100 0 
1000 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
in mil 
ha 
3,550 
1,816 
299 
10,132 
1,911 
43,049 
Source National Institute of Rural Development 1991 43-44 
* included under tubewells 
** source-wise break-up has been worked out in proportion to that for the year 
1974-75 except other wells 
Table 4 
Targets and achievements in major/medium and minor irrigation potential under 
successive Five Year Plans (in million hectares) 
PERIOD 
First (1951-56) 
Second (1956-61) 
Third (1961-66) 
Fourth (1969-74) 
Fifth (1974-78) 
Sixth (1980-85) 
Seventh (1985-90) 
MAJOR/MEDIUM 
Target 
η a 
4 2 
4 7 
5 7 
6 2 
5 7 
4 3 
Achievement 
abs 
2 5 
21 
2 2 
2 6 
4 0 
3 4 
15 
in % 
na 
50 0 
46 8 
45 6 
645 
59 6 
34 9 
MINOR 
Target 
na 
3 6 
3 4 
4 8 
6 0 
8 0 
8 6 
Achievement 
abs 
12 
0 7 
2 2 
4 5 
3 8 
7 5 
9 1 
in % 
η a 
194 
647 
93 8 
63 3 
93 8 
1096 
Source Own calculations from successive Five Year Plans 
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Annex 4 
Indicators of project performance 
Following the more descriptive analyses of the DGIS and ICCO projects in Chapters 
4 and 5, it is attempted to rate the projects here according to the issues placed 
central in the Introduction It should be noted that these ratings are of an indicative 
nature and cannot always be directly deduced from the project findings presented in 
the chapters on drinking water and irrigation As can be seen in the table, moreover, 
it was not always possible to assign such a rating The following guidelines were 
followed in assigning the ratings 
With regard to participation, attention was mainly paid to the extent to which 
the target group was involved in the design, implementation and maintenance of the 
project In SP-V and the projects of Kassar Trust and CRD, the target group was 
involved in setting up the activities For this reason, these three projects score very 
high on participation In the other projects, the target group was not involved in 
preparatory activities and the projects therefore score lower АР-I, for instance, 
scores very low in the field of participation because the target group was neither 
involved in the design nor in the implementation of the project facilities and the 
involvement of the users in the maintenance of the created facilities has been found 
to be temporary at best and generally haphazard 
Cost effectiveness has already been said to be extremely difficult to calculate 
because of a general lack of data particularly on the ICCO projects The ratings 
provided in the accompanying table should thus be taken as strictly indicative AP-I 
scores low for cost effectiveness as utilisation is extremely low Kassar Trust is 
relatively expensive when the costs per working facility are compared to SP-III and 
SP-VI In this regard, it should also be mentioned that installing a handpump in the 
Himalayas is something quite different from installing one in the plains of Uttar 
Pradesh where groundwater can be reached relatively easy CRD scores low on cost-
effectiveness mainly because the activities undertaken within this project (ι e , 
mainly cleaning and strengthening of wells) have not led to a substantia) improve­
ment in the capacity of the wells due to, among other things, declining ground-water 
levels 
Maintenance of the assets created under the different projects is, in contrast 
to cost-effectiveness, easier to comment upon Maintenance or upkeep can be 
measured m terms of preventive maintenance, cleaning (particularly in the case of 
drinking-water facilities) and break-down maintenance In some cases (e g , NBTDP 
and Kassar Trust), break-down maintenance was not yet (in 1992) observed to be a 
problem as the facilities had been quite recently installed Irrigation projects 
generally score higher on maintenance This is because these facilities are more 
regarded as the property of the target group than the facilities under drinking water 
and sanitation, 
With regard to poverty reach, it should be noted that the poor have been 
reached to some degree in all of the projects because they constitute a major part of 
the target group in all of the projects Some projects scoring somewhat higher may 
be due to specific attention to the poor during implementation For the hand 
tubewells in the NBTDP, for instance, nearly all of the beneficiaries are either 
Indicators of project performance 399 
marginal or small farmers who constitute the poorer sections of the farming popula­
tion SP-V also scores somewhat higher with regard to poverty reach This is 
presumably a result of the difference in the contribution asked of the target group 
depending on their economic status 
Utilisation or the extent to which the facilities constructed under the different 
projects are used by the target group does not differ much across the different 
projects There is basically only one project (i e , АР-I) rated as having a low extent 
of utilisation Utilisation depends not only on the extent to which the target group 
has been involved in the project right from the beginning but also on the extent to 
which the facilities are regarded as necessary by the target group In the case of 
Kassar Trust, for instance, the beneficiaries themselves indicated drinking water to 
be a problem It is therefore logical that they also make full use of the facilities In 
SP-ΠΙ (and also in SP-VI) utilisation is rated slightly lower This is due to the 
existence of other water sources and the lack of maintenance of the facilities and 
thus break down АР-I also scores low on utilisation and, being an older project, 
clearly shows the importance of maintenance 
The preceding already shows that the sustainabihty of АР-I to not be 
particularly high Sustainabihty is defined here as the extent to which a project is 
able to continue after the withdrawal of foreign aid Are specific activities able to 
sustain themselves without further foreign assistance9 The fact that software 
activities are considered necessary for projects to run successfully and that most of 
these software activities are financed by the donor suggests that the sustainabihty for 
most of the projects will be low That Kassar Trust forms an exception is mainly 
due to the fact that the target group has contributed to the facility themselves, 
regards the facility as its own and can fall back on its own people for assistance in 
maintenance In the case of irrigation, sustainabihty is rated somewhat higher 
because of the feeling of ownership among the target group Sustainabihty in these 
projects is also influenced by 'technical sustainabihty' (1 e , the extent to which 
ground- water sources are being depleted) 
Finally, impact is rated as the extent to which the target group sees an 
improvement in the case of drinking-water and sanitation projects in their health 
situation and an improvement in the case of irrigation projects in their income 
situation Although these perceptions are clearly subjective, they nevertheless 
indicate the importance of the projects for the target group None of the projects 
score particularly low in this regard which shows that, irrelevant of whether the 
target group actually uses and maintains the assets created or not, there is a general 
feeling among the target group of benefitting from the project activities As shown 
for CRD, these feelings can be wrong The perceptions of the people also need not 
correspond to the extent to which they feel responsible for the project and should 
not, therefore, be taken as indicators of either utilisation or maintenance 
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Aan het einde van de jaren tachtig werd de Nederlandse bilaterale hulp hevig bekriti­
seerd zowel van buiten als van binnen het Ministerie voor Ontwikkelingssamenwer­
king ' Niet alleen was het verwijl dat deze hulp inefficient was en dat er onvoldoen­
de aandacht werd besteed aan projectvoorbereiding en -monitoring, maar bovendien 
dat teveel hulp eerste en vooral het Nederlandse bedrijfsleven ten goede kwam De 
kwaliteits discussie die hieruit voortvloeide bleef echter niet beperkt tot de bilaterale 
hulp maar omvatte al snel ook de hulp via de medefinancieringsorganisaties ICCO, 
NOVIB, HIVOS en CEBEMO (het huidige Bilance) Deze MFO's kregen het verwijt 
dat ook zij er niet ш slaagden de ärmsten te bereiken, dat hun programma's met 
efficiënter waren dan die van de bilaterale hulp en dat ze vooral geïnteresseerd 
waren in hun eigen voortbestaan In tegenstelling tot de bilaterale hulp echter was de 
kritiek aan het adres van de MFO's niet of nauwelijks gebaseerd op wetenschap-
pelijk materiaal Het onderzoek dat aan deze dissertatie ten grondslag ligt, stelde zich 
dan ook als eerste doelstelling om de kennis over het functioneren van de MFO's te 
vergroten Daarnaast zou dit onderzoek een vergelijking moeten maken tussen de 
Nederlandse bilaterale hulp en de hulp via de medefinancieringsorganisaties Aange-
zien het onmogelijk was om binnen het bestek van dit onderzoek all vier MFO's op 
te nemen werd gekozen voor ICCO Uitgangspunt bij de keuze voor ICCO vormde 
onder andere de bekendheid van de onderzoeker met deze organisatie, de bereidheid 
van ICCO aan het onderzoek mee te werken, als ook de vooronderstelling dat er 
geen significante verschillen zijn tussen de MFO's wat betreft hun project-activitei-
ten De vergelijking zou plaatsvinden op zowel beleidsmatig als op het project-ni-
veau India werd gekozen als centraal land voor deze vergelijking omdat het een van 
de concentralielanden is voor de Nederlandse bilaterale hulp en omdat het binnen het 
ICCO programma een prominente plaats inneemt Wat betreft projecten werd 
gekozen voor activiteiten op het terrein van drinkwatervoorziening en van irrigatie 
Beide vormen binnen het DGIS programma de belangrijkste sectoren op het gebied 
van de directe armoedebestrijding Het is in het bijzonder de gemeenschappelijke 
doelstelling van armoedebestrijding die de twee kanalen van Nederlandse hulp 
vergelijkbaar maakt 
Aanvankelijk zijn in totaal dertien projecten geselecteerd waarvan er uiteindelijk 
elf opgenomen zijn in deze studie Veldwerk is vemcht over een periode van twaalf 
maanden Bij elk project is, met uitzondering van het Uttar Pradesh State Tubewell 
Project, tussen de twee en vijf weken veldwerk verricht Individuele interviews met 
leden van de doelgroep zijn afgewisseld met groepsinterviews en gesprekken met 
stafleden van de uitvoerende organisatie, deskundigen en vertegenwoordigers van 
overheids-departementen Deze gegevens werden aangevuld met informatie verkre-
gen uit dossieronderzoek bij de betreffende uitvoerende organisaties en de Neder-
* Het 'Ministerie voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking' is weliswaar een veel gebruikte, 
maar in feite onjuiste, benaming De minister voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking 
heeft in Nederland geen eigen departement en is een minister zonder portefeuille 
Het hulpbeleid wordt voorbereid en afgehandeld door het Directoraat Generaal 
Internationale Samenwerking (DGIS) van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 
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landse ambassade in New Delhi Op het Ministerie voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking 
in Den Haag zijn alle relevante algemene en projectdossiers met betrekking tot de 
Nederlandse bilaterale hulp aan India aan een onderzoek onderworpen Om meer 
zicht te krijgen op de ICCO-counterparts in India hebben alle door ICCO over de 
periode 1971-1992 ondersteunde NGDO's een vragenlijst gekregen Op basis van 
deze vragenlijst zijn vervolgens ook vragenlijsten gestuurd met betrekking tot 
activiteiten op het gebied van drinkwater, sanitarie en ïmgaüe naar die NGDO's die 
aangaven op de betreffende terreinen actief te zijn 
Armoedebestrijding is naast participatie/'empowerment' en Niet-Gouvernementele 
Ontwikkelings Organisaties (NGDO's) één van de dne centrale concepten die in het 
eerste hoofdstuk besproken worden Binnen armoedebestrijding is niet alleen de 
economische dimensie van belang, maar ook de sociale en de politieke Gesteld 
wordt dat de politieke dimensie (oftewel de mate waann mensen deelnemen aan 
besluitvormingsprocessen in hun samenleving) in laatste instantie van doorslaggeven-
de betekenis is voor een duurzame ontwikkeling, maar tevens dat de bevordering van 
armoedebestrijding op politiek vlak met los gezien kan worden van de sociale en 
economische armoedebestrijding De grotere nadruk op de afzonderlijke dimensies 
van armoedebestrijding zijn met alleen terug te vinden in de discussies over 
ontwikkeling zoals die sinds de tweede helft van de jaren tachtig (opnieuw) gevoerd 
worden, maar deze dimensies zijn ook zeer nadrukkelijk verbonden met de concep-
ten participatie en 'empowerment' Een onderscheid wordt hierbij gemaakt tussen 
participatie als middel en participatie als doel Als doel behelst participatie tevens 
een deelname aan besluitvorming en is als zodanig nauw verbonden met 'empower-
ment' 'Empowerment' op haar beurt wordt gedefinieerd als het proces van bewust-
wording en capaciteitsopbouw dat leidt tot grotere deelname, grotere invloed op de 
besluitvorming en controle en tot transformatieve actie NGDO's, tenslotte, worden 
veelal gezien als die organisaties die de concepten van armoedebestrijding en 
participatie samenbrengen, uitdragen en verwezenlijken Als zodanig worden 
NGDO's tevens gezien als de embryo's voor een democratiseringsproces 
Voorafgegaan wordt deze bespreking van de dne centrale concepten door een 
kort historisch overzicht van ontwikkelingsstrategieën gerelateerd aan ontwikke-
lingshulp sinds de jaren vijftig In dit historische overzicht, dat opgenomen is om de 
drie centrale concepten te kunnen plaatsen in de tijd, worden vier perioden onder-
scheiden De eerste periode omvat de jaren vijftig en zestig waann modemisenngs-
strategieen ontwikkeld werden die tot op de dag van vandaag de basis vormen voor 
het ontwikkehngsdenken en de rol van hulp daarin De tweede periode die geleide-
lijk ingezet werd in de tweede helft van de jaren zestig en met name tot bloei kwam 
in de jaren zeventig, wordt gekenmerkt door een reformistische inslag waarin directe 
armoedebestrijding meer op de voorgrond kwam te staan en waarin ook participatie 
een korte bloeitijd doormaakte Eind jaren zeventig zette het verval van deze 
reformistische periode reeds in met het centraal stellen van het belang van de markt 
en economische stabilisatie De terugdringing van de rol van de staat in het ontwik-
kelingsproces dat een van de centrale elementen vormt in het decennium van de 
stabilisatie, de jaren tachtig, legt ook de grondslag voor de opkomst van de NGDO's 
als centrale spelers op het ontwikkelingsspeelveld Eind jaren tachtig zien we dan de 
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vierde période gestalte krijgen met een teruggrijpen op zaken als armoedebestrijding 
en participatie, maar wel binnen de context van een sterkere rol voor de markt en 
een overheid die met name voorwaardenscheppend dient op te treden 
Concluderend wordt in hoofdstuk 1 gesteld dat het ontwikkelmgsdenken dat eind 
jaren tachtig opgang deed feitelijk een samenvoeging is van verschillende elementen 
uit de afgelopen decennia leidend tot een geïntegreerde ontwikkelingsstrategie waarin 
aandacht voor werkgelegenheid en inkomen gekoppeld is aan een accent op basisbe-
hoeften en 'empowerment' Dit neemt met weg dat ook het huidige ontwikkelmgs-
denken nog steeds onderdeel is van het, door relatief simpele tweedelingen geken-
merkte, modemiseringsdenken Ontwikkeling is en blijft een middel om de brug 
tussen arm en rijk, tussen Zuid en Noord te overbruggen Dat ontwikkelmgsdenken 
is en blijft daarmee tevens een Westers denken 
In Hoofdstuk 2 wordt de Nederlandse bilaterale hulp aan India beschreven Na een 
korte inleiding over de geschiedenis van de Nederlandse bilaterale hulp, komt het 
India beleid van DGIS (Directoraat Generaal Internationale Samenwerking) aan bod 
Onderverdeeld in drie perioden verhaalt du stuk over de wordingsgeschiedenis van 
dat Indiabeleid en de problemen om dat beleid in de praktijk vorm te geven 
Vervolgens komt de uitkomst van dat beleid aan de beurt door middel van een 
kwantitatieve beschrijving en analyse van de Nederlandse hulp aan India Aandacht 
wordt daarbij m het bijzonder geschonken aan de bestedingsdruk, de verdeling van 
de Nederlandse bilaterale hulp over sectoren en staten in India en de hulp bestemd 
voor armoedebestrijding in relatie tot die hulp die in eerste instantie gericht is op 
economische verzelfstandiging De conclusies met betrekking tot de in du hoofdstuk 
uitgevoerde beleidsevaluatie gaan in op een aantal zaken die de bilaterale hulp 
vooral kenmerkten tot 1992 Geconcludeerd wordt dat India een goed voorbeeld is 
van een ontwikkelingsland dat er in slaagt hulp met name voor zijn eigen doelstellin-
gen te gebruiken De geschiedenis van de Nederlandse hulp aan India laat een 
constante stnjd zien over bestedingen en prioriteiten met een sterke Indiase voorkeur 
voor snel besteedbare programmahulp zonder veel donor-inmenging en een Neder-
lands beleid dat erop gericht was een groter evenwicht te vinden tussen armoedebe-
strijding en economische verzelfstandiging Indiase voorschriften en regelgeving 
hebben de mogelijkheden voor Nederland beperkt om zijn beleid in de praktijk 
daadwerkelijk gestalte te geven Overigens is niet alleen India hieraan 'schuldig' In 
een aantal gevallen kwam de Indiase vraag om meer programmahulp Nederland goed 
uu (bestedingsdruk) Desalniettemin is Nederland er langzaam in geslaagd om een 
meer gelijke verdeling tussen hulp gericht op armoedebestrijding en hulp pnmair 
gericht op economische verzelfstandiging te bewerkstelligen Op het einde van de 
jaren tachtig had DGIS een vrijwel gelijke verdeling tussen project- en programma-
hulp bereikt en had armoedebestrijding aan belang gewonnen Dit laat tevens zien 
dat het belang van de hulp voor het Nederlandse bedrijfsleven navenant is afgeno-
men, vooral na de in grote lijnen mislukte verbredingsexercitie van de beginjaren 
tachtig 
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt een korte historische beschrijving gegeven van het Medefinan-
cieringsprogramma gevolgd door een analyse van het beleid van de medefinancie-
Dutch summary 425 
ringsorganisatie ICCO ten aanzien van India. De beleidsontwikkeling van de India-
afdeling van ICCO, de grootste afdeling binnen deze organisatie, is onderverdeeld in 
vier perioden vanaf 1976 tot en met 1992. De uitwerking van dit beleid wordt 
vervolgens weergegeven met speciale aandacht voor de groei van het aantal projec-
ten, de verdeling van de projecten over de Indiase deelstaten, de sectorale indeling 
van projecten en een karakterisering van de ICCO counterparts in India op basis van 
onder andere de identiteit van deze organisaties. In het laatste deel van dit hoofdstuk 
volgt tenslotte een beleidsevaluatie waarin een aantal zaken centraal staan: concen-
tratie van de hulp op staten, sectoren en counterparts, prioriteit voor de armen, 
relaties met de kerken in India en de zoektocht naar zogenaamde support-organisa-
ties. Deze beleidsevaluatie leert dat tot de tweede helft van de jaren tachtig het 
beleid van de India-afdeling van ICCO met name gericht was op een expansie van 
de projecten-portefeuille en dat dat beleid weergegeven was in zeer algemene 
termen. Sommige van de meer specifiek geformuleerde prioriteiten zijn in de loop 
der jaren gehaald zoals de financiering van zogenaamde niet natuurlijke (= niet 
christelijke) partners. Ook de concentratie op specifieke deelstaten werd gehaald. 
Hierbij moet wel opgemerkt worden dat de in 1984 tot concentratie-staten gekozen 
deelstaten voor een belangrijk deel reeds tot de belangrijkste staten voor ICCO 
behoorden en dat feitelijk alle deelstaten na 1984 een groei in het aantal projecten 
laten zien. Andere prioriteiten zijn niet gehaald zoals bijvoorbeeld het opzetten van 
een consultatief orgaan van Indiase counterparts. Pas in de tweede helft van de jaren 
tachtig komt de India-afdeling tot een meer systematische beleidsdiscussie vooral op 
basis van een in 1988 uitgevoerde interne evaluatie die leerde dat meer dan 40% van 
de Indiase counterparts niet beoordeeld kon worden door gebrek aan informatie. 
Deze beleidsdiscussie leidde niet alleen tot een verdere en meer specifieke prioritise-
ring maar tevens tot het verbreken van de financiële relatie met een groot aantal 
NGDO's in India. 
Hoofdstuk 4 start met een korte schets van het Indiase beleid ten aanzien van 
drinkwatervoorziening en sanitatie, terwijl tevens hel beleid van DGIS en ICCO 
weergegeven wordt. Het overgrote deel van dit hoofdstuk behelst een beschrijving en 
evaluatie van verschillende door DGIS en ICCO in India gefinancierde projecten op 
het terrein van drinkwatervoorziening en sanitatie. Voor elk van deze projecten (vier 
van DGIS in Uttar Pradesh en Andhra Pradesh en twee van ICCO in dezelfde 
deelstaten) wordt een korte schets van het project (waarin onder andere ingegaan 
wordt op doelstellingen, activiteiten en belangrijkste actoren) gevolgd door een 
weergave van de belangrijkste bevindingen uit het veldonderzoek en de belangrijkste 
conclusies ten aanzien van het betreffende project. Een vergelijkende analyse van de 
projecten maakt duidelijk dat zowel DGIS als ICCO participatie met name zien als 
een middel om 'operation and maintenance' (O&M) van de geïnstalleerde voorzie-
ningen te verbeteren. De mate waarin de doelgroep zich verantwoordelijk voelt voor 
het onderhoud van de voorzieningen is voor een belangrijk deel afhankelijk van de 
mate waarin zij betrokken zijn geweest bij de opzet en uitvoering van de projecten. 
Daarin speelt vooral ook een financiële bijdrage van de doelgroep een belangrijke rol 
zoals zowel een sanitatie-project van DGIS als een drinkwater-project van ICCO 
aantonen. De projecten laten tevens het belang van zogenaamde 'software' activitei-
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ten (organisatie, bewustwording) zien en daarmee tevens de problemen met betrek-
king tot 'sustainability', aangezien deze software activiteiten voornamelijk door de 
donor betaald worden Tenslotte tonen de projecten ook duidelijk de noodzaak aan 
van een geïntegreerde aanpak in de opzet en uitvoering van drinkwater activiteiten 
Hierbij is een belangrijke rol weggelegd voor activiteiten gericht op ïnkomensgenere-
ring onder de doelgroep 
Hoofdstuk S volgt dezelfde lijn als hoofdstuk 4, maar dan met betrekking tot 
irrigatie Een korte schets van het beleid van de Indiase overheid, DGIS en ICCO 
ten aanzien van irrigatie wordt dus gevolgd door een beschrijving en evaluatie van 
verschillende door de twee Nederlandse donoren gefinancierde irrigatie projecten in 
India Twee DGIS projecten (in Uttar Pradesh en West Bengalen) en drie ICCO 
projecten (allen in Andhra Pradesh) worden achtereenvolgens behandeld In de 
afsluitende vergelijkende evaluatie worden deze projecten tegenover elkaar gezet 
Voorop staat dat irrigatie voor beide donoren, in vergelijking met hun totale 
programma in India, niet tot de topprioriteiten behoort Beide donoren zijn wel 
gericht op 'minor irrigation' en er is grote overeenstemming tussen de beide donoren 
met betrekking tot de te volgen strategie in irrigatie Beide donoren achten partici-
patie door de doelgroep, een gevoel van verantwoordelijkheid van de doelgroep en 
het aanbieden van parallelle activiteiten zoals training, voorlichting, krediet, zaden en 
kunstmest belangrijk voor succesvolle irrigatie projecten Met betrekking tot 
participatie van de doelgroep laten de projecten een grote verscheidenheid zien Dat 
geldt niet zozeer een verschil tussen DGIS en ICCO projecten als wel lussen 
verschillende projecten van beide donoren In het tubewell project dat door DGIS 
gefinancierd is in Uttar Pradesh, is bijvoorbeeld de participatie van de doelgroep 
verwaarloosbaar, terwijl die beduidend hoger is in het North Bengal Terai project 
Participatie is ook hoog in het door ICCO ondersteunde programma van het Centre 
for Rural Development in Andhra Pradesh, terwijl de participatie van de doelgroep 
in het programma van de NGDO AIRDS veel lager scoort In het algemeen laten de 
projecten duidelijk zien dat participatie bijdraagt aan een groter 'ownership'-gevoel 
bij de doelgroep en daarmee aan een beter gebruik en onderhoud van de irrigatie 
faciliteiten In tegenstelling tot drinkwater echter is het gebruik en onderhoud ook 
sterk afhankelijk van de mate waann de doelgroep in economische zin daadwerkelijk 
profiteert van de irrigatiefaciliteiten en van de mate waarin die faciliteiten voldoende 
water leveren voor irrigatie Vooral op deze laatste twee punten laten een aantal 
projecten de nodige hiaten zien Tenslotte moet opgemerkt worden dat het aanbieden 
van zogenaamde 'allied activities' zoals krediet, zaden en kunstmest vaak makke-
lijker is te realiseren in een overheidsproject dan in een NGDO project, maar dat 
tegelijkertijd de mate waann men erin slaagt een geïntegreerd project van de grond 
te knjgen sterk afhangt van de mate waarin verschillende overheidsdepartementen 
bereid zijn samen te werken Al met al betekent dit dat er in het algemeen geen 
grote verschillen tussen DGIS en ICCO projecten te constateren zijn 
In hoofdstuk 6 (conclusies) wordt dit laatste verder uitgewerkt in een kanaalver-
gelijking op zowel het terrein van de totstandkoming van het beleid als dat van de 
uitvoering Geconstateerd wordt dat DGIS en ICCO beide lerende organisaties zijn 
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en dat beide ook, zeker gezien hun relatief geringe bijdrage aan het Indiase ontwik-
kelingsproces, er in slagen een aanzienlijk aantal armen te bereiken met hun projec-
ten op het terrein van drinkwater en irrigatie In de afsluitende kanaalvergelijking 
worden de hoofdconclusies van het onderzoek weergegeven Een van die conclusies 
luidt dat zowel DGIS als ICCO de algemene beleidsuitgangspunten vertaald hebben 
in hun India-beleid, maar dat dit niet automatisch betekent dat het algemene beleid 
van grote invloed is geweest op de vormgeving van het India-beleid Op beleidsma-
tig terrein kan ook geconcludeerd worden dat DGIS in een aantal gevallen beduidend 
sneller is geweest dan ICCO Dat geldt bijvoorbeeld voor zulke thema's als milieu 
en vrouwen in ontwikkeling, maar ook voor meer sector- georiënteerd beleid Het 
beleidsproces bij DGIS is meer verfijnd en gecentraliseerd dan bij ICCO Voor beide 
donoren geldt dat de landenbeleidsdocumenten een belangrijk sturingsmechanisme 
vormen vooral op de langere termijn 
Op het niveau van de uitvoering zijn eveneens een aantal algemene conclusies te 
trekken Naast de gemeenschappelijke nadruk op het platteland in de programma's 
en de gerichtheid op armoedebestrijding geldt voor beide donoren ook dat hun 
manoeuvreer-ruimte beperkt is In het geval van DGIS vooral door de druk vanuit 
India om meer programmahulp te verkrijgen, maar ook door de bestedingsdruk en de 
afspraken rond lokale kosten financiering tussen DGIS en het Ministerie van 
Economische Zaken In het geval van ICCO komen die beperkingen met name voort 
uit de eigen organisatie Naast bestedingsdruk gaat het daarbij dan vooral om de 
neiging van ICCO om haar counterparts te zien als organisaties met een hoge mate 
van autonomie Het gevolg hiervan was dat de controlerende taken door ICCO 
nauwelijks werden uitgevoerd en men er bij een interne evaluatie aan het eind van 
de jaren tachtig niet m slaagde zich een oordeel te vormen over het functioneren van 
een groot deel van de door haar ondersteunde NGDO's in India De grotere nadruk 
die na deze evaluatie door de India-afdeling van ICCO gelegd is op projectvoorbe-
reiding, het screenen van counterparts en monitoring is niet alleen een uitingsvorm 
van het lerende vermogen van deze medefinancieringsorganisatie, maar tegelijk ook 
een voorbeeld van het feit dat DGIS op een aantal van deze terreinen beduidend 
sneller is dan ICCO 
Hoewel beide donoren in hun beleid de economische, sociale en politieke 
dimensies van armoede en armoedebestrijding onderschrijven, laten de door hun 
gefinancierde projecten op het terrein van drinkwatervoorziening en irrigatie zien dat 
in de praktijk de politieke dimensie vaak ondergesneeuwd wordt De concepten van 
participatie en 'empowerment' zijn in de praktijk niet tot nauwelijks uitgewerkt en 
men valt feitelijk terug op de traditionele doelgroep-aanpak waarbij participatie 
vooral gezien wordt als een middel Slechts een paar projecten stijgen uit boven deze 
invulling van participatie Dat geldt bijvoorbeeld voor het door ICCO ondersteunde 
programma van het Centre for Rural Development waann de deelname van de 
doelgroep in de besluitvorming is geïnstitutionaliseerd in verschillende comités Het 
geldt ook voor het door DGIS ondersteunde SP-VI project in Uttar Pradesh Beide 
projecten laten zien dat de organisatie van de doelgroep en bewustwordingsactivi-
teiten van groot belang zijn om te komen tot een systeem waann de doelgroep niet 
alleen betrokken is bij de uitvoering van een project maar ook bij het besluitvor-
mingsproces 
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Echter, doordat geen van beide donoren in staat is om gestalte te geven aan de 
politieke dimensie van armoedebestrijding of 'empowerment', slagen beide er ook 
niet in om substantieel bij te dragen aan hun beider doelstelling van duurzame 
armoedebestrijding Voor een deel is dit falen te verklaren uit het feit dat zowel 
ICCO als DGIS moeten samenwerken met organisaties waarop hun invloed beperkt 
is Al met al laat het onderzoek zien dat meer structurele aandacht voor participatie, 
organisatievorming, scholing en bewustwording een grotere impact op de sociaal-
economische positie van de doelgroep kan betekenen Zowel DGIS als ICCO onder-
steunen projecten waarin dit soort van 'software' activiteiten voorkomen, maar ook 
projecten waarin ze uitblijven Als zodanig laat dit onderzoek zien dat het voor de 
armen van India niet uitmaakt via welk hulpkanaal zij ondersteund worden in hun 
strijd tegen armoede Het is 'the same difference' 
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organisations (MFOs) which were soon found to perform no better than bilateral 
aid with regard to poverty alleviation. The MFOs could not reach the poorest of 
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Co-Operation) to India in light of the central objective of (sustainable) poverty 
alleviation are evaluated. 
The 'Nijmeegs Instituut voor Comparatieve Cultuur- en Ontwikkelingsstudies' 
(NICCOS - Nijmegen Institute for Comparative Studies in Development and 
Cultural Change) of the University of Nijmegen, the Netherlands, was established 
in 1989 in order to co-ordinate and stimulate the research in the Third World and 
in peripheral regions of the industrialized countries carried out by the Department 
of Cultural and Social Anthropology, the Department of Geography of Developing 
Areas, the Third World Centre, the Centre for Women's Studies, the Missiology 
Department and the Department of Middle East Languages and Cultures. 
